mandarin, who, having lived in Canton, and being acquainted with the power of the English, ventured to express doubts as to the trustworthiness of Yeh's representations that he could bridle and extirpate the English barbarians;[1] and nothing less than the taking the Takoo forts by the allied forces, and an advance upon the capital (even after Yeh's capture and humiliation) was likely to bring the court of Peking to a sense of its own weakness, and the necessity of listening to our representations and remonstrances.
Every effort had been made to obstruct the progress of the allied ambassadors towards Peking; but they wisely determined not to delay their voyage to the Gulf of Pecheli, and, on the 24th April, they announced to the Chinese prime minister their arrival, at the mouth of the Tien-tsin river. The usual evasions were brought into play; and it was soon discovered that the commissioners sent down had no sufficient powers. On the 18th May, therefore, after consultation with the admirals, it was determined to "take the forts," and to "proceed pacifically up the river;" on the 19th, notice was given to the Chinese, and on the 20th, the forts were in the hands of the Allies. On the 29th, the ambassadors reached Tien-tsin. On the same day they were advised that "the chief secretary of state," and the president of one of the imperial boards, were ordered to proceed without delay "to investigate and despatch business." After many discussions the Treaty was signed on the 26th June.
The progress and the result of these negotiations only demonstrate that where our policy has failed, and where it will always fail in China, is in placing confidence in the Chinese. Our distrust must be the ground-*work: it is the only sound foundation of our security. When the four ambassadors were at Tien-tsin, and had extorted from the fears of the Chinese treaties more or less humiliating to Chinese pride, according to the amount of pressure employed, it should have been foreseen that on the removal of that pressure the Chinese mind would resume its natural obstinacy. A treaty with China will always be waste paper, unless some security is obtained for giving it due effect. It is, therefore, greatly to be regretted that the ambassadors should have left the most difficult of questions, one most wounding to Chinese pride—the reception of foreign ministers at Peking, and the initiation of their constant residence at court—to be settled by their successors, who had neither the same high diplomatic position, nor the same large naval and military forces at their disposal. It may, indeed, be a question whether it was desirable to force upon the Chinese the recognition of our right to have an ambassador permanently fixed at the capital; but if we thought fit to insist on such
- [Footnote: Commissioner, Mr. Marshall, not to proceed to the capital. Iliang, in one of his
despatches to the emperor, says: "Whatever the barbarian chief may insinuate against Yeh-ming-chen, it is he whom they fear."—Elgin Papers, p. 280.]
- ↑ When in the former war Commissioner Keshen humbly represented to the emperor Taou-Kwang, that it was impossible to resist the English, he was ordered to be executed for his mendacity. His life was saved by powerful friends at court.
