- bat and service of security on difficult terrain. Military experience
has shown, however, that in actual war it was seldom possible to take advantage of these special characteristics; that in most cases the Jägers were used as other infantry, and that infantry units fighting shoulder to shoulder with Jägers accomplished as good results as the latter. Since the war of 1866 the demand for special employment of Jägers has ceased. The brief course of the campaign of 1866, in which our infantry acted mostly on the offensive, gave the Jägers an opportunity for profitable employment only where, contrary to accepted notions, they fought side by side with the rest of the infantry.[1]
Mountain warfare presents such difficult problems to troops, requires a sum total of endurance, energy and intelligence, physical qualifications and special familiarity, that neither every recruit nor every unit of the army will quite fulfill all its demands, although the experience of Suworov, during his campaign in the Alps, apparently contradicts this statement. Many disadvantages can be neutralized by peace training and discipline, of course, but training alone will not suffice. For overcoming the difficulties peculiar to mountain warfare, a suitable equipment permitting free movement, and at the same time ensuring the comfort of the men while at
- ↑ The 6th Jäger-Battalion on July 3rd at Sendrasitz; the 4th Jäger-Battalion at Podol; the 5th at Skalitz; the Jägers of the Guard at Lipa; or where during an action a reverse threw us on the defensive (1st Jäger-Battalion at Trautenau, and also at Rosberitz). The superior commanders, in attempting to assign them a special role, frequently employed them unprofitably in taking up rallying positions (3rd, 7th, and 8th Jäger-Battalions on July 3rd), sometimes even to escort baggage (3rd and 4th Companies of the Jägers of the Guard at Soor; and the 1st and 4th Companies of the 5th Jäger-Battalion at Schweinschädel); or they distributed them along the whole front for the purpose of conducting extended order fighting. When they were thus distributed among infantry organizations their efforts merged with those of the infantry. For example, at Königgrätz half companies of Jägers were posted on both flanks of the Guard Infantry Division, and the 2nd Jäger-Battalion was on this day distributed by companies along the front of the entire division. v. Moltke, Kritische Aufsätze zur Geschichte des Feldzuges von 1866. Kunz, Die Tätigkeit der deutschen Jäger-Bataillone im Kriege 1870/71. On page 169, et seq, a number of excellent examples are recorded (for instance: 5th Prussian Jäger-Battalion in the actions on November 29th and 30th, 1870, and on January 19th, 1871, in siege positions in front of Paris).
