TJTILITAKIANISM. 781 UTILITARIANISM. cording to the utility priiu-iplc of Bentham, there are "four sanctions or sources of pain and pleas- ure," the physical, the political, the moral, and the religious. The physical sanction is the groundwork of all the others. "In a word, the l)overs of nature may operate of themselves; but neither the magistrate, nor men at large, can operate, nor is God in the case in question sup- posed to operate, but through the powers of na- ture." Bentham attempted to work out a cal- culus of pleasures, in which he took account of the intensity, the duration, the certainty, the propinquity or remoteness, the fecundity ( = 'chance of being followed by sensations of the same kind'), the purity, and the extent of pleasures and pain. Paley advocated a form of utility. He made the will of the Deity, enforced by future rewards and punishments, the impelling motive to duty; but in determining what that will was, in par- ticular cases, he included a reference to the ten- dency of actions to benefit others. John Austin, in his Province of Jurisprudence Determined, has contributed a lucid exposition and a strong defense of the principle of utility. .John Stuart Mill has devoted a separate work to the subject, and may be considered as the ablest champion of the doctrine since Bentham's time. His addition to the theory consists in rec- ognizing a distinction of quality as well as of intensity between pleasures. While Bentham had maintained that "the quality of pleasure being equal, push-pin is as good as poetry." Mill con- tended that "it is better to be a human being dis- satisfied than a pig satisfied," i.e. human discon- tent is better than swinish pleasures. Since Mill's day utilitarianism has been combined with the theory of evolution to form a basis for morality. Among the English advocates of the combination the best known are Herbert Spencer (q.v.l and Sir Leslie Stephen (q.v,). The objections urged against hedonism (q.v.) in general bear against utilitarianism. In addi- tion there are arginnents which tell against utilitarianism exclusively. Utilitarianism is not practicable for the reason that it is impos- sible to estimate the pleasures wdiich in the long run will flow from any course of action. Human nature changes very radically in its capacity to get pleasures from certain objects. Time was when the cruel torturing of a captured enemy brought intense delight to a whole tribe, and was regarded with complete indifference by the rest of mankind, with the exception of the victim's fellow-tril)esmen. Now such treatment of cap- tives would shock all Christendom. Jlany jokes and jests that centuries ago were appreciated with great relish would fall flat now in good society, and some of them would inflict consid- erable discomfort upon the hearers. Gladiatorial combats and bull fights are differently regarded at different times and places. These are only a few of the large number of instances which might be adduced to show how impossible it is to fore- see the hedonic effect of actions when a distant future is taken into accoiint. The uncertainties of calculation are great enough when only the pleasure of the agent is concerned (see Hedon- I.SM), but if the pleasures of all mankind, pres- ent and futiire, so far as they are in any way affected by our actions, must be estimated before we can properly pronounce upon the morality of any act, then moral judgment becomes imprac- ticable. Perhaps, however, the error of utilitarianism can be made most patent by asking the question. Why should I seek the greatest j)leasnre of the greatest number? Unless 1 ilesirc that end for itself or desire it because the attainment of it conduces to some other desired end. it would be impossible to make me regard that end as good or the pursuit of it as right. The savage is not cosmopolitan in his etliies (hence he is not utili- tarian), because he is not cosmopolitan in hi.s sympathies. The normal civilized man is not uni- formly cosmopolitan in his ethics (hence he is not a utilitarian I , because he is not uniformly cosmopolitan in his sympatliics. The average- good man cares more for his father and mother, for his wife and children, than he does for strang- ers. For this reason he docs not regard the hap- ]uness of a stranger as equally obligatory ujion him to pursue as the happiness of some member of his immediate family. But when this ordinary man undergoes an unusual change of heart and comes to care more, say, for the opinion some supernatural being is supposed to have of him than for his own kith and kin, then in order to win that good opinion he nuiy sacrifice the hap- piness of his family to that of strangers. It is not true, therefore, that we should be benevolent becatise only thus can we secure the greatest hap- piness of the greatest number; but, on the con- trary, we try to make 'the greatest hajipiness of the greatest number' an end because we are benevolent. But our benevolence is only a part of our endowment, varying in relative intensity in different persons, and in the same person at ditTerent times. In addition to our desire for the well-being of others we have an almost count- less number of desires for other objects. The realization of these desires enters into the ques- tion of the chief end of man. There is no reason why one desire should be singled out from the complex of desires in order that its realization may be considered the highest good of man — unless this desire is the most imperious of them all and its non-satisfaction conduces more to the agent's discontent with life than any other cause. Now there is no question that without some .so- cial features the life of most human beings would be robbed of much of its attractiveness, but there is very little evidence to show that the ordinary man would be greatly disttirbed for a long time by any failure on the part of humanity at large to get the gi'eate.st amoimt of happiness possible. And yet, though universal benevolence is not thus a very strong characteristic of our kind at large, still history seems to show that the reach of the average man's sympathetic interests is larger now than in tribal times. But. however much greater it may be now than formerly, free play given to one's impartially benevolent impulses can hardly be regarded as the highest good of man. Consult: Hutchcson, Intjuirtj Concernin;/ the Original of Our Ideus of Beuulij and 'irtue, etc. (London, 172.5); Tucker. Light of Nature Pur- sued (ib., 1768-74) ; Bentham, Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (ib.. 1780) ; Paley. Principles of Moral and Political Phi- losophic (ib., 178.5); J. S. Mill. I'tilitarianism (ib., i8t').3) : Sidgwick. The Methods of Ethics (ib., 1874); Grote. Examiiuilioyi of the Utilita- rian Philosophy (ib., 1870) ; Birks, Modern Utili-
