History of the United States During the Administrations of Thomas Jefferson/Second/I:16
Chapter 16: The Berlin Decree
While the summer of 1806 was passing in America, carrying Burr and his insane projects to failure, General Armstrong in Paris was watching the progress of another adventurer, whose plans were as dark as those of Burr, but whose genius was of a very different order. Talleyrand's mysterious instructions regarding Florida were given to Armstrong early in September, 1805. Ulm capitulated October 17; the battle of Trafalgar was fought October 21. Napoleon was thenceforward master of the Continent, and England of the ocean. December 2 Napoleon won the decisive battle of Austerlitz, and December 26 he signed the treaty of Pressburg which humbled Austria.
The wit of man often lagged behind the active movement of the world; but never had diplomatists a harder task than to keep abreast of Napoleon. Other men had moments of repose; but Napoleon's mind seemed never to rest. His schemes were developed, and swept over Europe like so many storm-centres. His plans sometimes succeeded and sometimes failed, but the success or the failure equally implied a greater effort behind; and while Armstrong and his brother diplomatists speculated about the Emperor's motives in pursuing one object, the Emperor was already devising and using new machinery for gaining another. At the close of the war with Austria, Armstrong needed to learn whether Napoleon still wanted money, whether Talleyrand favored the sale of Florida, whether the treaty of Pressburg had or had not left American affairs where they were; and none of these questions could be answered except by Napoleon himself, who was already far advanced in schemes which no one could fathom, and which largely depended for their success on the skill with which he could conceal them from Jefferson.
Armstrong could only wait. Through the winter of 1805-1806, while John Randolph's opposition delayed Madison's instructions to the minister at Paris, Armstrong had nothing to do. The Emperor and Talleyrand returned to Paris at midnight Jan. 26, 1806. More powerful than ever and more absolute, Napoleon came back from Vienna rich with the contributions he had levied in Germany, but angry at the condition into which Marbois had brought the Treasury of France. Within twelve hours after arriving at the Tuileries he called a council of his ministers, disgraced Marbois, and appointed Mollien in his place.
That this revolution in the Cabinet had some bearing upon American interests was more than likely; for not only was Marbois an honest man and a warm friend of the United States, but the weight that dragged him down was nothing less than the weight of Spanish finances. The story may be shortly told. Napoleon's wars and repudiation of every inconvenient debt threw the French mercantile class into general bankruptcy. In the want of coin to supply the demands of the Emperor and of the merchants, the Bank of France issued dangerous amounts of paper money. To support these issues specie had to be obtained; and the empire which produced specie was Spain. Spain might be forced to give up her treasures; her arrears of subsidy alone would if paid add greatly to Marbois's resources. Yet the treasures of Spain were shut in Mexico and Peru; they could be brought to Europe only under danger of capture; and a means by which ten or twenty million Mexican dollars could run the gauntlet of British cruisers and reach in safety the Bank of France was a matter of necessity to Marbois.
The ordinary business of the Treasury in discounts and contracts was conducted through a firm called the "Négociants réunis," consisting of three capitalists,—Messrs. Ouvrard, Desprez, and Vanlerberghe. Ouvrard, the most active of the three, went to Madrid; and by lending assistance to the sorely pressed Treasury and trade of Spain induced the Spanish government to give him the privilege of importing bullion from Mexico at the rate of seventy-five cents on the dollar. The risk of importation was worth twenty-five per cent on any cargo; but Ouvrard meant to escape all risk. He had plans of his own, involving partnership with the British government itself through the Hopes and Barings of Amsterdam and London; he proposed to draw some five million dollars from Mexico by giving to the United States government drafts on South America in settlement of the Spanish spoliations, besides getting no less than ten million dollars from the United States government for the Floridas.
The unnamed negotiator who came to Armstrong in September, 1805, with Talleyrand's autograph instructions was an agent of Marbois and Ouvrard, whose errand was doubtless known to the Emperor. Meanwhile the Treasury, the Bank, and the "Négociants réunis" supported each other by loans, discounts, and indorsements, largely resting on Spanish bonds, and made face as well as they could against commercial embarrassments and Napoleon's arbitrary calls for great sums of coin; but the Treasury, being in truth the only solvent member of the partnership, must ultimately be responsible for the entire loss whenever matters should come to liquidation.
This was the state of the finances when, Jan. 27, 1806, Napoleon called Marbois and Ouvrard before him. No one charged criminality on any of the parties to the affair. In truth one person alone was to blame, and that person was the Emperor himself; but men who served such masters were always in the wrong,—and in fact Marbois, Ouvrard, Desprez, and Vanlerberghe accepted their fate. Marbois was disgraced; while the three others were obliged to surrender all their property under the alternative of going to Vincennes, with its memories of the Duc d'Enghien.
The dismissal of Marbois and the ruin of Ouvrard had no immediate effect on the Florida negotiation. So far from discouraging Armstrong's hopes, they seemed at first likely to bring about some arbitrary decision, after the Emperor's well-known style of settling questions in which he had an interest. In the middle of February Armstrong wrote in some alarm to Madison:—
- "All the points in controversy between his Catholic Majesty and the United States were submitted on the 14th instant to this Government by the Spanish ambassador, with an order from his Court to solicit the immediate interposition of the Emperor and King. That his Majesty will take upon himself the mediation is not to be questioned; but the form he may think proper to give to it is a point equally doubtful and important. Should this movement on the part of Spain have been spontaneous, growing merely out of her own policy and feelings, there is reason to believe that I may be able to prevent any sudden and unfavorable determination from being taken; but if, on the other hand, it should have been either dictated or invited by this Cabinet, the presumption is strong that the decision is already taken, and will present only the alternative,—submission or hostility. Of the two conjectures, the latter is the more probable."
For the moment, while Napoleon was struggling with the confusion of his finances, he held Florida in reserve as a resource for extremity, Armstrong was officially or semi-officially told that the Emperor supposed the whole matter of the Spanish-American dispute to be regularly before him by consent of both parties.  He had another long interview with his unnamed negotiator, who pressed him to accept Spanish drafts on South America in payment of the claims for Spanish spoliations, and who argued with much obstinacy that Florida was well worth ten million dollars to the United States.
During all this time Armstrong had heard not a word from his Government. While the minister was listening to these whispers of imperial policy at Paris, Madison had but begun to write the long-delayed instructions which were in effect an acceptance of Talleyrand's proffered terms. The long-delayed "Two-Million Act" received the President's signature Feb. 13, 1806; but not until March 13 did Madison sign the instructions which contained the project of a convention. This despatch was accompanied by another of March 15, which contained an explanation of the Miranda affair and long complaints of Yrujo's conduct. The law prohibiting trade with St. Domingo, "although it must be understood to have proceeded. . . not from any rightful requisition on the part of France, and still less from a manner of pressing it which might have justly had a contrary tendency," was enclosed in the despatch, with instructions to sound the French government in the hope of inducing Napoleon to lay aside his objections to the traffic.
The packet sailed at once; and after a voyage of the usual length arrived in France in time to bring the despatches, May 1, to Armstrong's hands. No apparent change had then taken place in the Emperor's plans; but during the three months of labor since his return from Austria he had succeeded in restoring order to his finances and was richer than ever before. The Spanish government sent to Paris a certain Señor Izquierdo as special agent to make a financial arrangement with Napoleon; and through him much business was done unknown to the department over which Talleyrand presided. In short the situation had changed, although no one, even among the Emperor's immediate household, knew what had taken place.
In pursuance of the secret memorandum in Talleyrand's handwriting, Armstrong, May 1, sent a note to the Foreign Office in the language of his instructions. Talleyrand acted promptly; May 2 he carried Armstrong's note to Napoleon's closet. Without discussing the matter the Emperor said: "I have some papers in relation to that business which you have not seen." The next day these papers were given to him. They consisted in maps and charts of the Floridas, with many arguments to prove their military and naval importance to Spain, and a formal declaration from Don Carlos IV. that on no account would he consent to alienate them either by sale or otherwise.
Talleyrand immediately sent for the American minister and told him what had occurred. Only a few weeks before, with equal appearance of seriousness, Armstrong had been assured that the whole matter was in the Emperor's hands by the request of the Spanish government. May 3 he was suddenly told that King Charles would on no account consent to alienate Florida. If the first story were true the second must be false. Armstrong hinted as much. "Though I have not seen the overture on paper," said he, "yet I am not the less assured that it had existence; and if I have not been much deceived, it may at this moment be found in the portfolio of M. Ouvrard."
"That may be," replied Talleyrand; "but it is not the less true that circumstances have produced an entire change in the dispositions of Spain." Then, as though to protect himself from the charge of deception by making a counter-charge against Armstrong, he suddenly hinted that Armstrong's own conduct had much to do with alarming the pride of Spain.
- "Do you know," said he, "that Mr. Erving has communicated to the Prince of Peace the confidential propositions of which you were made the depositary last summer, and that they were derived from Mr. Bowdoin, as it would appear for the express purpose of being so communicated?"
At this unexpected shock, coming instantly after the other, Armstrong was thunderstruck.
- "You may readily imagine my confusion and astonishment at this discovery," he continued in his narrative to Madison. "I had confided the propositions to Mr. Bowdoin under the most solemn injunctions of secrecy. . . . Could I believe that a man to whom his country has committed so high an office could so flagrantly violate a trust so sacred?"
His anger was diverted from Talleyrand to his colleague; but in spite of this successful diversion, one might suppose Armstrong capable, even in anger, of seeing that Talleyrand's story was not altogether clear,—that he was trying to distract attention from his own failures.
The more closely Ouvrard's scheme was brought to light, the more clearly it seemed to take the form of an intrigue or a job. The notorious corruption that surrounded Talleyrand explained the favor shown it by the French Foreign Office; but neither the Emperor of France nor the King of Spain was ruled in such matters by subordinates, and Armstrong began to feel the error of making his own Government the instrument of Ouvrard's speculations. Too deeply involved to draw back he took refuge in caution, and said even to the Secretary of State as little as he could. Above all, he avoided reference to possible corruption involved in the bargain. His colleague Bowdoin, whose garrulity had already annoyed him, did not imitate Armstrong's reticence, but wrote to the President the facts which Jefferson least cared to know. The profits on the Louisiana stock, he said, had stimulated jobbery; fifteen per cent discount on one million seven hundred and ten thousand dollars had been divided among the individuals concerned. The two Floridas were offered by Daniel Parker, agent of the Hopes in Amsterdam, who came with a letter of recommendation from Labouchere, Sir Francis Baring's son-in-law, and who held or pretended to hold powers of transfer from the Prince of Peace. The highest point to which the propositions could be traced was to one Cazeneau, Parker's friend, who lived in Talleyrand's house. Some time afterward Bowdoin added  that a new negotiator had appeared,—a former private secretary to Talleyrand,—a M. Dautremont, who came to Skipwith, the American consul at Paris, and after explaining that the X. Y. Z. business and the jealousy of the American government had caused much uneasiness in matters of this delicate nature, suggested that other means less exposed than money to observation might be devised. He thought well of land-grants to Talleyrand's brother, in which Skipwith might take a share.
With so many different persons and interests involved in the Floridas and the claims, Armstrong might feel confident that a single rebuff from the Emperor would not end the matter. After a few weeks Talleyrand quietly instigated the American minister to renew his request, which was done by a note of May 25; and May 28 Armstrong received in reply an official assurance of "his Majesty's wishes to see the controversy amicably terminated, and his readiness to lend himself to that object." Talleyrand was not only in earnest but in haste; for on the same day, May 28, he wrote to M. de Vandeul, who was in charge of the French embassy at Madrid, a cautious letter of instructions. The United States government, he said, seemed disposed to renew negotiations with Spain. He ran over the points in dispute, and sketched the outlines of an arrangement, including the cession of West Florida.
- "You will have, sir, to express no official opinion on this point," he said. "I need only tell you, in order that you may make use of it in your conversations, that this part of the Floridas must be warmly desired by the Americans, because it closes the mouths of several rivers which have a great part of their course within the United States. Under another Power Florida, so situated, can intercept American commerce; and since the Province is thinly populated and very accessible by land, it is to be presumed that the United States would seize the first pretext for invasion. If Spain is not bent on preserving this colony, she may listen to the American propositions; and all that she would have to remark in making this arrangement is that West Florida, which brings very little revenue to her, would be a much more valuable possession for the United States."
Vandeul was intimate with G. W. Erving, the American chargé at Madrid; and with friendly zeal he entered into the negotiation. Taking Talleyrand's despatch and Armstrong's note, a copy of which was inclosed for his guidance, he went to the Prince of Peace, with whom he had a long conversation June 18, 1806.
- "To tell your Excellency the truth," he wrote the next day to Talleyrand, "I ought to inform you that the Prince of Peace appears to me to hold pronounced opinions excessively opposed to the conciliatory views which I should have wished to find in him. Nevertheless I did my best to bring him to less passionate ideas, and asked him whether he did not think it a matter of general interest that the old relations should be restored between Spain and the United States, even admitting (for this is one of the Prince's allegations) that they were only suspended for the moment as to official forms. He answered me that this state of things was in no way prejudicial to the interests of the two countries; that commerce continued between them under the safeguard of reciprocal good faith; and that this mode of existence might last a long time without disquieting Spain."
Vandeul was obliged to urge the Emperor's wish for a reconciliation and the advance made by Armstrong at Paris. Thereupon Godoy suddenly changed his tone. "At bottom," said he, "we are quite ready to see where they want to come out; you may assure your Court of that." Vandeul thanked him, and added that he hoped the Prince would be pleased to have the matter negotiated at Paris. "Well, granted again!" answered Godoy; "I see no inconvenience in consenting to that." "Your Excellency authorizes me to inform M. de Talleyrand by my first despatch?" "By your first despatch."
Greatly pleased at his success, Vandeul immediately wrote to Talleyrand. A few days afterward he returned to the Prince of Peace, and in a long interview undertook to dispose of the whole subject. Godoy objected chiefly that as yet no official representation had been made on which the Government of Spain could act. Vandeul urged that Armstrong's note and Talleyrand's instructions were sufficient proof that the Americans had changed their tone and system. In his earnestness he insisted upon expressing his opinion on all the points in dispute, including the cession of West Florida.
- "Then the Prince gave way entirely to the accession that I asked; and in a manner that I found not only open, but even friendly, told me to renew to you what he had previously authorized me to write to you, and to add that ministerial measures should decidedly be taken for a suitable expression of the intentions of the Spanish Court both to your Highness and to the American ministers, with views of conciliation and definite arrangement, in the dispute with the United States."
Vandeul was convinced that the Prince spoke the truth, and he hurried to tell Erving. The American chargé, though far from friendly to Spain, believed that Godoy was honest; and he hastened to notify Armstrong. Armstrong had no doubt that all was well, and lost no time in consulting Talleyrand, who had every motive to feel sure of success. The Spanish imbroglio seemed on the verge of a friendly settlement.
Suddenly occurred one of the scenes of melodrama to which the Emperor's servants were accustomed. When Talleyrand brought Vandeul's despatch to his master, Napoleon broke into a passion. Rebuking Talleyrand sharply for having pressed the matter in its first stages, he threatened to degrade and punish Vandeul; and he ordered Talleyrand not only to reprimand his subordinate in the severest manner, but himself to meddle no more with the subject. His orders were instantly followed with the blind obedience which marked the Emperor's service. Vandeul was still congratulating himself on his success, and waiting for a letter of approval from Paris, when a despatch arrived which shivered his diplomatic triumph. Without a word of explanation, Talleyrand administered the reproof he had been ordered to give. Vandeul was told that he had gone altogether beyond his instructions:—
- "To cause the negotiations of these two Governments to be opened under his Majesty's eyes would be to associate him in all their quarrels and to render him more or less responsible for the results. He will see with pleasure the return of a good understanding between the two countries; but they alone can judge what means of reconciliation suit their respective interests."
A few days afterward came another and sharper reprimand:—
- "In demanding that the negotiation should take place at Paris, in making overtures to the United States minister while he has not even received instructions from his Government, in leading the Prince of Peace to believe that everything would be done under the mediation of France,—you exceed the instructions marked out for you; and such is the effect of one false step, that it inevitably draws others after it before the system which has been forsaken can be resumed. That Spain and the United States should seek a reconciliation is to be desired; but leave to them the opening of negotiation, and take only such steps as are marked out for you,—such are his Majesty's orders. The United States and Spain will communicate their intentions to each other. You cannot charge yourself with the always embarrassing functions of an intermediary without being formally authorized to do it; for the Government alone can know whether this step is consistent with its interests of the moment and with the general plan it has formed for itself."
That the words of this despatch were taken from the Emperor's lips is more than likely. Talleyrand's notes always repeated as nearly as possible the exact expressions of his master; and the expressions of this note were Napoleonic even in their confusion of facts and ideas. Above all, the concluding sentence, which was probably as mysterious to Talleyrand as to the Americans, marked the proceeding with the peculiar stamp of Napoleon's mind. No one but himself should judge whether the cession of Florida was "consistent with his interests of the moment and with the general plan he had formed for himself." Probably for the first time, July 12, 1806, Talleyrand learned that Napoleon had a general plan which was inconsistent with complete reconciliation between Spain and the United States; yet he could no longer doubt that the same general plan had controlled the Emperor's conduct at least as far back as May 1. From this reticence he might infer that his own fall approached. Another proof that his credit waned came in a form more gracious, but not less convincing. Napoleon conferred on him an Italian principality. The Ex-Bishop of Autun became Prince of Benevento.
Had Armstrong been allowed to know every detail of this transaction, he could not have penetrated Napoleon's secret; but for weeks he was kept in dense ignorance. Aware that the Prince of Peace had consented to negotiate, informed that Izquierdo had received powers and was authorized to proceed, Armstrong still found an invisible barrier across his path,—frivolous difficulties of form and unmeaning references to Madrid,—which no effort of his could remove. At a hint from Talleyrand he went to Marshal Duroc, a man of high character and abilities, who stood as near as the nearest to the Emperor, and who was conducting with Izquierdo the Spanish negotiations which Napoleon had taken from Talleyrand. Duroc seemed well disposed toward America; and through him Armstrong succeeded inputting into Napoleon's hands the project of a treaty between the United States and Spain. After reading it attentively, the Emperor quietly returned it, without a word.
Foiled again by this impenetrable mystery, Armstrong dreamed of forcing the Emperor's hand. He could at least, by an official note, compel Talleyrand and Izquierdo either to act or to explain their inaction; but from this step he was dissuaded by Talleyrand and Duroc, who reasoned that precipitancy might do harm, but could do no good.
Meanwhile Talleyrand wrote a despatch to Turreau at Washington; and if Turreau understood its meaning, his insight was clearer than that of the Prince of Benevento himself. The tone of this instruction varied between a caress and a threat; but the threat came last, and was most significant:—
- "His Majesty would be pained to remark that the United States, to whose prosperity France has at all times contributed,—that Spain, in whom she takes a like interest,—should revive in America quarrels that are beginning to slumber in Europe. The United States, which owe their fortune to commerce, are interested in peace; they have reason to wish it with their neighbors; and if, comparing their force with that of a colony, they can promise themselves success at first, they can also bear in mind (reconnaître) that the colonies are not alone, and that Europe has always gone to their aid. Take care, sir, to maintain the United States in the views of conciliation with which the news of the events of the last campaign may have inspired them. A sense of their true interests would suffice to make them true to this disposition, even though they had not bound themselves to it by the demand they have made on his Majesty the Emperor to intervene in their discussions with Spain, and to employ his good offices for the re-establishment of a perfect harmony between the two Powers. His Majesty, without putting himself forward as mediator in circumstances where other interests, which directly concern his empire, ought to fix his whole attention, will regard whatever the United States and Spain may do toward a reconciliation as an evidence of friendship toward himself."
Sept. 25, 1806, the Emperor returned to Germany to begin a war with Prussia which was to lead him far. His departure put an end to whatever hopes Armstrong still cherished, while it left the United States in a mortifying attitude. After having been defied by Spain, Jefferson found himself deluded by France. No imagination could conceive the purpose for which Napoleon meant to use the United States government; but that he had some scheme, to which President Jefferson must be made subservient, was clear. Armstrong tried in vain to penetrate the mystery. Whatever it might be, it was as yet hidden in the recesses of Napoleon's mind.
No sooner had the Emperor left Paris than the American minister, September 30, wrote a note of inquiry to Izquierdo, who replied in substance that his powers had been suspended or recalled. Nothing remained but for Armstrong to inform the President of all the facts connected with the failure of his negotiation, and then to wait at Paris, with what patience he could command, for the moment when Napoleon should consent to reveal the meaning of these mysterious manœuvres. Yet in diplomacy as in war, nations were commonly lost when they allowed Napoleon to take the initiative, and to choose his own time and place for attack. The United States government had every reason to be on its guard.
Napoleon reached the battle-field of Jena Oct. 14, 1806, and crushed the Prussian army. October 27 the conquering French battalions made a triumphal entry into Berlin. November 25,—the day so frequently occurring in the story of Burr's conspiracy, when Jefferson received General Wilkinson's despatch, and when Wilkinson himself reached New Orleans,—the Emperor Napoleon left Berlin for Poland and Russia. Before leaving Berlin he signed a paper destined to become famous throughout the world under the name of the Berlin Decree. This extraordinary mandate, bearing the date of Nov. 21, 1806, began by charging that England disregarded the law of nations. She made non-combatants prisoners of war; confiscated private property; blockaded unfortified harbors and mouths of rivers, and considered places as blockaded though she had not a single ship before them,—even whole coasts and empires. This monstrous abuse of the right of blockade had no other object than to raise the commerce and industry of England on the ruin of the commerce and industry of the Continent, and gave a natural right to use against her the same weapons and methods of warfare. Therefore, until England should recognize and correct these violations of law, it was decreed—(1) That the British Isles were in a state of blockade; (2) That all intercourse with them was prohibited; (3) That every Englishman found within French authority was a prisoner of war; (4) That all British property, private as well as public, was prize of war; (5) That all merchandise coming from England was prize of war; (6) That half the product of such confiscations should be employed to indemnify merchants whose property had been captured by British cruisers; (7) That no ship coming from England or her colonies should be admitted into any port; (8) That every vessel trying to elude this rule by means of false papers should be confiscated.
This decree, which cut the roots of neutral rights and of American commerce with Europe, was published at Paris in the "Moniteur" of Dec. 5, 1806. At the same time news arrived that Hamburg, and nearly all the north coast of Germany along the German Ocean and the Baltic, had fallen into Napoleon's hands, or was certain soon to become his prey. When Armstrong, watching with keen interest the rapid progress of French arms, took up the "Moniteur" which contained the Berlin Decree, he might well have started to his feet with the cry that at last he understood what the Emperor would be at. A part of the enigma which had perplexed diplomacy was explained, and what was not yet revealed might vaguely be divined.December 10 Armstrong wrote to Decrès, the Minister of Marine, to ask of him, in Talleyrand's absence, an explanation of the decree. For some days no answer was received. "Much is said here," he wrote to Madison, "of qualifications which are to be given to the arrêté of November 20 , and which would indeed make it very harmless; but these are rather to be hoped for than believed in." When Decrès' reply arrived, dated December 24, it went far to confirm Armstrong's fears, by avoiding decisive and official explanation.
- "I consider the imperial decree of the 2lst of November last," wrote Decrès, "as thus far conveying no modification of the regulations at present observed in France with regard to neutral navigators, nor consequently of the convention of Sept. 30, 1800, with the United States of America; . . . but it will be proper that your Excellency should communicate with the Minister of Exterior Relations as to what concerns the correspondence of citizens of the United States with England. . . . It will not escape General Armstrong that my answers cannot have the development which they would receive from the Minister of Exterior Relations, and that it is naturally to him that he ought to address himself for these explanations, which I am very happy to give him, because he wishes them, but upon which I have much less positive information than the Prince of Benevento."
With this explanation, such as it was, Armstrong was obliged to content himself; and the year 1806 closed, leaving President Jefferson at the mercy of battles soon to be fought in the most distant corner of Germany, where the Emperor Alexander of Russia was gathering his forces for a conflict more terrible than Europe had yet seen.
- Thiers, Consulat et Empire, vi. 30.
- Armstrong to Madison, Feb. 17, 1806; MSS. State Department Archives.
- Armstrong to Madison, March 9, 1806; MSS. State Department Archives.
- Madison to Armstrong and Bowdoin, March 13, 1806; MSS. State Department Archives.
- Armstrong to Madison (private), May 4, 1806; MSS. State Department Archives.
- Bowdoin to Jefferson, May 20, 1806; Jefferson MSS.
- Bowdoin to Jefferson, Oct. 20, 1806; Jefferson MSS.
- Armstrong to Madison, Oct. 10, 1806; MSS. State Department Archives.
- Talleyrand to Vandeul, May 21, 1806; Archives, des Aff. Étr., MSS.
- Vandeul to Talleyrand, June 19, 1806; Archives des Aff. Étr., MSS.
- Vandeul to Talleyrand, June 23, 1806; Archives des Aff. Étr., MSS.
- Armstrong to Madison, Oct. 10, 1806; MSS. State Department Archives.
- Talleyrand to Vandeul, July 3, 1806; Archives des Aff. Étr., MSS.
- Talleyrand to Vandeul, July 12, 1806; Archives des Aff. Étr., MSS.
- Talleyrand to Turreau, July 31, 1806; Archives des Aff. Étr., MSS.
- Armstrong to Madison, Dec. 24, 1806; State Papers ii. 805.