The Federalist (Dawson)

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The Federalist (Dawson edition)  (1863) 
Henry Dawson's edition of The Federalist is recognized for its faithfulness to the original text of the essays, as they were written and published in 1787.

As a result, many of essay numbers in Dawson's edition are different from the numbers in Ford's edition and modern editions. Notes at the top of all essays indicate both the number as published by Dawson and the number most common in modern usage.

For the generic table of contents, see The Federalist.

THE FŒDERALIST:

A

COLLECTION OF ESSAYS, WRITTEN IN FAVOR
OF THE NEW CONSTITUTION, AS
AGREED UPON BY

THE FŒDERAL CONVENTION,

SEPTEMBER 17, 1787.

REPRINTED FROM THE ORIGINAL TEXT.

WITH AN

HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION AND NOTES,


By HENRY B. DAWSON


IN TWO VOLUMES

VOL. I.


NEW YORK:

CHARLES SCRIBNER, 124 Grand Street,

LONDON: SAMPSON LOW, SON & CO.

1863

SYNOPTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS.


Essay,  Page
I. GENERAL INTRODUCTION, No. I. 1
II. "THE UTILITY OF THE UNION TO YOUR [the People of the State of New York] POLITICAL PROSPERITY," II. 6
1. introduction, 6
2. in its political relations with foreign nations, III. 12
A. by securing it against dangers from foreign arms and influence, 12
a. through a removal of the usual causes of just war, 13
a. violations of compacts and treaties, 13
A. by securing a more perfect administration of government, 13
a. by the employment of better men than those employed in State governments, 13
b. by an uniform interpretation of the provisions of those compacts and treaties, 14
c. by avoiding the local temptation to bad faith to which a single State may yield, 14
d. by avoiding local prejudices to which a single State may be subject, 14
b. direct and unlawful violence, 15
b. through the greater ability which it will afford to settle amicably those causes of just war, 16
a. in the absence of local pride and prejudices, 16
b. in the greater strength of the States when united, 16
c. through its removal beyond the influence of unjust causes, IV. 17
a. the superior power of neighboring nations, 17
b. the jealousy of foreign powers from successful trade, 18
B. by securing it from similar influences in the several States, if disunited, V. 22
C. by preventing European alliances with rival States or confederacies, 26
3. in its political relations with the Peoples of other States, VI. 27
A. by securing it from inter-State hostilities, 27
a. the danger of hostilities arising between "independent, unconnected sovereignties," 27
a. through love of power, 28
b. through jealousy of power, 28
c. through competitions of commerce, 28
d. through individual passions and influences, 28
A. Pericles and Aspasia referred to, No. VI. 28
B. the Peloponnesian war referred to, 28
C. Cardinal Wolsey referred to, 29
D. Madame de Maintenon referred to, 29
E. Duchess of Marlborough referred to, 29
F. Madame de Pompadour referred to, 29
G. Shays and the rebellion in Massachusetts referred to, 30
b. objections of anti-constitutionists answered, 30
a. "the genius of republics is pacific," 30
b. "the spirit of commerce tends to peace," 30
A. Introductory remarks, 30
B. Sparta referred to, 31
C. Athens referred to, 31
D. Rome referred to, 31
E. Carthage referred to, 31
F. Venice referred to, 31
G. Holland referred to, 31
H. Great Britain referred to, 32
c. an appeal to the People, founded on these examples, 32
c. the inducements which the disunited States could have to make war on each other considered, VII. 34
a. the same which have produced wars elsewhere, 34
b. special causes within themselves, 34
A. unadjusted territorial disputes, 34
a. introductory remarks, 34
b. crown-lands, within the States, 34
c. western lands, 35
d. Wyoming lands, 36
e. New Hampshire grants, 36
B. commercial rivalry, 37
a. disregard of local revenue laws generally, 37
b. jealousy of New York in New Jersey and Connecticut, 38
C. the existing debt of the confederacy, 38
a. in its apportionment among the States, 38
b. in its extinguishment, 38
D. local laws violative of private contracts, 40
E. incompatible alliances between individual States and foreign powers, 40
d. the consequences of inter-State hostilities, VIII. 41
a. primarily, great destruction of life and property, 42
b. ultimately, 43
A. the establishment of standing armies, 43
B. the extension of the power of the executive, 44
C. the elevation of the military over the civil power, 44
c. objections answered, 44
A. standing armies were not created in ancient Greece, 45
B. the impotency of the army in Great Britain, No. VIII. 46
d. the general subject discussed, and the value of the Union enforced, 47
4. in affording a barrier to domestic faction and insurrection, IX. 48
A. liability of republics to experience these troubles, 48
B. they afford arguments for the advocates of despotism, 49
C. the utility of a confederacy to guard against these troubles, 50
a. resorted to in other ages and countries, 50
b. approved by most authors on the subject of politics, 50
a. Montesquieu's sentiments concerning extended territories, under republican governments, misrepresented by the Anti-fœderalists, 50
b. his views on a confederate republic, 51
c. distinction between a confederacy and a consolidation of the States discussed, 53
a. what a confederacy is said to be, 53
b. what a confederacy really is, 53
A. the proposed Constitution a confederate republican form of government, 54
B. the Lycian Confederacy a confederate republic, 54
D. the propensity of popular governments to faction, X. 55
E. the United States liable to the same result, 55
F. what constitutes "a faction," 56
G. in what way its mischief may be cured, 56
a. by removing its causes, 56
a. in the destruction of the liberty of the People, 56
b. by causing every citizen to possess the same opinions, passions, and interests, 56
c. the first unwise, the second impracticable, 56
b. by controlling its effects, 56
a. the nature and purposes of "factions," 57
b. when the faction is a minority, "by regular vote," 59
c. when the faction is a majority, 59
A. by dividing the prevailing influences, 60
B. by preventing the concentration of those influences, 60
H. the advantage of a representative government over a democracy in curing the mischiefs of faction, 60
I. the advantages of an extended republic over a small one, in like cases, 62
5. in their commercial relations with foreign nations, XI. 64
A. the growing commerce of America has excited the jealousy of foreign powers, 65
B. the necessity of uniformity of action in America in order to secure the benefits arising from its own markets, 65
C. the establishment of a Fœderal navy another resource for commanding the respect of foreign nations, 67
D. "a steady adherence to the Union" necessary to secure all the commercial advantages which America possesses, No. XI. 67
E. the effects of disunion on the commerce of America, 68
a. the rivalship of the different parts would frustrate all their natural advantages for promoting commerce, 68
b. it would become "a prey to the wanton intermeddling of all nations who are at war with each other," 68
a. neutrality is respected only when it can be adequately defended, 68
c. it would produce "little arts of little politicians to control or vary the irresistible course of nature" in the growth of our commerce, 68
d. it would invite foreign nations to interfere with our rights, 68
a. by prescribing the conditions of our political existence, 68
b. by embarrassing our commerce, 68
c. by interfering with the commercial rights of the Union, which had been then acquired, 69
A. in the fisheries, 69
a. the importance of the fisheries to France and Britain, 69
b. our "decided mastery" therein, a subject of importance to those powers, 69
c. their importance to all the commercial States, 69
i. in affording a field for their enterprise, 69
ii. in affording a nursery for the mercantile marine, 69
d. their importance in promoting the establishment of a Fœderal navy, 70
B. in the navigation of the western lakes, 69
C. in the navigation of the Mississippi River, 69
a. the jealousy of Spain on that subject, 69
6. in promoting the establishment of a Fœderal navy, 70
A. such a navy would be mutually advantageous to all the States, 70
7. in their commercial relations with the Peoples of other States, 70
A. it would promote the interchange of their respective productions, 70
B. "the veins of commerce would be replenished" and invigorated, 70
C. a greater variety would be afforded to the commerce of the country, 71
D. the aggregate balance of trade would be increased, in favor of America, 71
E. objection, concerning the necessary course of inter-State commerce, in any event, answered, 71
F. the assumed superiority of Europe referred to, and Americans appealed to to disprove it, 71
8. in respect to revenue, XII. 73
A. commerce the most productive source of national wealth, 73
B. it increases the ability of the inhabitants to pay taxes, No. XII. 74
C. the system of "direct taxation" unsuccessful in the United States, 74
D. "indirect taxation" the main dependence for the necessary revenues, 75
a. because "the genius of the People" is opposed to excise laws, 75
b. because the scarcity of money will render the collection of excise duties difficult, 75
E. the union of the States will best enable us to improve this resource, 75
a. by being conducive to commerce from whence it is drawn, 76
b. by simplifying the regulations for its collection, 76
F. the separation of the States would destroy this source of revenue, 76
a. by promoting illicit trade, 76
b. by promoting jealousy between the States, and ultimate reduction of impost duties, in order to secure trade, 76
c. from the absence of sufficiently rigorous border-guards between the States, and the improbability of their establishment, 76
a. the ordinary powers of border-guards intolerable in a free country, 76
b. border-guards unnecessary with the States united, 77
G. the effect of a destruction of this resource, 78
a. necessity of revenue to the existence of a nation, 78
b. if it cannot be obtained from commerce it must be taken from the real estate of the inhabitants, 79
a. because excises will not be available, 79
b. because the objects proper for excise within the agricultural States will be insufficient to produce the requisite revenue, 79
c. because it is difficult to trace personal property, 79
9. in the greater economy in the administration of government, XIII. 80
A. "if the States are united under one government, there will be but one national civil list to support," 80
B. "if they are divided into several confederacies, there will be as many national civil lists to be provided for," 80
a. speculations on the number of confederacies to be formed from the débris of the Union, 80
b. each small confederacy will require a civil list as extended as has been proposed in the new system for the aggregate of all the States, 80
a. because of the extent of territory which each will occupy, 80
b. because of the necessary plurality of the revenue departments, 82
c. because of the necessary plurality of the military establishments, No. XIII. 83
10. the objection which has been drawn from the extent of territory which the Union occupies, answered, XIV. 83
A. the distinction between a republic and a democracy noticed, 84
B. the errors of political writers concerning the turbulence in the ancient republics, 84
C. practicability of extending the limits of a republic, 85
D. the territory of the United States not too extended for their proper government, 85
E. the territory of the United States compared with those of some European nations, 86
F. the jurisdiction of the United States limited to objects of general interest, 86
G. the objects of the proposed Constitution are to secure the union of the thirteen primitive States, and to add to their number, 87
H. the intercourse between the States will be daily facilitated by improvements for transit of passengers, etc., 87
I. almost every State being a frontier State, all will be exposed to foreign aggression, and all, alike, need protection, 87
J. an appeal to the People of New York to avoid disunion, 88
III. "THE INSUFFICIENCY OF THE PRESENT CONFEDERATION TO PRESERVE THAT UNION," XV. 90
1. introductory remarks, 90
2. the proposition neither controverted nor doubted, 91
3. disastrous result of its inefficacy, 91
4. an appeal to the People to "break the charm" of the confederation, 93
5. the character of the opposition to the Constitution, and its inconsistency, 93
6. the character of the defects in the confederacy, 94
A. the legislation for States, in their corporate capacity, 94
a. the bad effect of this evil in raising men and money, 94
b. the opposition to the new system, because it deviates from this principle, considered generally, 94
c. the peculiarities of a simple league between independent nations, considered, 94
d. the effect of a simple league, as the bond of union between the States, considered generally, 95
e. such a bond of union inconsistent with the organization of "a superintending power, under the direction of a common council," 96
f. it is also inconsistent with the authority, over the persons of the citizens, which is necessary in the establishment of a government, 96
a. the purposes of government considered generally, 96
b. the penalties which governments find it necessary to inflict on offenders against their laws, No. XV. 96
A. the coercion of the magistracy, which is applicable only to men, 96
B. the coercion of arms, which is applicable only to States, 96
a. it would be productive of constant war, 96
b. it would be subversive of every purpose of government, 96
c. the argument that breaches of the laws by the States need not be expected, considered, 96
A. such breaches would arise from the passions of the individual members of the States, 97
B. from the impatience of control which arises from the sovereign powers of the States, 97
g. the improbability of the execution of the Fœderal measures, in a simple league of the States, considered and averred, 98
a. supported by the natural constitution of the local authorities, 98
b. supported by the experience of the United States, under the old confederation, 99
c. supported by the experience of similar confederacies, elsewhere, XVI. 100
A. the Lycian and Achæan leagues not thus exposed, 100
h. the employment of force in executing the measures of such a league, "in its application to us," considered, 100
a. it would be productive of constant war between the States, 101
b. it would lead to counter-alliances between individual States, 101
c. it would lead to alliances between foreign nations and portions of the Union, 101
d. it would lead to "the violent death of the confederacy," 102
e. and to the establishment of a military despotism, 103
i. the impracticability of sustaining the Union by military coercion, 103
j. an efficient government can only be established on the responsibility of individual citizens, 103
a. objections answered; that the States, as such, may still interpose their authority, and obstruct the execution of the laws, 104
b. that individuals, also, more or less numerous, may still oppose the government, 105
c. that the reserved rights of the States would be invaded by the Fœderal government, XVII. 107
A. the absence of any competent inducement, 107
B. the People of the several States, through the House of Representatives, could frustrate such an attempt, 108
C. the greater danger that the delegated authority of the Fœderal government will be invaded by the State governments, No. XVII. 108
a. from the superior influence which they will exercise over the People, 108
i. from the diffusive construction of the Fœderal government, 108
ii. from the nature of the objects of local control, 108
b. the general subject considered, 109
i. enforced by argument, 109
ii. illustrated from the history of the feudal system, 110
iii. illustrated from the history of Scotland, 111
iv. illustrated from the history of the Amphictyonic league, XVIII. 112
v. illustrated from the history of the Achæan league, 115
vi. illustrated from the history of the Germanic league, XIX. 119
vii. illustrated from the history of Poland, 125
viii. illustrated from the history of Switzerland, 125
ix. illustrated from the history of the United Netherlands, XX. 126
k. concluding remarks, 131
B. "the total want of a sanction to its laws," XXI. 132
a. the Fœderal government possesses no power to exact obedience, 132
b. the Fœderal government possesses no power to punish disobedience, 132
c. the Fœderal government has received no express delegation of authority to use force against the States, 132
C. "the want of a mutual guaranty of the State governments," 133
a. the consequent absence of authority in the Fœderal government to assist a State in enforcing its own laws, 134
b. the danger of an "officious interference in the domestic concerns of its members" by the Fœderal government considered, 134
D. "the principle of regulating the contributions of the States to the common treasury, by quotas," 135
a. the standard of constitutional wealth, 135
b. the causes on which it is dependent, 136
c. the rule of the confederation, on taxation, is unequal and oppressive, 136
d. this cause alone is sufficient to work the destruction of the Union, 136
e. the remedy proposed for this evil, 137
a. the advantages of taxes on articles of consumption, 137
b. the advantages attending indirect taxation, 138
E. "the want of a power to regulate commerce," No. XXII. 139
a. it operates as a bar to the formation of commercial treaties, 139
b. it has given occasion for dissatisfaction between the States, 139
F. the raising of troops by quotas, 140
a. it produces great expense in raising troops, 140
b. it is not conducive to a vigorous system of defence, 140
c. it is unequal in the burden it imposes on the several States, 141
G. the right of equal suffrage among the States, in the Congress, 141
a. arising from the inequality of weight among the States, 142
a. objection that sovereigns are equal, answered, 142
b. objection that "a majority of the States will be a majority of confederated America," answered, 142
c. objection that two thirds of the States, in approval, are necessary to the most important acts, 142
A. the mischief which is incident to the last-named rule, 143
B. the danger from foreign corruption which it imposes, 144
a. republics particularly exposed to this evil, 145
b. instances when this evil has prevailed, 146
i. the deputies of the United Provinces, 146
ii. the authorities in Sweden, 146
H. "the want of a judiciary power," 146
a. to expound and define the true meaning and operation of the laws, 146
b. to ascertain the true import of treaties with foreign nations, 146
c. to secure uniformity in the decision of the judges, 147
I. "the organization of Congress utterly improper for the exercise of those powers which are necessary to a Fœderal Union, 148
J. the existing Fœderal system never had a ratification by the People, 149
IV. "THE NECESSITY OF A GOVERNMENT AT LEAST EQUALLY ENERGETIC WITH THE ONE PROPOSED, TO THE ATTAINMENT OF THIS OBJECT" [the preservation of the Union], XXIII. 150
1. concerning "the objects to be provided for by the Fœderal government," 150
A. "the common defence of the members," 150
a. "the authorities essential to the care of the common defence," 150
a. "to raise armies," 150
b. "to build and equip fleets," 150
c. "to prescribe rules for the government of both" the armies and the fleets, 150
d. "to direct their operations," 150
e. "to provide for their support," 150
b. "these powers ought to exist without limitation," No. XXIII. 150
a. "because it is impossible to foresee or define the extent and variety of national exigencies," 150, 151
b. because it is impossible to foresee "the extent and variety of means which may be necessary to satisfy" those exigencies, 150, 151
c. this principle fully recognized in the Articles of Confederation, 151
d. no "proper or adequate provision for its exercise" made in those articles, 151
e. the expectations concerning it of the framers of those articles, 152
f. "this expectation was ill-founded and illusory," 152
g. the effect of that failure, 152
h. the remedy therefor, the measures proposed in the new Constitution, 152
c. objection, the danger of standing armies, considered, XXIV. 156
a. the powers referred to are delegated to the legislative department, not to the executive of the Union, 156
b. the Congress itself, in the exercise of the powers referred to, is expressly limited by the terms of the proposed Constitution, 157
c. the State constitutions, with two exceptions, contain no interdiction of standing armies, in time of peace, 157
d. the Articles of Confederation "had not imposed a single restraint on the authority of the United States" on this subject, 158
e. the constant danger of the United States from foreign and Indian hostilities renders such authority in the Fœderal government necessary, 159
f. the growing commerce of the United States demands a navy for its protection, 161
d. objection, "that the objects enumerated above ought to be provided for by the State governments," considered, XXV. 162
a. "it would be an inversion of the primary principle of our political association," by transferring the care of the common defence to the individual members of the Union, 162
A. the result of which would be "oppressive to some States," 162
B. it might become dangerous to all the States, through the inefficiency or inability of some of them, 163
C. it would create jealousy by increasing the military power of some of the States, 163
D. it might afford temptation for invading the constitutional authority of the Union, No. XXV. 163
b. the provisions of the Articles of Confederation on State military and naval establishments, referred to, 164
e. the impropriety of restraining the discretion of Congress, on keeping up armies, further considered, 164
a. the uncertainty of the period or extent of the danger to be guarded against, 164
b. it presumes a possibility of collusion between the Congress and the executive, in schemes of usurpation, 165
f. the impropriety of restraining Congress in raising armies in times of peace considered, 165
g. the objection that "the militia of the country is its natural bulwark," considered, 166
a. it often wants "vigor and stability," 166
b. it is not the most economical, 166
c. standing armies sometimes necessary in times of external peace, 167
A. instance of Pennsylvania, notwithstanding her Bill of Rights, 167
B. instance of Massachusetts, notwithstanding the Articles of Confederation, 167
h. the danger of "fettering the government with restrictions" considered, 167
i. "the idea of restraining the legislative authority, in the means of providing for the national defence," further considered, XXVI. 169
a. its origin 169
b. it never found much favor in America, 169
j. "the idea which aims at the exclusion of military establishments in times of peace," further considered, 170
a. its origin and progress, 170
b. vesting authority on the subject in the Congress, a sufficient safeguard, 171
A. because the subject must be reconsidered every two years, 173
B. because "schemes to subvert the liberties of a people require time to mature them for execution," which cannot be secured, 174
C. objection, that the executive may seize supplies, answered, 175
D. an appeal for the Union based on this objection, 175
B. concerning the administration of the laws, XXVII. 176
a. the assertion that the laws which the Constitution authorizes cannot be executed without the aid of a military force, considered, 176
a. unless the Fœderal government shall be worse administered than the State governments, there will be no danger from popular ill-will, No. XXVII. 176
b. it is probable that the former will be better administered than the latter, 177
A. from the greater latitude of choice, in the selection of officers, 177
B. from the peculiar care and judgment with which the Fœderal Senate will be composed, 177
C. from the superior intelligence of the Fœderal Congress, 177
D. from the absence of faction therein, 177
c. there will be less liability to sedition, because there will be a greater power to suppress it, 178
d. The Fœderal government "will be strengthened by its extension to matters of internal concern," 178
b the proposed form of government "bids much fairer to avoid the necessity of using force," than that proposed by its opponents, 179
a. because "it enables the Fœderal government to employ the ordinary magistracy of each State, in the execution of its laws," 179
b. because it displays to the People the common origin of both the Fœderal and the State governments, 179
c. because it conveys to the People the consideration of its superior power to enforce obedience, and thereby checks disaffection, 179
A. "the laws of the confederacy, as to the enumerated and legitimate objects of its jurisdiction, the supreme law of the land," 180
c. "there may happen cases in which the National government may be necessitated to resort to force," XXVIII. 181
a. in which cases force must be employed, 181
A. examples referred to, in the individual States, 182
B. it would be equally necessary in the plan proposed by the opponents of the new system, 182
b. it will be entirely controlled by the representatives of the People, 183
A. if the Congress betrays the People there is no remedy but "the original right of self-defence, which is paramount to all positive forms of government," 183
B. in that case it may be remedied better than if a State government should be similarly treacherous, 183
C. the State governments the greatest security against Fœderal usurpations of power by the Fœderal authorities, 185
D. the great extent of our territory affords additional security, No. XXVIII. 185
E. the limited resources of the country afford still more security, 185
C. concerning "a general power of taxation," XXIX. 186
a. such authority is necessary in every constitution, 187
a. the want of such authority leads either to official plunder, or, 187
b. to "a fatal atrophy" in the government, and speedy dissolution, 187
b. in the present confederation, the want of it has produced disaster, 187
c. the only remedy is "that of permitting the National government to raise its own revenues by the ordinary methods of taxation," 188
d. objection, that the authority of Congress should be limited to "external taxation," answered, 188
e. reply, "that deficiencies may be provided for by requisitions upon the States," considered, 189
a. the "vices and deformities" of the system of requisitions, considered, 189
b. its effect in time of war, 190
A. primarily, no "proper dependence" on the plan, 191
B. secondarily, the diversion of other funds, already appropriated, to the defence of the State, 191
C. thirdly, the destruction of public credit, 191
D. fourthly, difficulty in procuring loans, 191
E. finally, disaster to the country, 191
f. surrejoinder, "that, from the scantiness of the resources of the country, the necessity of diverting the established funds would exist, though the National government should possess this power," considered, 191
a. "the resources of the community, in their full extent, will be brought into activity for the benefit of the Union," 191
b. "whatever deficiency there may be, can readily be supplied by loans," 191
A. confidence inspired, among lenders, by the delegation of this authority of taxation, 192
B. distrust arising from the absence of that authority, in the Confederation, removed, 192
g. the necessity of "a general power of taxation" further considered, XXX. 192
a. the importance of "first principles," on every general subject, 192
b. "first principles" in morals and politics less frequently assented to than those of other branches of knowledge, No. XXX. 194
c. the reason for that diversity of opinion in morals and politics is the passions and prejudices of the reasoner, 194
d. the same influences prevail among the opponents of the new system, 194
A. the reasoning of the anti-Fœderalists reviewed, 194
B. their fairness, in argument, considered, 195
C. a review of Publius's arguments on the powers of the government, 197
D. a review of the anti-Fœderal arguments on the probability of usurpation by the Fœderal government, 197
E. a review of the arguments on the probable aggressions of the State governments on the Fœderal authority, 197
a. the sympathy of the People with the State governments, 197
h. objection, that such a power in the Fœderal government would interfere with the State governments in their levies of money, considered, XXXI. 198
a. the sense of the People, a barrier to the oppressive use of this power by the Fœderal authorities, 198
b. the hazard of provoking the resentments of the State governments, another barrier thereto, 198
c. a conviction of the utility and necessity of local administrations, for local purposes, a third barrier thereto, 198
d. the several States would still retain an independent and uncontrollable authority to raise their own revenues, 198
A. an attempt, by the Fœderal authorities, to abridge that authority will be a violent assumption of unconstitutional power, 199
B. the sovereignty of the Fœderal authorities limited in extent, 199
a. "where the Constitution in express terms grants an exclusive authority to the Union," 199
b. "where it grants an authority to the Union and prohibits the States from exercising the like authority," 199
c. "where it grants an authority to the Union, to which a similar authority in the States would be absolutely and totally contradictory and repugnant," 199
C. the only exclusive power of taxation which is delegated to the Fœderal government is that of imposing taxes on imports, 200
D. the authority to impose taxes on all other articles is concurrent and coequal in the Fœderal and the State authorities, No. XXXI. 200
a. it has not been exclusively granted to the Union, 200
b. it has not been prohibited to the several States, 200
c. it is a necessary deduction from the particular restraint which has been imposed on the States concerning duties on exports and imports, 200
i. the contrary would be an unnecessary restraint on the States, 201
ii. it would also be a dangerous restraint on them, 201
iii. "the restriction in question is a negative pregnant," 201
d. there is no repugnancy between the authority to levy taxes by the Fœderal authorities, and that under which the State governments do the same, 202
e. concurrent authority to levy taxes the necessary result of a division of the sovereign power, 202
i. objection to the delegation of incidental powers of taxation to the Fœderal government considered, 203
a. no authority delegated which it would not have necessarily possessed, 203
b. the authority to levy taxes carries with it all the incidental authority which may be necessary and proper to carry it into execution, 204
c. the express delegation of incidental authority an act of caution, 205
d. the Fœderal authorities must judge, in the first instance, what may be necessary and proper powers for them to exercise, 205
e. the constituents of that government must be the ultimate judge of the necessity and propriety of employing such powers, 205
A. how the constitutional impropriety of a Fœderal measure must be determined, 206
B. instances wherein such impropriety would be evident, 206
j. objection, that the laws of the Union concerning taxation are supreme, considered, 206
a. any other than supreme laws would be useless, 206
b. all laws must, necessarily, be supreme to those to whom they apply, 206
c. "acts which are not pursuant to the Constitution are merely acts of usurpation, and will deserve to be treated as such," 207
d. the new system "expressly confines this supremacy to laws made pursuant to the Constitution," 207
e. any act of the United States which interferes with a State tax-law (unless upon imports and exports) an unconstitutional usurpation of power, No. XXXI. 207
k. "concurrent authority concerning taxation the only admissible substitute for an entire subordination of the States," XXXII. 208
a. absurdity of denying the practical impossibility of coördinate authority, 208
b. illustrations of its practicability, from Roman history, 209
c. difficulties which will interfere with its execution less powerful than those which existed in Rome, 209
d. purposes of a Fœderal revenue more extended than those which the State governments must provide for, 210
A. "there ought to be a capacity to provide for future contingencies," 210
B. there must be a capacity to provide for the public defence, 210
C. for the payment of public debts, 212
e. concluding remarks, urging that a delegation of concurrent authority was preferable to an entire subordination of the States to the Fœderal authorities, 214
l. objection, "that the jurisdiction of the National government, in the article of revenue, should be restricted to particular objects," considered, XXXIII. 215
a. it would oppress particular branches of industry, 215
b. taxes would be unequally distributed, 215
c. illustration from the proposed limitation of its jurisdiction to duties on imports, 215
A. objections against a high tariff, 216
a. it encourages smuggling, 216
b. it renders other classes tributary to the manufacturing classes, who will hold a monopoly of the markets, 216
c. it will force industry out of its more natural channels into those which are less beneficial, 216
d. it will oppress the merchant in the payment of duties, 216
B. the limitation proposed would be productive of inequality of taxation among the several States, 216
C. the objection, "that the interest of the revenue itself would be a sufficient guard against an extreme tariff," considered, 217
m. objection, that the House of Representatives cannot contain representatives of all classes of tax-paying citizens, considered, 218
a. such a special representation of each class impracticable, 219
b. merchants the natural representatives of the mechanic and manufacturing classes, 219
c. the learned professions form no distinct class in society, No. XXXIII. 219
d. the landholders will be well represented by those in whom they have most confidence, without regard to the extent of their property, 220
e. the good effects of a mixed representation, and the impracticability of special delegations from particular classes, 220
f. men possessing the most extensive information will best represent all classes, 221
g. men of strong minds, who belong to no particular class, will sometimes command the attention which is due to their merit, XXXIV. 222
h. men of different trades will seldom possess greater sympathy for each other than the merchant will for both, 222
n. objection, that a power of internal taxation in the Fœderal Congress cannot be exercised with advantage for the want of sufficient knowledge of local circumstances, considered, 224
a. the members from each State can obtain the necessary information, 224
b. systems of finance are usually framed by a few persons, 224
c. local disabilities may be easily ascertained and understood, 225
d. the assessment of property to be taxed will devolve on discreet persons who are acquainted with "local details," 225
e. "the National legislature can make use of the system of each State within that State," 226
f. the proportion of taxes among the States is fixed, and is "to be determined by the numbers of each State," respectively, 226
g. if this power should prove "to be really inconvenient," it need not be used, and requisitions may be resorted to, 226
A. "why not omit that ambiguous power, in the first instance, and rely on requisitions?" answered, 227
a. because, if convenient, this mode will be preferable, 227
b. because the existence of such authority will give greater efficacy to requisitions, 227
o. clashing of authority concerning taxation, State and Fœderal, cannot occur, 227
p. minor objections to the delegation of authority to levy taxes considered, 227
a. double sets of revenue officers, No. XXXIV. 228
b. "duplication of the popular burdens by double taxations," 229
c. "the frightful forms of odious and oppressive poll-taxes," 229
2. in "the power of regulating the militia, and of commanding its services in times of insurrection and invasion," XXXV. 231
A. uniformity in its organization and discipline is desirable, 231
B. that uniformity is attainable only by confiding the regulation of the militia to the Fœderal authorities, 231
C. the weakness of those who oppose the delegation of this authority to the Fœderal authorities, 232
D. objection, that no provision has been made for calling out the posse comitatus, to assist the Fœderal magistrate, considered, 232
E. objection, that danger may be apprehended from the delegation of such an authority, considered, 233
a. the project for a militia establishment which "Publius" approved, 233
b. the necessity for a military establishment would, thereby, be diminished, 235
c. the pretence of danger from a disciplined militia ridiculed, 235
d. the authority absolutely retained by the States, to appoint the officers of the militia, a sufficient safeguard, 235
F. objection, based on the authority to order the militia into distant States, considered, 236
V. "THE CONFORMITY OF THE PROPOSED CONSTITUTION TO THE TRUE PRINCIPLES OF REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT," XXXVI. 238
1. introductory remarks, 238
A. difficulty of investigating public measures with moderation and candor, 239
B. the manner in which the proposed Constitution has been discussed, considered, 239
a. the predetermined friend of the new system may be upright, 240
b the predetermined opponent "cannot be upright and must be culpable," 240
C. The Fœderalist not addressed either to predetermined enemies or friends of the measure, but to those who desire the happiness of their country, 240
D. in considering the plan allowances must be made for the difficulties, inherent in the very nature of the undertaking, which the Convention experienced, 240
a. the novelty of the undertaking, 240
b. the difficulty of "combining the requisite stability and energy in government with a due regard to liberty and the republican form," No. XXXVI. 241
c. the difficulty of "marking the proper line of partition between the authority of the General, and that of the State governments," 242
d. "the interfering pretensions of the larger and smaller States," 245
e. "other combinations [of the States], resulting from a difference of local position and policy," 245
E. it need not excite wonder if the proposed Constitution shall want harmony between its several parts, 246
F. the experience of the past, on similar subjects, when compared with the result in this case, proves, 246
a. that the Convention was not afflicted with party animosities, and, 247
b. that "all the deputations composing the Convention were finally accommodated," 247
G. "in every case reported by ancient history in which government has been established with deliberation and consent," it has been framed by a single individual, XXXVII. 247
H. the difficulties which they experienced in the establishment of their governments, 248
I. the errors which the new system contains are rather the result of the defect of antecedent experience, than of the want of accuracy and care in preparing it, 249
a. proved from general causes, 249
b. from the peculiar amendments to the Articles of Confederation which have been proposed for ratification, 250
J. the present situation of America considered, 250
a. the severity of "her malady," 251
b. the diversity of the advice given for her relief, 251
c. improbability that those who object to the new system could improve it, 254
d. the proposed Constitution, notwithstanding its defects, an improvement on the old one, 254
e. the principal grounds of objection to the new one exist, or are permitted to be exercised, under the old one, 255
f. answer, that notwithstanding these practices, under the old constitution, they are rendered harmless by the entire dependence of the Congress on the constituent States, considered, 256
g. the Congress not open to censure for assuming doubtful authority, 257
2. "a candid survey of the plan of government reported by the Convention," XXXVIII. 258
A. no other than a strictly republican form of government reconcilable with the genius of the People of America, No. XXXVIII. 258
a. what are the distinctive characters of the republican form, considered, 258
a. the example of Holland referred to, 258
b. the example of Venice referred to, 258
c. the example of Poland referred to, 258
d the example of England referred to, 259
e. the general subject discussed, 259
B. the proposed Constitution conforms to the standard here fixed, 260
a. in the tenure of its offices, 260
b. in its absolute prohibition of titles of nobility, 261
c. objection, that it has not preserved the Fœderal form, but provides for a National government, considered, 261
a. what is the real character of the proposed government, 261
A. it will be founded on the assent and ratification of the People of the several States, as such, 262
B. the sources from which its ordinary powers will be drawn, 263
a. the House of Representatives, from the People of America, 263
b. the Senate, from the States, as such, 263
c. the Executive, 263
i. immediately from the States in their political characters, 263
ii. eventually by the House of Representatives, as representatives of the States, as distinct and coequal bodies politic, 263
C. the operation of its ordinary powers, 263
D. the extent of its ordinary powers, 264
E. the authority by which amendments are to be made, 265
F. the subject generally discussed, 266
b. was the Convention authorized to frame and propose a mixed system, XXXIX. 266
A. the commissions of its members examined, 266
B. the recommendatory acts considered, 266
C. the authority of the Convention deduced therefrom, 267
a. "to establish, in these States, a firm National government," 267
b. that government to be "adequate to the exigencies of government, and the preservation of the Union," 267
c. these purposes were "to be effected by alterations and provisions in the Articles of Confederation," 268
d. these alterations were to be reported to the Congress and to the States, for approval and ratification, 268
D. the general subject discussed, No. XXXIX. 268
c. how far considerations of duty might have supplied any defect of regular authority in the Convention, 272
A. as its powers were merely advisory and recommendatory, the proposed system is harmless until it shall be approved, 272
B. the importance, to the United States, of the result of its deliberations, 273
C. the necessity which existed for a radical change in the form of government, 274
D. the question whether the Convention exceeded its powers does not affect the propriety of ratifying the proposed Constitution, 275
C. the Constitution proposed by the Convention considered, XL. 276
a. "the sum or quantity of power which it vests in the [Fœderal] government" considered, 276
a. is the aggregate of that power greater than it should be, 276
A. the arguments of opponents considered generally, 277
B. the objects of those powers considered, 277
a. concerning "security against foreign danger," 278
i. the power of declaring war and granting letters of marque, 278
ii. that of providing armies and fleets, 278
i. it must be indefinite, 278
ii. it must extend to times of peace as well as to those of war, 278
iii. the danger from military establishments considered, 279
iii. that of regulating and calling forth the militia, 284
iv. that of levying and borrowing money, 284
i. the authority to levy internal taxes considered, 285
ii. the indefinite character of the authority considered, 285
A. it has been sufficiently restricted, 286
B. it was copied from the old system, 287
C. an appeal to the objectors, 287
b. concerning the "regulation of the intercourse with foreign nations," XLI 288
i. the power to send and receive ambassadors and consuls and to make treaties, 288
ii. to punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offences against the laws of nations, 289
iii. to regulate foreign commerce, 290
i. reflections on the sanction of the slave-trade, 290
ii. objection to the Constitution, based on that clause, considered, 291
c. the "maintenance of harmony and proper intercourse among the States," No. XLI. 291
i. to regulate commerce among the States and the Indian tribes, 292
ii. to coin money, and to regulate its value and that of foreign coin, 294
iii. to provide for the punishment of counterfeiters of coin and public securities, 294
iv. to fix the standard of weights and measures, 294
v. to establish an uniform rule of naturalization, 294
vi. to establish an uniform law of bankruptcy, 296
vii. to establish a rule by which public acts, etc., shall be proved, and with what effect, 296
viii. to establish post-roads and post-offices, 296
d. "miscellaneous powers," XLII. 297
i. the power to pass laws for securing the exclusive right to their works to authors and inventors, 297
ii. the exclusive right of legislation over the seat of the Fœderal government, 297
iii. the punishment of treason against the United States, 299
iv. to admit new States into the Union, 299
v. to dispose of and govern the territories and public property of the United States, 300
vi. to guarantee to every State a republican form of government, 300
vii. to protect the States against invasion, 302
viii. to protect the States against domestic violence, 302
i. the powers and rights of majorities and minorities of the several States discussed, 302
ii. the probability of a general, overpowering insurrection within all the States considered, 304
ix. to assume the payment of outstanding debts of the United States, 305
i. its purpose, 305
ii. objection, that it does not assert the continued validity of debts due to the United States, answered, 305
x. to provide for amendments to the Constitution, 306
xi. the establishment of the new system, when nine States shall have approved it, 306
i. the violation, by this provision, of the Articles of Confederation considered, 307
ii. the relations which will exist between the assenting and the dissenting States of the Union considered, 308
e. "restrictions on the authority of the several States," No. XLIII. 308
i. forbidding the establishment of treaties and alliances between them, 309
ii. forbidding the issue of letters of marque and reprisal, 309
iii. forbidding the coinage of money by them, 309
iv. forbidding the issue of bills of credit by them, 309
v. forbidding the establishment of any other legal tender than gold and silver, 310
vi. forbidding the passage of bills of attainder, 310
vii. forbidding the passage of ex post facto laws, 310
viii. forbidding the passage of laws impairing contracts, 310
ix. forbidding the establishment of titles of nobility, 311
x. forbidding the imposition of duties on exports or imports, 312
f. "the several powers and provisions by which efficacy is given to all the rest," 312
i. the power to make all necessary and proper laws for carrying the preceding powers into execution, 312
i. the necessity of such authority in the United States, 312
ii. other methods considered, 312
A. prohibiting the exercise of any power not expressly delegated to the Union, 313
B. a positive enumeration of the general powers so delegated, 313
C. a negative enumeration of them, by a specification of the reserved powers, 314
D. entire silence on the subject, 314
iii. the remedy for an abuse of this authority, 315
ii. the supremacy of the Constitution and constitutional laws of the United States, and of their treaties with other powers, 315
i. the effect of reserving the supremacy of the State constitutions therefrom, considered, 316
iii. the various officers, State and Fœderal, to be bound by oath to support it, 317
i. why State officers are to be thus obligated, 317
C. conclusion, that no part of the powers delegated to the Fœderal government is unnecessary or improper, 317
b. will the aggregated powers of the Union be dangerous to the reserved authority of the several States, XLIV. 318
A. if the objects of the Union can be attained only through the proposed Constitution, it is not a valid objection that it abridges the authority of the State governments, No. XLIV. 318
B. the new Constitution will not prove fatal to the State governments, 319
a. because of the tendency, in confederacies, to despoil the General government of its delegated powers, 319
b. because the State governments will possess more influence among the People, 321
c. because the State governments are constituent and essential parts of the Fœderal government, 321
d. because the employees of the United States will be less numerous than those of the States, 321
e. because the powers reserved by the States are relatively greater and more numerous than those which are delegated to the Union, 323
f. because the proposed change consists less in the addition of new powers to the Union, than in the invigoration of its old ones, 324
g. because the State governments will possess more influence among the People, resumed, XLV. 325
i. the State and the Fœderal governments are in fact only different agents for the People, with different powers and for different purposes, 325
ii. they both depend on the sentiments and sanction of common constituents for their respective powers, 325
iii. the first and most natural attachment of the People will be to their respective State governments, 326
i. from the greater number of offices in the latter, 326
ii. from the character of the interests which they provide for, 326
iii. from the greater familiarity of the People with them, 326
iv. from the history of the country during the war, 326
iv. if the popular favor should rest on the Fœderal government, it will be only because that will be better administered than the others, 327
h. because the prepossessions of the members of the Fœderal government will be in favor of their States, 327
i. because the respective States possess the means of defeating Fœderal encroachments, 329
j. because other States would sympathize with the suffering State, and combine for its support, 330
k. the objection, that the military power will be in the Fœderal government, answered, 330
i. the impossibility of collecting a force for such a purpose, 331
ii. the superior power of the militia to resist and overcome it, No. XLV. 331
l. concluding remarks on this particular branch of the subject, 332
C. concluding remarks, on the danger that the Fœderal powers will be formidable to reserved powers of individual States, 333
b. "the particular structure of the Fœderal government and the distribution of its powers among its constituent parts," XLVI. 333
a. "its supposed violation of the maxim, that the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments ought to be separate and distinct," considered, 333
A. the truth of the maxim conceded, 334
B. the proposed Constitution does not violate it, 334
a. the meaning of the maxim discussed, 334
i. the views of Montesquieu examined, 334
i. the British Constitution, as his standard of government, referred to, 334
ii. his own expressed reasons referred to, 335
ii. the provisions of the State constitutions, relative thereto, examined, 337
i. New Hampshire, 337
ii. Massachusetts, 338
iii. New York, 339
iv. New Jersey, 339
v. Pennsylvania, 339
vi. Delaware, 340
vii. Maryland, 340
viii. Virginia, 340
ix. North Carolina. 341
x. South Carolina, 341
xi. Georgia, 341
xii. general remarks on the State constitutions, 342
b. the necessity that "these departments shall be so far connected and blended as to give to each a constitutional control over the others," considered, XLVII. 342
i. "the powers belonging to one department ought not to be directly and completely administered by either of the others," conceded, 343
ii. "neither of them ought to possess an overruling influence over the others in the administration of their powers," conceded, 343
iii. what practical security can be provided for each, against the invasion of the others, considered, 343
i. the insufficiency of naked constitutional restrictions, No. XLVII. 343
A. the tendency of the legislature to absorb the others, 343
a. from the nature of our political organization, 344
b. from "an intrepid confidence in its own strength," 344
c. from necessary extent of its powers, 345
d. from its control of the pecuniary resources of the country, and the indefiniteness of its authority in many cases, 345
e. from the examples presented in history, 345
B. an instance of executive encroachment accounted for, 348
C. concluding remarks, 348
ii. Mr. Jefferson's proposition, that, two thirds of the members of each of two of the departments concurring, an appeal to the People may be taken, considered, XLVIII. 349
A. the People the only source of authority, 349
B. the propriety of a well-defined mode of appealing to the People considered, 350
C. it does reach the case of an improper combination of two departments of the government, 350
D. by frequent applications it might impair the respect with which the People would regard the government, 350
E. the public tranquillity might be disturbed by a too frequent recurrence to the decision of the society, 351
F. the decisions thus obtained would not answer the purpose of maintaining the constitutional equilibrium of the government, 352
a. the legislature will still control the decision, 352
b. members of the legislature will probably be the members of the conventions to revise the form of government, 353
c. when such appeals to the People, against the legislature, will be useful, 353
G. concluding remarks on occasional appeals to the People, 354
iii. periodical appeals to the People considered, XLIX. 354
A. the disadvantage of short intervals discussed, 355
B. the disadvantage of long intervals discussed, No. XLIX. 355
C. the example of Pennsylvania referred to, 355
iv. the interior structure of the government should be so arranged that its several constituent departments, by their mutual relations, may keep each other in their proper places, L. 358
A. the members of each should have little to do in the appointment of members of the others, 359
B. the members of each department should be as little dependent as possible on those of the others for their emoluments, 359
C. the members of each should possess the constitutional means and personal motives to resist invasions by the members of other departments, 360
a. this policy not unfrequently resorted to, 360
b. an equal power of self-defence cannot be granted to each department, 361
c. a division of the power of the legislature necessary, in order to guard against its encroachments, 361
d. an increase of the power of the executive, that of the veto, for its protection, necessary, 361
v. the advantages afforded by the Fœderal system of America, in securing the rights of the People, 362
A. the division of the delegated powers between two distinct governments, and its subsequent subdivision, in each, among distinct and separate departments, 362
B. the multitude of different and distinct interests among the People, 362
b. "the House of Representatives," LI. 365
A. the qualifications of the electors thereof, 365
a. why not subject to regulation by the Congress, 365
b. why not subject to regulation by the State legislatures, 365
c. why not made uniform throughout the several States, 365
d. the advantages derived from the constitutional provision, 365
B. the qualifications of the members, 366
C. the term of office of its members, 366
a. "whether biennial elections, in this case, will be safe," considered, 366
i. frequent elections the only effectual security for an immediate dependence on, and sympathy with, the People, No. LI. 366
ii. the length of terms of service in other governments, 367
i. British House of Commons, at different periods, 367
ii. Irish Parliament, 368
iii.' the American colonies, 369
iii. conclusion, that biennial elections will not be dangerous, 370
iv. this conclusion strengthened by other circumstances, 370
i. the Fœderal Congress will possess less power than the British or Irish Parliaments, or the colonial Assemblies, 370
ii. it will be restrained by its dependence on the People, while it will be watched, also, by the several State governments, 370
iii. the other departments of the Fœderal government will possess fewer means to seduce the House than are possessed by the governments referred to, 370
v. objection, that "where annual elections end, tyranny begins," considered, LII. 371
i. no adequate reason for the opinion, 371
ii. the practice of different States in the choice of their legislators, 371
iii. the practice of the British Parliament, by simple statute, to change fundamental principles of government not applicable, in this case, as a reason, 372
b. are "biennial elections necessary or useful," 373
i. short terms of office prevent members from acquiring the practical knowledge requisite to the due performance of their duties, 373
i. greater scope of information necessary in the Fœderal than in the State governments, 374
ii. the necessity of acquiring a knowledge of foreign affairs, 376
ii. short terms will be inconvenient to members who reside at a distance from the capitol, 376
iii. short terms will be more dangerous from the greater number of inexperienced members, 377
iv. short terms will prevent the correction of spurious elections, 377
v. conclusion, that "biennial elections will be as useful to the public, as they will be safe to the liberty of the People," No. LII. 377
D. "the apportionment of its members to the several States," LIII. 378
a. numbers in each State the proper standard for regulating the representation of each State, 378
i. objection against representation of slaves, considered, 378
i. slaves not merely property, 379
ii. slaves are also persons, 379
iii. the Constitution recognizes this mixed character in slaves, 379
iv. the apportionment is governed by the same rule as that for the levy of direct taxes, 380
v. they are not considered as property merely, in the laws of the States which possess them, 380
A. reply, that they do not form a basis of local representation, considered, 380
vi. the right of representation of property as well as of persons, considered, 381
vii. the votes in the Congress which are allowed to the several States should be proportioned to the comparative wealth of those States, 382
b. there will be no inducement for falsifying the census, as the measure for representation is also the measure for taxation, 383
E. "the number of which the House is to consist" considered, LIV. 384
a. the importance which is attached to this subject, 384
b. the difficulty of determining the proper number, 385
c. the small States require smaller ratios of representation than the large States, 386
d. with the limited powers which are delegated to the Congress the necessity for a numerous representation is diminished, 386
e. objections considered and answered, 387
i. "so small a number of members cannot be safely trusted with so much power," 387
i. a rapid increase of population may be expected, and a corresponding increase of representation will ensue, 387
ii. "whether the smallness of the number, as a temporary regulation, be dangerous to the public liberty," considered, 387
iii. from whence can danger ultimately proceed, considered, 388
A. from foreign gold, No. LIV. 388
B. from other branches of the Fœderal government, 389
ii. "it will be too small to possess a due knowledge of the interests of its constituents," considered, LV. 391
i. "the representative ought to be acquainted with the interests and circumstances of his constituents," considered, 391
ii. the objects of Fœderal legislation considered, 391
A. "a very few representatives will be very sufficient vehicles of information concerning commerce to the Fœderal councils," 392
B. the same observations will apply to matters concerning taxation, 393
C. they "will apply also with greater force to the case of the militia," 393
D. nothing in the above reasons will conflict with the necessity, before referred to, for general information in the representative, 393
iii. the experience of Great Britain referred to, 394
iii. it will tend to the aggrandizement of the few at the expense of the many, LVI. 396
i. this objection strikes at the root of representative government, 396
ii. the members of the House will be elected by all classes and conditions of citizens, 397
iii. they will be taken from all classes and conditions of citizens, 397
iv. securities to insure their fidelity to their constituents, 397
A. their personal character, 397
B. the honorable position to which they will be called, 398
C. the opportunity which will be afforded to secure honor and distinction, 398
D. the frequent election compelling them to remember their dependence on the People, 398
E. the measures adopted must operate on themselves as well as on the great mass of the society, 399
v. the provisions for electing members, and their qualifications for office, similar to those of the State constitutions for State officers, 400
vi. the relative numbers of the constituencies no justification for approval of the State system and disapproval of the Fœderal system, No. LVI. 400
A. the doctrine is not reasonable, 400
B. the doctrine is not admissible in its consequences, 401
C. the doctrine is not warranted by facts, 401
a. the British House of Commons, 401
b. the State senators of New Hampshire, 401
c. the State senators of Massachusetts, 402
d. the State senators of New York, 402
e. members of Assembly in the cities of New York and Albany, 402
f. State representatives in Pennsylvania, 402
g. the upper house of the Assembly of Connecticut, 403
h. the Governor of Connecticut, 403
i. the Governor of Massachusetts, 403
j. the Governor of New York, 403
k. the President of New Hampshire, 403
iv. "the number of its members will not be augmented from time to time as the progress of population may demand," LVII. 403
i. the provisions of the State constitutions compared with those of the proposed Constitution, 403
ii. the practice of the State governments considered, 404
iii. the peculiar organization of the Congress will induce watchfulness on this subject, 404
A. the large States, in the House, can control the small ones, and compel their acquiescence, 404
a. objection, that the Senate may object and prevent such an augmentation, answered, 405
1. there is no probability that the House, representing the majority of the People, could be successfully resisted, 405
2. the consciousness of the House being supported by right, reason, and the Constitution, will check the Senate, 405
3. it is not certain that a majority of the Senate would oppose such an augmentation, 406
4. senators from the new States will, probably, favor such an augmentation, 406
5. "a constitutional and infallible resource" will be a refusal by the House to vote the supplies, No. LVII. 406
6. the Senate will be more ready to yield, in such a contest, than the House, 407
iv. considerations against a numerous House of Representatives, 408
v. objection that a majority of the members of each House shall form quorums, and majorities of quorums enact laws, considered, 409
F. the authority vested in the Congress to regulate, in the last resort, the election of the members of the House of Representatives, considered, LVIII. 410
a. introductory remarks, 410
b. "every government ought to contain in itself the means of its own preservation," 411
i. the different depositaries of power to control the elections, considered, 411
ii. the exact character and extent of the delegated power considered, 411
c. "the existence of the Union would be entirely at the mercy of the State governments," if the regulation of elections for the Fœderal government is left entirely in their hands, 411
i. the right of self-preservation in the State governments is unimpaired, 412
ii. objection, that the retention of authority in the State governments to control the election of senators is equally dangerous, considered, 413
i. it is necessary from the character of the States, as constituent bodies, 413
ii. it is less hazardous, from the peculiar organization of the Senate, 414
iii. objection, that the interest of each State to be represented in the House will be sufficient security against an abuse of power by its government, considered, 415
d. objection, the Congress may thereby "promote the election of some favorite class of men in exclusion of others," considered, LIX. 416
i. the improbability that such a purpose would be carried out through this channel, discussed, 416
ii. the certainty that, if attempted, it would be corrected by "an immediate revolt of the great body of the People, headed and directed by the State governments," averred and discussed, 417
iii. the dissimilarity of the organization of the Senate and the House a security against an improper exercise of this authority, No. LIX. 417
iv. there can be no conceivable motive for such an attempt on the part of Congress, 418
v. inquiry concerning the relative weight of influence possessed by different classes of the People, 419
vi. the qualifications, both of the electors and the elected, being controlled exclusively by the State governments, no favor can be extended to any particular class by the Congress, 421
vii. the certainty of a general revolt against such an assumption of authority further discussed, and the necessity of a military power to insure success to the attempt considered, 422
e. objection, that this provision should have been accompanied by a provision that all elections shall be held within the counties where the electors reside, considered, LX. 423
i. such a provision would be harmless, 423
ii. it would afford no security from the danger apprehended, 423
iii. the provision compared with provisions concerning elections in the State constitutions, 424
i. those in the constitution of New York particularly examined, 424
ii. defects in the State constitutions no apology for defects in the proposed Constitution, considered, 425
f. the probability that such authority in the Congress, to fix uniform days of election, may be very important to the public welfare, 426
i. the want of any provision in the proposed Constitution, fixing a particular day for the election, considered, 427
ii. concluding remarks, 427
c. the Senate LXI. 428
A. "the qualifications of senators" considered, 428
B. "the appointment of senators by the State legislatures" considered, 429
C. "the equality of representation in the Senate" considered, 429
a. the mixed character of the Fœderal government requires a mixed representation, 429
b. the equal representation in the Senate a recognition of sovereignty in the States, 430
c. it furnishes a security against improper acts of legislation, No. LXI. 430
D. "the number of senators, and the term for which they are to be elected," considered, 431
a. "the inconveniences which a republic must suffer from the want of such an institution," 431
i. the security which it furnishes against improper legislation will be wanting, 431
ii. there will be less security against the "infirmity" of faction, 432
iii. there will be less wisdom in the legislation of such a republic, 432
i. the importance of a knowledge of the proper mode of legislation, 433
ii. the little attention paid thereto in America, 433
iv. mutability in its councils from frequent changes in its members, 433
i. the mischievous effects of such mutability, 433
A. it forfeits the respect and confidence of other nations, 434
B. by multiplying laws "it poisons the blessings of liberty," 434
C. by affecting the market-price of property it gives the sagacious and the rich an undue advantage over the industrious and uninformed poor, 435
D. it checks extended improvements and enterprise, 435
E. it diminishes the attachment and reverence of the People, 435
v. "the want of a due sense of National character," LXII. 436
vi. "the want of a due responsibility in the government to the People," 437
vii. the want of a defence to the People against their own temporary errors and delusions, 438
i. objection, that a widely spread People is not subject to such errors and delusions, answered, 439
b. "history informs us of no long-lived republic which had not a senate," 439
i. the difference between the ancient republics and the United States, 440
i. Athens referred to, 441
ii. Carthage referred to, 441
iii. Sparta referred to, 441
iv. Rome referred to, 441
v. Crete referred to, No. LXII. 442
c. objection, that the Senate will "gradually acquire a dangerous preëminence in the government and finally transform it into a tyrannical aristocracy," considered, 442
i. the impossibility of such a result averred and discussed, 443
ii. the organization of the Senate of Maryland referred to, 443
iii. the organization of the two Houses of the British Parliament, 444
iv. the examples of the ancient republics referred to, 444
i. Sparta and her Ephori, 444
ii. Rome and her Tribunes, 444
iii. Carthage and her Senate, 445
v. the controlling influence of the House of Representatives, 445
E. "the powers vested in the Senate," LXIII. 446
a. the treaty-making power, 446
i. the great importance of that power, 446
ii. the authority to exercise it vested in those who will be best qualified to exercise it, 446
iii. a popular assembly does not possess such qualifications, 447
i. an intimate acquaintance with public affairs necessary, 447
ii. secrecy and despatch are often required, 449
iv. objections to this part of the proposed Constitution considered, 450
i. that the treaty-making power has not been delegated to men invested with legislative authority, 450
ii. that treaties so entered into are to be of supreme authority, 451
iii. that treaties so entered into are not repealable at pleasure, like Acts of Assembly, 451
iv. that they may be made instruments of oppression, 451
v. that proper guards against corruption are wanting, 452
A. the responsibility of senators considered, 452
v. concluding remarks, 453
b. the appointing of public officers, LXIV. 453
c. its authority as a court for the trial of impeachments, 453
i. the difficulty in forming such a court, in an elective government, 453
ii. the subjects of its jurisdiction render the trust a delicate one, No. LXIV. 453
iii. the Senate the most fit depositary of that trust, 454
iv. the propriety of delegating that authority to the Supreme Court considered, 455
i. that court will not possess the fortitude, credit, and authority requisite to the execution of the duties of the trust, 455
ii. the membership of the Supreme Court will be too limited, 456
iii. as the punishment inflicted by the Court of Impeachment will not terminate the proceedings, it will be improper to bring the offender twice before the same court, 456
v. the propriety of a junction of the Supreme Court with the Senate in this trust, considered and denied, 457
vi. the propriety of delegating this authority to those who are wholly disconnected with other departments of the government, considered and denied, 458
vii. the proposed Constitution should not be rejected for that cause, even if this feature is not the most desirable, 459
viii. objections to this portion of the new Constitution considered, LXV. 460
i. it unites legislative and judicial authority in the same body, 460
A. the inconsistency of those who raise the objection while they admire the constitution of New York, in which similar provisions exist, 461
ii. it contributes to an undue accumulation of power in the Senate, and tends toward the establishment of an aristocracy, 461
iii. as an appointing power, the Senate will be too lenient judges of the conduct of those whom they shall have appointed to office, 463
iv. as a treaty-making power, the Senate may be called to try themselves for corrupt or perfidious action, 465
d. the Executive department, LXVI. 467
A. the misrepresentations of this subject considered, 467
B. the mode of electing the President considered, LXVII. 472
a. the only part of the new Constitution which its opponents do not condemn, 472
b. "it is pretty well guarded," No. LXVII. 473
c. "it was desirable that the sense of the People should operate in the choice," 473
d. it was desirable that the choice should be made by competent persons, 473
e. it was desirable to avoid tumult and disorder, 473
f. it was desirable to avoid cabal, intrigue, and corruption, 474
g. it was desirable to maintain the independence of the President on all but the People themselves, 475
h. "all these advantages will happily combine" in the proposed Constitution, 475
i. the choice will seldom fall on one who will not be qualified, 475
C. the choice of a Vice-President by the People considered and approved, 476
D. "the real characters of the proposed Executive" considered generally, LXVIII. 477
a. the executive authority is delegated, generally, to one person, 477
i. compared with King of Great Britain, 478
ii. compared with Governor of New York, 478
b. he is elected for four years, and is reëligible, 478
i. compared with Ring of Great Britain, 478
ii. compared with Governor of New York, 478
c. he is liable to impeachment, trial, removal from office, and subsequent punishment by the civil law, 478
i. compared with King of Great Britain, 478
ii. compared with Governor of New York, 478
iii. compared with the Governors of Maryland and Delaware, 478
d. he has the power of vetoing any measure passed by Congress, 479
i. his authority in this case compared with that of the King of Great Britain, 479
ii. his authority in this case compared with that of the Council of Revision in New York, 479
iii. his authority in this case compared with that of the Governor of New York, 479
iv. his authority in this case compared with that of the Governor of Massachusetts, 479
e. he is commander-in-chief of the militia, when in the Fœderal service, 480
i. his authority in this case compared with that of the King of Great Britain, 480
ii. his authority in this case compared with that of the Governor of New York, No. LXVIII. 480
f. he is commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States, 480
i. his authority therein compared with that of the King of Great Britain, 480
ii. his authority therein compared with that of the Governor of New York, 480
iii. his authority therein compared with that of the Governors of New Hampshire and Massachusetts, 481
g. his power to pardon offenders against the laws, 481
i. his authority therein compared with that of the Governor of New York, 481
h. his power, in one case, to adjourn the Congress, 482
i. his power therein compared with that of the King of Great Britain, 482
ii. his power therein compared with that of the Governor of New York, 482
i. his treaty-making power, 482
i. his power therein compared with that of the King of Great Britain, 482
j. his power to receive ambassadors and public ministers, 483
k. his power, in connection with the Senate, to appoint ambassadors and other ministers, 483
i. his power therein compared with that of the King of Great Britain, 484
ii. his power therein compared with that of the Governor of New York, 484
l. the general authority of the President reviewed, and compared with that of the Governor of New York, 485
m. the general authority of the President reviewed, and compared with that of the King of Great Britain, 485
E. the provisions of the new Constitution, concerning the Executive, further considered, LXIX. 486
a. the idea that a vigorous executive is inconsistent with the genius of republican government examined and refuted, 486
b. "the ingredients which constitute energy in the Executive" considered, 487
i. unity 488
i. it has been approved by the soundest political writers, 488
ii. it is indisputably conducive to energy, 488
iii. in what manner it may be destroyed, 488
A. by vesting the authority in two or more magistrates, No. LXIX. 488
B. by making the authority subject to the coöperation and control of a council, 488
a. plurality of magistrates considered, 489
b. the controlling authority of a council considered, 491
c. the argument reviewed and concluded, 491
1. plurality removes responsibility and destroys the force of popular opinion, 492
2. it tends to concealment of wrong-doing, 492
3. councils are unnecessary where the magistrate is personally responsible, 494
4. plurality in the Executive will be more dangerous to liberty, 495
5. plurality will be more expensive, 496
ii. duration in office of the Executive, LXX. 496
i. it affects his personal firmness in the employment of his constitutional powers, 496
A. more interest will be felt in that which is permanent, 497
B. subserviency to popular impulses not desirable in the Executive, 497
C. subserviency to the humors of the legislature equally improper, 498
D. independence of the several departments of government necessary, 499
E. shortness of the term of office will affect the independence of the Executive, 500
F. a term of four years compared with longer and shorter terms, 500
ii. it affects the stability of his system of administration, LXXI. 502
A. the term "administration of government" defined, 502
B. the heads of foreign, finance, military, and naval departments are only "assistants or deputies of the chief magistrate," and ought to be appointed by him and be subject to his superintendence, 502
C. changes in the Executive will produce, primarily, changes in these departments, and, ultimately, changes in the system of administration, 503
iii. the reëligibility of the Executive considered, 503
A. the opposition thereto considered, 503
B. the effects of confining the eligibility to a single term, No. LXXI. 504
a. the inducements to good behavior would be diminished, 504
b. temptations would be offered to selfishness, peculation, and usurpation, 504
c. it would deprive the country of experience in the magistracy, 505
d. it would deprive the country of the services of those who can be most useful in cases of emergency, 506
e. it would operate as a constitutional interdiction of stability in the administration, 506
C. an examination of the supposed advantages of such a limitation of eligibility, 507
a. greater independence in the magistracy, 507
b. greater security to the People, 507
D. conclusions, on the impropriety of confining the choice of the People, when incumbents are qualified, to other and inexperienced candidates, 508
iii. an adequate provision for its support, LXXII. 508
i. without such a provision the Executive would be at the mercy of the legislature, 509
ii. the independence of the Executive cannot be impaired, 509
iv. competent powers, 510
i. the power of returning bills to the legislature without approval, 510
A. the propensity of the legislature to usurp authority considered, 510
B. the propriety of delegating this authority to the Executive considered, 510
a. to defend the Executive from legislative aggressions, 510
b. to defend the People from improper legislation, 511
C. objection, that "one man cannot possess more wisdom and virtue than a number of men," considered, 511
D. objection, that "the power of preventing bad laws includes that of preventing good ones," considered, 512
E. the influence of the legislature will prevent the frequent and incautious use of this power, 512
F. the greater danger is that it will not be used at all times when it may be employed usefully, No. LXXII. 513
G. the power not being absolute, two thirds of the legislature may successfully resist it, 514
a. a similar power delegated to the "Council of Revision" in New York, 515
b. the Governor of Massachusetts possesses a power similar to that which is here delegated to the Executive, 515
c. the latter preferable to the former, 515
ii. the command of the military and naval forces of the Union, LXXIII. 516
iii. to require opinions of heads of the executive departments, 516
iv. the power of pardoning offenders against the laws of the Union, 517
A. the propriety of delegating it to a single person considered, 517
B. the propriety of delegating authority to the President to pardon traitors considered, 517
v. in connection with the Senate, to make treaties, LXXIV. 519
A. one of the best digested features of the proposed Constitution, 519
B. objection, that it unites the executive and legislative departments, considered, 520
a. it is a proper combination of the two departments, 520
b. it is not entirely an executive, nor is it entirely a legislative subject, but combines the nature of both, 520
c. it cannot properly be delegated to an elective Executive alone, 521
d. it cannot properly be delegated to the Senate alone, 522
e. the House of Representatives cannot properly be admitted to share in that power, 523
C. objection, that two thirds of all the Senators should be required, instead of two thirds of those present, considered, 523
vi. in connection with the Senate, to appoint certain public officers, LXXV. 525
A. this feature of the proposed Constitution is entitled to particular commendation, 526
B. the People at large cannot exercise this power, 526
C. the President will usually be a man of ability, No. LXXV. 527
D. the delegation of this authority to one man will beget a livelier sense of duty and greater regard to reputation than the delegation of it to many, 527
E. objection, that it should have been delegated solely to the President, considered, 528
a. all the advantages desired to be gained thereby will be secured by the proposed plan, 528
b. the fact that his choice may be overruled by the Senate considered, 529
c. the necessary concurrence of the Senate will afford a check on the favoritism of the President, 529
F. objection, that the President thereby may secure the complaisance of the Senate to his views, considered, 530
a. the integrity of the whole body of the Senate will check such a result, 531
b. the proposed Constitution has guarded against it, 531
G. the consent of the Senate will be necessary to displace as well as to appoint officers of the government, LXXVI. 532
a. further stability will thereby be secured to the government, 532
H. objection, that the Senate will be unduly controlled by the President, considered, 533
I. objection, that the President will be unduly controlled by the Senate, considered, 533
J. this feature of the proposed Constitution compared with the plan of appointing State officers in New York, 534
K. the impropriety of delegating this authority to a council of appointment, 535
L. the impropriety of admitting the House of Representatives to share in this authority, 536
vii. to communicate information to Congress on the state of the Union, 536
viii. to recommend to Congress the adoption of such measures as he shall consider expedient, 537
ix. to convene one or both branches of the Congress on extraordinary occasions, 537
x. to adjourn the Congress when there is a disagreement concerning the time of adjournment, No. LXXVI. 537
xi. to receive ambassadors and other public ministers, 537
xii. to execute the laws of the Union, 537
xiii. to commission all the officers of the United States, 537
F. concluding remarks, 537
e. the Judiciary department, LXXVIII. 538
A. "the mode of appointing the judges," considered, 539
B. "the tenure by which the judges are to hold their places" considered, 539
a. it is similar to that by which the judges in the several States hold office, 539
b. objection thereto considered, 539
i. the Judiciary will be least in a capacity to annoy the other departments of the government, 539
ii. it is the weakest of the three departments of government, 540
c. the necessity for a complete independence of the Judiciary, 541
i. the authority of the courts to pronounce legislative acts void because contrary to the Constitution, considered, 541
ii. the exercise of that authority does not indicate that the Judiciary is superior to the legislature, 541
iii. that the legislature is the constitutional judge of its own powers, considered and denied, 542
iv. the interpretation of the laws is the peculiar province of the courts, 542
i. the effect of that interpretation on the action of the courts, 542
v. that consideration a reason for the permanent tenure of the Judiciary, 544
vi. independence of the Judiciary also necessary in order that it may guard the Constitution and the rights of individuals from sudden impulses of popular passion and prejudice, 544
vii. as well as the private rights of individuals from the mischievous effects of unjust and partial laws, 545
viii. it is necessary, also, to insure an inflexible and uniform adherence to the rights of the Constitution and of individuals, 546
ix. and from the nature of the qualifications which are required for the discharge of its duties, 546
d. the wisdom of the provision establishing good behavior as the tenure of office in the Judiciary department considered as conducive to its independence, No. LXXVIII. 547
e. a fixed provision for the support of the Judiciary also contributes to its independence, LXXIX. 548
i. "a power over a man's subsistence amounts to a power over his will," 548
ii. the provisions of the proposed Constitution on this subject stated, 548
f. the responsibility of the Judiciary considered, 550
i. it will be liable to impeachments under the proposed Constitution, 550
ii. it is not liable to removal for inability, 550
i. the impossibility of fixing the limits of ability and disability, 550
ii. the provisions of the constitution of New York considered, 550
g. the extent of the authority delegated to the Judiciary, LXXX. 551
i. to what cases the judicial authority of the Union ought to extend, considered, 551
i. to all cases arising from the duly enacted laws of the Union, 552
A. the necessity of a constitutional method of giving efficacy to constitutional provisions, 552
B. examples referred to, 552
ii. to all cases which concern the execution of the provisions expressly contained in the articles of Union, 553
iii. to all cases in which the United States are a party, 553
iv. to all cases which involve the peace of the confederacy, 553
A. in their foreign relations, 553
B. wherein two States, or a State and the citizens of another State, or the citizens of different States, are parties, 554
v. to all cases which originate on the high seas, and are of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, 555
vi. to all cases wherein the State tribunals cannot be supposed to be impartial and unbiased, 555
ii. to what cases it will extend under the proposed Constitution, 556
i. the constitutional provision stated generally, 556
ii. the powers thus delegated "conformable to the principles which ought to have governed the structure of the Judiciary," 556
iii. the propriety of delegating "equity jurisdiction" discussed, No. LXXX. 557
iii. concluding remarks, 558
C. "the partition of the judiciary authority between different courts, and their relations to each other," LXXXI. 559
a. the constitutional provision stated, 559
b. the propriety of establishing "one court of supreme and final jurisdiction" considered, 560
i. the propriety of delegating that authority to a distinct department, considered, 560
i. that "the errors and usurpations of such a body will be unaccountable and remediless" considered, 560
A. the proposed Constitution does not "directly empower the Judiciary to construe the laws according to the spirit of the Constitution," 561
ii. it secures more completely the separation of the Judiciary from the legislature, 561
iii. it recognizes more fully the principle of good behavior as the tenure of judicial office, 562
iv. it secures greater legal ability in the determination of causes, 562
v. it removes the Judiciary from the arena of party strife, 562
vi. the example of several States considered, 562
ii. no legislature can rectify the exceptionable decisions of the courts in any other sense than by prescribing a rule for future action, 563
iii. the "supposed danger of judiciary encroachments on the legislative authority" considered, 563
c. "the propriety of the power of constituting inferior courts" considered, 564
i. "it obviates the necessity of having recourse to the Supreme Court in every case of Fœderal cognizance," 564
ii. why the same purpose may not be accomplished by the instrumentality of the State courts considered, 565
iii. the advantage to be gained by dividing the United States into judicial districts, 566
d. "in what manner the judicial authority is to be distributed between the Supreme and the inferior courts of the Union," 566
i. the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court considered, 566
i. the Fœderal courts have no authority to enforce the payment of their debts by the individual States, No. LXXXI. 567
ii. the original jurisdiction of the inferior courts considered, 568
iii. the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court considered, 568
i. the meaning of the term "appellate" discussed, 568
ii. a review of matters of fact by the Supreme Court not to be implied as a necessary consequence, 569
iii. the motives which probably influenced the Convention in relation to this particular provision, 570
iv. the Congress will have authority to restrain the Supreme Court from reexamining matters of fact, 570
v. concluding remarks, 571
e. the jurisdiction of the State courts on Fœderal questions considered, LXXXII. 571
i. the individual States "will retain all preëxisting authorities which may not be exclusively delegated to the Fœderal head," 572
i. in what that "exclusive delegation" consists, 572
ii. "the State courts will retain the jurisdiction they now have, unless it appears to be taken away by exclusive delegation," 572
i. "the concurrent jurisdiction of the State tribunals the most natural and defensible construction" of the Constitution, 573
ii. this is "only clearly applicable to those descriptions of causes of which the State courts had previous cognizance," 573
iii. the decision of causes arising upon a particular regulation may be committed by the Congress to the Fœderal courts solely, if it desires to do so, 573
i. this will not divest the State courts of any part of their primitive jurisdiction, further than may relate to an appeal, 573
ii. nor, except where expressly excluded, of their right to take cognizance of the causes to which those particular regulations may give birth, 574
iv. the relation which will subsist between the State and the Fœderal courts in instances of concurrent jurisdiction, 574
i. an appeal will lie from the State courts to the Supreme Court of the United States, No. LXXXII. 574
ii. the appellate jurisdiction of the inferior Fœderal courts, in such cases, considered, 575
D. objection, that no provision has been introduced into the proposed Constitution to establish the right of trial by jury in civil cases, considered, LXXXIII. 576
a. the disingenuous form of the objection considered, 577
i. the silence of the Constitution on this subject, 577
ii. rules of legal interpretation applicable to this case, considered, 577
iii. "a power to constitute courts is a power to prescribe the mode of trial" therein, 578
iv. concluding remarks, 578
b. the proper use and true meaning of the maxims on which the objection rests, 579
c. the importance of the right of trial by jury considered, 581
i. its importance in criminal cases conceded, 581
ii. its relative unimportance in civil cases maintained, 581
i. a safeguard against undue taxation, denied, 582
ii. it affords security against official corruption, 583
iii. it is useful in settling questions of property, 584
iii. the extent to which juries are employed in different States, 584
d. "no general rule could have been fixed upon by the Convention which would have corresponded with the circumstances of all the States," 586
e. "as much might have been hazarded by taking the system of any one State as a standard, as by omitting it altogether" and leaving it to the Congress, 586
f. the difficulty of establishing a general constitutional rule, 586
i. the impropriety of its use in many cases, 587
i. those in which the foreign relations of the United States are concerned, 587
ii. those which belong to the equity jurisdiction, 588
ii. "the proposition of Massachusetts" on this subject considered, 589
iii. the provision of the constitution of New York on this subject considered, 591
iv. the proposition that it should be established in all cases whatever, 592
v. concluding remarks, 592
c. other objections to the proposed Constitution considered and answered, LXXXIV. 594
a. it contains no Bill of Rights, No. LXXXIV. 595
A. the constitution of New York contains none, considered, 595
a. it contains provisions in the body of the instrument, which, in substance, amount to the same thing, 595
b. it adopts, in their full extent, the common and statute laws of Great Britain, 595
B. the proposed Constitution contains, in the body of the instrument, similar equivalent provisions, 595
C. a Bill of Rights will be unnecessary, because the People will surrender nothing in the adoption of the proposed Constitution, and the government will be administered by their immediate representatives and servants, 598
D. a Bill of Rights would be dangerous, as implying the grant of all powers not expressly withheld, 599
E. the liberty of the press considered, 599
F. the proposed Constitution itself a Bill of Rights, 600
b. "the seat of government will be too remote from many of the States to admit of a proper knowledge, on the part of the constituent, of the conduct of the representative," 601
c. there is no provision respecting debts due to the United States, 603
d. the additional expense which will be imposed by the new system, 603
A. the increase of offices under the new government considered, 604
a. in many cases the State officers will be diminished to the same extent, 605
b. the judiciary will furnish the principal additions, 605
B. the diminished sessions of the Congress will counterbalance much of the increased expense, 605
C. the State legislatures, also, will hold shorter sessions, at diminished cost, 606
D. concluding remarks, 606
VI. "ITS ANALOGY TO YOUR [the People of the State of New York] OWN STATE CONSTITUTION," LXXXV. 607
VII. "THE ADDITIONAL SECURITY WHICH ITS ADOPTION WILL AFFORD TO THE PRESERVATION OF THAT SPECIES OF GOVERNMENT, TO LIBERTY, AND TO PROPERTY," 608
VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS, 609
1. the manner in which Publius had discussed the subject considered, 609
A. an appeal to the reader to weigh the subject under discussion carefully, and to act conscientiously, 609
B. the entire confidence of Publius in the arguments which recommend the proposed system, No. LXXXV. 610
2. the conceded imperfections of the system no cause for delay in adopting it, 610
A. the extent of these concessions has been greatly exaggerated, 610
a. "that it is radically defective" denied, 610
b. "that without material alterations the rights and interests of the community cannot be safely confided to it" denied, 610
c. although not perfect, it is upon the whole a good plan, 611
B. the precarious state of the country forbids delay for the only purpose of engaging in the chimerical pursuit of a perfect plan of government, 611
a. the improbability of assembling a new convention with the same success as that which attended the last, 611
b. more easy to obtain amendments subsequent to the adoption of the Constitution than previous thereto, 612
c. no plan can be proposed which will be satisfactory to all the States, in every respect, 612
d. supposed obstacles in the way of making subsequent amendments considered, 612
e. the ease with which a Fœderal convention may be called for the amendment of the Constitution, under the provisions of the proposed Constitution, 613
3. concluding remarks, 614