atrocities which were perpetrated by the Chinese, long after our possession of the city. The prisons continued to be scenes of horrible tortures. It was thought necessary to destroy whole streets, in order to convey terror into districts where assassinations of the subjects of allied powers had taken place: all the eastern suburb of the city was razed to the ground, and not a respectable inhabitant was left amidst the desolation. There can be no doubt that Governor Pehkwei considered himself invested with supreme authority over Chinese subjects. He complains bitterly, in a despatch to Lord Elgin, of 31st January, 1858, of Consul Parkes' interference—of his "over-*bearing" and unreasonably oppressive "conduct in disposing of Chinamen confined in the gaols of Canton. I ask, whether Chinese officers would be tolerated in their interference with British subjects confined in British gaols?" Lord Elgin does not, in his reply, assert British jurisdiction over the prisons in Canton; but says, Pehkwei will be required to release all prisoners entitled to the benefits of the amnesty; and in another despatch (p. 178), distinctly throws upon Pehkwei the responsibility of preserving the public peace. This anomalous state of matters awakened the attention of our Government at home: a despatch of Lord Malmesbury (14th June, 1858), says: "It will be a disgrace to the allied powers if they do not prevent such enormities as are practised in the prisons of Canton.". . . The "British name must be relieved from the disgrace and guilt of having connived at a state of things so monstrous and revolting." As to the mixed authority of native mandarins and allied commissioners, Lord Malmesbury says: "It is wholly inefficient for all objects of administration and policy, and should be replaced by a military government acting under the rules of martial law." He recommended that the allies should take possession of the custom-house revenues, and hold the balance after the payment of the local expenses. It is much to be regretted that these measures were not adopted. Undoubtedly, Lord Elgin exercised a sound discretion in not proceeding to Peking until "a lesson" had been given to Yeh's obstinacy. Had he gone to the North it would have been deemed a confession that he had been foiled in the South, and compelled to appeal to the emperor, in order to relieve himself from the difficulties in which Yeh had placed him; for Yeh—who had chosen to represent the English "barbarians" as making common cause with the rebels, and in fact, being themselves in a state of rebellion against imperial authority—gave the court the assurance that, as he had been so successful in breaking up the native insurrection, so he would not fail "to drive the foreign 'barbarians' into the sea." In short, there could be little doubt, that had his calculations proved correct, a hostile policy would have pursued us in all the other parts of China, and our immense interests there have been placed in jeopardy.
For some time the court ventured to dream that by Yeh's indomitable bravery China might be wholly rid of the presence of the intrusive strangers.[1] It is known that the emperor was much displeased with a*
- ↑ The influence of Yeh at Peking was considerably strengthened by the support he received from Iliang, who obtained the credit of persuading the United States
