Valuable time was thus lost. Even when the situation was not pressing, the leader was obliged, for example, to allow a regiment having a depth of 1200 m. to close up to a depth of 100 paces. When this had been done, he was forced to wait until thin skirmish lines gained a proper distance to the front. The rear elements were able to follow only when the skirmishers had gained a distance approximately equal to the former depth of the entire column. Such a concentration is only proper however, when the commander wishes to launch his troops subsequently in several directions. Advantage should be taken of every opportunity for decreasing the depth of the column (by forming column of sections).
The advance of large bodies of troops presents no difficulties even in close country, if, as recommended by the author,[1] the battalions in route column are placed abreast of each other and are permitted to go around obstacles and take advantage of the cover available. However, even at long ranges, troops in such formations present favorable targets to hostile machine guns and artillery.
The British were surprised in close order formations at Magersfontain
and Colenso. In subsequent engagements, in order to avoid this,
their infantry, when still a great distance away from the enemy, took up
an attack formation which permitted only movements directly to the front
(at Poplar Grove, for example, this was done when 10 km. from the
enemy). An advance in such a formation was possible only because the
plains of South Africa presented no obstacles, and because the British had
only to hold the enemy who stood passively on the defensive. Each brigade
formed its four battalions into an open double column with a front
of 2000 and a depth of 800 m., the distances and intervals between battalions
being 300-400 m. Each battalion deployed from this column so
that its eight companies, each in a thin line (with 2 and finally 20 pace
intervals between the men), followed each other at a distance of 100-120
paces. The advantage of having troops in hand so that they can be used
in other directions than straight to the front, had disappeared.
- ↑ See Taktik, III, p. 307.
