The Spirit of Laws (1758)/Volume I/The Translator to the Reader
THE
TRANSLATOR
TO THE
READER.
THE following work may with the strictest justice be said to have done honour to human nature as well as to the great abilities of the author. The wisest and most learned men, and those most distinguished by birth and the elevation of their stations, have, in every country in Europe, considered it as a most excellent performance. And may we be permitted to add, that a sovereign prince[1] as justly celebrated for his probity and good sense, as for his political and military skill, has declared that from M. de Montesquieu he has learnt the art of government. But has the illustrious author received no such distinguished honor, the numberous editions of this work in French, and their sudden spreading through all Europe, are a sufficient testimony of the high esteem with which it has been received by the public.
But notwithstanding the deserved applause which has been so liberally bestowed on the author, there have been some who have not only endeavoured to blast his laurels, but have treated him with all the scurrility which bigotry and superstition are apt, on every occasion, to throw out against truth, reason and good sense. These M. de Montesquieu has himself answered, in a separate treatise intitled, A defense of the Spirit of Laws, from whence we have thought proper to extract, for the sake of such as have not seen that treatise, the principal of those objections, and the substance of what has been given in reply: Only first observing, that this defence is divided into three parts, in the first of which he answers the general reproaches that have been thrown out against him; in the second he replies to particular reproaches; and in the third, he gives some reflections on the manner in which his work has been criticized.
The author first complains of his being charged both with espousing the doctrines of Spinosa (sic), and with being a Deist, two opinions directly contradictory to each other. To the former of these he answers, by placing in one view the several passages in the Spirit of Laws directly levelled against the doctrines of Spinosa; and then he replies to the objections that have been made to those passages, upon which this injurious charge is founded.
The critic asserts that our author stumbles at his first setting out, and is offended at his saying, that Laws in their most extensive signification, are the necessary relations derived from the nature of things. To this he replies, that the critic had heard it said that Spinosa had maintained that the world was governed by a blind and necessary principle; and from hence on seeing the word necessary, he concludes that this must be Spinosism; though what is most suprizing, this article is directly levelled at the dangerous principles maintained by Spinosa: That he had Hobbes's system in his eye, a system, which as it makes all the virtues and vices depend on the establishment of human laws, and as it would prove that men were born in a state of war, and that the first law of nature is a war of all against all, overturns, like Spinosa, all religion, and all morality. Hence he laid down this position, that there were laws of justice and equity before the establishment of positive laws: hence also he has proved that all beings had laws; that even before their creation they had possible laws; and that God himself had laws, that is, the laws which he himself had made. He has shewn[2] that nothing can be more false than the assertion that men were born in a state of war; and has made it appear that wars did not commence till after the establishment of society. His principles are here extremely clear; from whence it follows, that as he has attacked Hobbes's errors, he has consequently attacked those of Spinosa; and he has been so little understood, that they have taken for the opinions of Spinosa, those very objections which were made against Spinosism. Again, the author has said that the creation which appears to be an arbitrary act, supposes laws as invariable as the fatality of the Atheists. From these words the critic concludes that the author admits the fatality of the Atheists.
To this he answers, that he had just before destroyed this fatality, by representing it as the greatest absurdity to suppose that a blind fatality was capable of producing intelligent beings. Besides, in the passage here censured, he can only be made to say what he really does say: he does not speak of causes, nor does he compare causes; but he speaks of effects and compares effects. The whole article, what goes before and what follows, make it evident that there is nothing here intended but the laws of motion, which, according to the author, had been established by God: these laws are invariable; this he has asserted, and all natural philosophy has asserted the same thing; they are invariable because God has been pleased to make them so, and because he has pleased to preserve the world. When the author therefore says that the creation which appears to be an arbitrary act, supposes laws as invariable as the fatality of the Atheists, he cannot be understood to say that the creation was a necessary act like the fatality of the Atheists.
Having vindicated himself from the charge of Spinosism, he proceeds to the other accusation, and from a multitude of passages collected together proves that he has not only acknowledged the truth of revealed religion; but that he is in love with Christianity, and endeavors to make it appear amiable in the eyes of others. He then enquires into what his adversaries have said to prove the contrary, observing that the proofs ought to bear some proportion to the accusation; that this accusation is not of a frivolous nature, and that the proofs therefore ought not to be frivolous.
The first objection is, that he has praised the Stoics, who admitted a blind fatality, and that this is the foundation of natural religion. To this he replies, "I will for a moment suppose that this false manner of reasoning has some weight: has the author praised the philosophy and metaphysics of the Stoics? He has praised their morals, and has said that the people reaped great benefit from them: he has said this, and he has said no more: I am mistaken, he has said more, he has at the beginning of his book attacked this fatality, he does not then praise it, when he praises the Stoics."
The second objection is, that he has praised Bayle, in calling him a great man. To this he answers, "It is true that the author has called Bayle a great man, but he has censured his opinions: if he has censured them, he has not espoused them: and since has censured his opinions, he does not call him a great man because of his opinions. Every body knows that Bayle had a great genius which he abused; but this genius which he abused, he had: the author has attacked his sophisms, and pities him on account of his errors. I do not love the men who subvert the laws of their country; but I should find great difficulty in believing that Caesar and Cromwell had little minds: I am not in love with conquerors, but it would be very difficult to persuade me to believe that Alexander and Jenghiz-Khan were men of only a common genius. Besides, I have remarked, that the declamations of angry men make but little impression on any except those who are angry: the greatest part of the readers are men of moderation, and seldom take up a book but when they are in cool blood; for rational and sensible men love reason. Had the author loaded Bayle with a thousand injurious reproaches, it would not have followed from thence, that Bayle had reasoned well or ill; all that his readers would have been able to conclude from it would have been, that the author knew how to be abusive."
The third objection is, that he has not in his first chapter spoken of original sin. To which he replies: "I ask every sensible man if this chapter is a treatise of divinity? if the author had spoken of original sin, they might have imputed it to him as a crime that he had not spoken of redemption."
The next objection takes notice, that "The author has said that in England self-murder is the effect of distemper, and that it cannot be punished without punishing the effects of madness; the consequence the critic draws from hence is, that a follower of natural religion can never forget that England is the cradle of his sect, and that he rubs a sponge over all the crimes he found there." He replies, "The author does not know that England is the cradle of natural religion; but he knows that England was not his cradle. He is not of the same religious sentiments as an Englishman, any more than an Englishman who speaks of physical effects he found in France, is not of the same religion as the French. He is not a follower of natural religion; but wishes that his critic was a follower of natural logic."
These are the principal objections levelled against our author, on this head, from which our reader will sufficiently see on what trifling, what puerile arguments this charge of Deism is founded. He concludes however this article, with a defence of the the religion of nature, and such a defence as every rational Christian must undoubtedly approve.
"Before I conclude this first part, I am tempted to make one objection against him who has made so many; but he has so stunned my ears with the words follower of natural religion, that I scarcely dare pronounce them. I shall endeavour however to take courage. Do not the critic's two pieces stand in greater need than that which I defend? Does he do well, while speaking of natural religion and revelation, to fall perpetually upon one side of the subject, and to lose all traces of the other? Does he do well never to distinguish those who acknowledge only the religion of nature, from those who acknowledge both natural and revealed religion? Does he do well to turn frantic whenever the author considers man in the state of natural religion, and whenever he explains any thing on the principles of natural relgion? Does he do well to confound natural religion with Atheism? Have I not heard that natural religion is employed to prove the truth of revelation against the Deists? and that the same natural religion is employed to prove the existence of a God against the Atheists? He has said that the Stoics were the followers of natural religion; and I say, that they were Atheists, since they believed that a blind fatality governed the universe; and it is by the religion of nature that we ought to attack that of the Stoics. He says that the scheme of natural religion is connected with that of Spinosa; and I say, that they are contradictory to each other, and it is by natural religion that we ought to destroy Spinosa's scheme. I say, that to confound natural religion with Atheism, is to confound the proof with the thing to be proved, and the objections against the error with error itself, and that this is to take away the most powerful arms we have against this error."
The author now proceeds to the second part of his defence, in which he has the following remarks. "What has the critic done to give an ample scope to his declamations, and to open the widest door to invectives? he has considered the author, as if he had intended to follow the example of M. Abbadye (sic), and had been writing a treatise on the Christian religion: he has attacked him, as if his two books on religion were two treatises on divinity; he has cavilled against him, as if while he had been talking of any religion whatsoever which was not Christian, he should have examined it according to the principles, and doctrines of Christianity; he has judged him as if in his two books relating to religion he ought to have preached to Mahometans and Idolaters the doctrines of Christianity. Whenever he has spoken of religion in general, whenever he has made use of the word religion, the critic says, that is the Christian religion; whenever he has compared the religious rites of different nations and has said that they are more conformable to the political government of these countries than some other rites, the critic again says, you approve them then and abandon the Christian faith: when he has spoken of a people who have never embraced Christianity, or who have lived before Christ, again says the critic, you do not then acknowledge the morals of Christianity; when he has canvassed any custom whatsoever, which he has found in a political writer, the critic asks him, Is this a doctrine of Christianity? He might as well add, You say you are a civilian, and I will make you a divine in spite of yourself: you have given us elsewhere some very excellent things on the Christian religion, but this was only to conceal your real sentiments, for I know your heart, and penetrate into your thoughts. It is true I do not understand your book, nor is it material that I should discover the good or bad design with which it has been written; but I know the bottom of all your thoughts: I do not know a word of what you have said, but I understand perfectly well, what you have not said."
But to proceed. The author has maintained that polygamy is necessarily and in its own nature bad; he has wrote a chapter expressly against it, and afterwards has examined in a philosophical manner, in what countries, in what climates, or in what circumstances it is least pernicious; he has compared climates with climates, and countries with countries, and has found, that there are countries, where its effects are less pernicious than in others; because, according to the accounts that have been given of them, the number of men and women not being every where equal, it is evident, that if there are places where there are more women than men, polygamy, bad as it is in itself, is there less pernicious than in others. But as the title of this chapter[3] contains these words, That the law of polygamy is an affair of calculation, they have seized this title as an excellent subject for declamation. Having repeated the chapter itself, against which no objection is made, he proceeds to justify the title and adds: "Polygamy is an affair of calculation when we would know, if it is more or less pernicious in certain climates, in certain countries, in certain circumstances than in others; it is not an affair of calculation when we would decide whether it be good or bad in itself. It is not an affair of calculation when we reason on its nature; it may be an affair of calculation when we combine its effects; in short it is never an affair of calculation when we enquire into the end of marriage, and it is still less so, when we enquire into marriage as a law established and confirmed by Jesus Christ.
Again, the author having said, that[4] polygamy is more conformable to nature in some countries than in others, the critic has seized the words more conformable to nature, to make him say, that he approves polygamy. To which he answers, "If I say, that I should like better to have a fever than the scurvy, does this signify that I should like to have a fever? or only that the scurvy is more disagreeable to me than a fever?"
Having finished his reply to what had been objected on the subject of polygamy, he vindicates that excellent part of his work which treats of the climates; when speaking of the influence these have upon religion, he vindicates that excellent part of his work which treats of the climates; when speaking of the influence these have upon religion, he says, "I am very sensible that religion is in its own nature independent of all physical causes whatsoever, that the religion which is good in one country is good in another, and that it cannot be pernicious in one country without being so in all; but yet, I say, that it is practiced by men, and has a relation to those who do not practice it, any religion whatsoever will find a greater facility in being practiced, either in the whole or in part, in certain countries than in others, and in certain circumstances than in others, and that whoever says the contrary must renounce all pretensions to sense and understanding."
But the critic has been greatly offended by our author's saying,[5] that when a state is at liberty to receive or to reject a new religion it ought to be rejected; when it is received, it ought to be tolerated. From hence he objects, that the author has advised idolatrous princes, not to admit the Christian religion into their dominions. To this he answers first by referring to a passage in which he says,[6] that the best civil and political laws are, next to Christianity, the greatest blessings that men can give or receive; and adds, "If then Christianity is the first and greatest blessing, and the political and civil laws the second, there are no political and civil laws in any state that can or ought to hinder the entrance of the Christian religion."
His second answer is, "That the religion of heaven is not established by the same methods as the religions of the earth; read the history of the church, and you will see the wonders performed by the Christian religion: was she to enter a country, she knew how to open its gates; every instrument was able to effect it; at one time God makes use of a few fishermen, at another he sets an emperor on the throne and makes him bow down his head under the yoak of the gospel. Does Christianity hide herself in subterranean caverns? Stay a moment, and you see an advocate speaking from the imperial throne on her behalf. She traverses, whenever she pleases, seas, rivers, and mountains; no obstacles here below can stop her progress: implant aversion in the mind, she will conquer this aversion: establish customs, form habits, publish edicts, enact laws, she will triumph over the climate, over the laws which result from it, and over the legislators who have made them. God acting according to decrees which are unknown to us extends or contracts the limits of his religion.
He next proceeds to vindicate what he has said on celibacy; but as another writer who has done justice to this work, has set the ill consequences attending the celibacy of the clergy in a stronger light, than it would perhaps have been prudent for any gentleman in France to have done, we shall beg leave to insert a paragraph or two from him.
"The doctrine of the perfection of celibacy, says he, has produced the same destructive effects, in Europe, as the heat of the climate, the jealousy of commanders, and the slavery of the women have produced in Asia. According to the most exact observations, a state that suffers neither pestilence, nor war, nor famine, doubles the number of its inhabitants every sixty years. This being granted, every kingdom which contains an hundred thousand monks, loses every sixty years, two hundred thousand men, and a much greater number if an hundred thousand monks are always kept on foot. Thus suppofing that they have had in France since the year 1640, two millions of souls who have taken the vow of celibacy, this kingdom has lost these two millions who have been unuseful during their life, four millions which would have been produced by them in the space of an hundred and twenty years, two millions which would have proceeded from the children of the first, from the year 1690 to the year 1750, and two millions which would be produced by the children of the two last millions from the year 1750 to the year 1810. In all ten millions, a loss which though immense is real; because the two millions upon which I build this computation may reasonably be supposed to be sheltered from the miseries of war and famine, and to propagate in full security: from hence it follows that France having only twenty millions of souls, though it ought without the obstacle of celibacy to have thirty millions by the year 1810, it loses one third of the force it might acquire. Can we then be astonished that states formerly extremely populous should be now thinly inhabited?
"Cast an eye on the infinite number of persons who in the two last ages have taken the vow of celibacy. Compute the descendants they would have had in this space. To avoid all dispute add only to the generative number, a number equal to it, and you will find that they would be equal to all Europe. What would they be, if you were to attempt to calculate the progressive course of generations. Your imagination would create immense multitudes which celibacy has annihilated. What would they be if you considered this subject with the eye of faith, according to this principle, that all the people upon earth, who are commonly computed an hundred millions, are all descended from one man, created about six thousand years ago; you will very readily find, that even a dozen men who at the beginning of Christianity embraced celibacy, might very well deprive the world of as many millions of inhabitants as it at this day contains."
These are some of the principal objections that have been made to the Spirit of Laws; objections which however weak and trifling, have been uttered with the zeal of a blind bigot, who seeks to pervert what he does not understand, Truth and good sense always meet with enemies, and though expressed in the strongest and clearest manner, will be misinterpreted by the ignorant; and attacked, censured and vilified by those, who, blinded by zeal or prejudice, are resolved to see every thing through a false medium. The author has however, done ample justice to his own work, and has sufficiently cleared his reputation from all the aspersions that have been thrown upon it; we shall therefore conclude this preface with the third part of his defence, which, as it consists of some excellent reflections on the manner in which the Spirit of Laws has been criticised, and as it may be of use to direct the judgment of future critics, we shall give intire, and without abbreviation.
"We have seen in the two first parts, that all that results from so many bitter criticisms is this, that the author of the Spirit of Laws has not performed his work according to the plan and the views of his critics; and that it his critics had wrote upon the same subject, they would have inserted in it a great number of things with which they were acquainted. It appears also that they are divines, and the author is a civilian; that they think themselves able to perform his business, and that he does not think himself fit for theirs. In short, it follows, that instead of attacking him with such asperity, they would have done better to have felt the value of what he has said in favour of religion: which he has equally respected and defended: I shall now make some reflections.
"That manner of reasoning is not good, which being employed against any good book whatsoever, will make it appear as bad as the worst book whatsoever; and which being employed against any bad book whatsoever, may make it appear as good as the best book whatsoever.
"That manner of reasoning is not good, which to those things that are the subject of dispute, calls in others that are foreign to the purpose, and which confounds the several sciences and the principles of each science.
"We ought not to dispute upon a work built upon a science, from reasons that may be brought against the science itself.
"When we criticise a work, and particularly a large work, we ought to endeavour to obtain a particular knowledge of the science of which it treats, and carefully to read the approved authors who have already wrote on that science, to the end that we may be enabled to see if the author has deviated from the common and received manner of treating the subject.
"When an author explains himself by his words, or by writings, which are the image of words, it is contrary to reason to quit the exterior signs of his thoughts, in order to search into his thoughts themselves; because there are none besides himself who know his thoughts: it is much worse when his thoughts are good, and they attribute to him those that are bad.
"When we write against an author, and become incensed against him, we should prove the qualifications by the things, and not the things by the qualifications.
"When we find in an author a good intention in general, we shall be more rarely deceived, if in certain places which appear equivocal, we judge according to the general intention, than if we impute to him a particular bad intention.
"In books designed for amusement, three or four pages may give an idea of the style, and the perfection of the work: in books of argumentation, we see nothing if we do not see the whole chain.
"As it is extremely difficult to make a good work, and extremely easy to criticise upon it, because the author has had all the passes to guard, and the critic has but one to force; it is necessary that this last should never be in the wrong: and if it happens that he is continually wrong, he must be inexcusable.
"Besides, as the criticism may be considered as an ostentation of his superiority over others, and its ordinary design is to gratify human pride, those who deliver themselves up to this gratification, always deserve to be treated with equity, but seldom with indulgence.
"And as of all the different kinds of writing, this is that in which it is most difficult to shew a good natural disposition, care should be taken not to encrease by the asperity of the expressions, the disagreeableness of matter.
"When a person writes on great subjects, it is not sufficient that he consults his zeal; he should also consult his abilities; and if heaven has not granted us great talents, we may supply them by a distrust of ourselves, by accuracy, labour, and reflection.
"That art of finding, in what has naturally a good meaning, all the bad meanings, which a mind accustomed to false reasoning can give, is of no service to mankind; those who practise it referable the ravens who shun living bodies, and fly on all sides in search of carcasses.
"This conduct, when observed in criticism, produces two very great inconveniences: the first is, that it spoils the minds of the readers, by a mixture of true and false, good and bad: they accustom themselves to search for a bad sense in things that naturally have a very good one; from whence it becomes easy to pass to a disposition to search for a good sense in things that have naturally a bad one; it makes them lose the ability of reasoning justly, by throwing them into all the subtilties of false logic. The second mischief is, that rendering by this manner of reasoning, the good suspected, they have no other arms to enable them to attack the worst and most pernicious performances; by which means the public lose the very rules by which they might distinguish them. If they treat as Spinosists and as Deists those that are not so, what will they say to those who are?
"Though we ought readily to think that the men who write against us, upon subjects in which all mankind are concerned, are determined to this conduct by the force of Christian charity; nevertheless as the nature of this virtue will fearcely permit it to be concealed, as it shews itself in us in spite of ourselves, and shines and sparkles on all sides; if it happened that in two pieces both wrote against the same person, one upon the back of another, there could be found no trace of this charity, that it did not appear in any phrase, in any turn, any word, any expression; he who had wrote such works would have just reason to fear his not being influenced by Christian charity.
"And as the virtues purely human, are in us the effect of what is called good nature; if it was impossible to discover any vestige of this good nature, the public might from thence conclude that these writings were not the effect of human virtues.
"In the eyes of men, actions arc always more sincere than motives; and it is more easy for them to believe that the act of uttering the most cruel invectives is evil, than to persuade them that the motive which made them utter them is good.
"When a man is placed in a situation which creates a respect for religion, and in which religion entitles him to respect, and attacks before the men of the world, one of their own body; it is absolutely necessary, that he should maintain, by his manner of acting, the superiority of his character. The world is very corrupt; but there are certain passions which even in the world are under a great restraint; there are favourites which forbid the others appearing. Consider the men of the world in respect to each other, there is nothing so timid; this arises from a pride which durst not discover its secret motion, and which from the respect it has for others, lets go its hold in order to recover it again. Christianity gives us the habit of subduing this pride; the world gives us the habit of concealing it. With the few virtues we have what would become of us, if the whole soul was set at liberty, and if we were not attentive to the least words, the least signs, and the least gestures? Now when persons of a respectable character discover passions which the men of the world durst not suffer to appear, these begin to believe themselves better than they really are. This is an evil of very great consequence.
"We men of the world are so frail that we deserve to be treated with the extremest circumspection and address: for when they let us see all the exterior marks of violent passions, what would they have us think of their minds? Can they hope that we, with our ordinary rash way of judging, shall not be tempted to judge?
"They might have remarked in disputes and conversations what happens amongst that part of mankind whose spirits are rough and untractable: as they do not combat to assist, but to throw each other to the earth, they fly from truth, not in proportion to the greatness or littleness of their souls; but to the greater or the less degree of that caprice or inflexibility which constitutes their characters. The contrary happens to those to whom nature or education have given a sweetness of temper: as their disputes are mutual helps, as they center in the same object, as they think differently only that they may arrive at the same sentiments, they find truth according to their abilities.
"When a man writes on religious subjects, he ought not to depend so far on the piety of his readers, as to say what is contrary to good sense; because, to gain credit with those who have more piety than knowledge, he will gain discredit from those who have more knowledge than piety.
"And as religion, when let alone, is capable of. defending herself, she loses more when ill defended, than when she is not " defended at all.
"If it should happen that a man, after having lost his readers, should attack any one who had gained some reputation, and by that method should find the means of being read; it might perhaps be suspected that under the pretence of sacrificing this victim to religion, he sacrificed him to his self-love.
"That manner of criticism of which we are speaking, is of all things in the world, the most capable of limiting the extent, and of diminishing, if I may presume to make use of this term, the sum total of rational genius. Theology has its bounds and set forms; because the truths it teaches being known, it is necessary that men should adhere to them; and they ought to be hindered from wandering: it is here that genius ought not to take its flights; it is circumscribed, if I may be allowed the expression, within an enclosure. But it would be making a jest of mankind to put the same enclosure about those who treat of human sciences. The principles of geometry are most true; but if they were applied to things of taste, they would make reason itself talk nonsense. Nothing stifles a doctrine so effectually, as wrapping up every thing in a doctor's gown: the men who would always teach, are great obstacles to learning; there is no genius which they do not contract, when they overwhelm it with a million of frivolous scruples. If you have the best intentions in the world, they will force you to suspect them; you can no longer be employed in speaking well, when you are perpetually terrified with the fear of speaking ill; and when instead of pursuing your thoughts, you are only employed in finding out such terms as may escape the subtilty of the critics. They come to put a biggin on our heads, and to repeat at every word, Take care of falling. You would speak like yourself, I will have you speak like me. Do you attempt to soar aloft, they stop you by pulling your sleeve: have you life and vigour, they scratch you cut of it: do you rise a little, there are men, who taking a foot rule, and holding up heads cry, Come down that we may measure you: do you run your race, they would have you observe all the stones which their trifling forms have placed in your way. No science, no literature can escape this pedantry: for our age has formed academicians who would make us enter the schools of the darkest and most ignorant times. Descartes may properly give courage to those, who with a genius infinitely less than his, have as good intentions: this great man was perpetually accused of Atheism; and yet there are not at this day stronger arguments employed against the Atheists than he himself produced.
"As to the rest, we ought not to regard criticisms as personal, except in the case where those who make them would render them so. It is extremely proper that persons should be permitted to criticise the works that have been given to the public, because it would be ridiculous, for those who have been willing to enlighten others, not to be willing to be enlightened themselves. Those who inform us are the companions of our labours: if both the critic and the author seek the truth, they are in the same interest; for as truth is the property of all men; they will be confederates and not enemies."