X. THE ATTACK ON AN ENEMY DEPLOYED FOR DEFENSE.
1. LESSONS OF WAR.
During the Boer War (1899-1902), the British infantry always attacked
positions prepared for defense. Aside from the superannuated
fire tactics and deficient marksmanship training of the British, their failures
in the early engagements of the war may generally be traced to the
following causes:—
1. Insufficient reconnaissance. This caused British detachments to be surprised, in a number of cases, by fire at short range. (Brigade of the Guards at Modder River). In many instances, the British forces were even surprised by fire while in close order formations. (Hart's Brigade at Colenso).
2. Pure frontal attacks, in which equal forces were frequently pitted against each other. (Modder River, Magersfontain, Colenso).
3. Insufficient protection of the flanks by echelons against fire surprises carried out by small detachments.
4. Insufficient coöperation of the artillery and infantry.
5. Isolated attacks made by brigades (consisting of 4 battalions). The employment of several brigades simultaneously for concerted action was a rare exception.
6. Insufficient support of the firing line. A timely reinforcement of an organization that had already been shaken never did occur.
7. Hesitating use of reserves in the crisis of the fight. At Magersfontain only 8-1/2 battalions out of 13, and at Colenso only 6 battalions out of 16-1/2, had been seriously engaged. When Spionskop was evacuated, 11 battalions had not as yet been engaged. The attacks were begun, but not pushed home.
The Infantry Attack in the Russo-Japanese War.
The combat tactics of the Russian infantry[1] (Russian I. D. R. of 1903) were based on shock action, narrow frontage, and deep formations. The
- ↑ "The Russian infantry is embued with a mixture of defensive spirit and instinct for hand to hand fighting." Count Marenzi.
