of industry and commerce, and she was often compelled to seek loans in France, Belgium, Holland, and Switzerland. After the War, she will have to fulfill so many obligations to Austria Hungary and Turkey, as well as to several neutral powers, that she will scarcely have enough for her own needs. Moreover, we must not forget that it is to Germany's advantage to keep Russia weak economically, as an economically weak country cannot be a formidable adversary in war. Russia's weakness would facilitate considerably the realization of Germany's dream of a hegemony in Europe, since the land forces of the rest of her opponents are not very formidable to her. Thus, Germany is interested in keeping the development of Russia's productive forces at the slowest possible pace.
The stabilization of the value of Russian money by means of large foreign loans is necessary for Russia, also, because it would decrease the amount she would have to pay for her imports. During the three years from 1911 to 1913, the value of Russia's imports was, on the average, about one and a quarter billion roubles a year. If the present exchange value of Russian money will remain unchanged after the War, it would mean that during the years immediately following the re-establishment of peace, Russia would have to overpay on her imports, (which will probably increase after the War in view of the rapid exhaustion of our supplies) the sum of seven or eight hundred million roubles annually. To this figure we must add at least another billion roubles, which represents the deficit in the Russian foreign trade, that has accumulated during the War, due to the excess of imports over exports.
The condition of affairs that we have just described will require, immediately after the end of the War, enormous exports from Russia, for otherwise the exchange value of our money will fall even lower. Moreover, because of lack of efficiency in the functioning of the Russian railroad system, immense amounts of grain have been stored up in many parts of Russia. The impossibility of exporting this grain would entail a sharp fall in the prices of agricultural products, which would be highly unprofitable for our rural economy, since its expenses of production have increased considerably during the War.
The extent of this accumulation of grain may be seen from the fact that according to estimates made by experts, there is an accumulated surplus of all kinds of grains in Siberia alone of almost nine million tons. The accumulation in other parts
