BLtfCHER 753 30,000 men, and thus securing their vigorous cooperation in the attack. After the final vic- tory of Oct. 19, and during the whole of Napo- leon's retreat from Leipsic to the Rhine, Blucher alone gave him an earnest pursuit. While, on Oct. 19, the generals in command met the sov- ereigns in the market place of Leipsic, and precious time was spent in mutual compliments, his Silesian army was already marching in pur- suit of the enemy to Lutzen. On his march from Lutzen to Weissenfels, Prince William of Prussia overtook him, to deliver to him the commission of a Prussian field marshal. The allied sovereigns had allowed Napoleon to gain a start which could never be recovered ; but from Eisenach onward Blucher found him- self every afternoon in the room which Napo- leon had left in the morning. When about to march upon Cologne, there to cross the Rhine, he was recalled and ordered to block- ade Mentz on its left bank ; his rapid pursuit as far as the Rhine having broken up the confed- eration of the Rhine, and disengaged its troops from the French divisions in which they were still enrolled. While the headquarters of the Silesian army was established at Hochst, the main army marched up the upper Rhine. Thus ended the campaign of 1813, the success of which was entirely due to Blucher's bold enter- prise and iron energy. The allies were divided as to the plan of operations now to be followed ; the one party proposing to stay on the Rhine, and there to take up a defensive position ; the other to cross the Rhine and march upon Paris. After much wavering on the part of the sover- eigns, Blucher and his friends prevailed, and the resolution was adopted to advance upon Paris in a concentric movement, the main army being to start from Switzerland, Bulow from Holland, and Blucher, with the Silesian army, from the middle Rhine. For the new campaign, three additional corps were made over to Blu- cher, viz., Kleist's, the elector of Hesse's, and the duke of Saxe-Coburg's. Leaving part of Langeron's corps to invest Mentz, and the new reinforcements to follow as a second division, Blucher crossed the Rhine Jan. 1, 1814, at three points, at Mannheim, Oanb, and Cob- lentz, drove Marmont beyond the Vosges and the Saar, posted York's corps between the fort- resses of the Moselle, and with a force of 28,000 men, consisting of Sacken's corps and a division of Langeron's, proceeded by Vaucouleurs and Joinville to Brienne, in order to effect his junction with the main army by his left. At Brionne, Jan. 29, he was attacked by Napoleon, whose forces mustered about 40,000, while York's corps was still detached from the Sile- sian army, and the main army, 110,000 strong, had only reached Chaumont. Blucher had con- sequently to face the greatly superior forces of Napoleon, but the latter neither attacked him with his usual vigor, nor hindered his retreat to Trannes, save by some cavalry skirmishes. Having taken possession of Brienne, placed part of his troops in its vicinity, and occupied Dien- ville, La Rothiere, and Chaumenil, with three different corps, Napoleon would on Jan. 30 have been able to fall upon Blucher with superior numbers, as the latter was still awaiting his re- enforcements. Napoleon, however, kept up a passive attitude, while the main army was con- centrating by Bar-sur-Aube, and detachments of it were strengthening Blucher's right flank. The emperor's inactivity is explained by the negotiations of the peace congress of Chfttil- lon, which he had contrived to start, and by which he expected to gain time. In fact, after the junction of the Silesian with the main army had been effected, the diplomatic party insist- ed that during the deliberations of this con- gress the war should be carried on as a feint only. Prince Schwarzenberg sent an officer to Blucher to procure his acquiescence, but Blucher dismissed him with this answer : " We must go to Paris. Napoleon has paid his visits to all the capitals of Europe ; should we be less polite? In short, he must descend from the throne, and until he is hurled from it we shall have no rest." He urged the great advantages of the allies attacking Napoleon near Brienne, before he could bring up the remainder of his troops, and offered to make the attack himself, if he were only strengthened in York's absence. The consideration that the army could not sub- sist in the barren valley of the Aube, and must retreat if it did not attack, caused his advice to prevail. The battle was decided upon, but Prince Schwarzenberg, commander-in-chief of the main army, instead of bearing upon the enemy with the united force at hand, only lent Blucher the corps of the crown prince of Wurtemberg(40,000 men), that of Gyulay (12,- 000), and that of Wrede (12,000). Napoleon on his part neither knew nor suspected any- thing of the arrival of the main army. When about 1 o'clock, Feb. 1, it was announced to him that Blucher was advancing, he would not believe it. Having made sure of the fact, he mounted his horse with the idea of avoiding the battle, and gave Berthier orders to this effect. When, however, between Old Brienne and Ro- fhiere, he reached the young guard, who had got under arms on hearing the approaching cannonade, he was received with such enthusi- asm that he thought fit to improve the opportu- nity, and exclaimed, " Vartillerie en avant! " Thus, about 4 o'clock, the affair of La Rothiere commenced in earnest. At the first reverse, however, Napoleon no longer took any personal part in the battle. His infantry having thrown itself into the village of La Rothiere, the com- bat was long and obstinate, and Blucher was even obliged to bring up his reserve. The French were not dislodged from the village till 11 o'clock at night, when Napoleon ordered the retreat of his army, which had lost 4,000 or 5,000 men in killed and wounded, 2,500 prison- ers, and about 50 cannon. If the allies, then only six days' march from Paris, had vigorously pushed on, Napoleon must have succumbed be- fore their immensely superior numbers ; but the
