disturbance, touching the opinions which he maintained.
3. 'Tis very possible, that many good men now also may entertain peculiar opinions: and some of them maybe as singular herein, as even Jehonabab was. And 'tis certain, so long as we know but in part, that all men will not see all things alike. It is an unavoidable consequence of the present weakness and shortness of human understanding, that several men will be of several minds, in religion as well as in common life. So it has been from the beginning of the world, and so it will be till the restitution of all things.
4. Nay farther. Altho' every man necessarily believes, that every particular opinion which he holds is true (for, to believe any opinion is not true, is the same thing as, not to hold it:) yet can no man be assured, that all his own opinions taken together, are true. Nay, every thinking man is assured, they are not: seeing Humanum est errare et nescire. To be ignorant of many things, and to mistake in some, is the necessary condition of humanity. This therefore he is sensible is his own case. He knows in the general, that he himself is mistaken. Altho' in what particulars he mistakes, he does not, perhaps cannot know.
5. I say, perhaps he cannot know. For who can tell how far invincible ignorance may extend? Or (that comes to the same thing) invin-
