752 BLtfCHER necessitated by supreme political reasons, and led finally to the battle of Leipsic, which but for Blilcher the slow and over-cautious grand army would never have risked. The army of the north, of which Bernadotte was the com- mander-in-chief, was about 90,000 strong, and it was of the utmost importance that it should advance on Saxony. By means of the close connection which he maintained with Billow and Wintzingerode, the commanders of the Prussian and Russian corps forming part of the army of the north, Blilcher believed that he had obtained convincing proofs of Bernadotte's coquetting with the French, and of the im- possibility of inciting him to any activity so long -as he remained alone on a separate theatre of war. Bulow and Wintzingerode declared themselves ready to act in spite of Bernadotte, but to do so they wanted the support of 100,- 000 men. Hence Blilcher's resolution to ven- ture upon his flank march, in which he persist- ed despite the orders he had received from the sovereigns to draw near to them on the left, toward Bohemia. He was not to be diverted from his purpose through the obstacles which Bernadotte systematically threw in his way, even after the crossing of the Elbe by the Sile- sian army. Before leaving Bautzen he had despatched a confidential officer to Bernadotte, to inform him that, since the army of the north was too weak to operate alone on the left bank of the Elbe, he would come with the Silesian army, and cross at Elster on Oct. 3 ; he therefore invited him to cross the Elbe at the same time, and to advance with him toward Leipsic. Bernadotte not heeding this message, and the enemy occupying Wartenburg opposite Elster, Blilcher first dislodged the latter, and then, to protect himself in case Napoleon should fall upon him with his whole strength, began establishing an intrenched encampment from Wartenburg to Bleddin. Thence he pushed forward toward the Mulde. On Oct. 7, in an interview with Bernadotte, it was arranged that both armies should march upon Leipsic. On the 9th, while the Silesian army was pre- paring for this march, Bernadotte, on the news of Napoleon's advance on the road from Meis- sen, insisted upon retreating behind the Elbe, and only consented to remain on its left bank on condition that Blilcher would resolve to cross the Saale in concert with him, in order to take up a position behind that river. Al- though by this movement the Silesian army lost anew its line of communication, Blilcher consented, since otherwise the army of the north would have been effectually lost for the allies. On Oct. 10 the whole Silesian army stood united with the army of the north on the left bank of the Mulde, the bridges over which were destroyed. Bernadotte now declared a retreat upon Bernburg to have become neces- sary, and Blilcher, with the single view of pre- venting him from crossing the right bank of the Elbe, yielded again on the condition that Bernadotte should cross the Saale at Wettin and take up a position there. On the llth, when his columns were just crossing the high road from Magdeburg to Halle, Blilcher being informed that, in spite of his positive promise, Bernadotte had constructed no bridge at Wet- tin, resolved upon following that high road in forced marches. Napoleon, seeing that the northern and Silesian armies avoided accepting battle, which he had offered them by concen- trating at Duben, and knowing that they could not avoid it without retreating across the Elbe being at the same time aware that he had but four days left before he must meet the main army, and thus be placed between two fires undertook a march on the right bank of the Elbe toward Wittenberg, in order by this simu- lated movement to draw the northern and Si- lesian armies across the Elbe, and then strike a rapid blow on the main army. Bernadotte in- deed, anxious for his lines of communication with Sweden, gave his army orders to cross without delay to the right bank of the Elbe, by a bridge constructed at Aken, while on the same day, Oct. 13, he informed Blilcher that the emperor Alexander had, for certain impor- tant reasons, put him (Blticher) under his or- ders. He consequently requested him to follow his movements on the right bank of the Elbe with the Silesian army, with the least possible delay. Had Blucher shown less resolution on this occasion and followed the army of the north, the campaign would have been lost, since the Silesian and northern armies, amount- ing together to nearly 200,000 men, would not have been present at the battle of Leipsic. He wrote in reply to Bernadotte that, according to all his information, Napoleon had no intention whatever of removing the theatre of war to the right bank of the Elbe, but only intended to lead them astray. At the same time he conjured Bernadotte to give up his intended movement across the Elbe. Having, mean- while, again and again solicited the main army to push forward upon Leipsic, and offered to meet it there, he received at last, Oct. 15, the long expected invitation. He immediately ad- vanced toward Leipsic, while Bernadotte re- treated toward the Petersberg. On his march from Halle to Leipsic, Oct. 16, Blilcher routed at Mockern the 6th corps of the French army under Marmont, in a hotly contested battle, in which he captured 54 pieces of artillery. Without de- lay he sent accounts of the issue of this battle to Bernadotte, who was not present on the first day of the battle of Leipsic. On its second day, Oct. 17, Blucher dislodged the enemy from the right bank of the Parthe, with the exception of some houses and intrenchments near the Halle gate. On the 18th, at daybreak, he had a conference at Brachenfeld with Bernadotte, who declared he could not attack on the left bank of the Parthe unless Blucher gave him for that day 30,000 men of the Silesian army. Keeping the interest of the whole exclusively in view, Blucher consented without hesitation, but on the condition of remaining himself with these
