government, had to be met by a continuance of the offensive.[1] The peculiar character of the theater of war made it difficult to maneuver the enemy out of his strong positions; so at best nothing remained for the Japanese—unless they wished to renounce the offensive entirely—but to conquer the enemy by attacking him in front. Since the advantages of the attack—superior numbers and the freedom of choosing the point of attack—were thus dissipated, the victory had to be gained by making use of defensive expedients. As the demoralizing and retarding effect produced by fire increased more rapidly than the morale of the assailant, nothing remained but to intrench and to take advantage of the cover afforded by darkness as in fortress warfare. Moreover, the inferior forces available precluded deep formations and necessitated an immediate development of the entire force in one line. Thus the desire to push forward resolved itself into an advance along a broad front. Favored by the purely passive conduct of the Russians, this led to an envelopment of their flanks and a pressure on their line of retreat. The Japanese were able to overcome the constantly growing power of resistance of the Russian defense, because, while strictly adhering to the offensive, they availed themselves of defensive expedients although their movements were retarded thereby.
The conduct of the attack was, of course, considerably influenced by the character of the terrain. The 1st Army, fighting in hilly country, perhaps remained true longer to regulation formations and long rushes than the other Japanese forces, but was finally obliged to resort to a wide extension of closed bodies. The IInd and IVth Armies were differently situated, as the attack over open plains fell to their lot.
Speaking generally, the following details may be given in regard to the method of attack of the Ist Japanese Army:[2] Units were pushed into action abreast; objective points were assigned to each; and certain lines or points, according to which they had to maintain touch, were indicated to subordinate units. To avoid a surprise, if for no other reason, thin firing lines were formed at the outset, and in a serious attack whole companies, in dense firing lines capable of developing a strong fire, were at once thrown in; these advanced to mid ranges in order to open fire, as a rule, under 1000 m. The Ist army had a special penchant for making rushes of 80-100 m.,[3] usually by entire companies; the assault was, in many instances, begun as far as 300 m. from the hostile position, and then pushed home; supports and reserves followed in extended formation, but assembled promptly on reaching cover. The infantry was disinclined to
- ↑ C. H. Über das innere Wesen der japanischen und neuzeitlichen Offensive. Streffleur, 1907, October number.
- ↑ Streffleur, 1907, January number.
- ↑ This is not true of the 4th Guard Regiment. See von Lüttwitz, Angriffsverfahren der Japaner, p. 24: Rushes of 50 m. were made "as the men otherwise got out of breath and shot badly." An advance was made by squads and crawling was tabooed. The new Japanese Drill Regulations warn against making rushes less than 30-40 m. long. On the other hand, according to the opinion of von Lüttwitz, the length of rushes will seldom exceed 100 m.
