Page:The Russian Review Volume 1.djvu/225

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ANTI-GERMAN ECONOMIC COALITION
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of Russia is also very great, because the peasants are not very anxious to sell their crops, fearing the difficulties of transportation, or biding their time in the expectation of still higher prices.

Hope is expressed in some quarters that the low exchange value of Russian money might prove a factor in increasing Russia's exports, since it will make the purchase of grain in Russia very profitable. While we cannot deny the possibility of such an influence upon Russian exports, we ought to bear in mind that this fact alone cannot have an all-important significance. The possiblities of extended export trade will be greatly lessened, for some time at least, by the difficulties of the means of transportation and the large number of floating mines in Russian waters. Finally, we should not forget that the lowering of prices on the Russian market will result in a similar drop in prices in the United States, Canada, Argentine, Australia, and India, for the grain dealers of these countries cannot keep forever the large surpluses which are due to their splendid crops of the past year, and which they cannot consume.

It would also be unreasonable to expect that the general lowering of prices on the world market would result in a restriction of the grain areas in the American West, Canada, etc. For farmers take into account not only the prices on the world market; they are concerned primarily with utilizing as best they can the stock and the working force at their disposal. Always fearing the possibility of crop failure, in which case they would have to purchase a part of the amount they need, they are often compelled to plant larger areas than the existing prices on the world market would seem to warrant.

The above considerations lead me to believe that Russia's own economic strength alone would not be sufficient to enable her to conduct successfully a long and severe economic struggle with Germany and her allies. Her hope of emancipation from the dominating influence of Germany upon her markets can be brought about only if she succeeds in forming a powerful coalition with her present allies and with those of the neutral countries which are displeased with the aggressive policies of Germany.

This is especially true since, after the War, Russia can scarcely expect to export grain to Germany in as large quantities as she did before. Allied now with Bulgaria and Turkey and utilizing the crops of Hungary and Roumania, on the one hand,