bayonet training preached by Dragomirov was the result of the belief in decisive psychological impressions and the consciousness that the Russian fire tactics, based upon volley fire, were inadequate to annihilate a well concealed defender. Thus, the endeavor to cross blades with the opponent as quickly as possible, led to a headlong rush to the front, without creating the preliminary conditions necessary for pushing the attack home. The hesitation of the higher commanders to throw in every available man at the decisive stage, and the tendency, reaching down to the lowest grades, of creating detachments and separate missions, contrasted unfavorably with this splendid offensive spirit.
The Japanese infantry was trained according to the letter and spirit of the German regulations of 1889. It had fought shy of unhealthy tendencies after the Boer war, cultivated the independence and initiative of all leaders, and recognized the necessity of night combats and of using the spade. In addition, the way for success was carefully, almost cautiously, prepared by the commander-in-chief, who left nothing to chance. It is easy for subordinate leaders to be bold and daring, when they know that the commander-in-chief has neglected nothing to ensure victory. The principal characteristics of the Japanese combats were—
1. The cautious advance, frequently under cover of darkness;
2. The systematic preparation of the attack by the coöperation of infantry and artillery, and the determined advance along the whole front;
3. The attempt to induce the enemy to launch infantry at a point where the decisive attack was not to take place;[1]
4. The sudden launching of the decisive attack;
5. The prompt preparation of every captured position for defense;
6. The absence of pursuit.
The fights at Wafangu,[2] as well as the attack made by the Guard and the 12th Division at the Yalu[3] proceeded entirely according to German pattern.
A change took place in the tactical methods of the Japanese when the Russian artillery—whose ballistic properties were superior to those of its antagonist—brought a greater number of guns into the field, and when, in addition, the Japanese infantry became numerically inferior in the battles after Liao Yang.[4]
The task set commanders of armies and leaders of troops by the
- ↑ The advance of the Vth Army at Mukden.
- ↑ Einzelschriften über den Russisch-Japanischen Krieg, Vienna, 1906, I, p. 226. The envelopment of the Russian right flank by the Japanese 19th Brigade is especially instructive.
- ↑ Ibid., I, p. 79, et seq. Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften, 39-40, p. 123, et seq. Consult also Von Lüttwitz, Angriffsverfahren der Japaner, p. 2.
- ↑ The statements in regard to the strength of the opposing forces are still very contradictory. At Liao Yang 120,000 Japanese confronted 150,000 Russians; at Mukden the Russians had perhaps 10,000 rifles, 300 field guns, and 100 heavy pieces of ordnance more than the Japanese.
