Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc./Opinion of the Court

by John Paul Stevens

An Act of Congress authorizing the transfer of operating control of two major airports from the Federal Government to the Metropolitan Washington Airport Authority (MWAA) conditioned the transfer on the creation by MWAA of a unique "Board of Review" composed of nine Members of Congress and vested with veto power over decisions made by MWAA's Board of Directors. ^[1] The principal question presented is whether this unusual statutory condition violates the constitutional principle of separation of powers, as interpreted in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 77 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983), Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 106 S.Ct. 3181, 92 L.Ed.2d 583 (1986), and Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 48 S.Ct. 480, 72 L.Ed. 845 (1928). We conclude, as did the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, that the condition is unconstitutional.

* In 1940, Congress authorized the Executive Branch to acquire a tract of land a few miles from the Capitol and to construct what is now Washington National Airport (National). 54 Stat. 686. From the time it opened until 1987, National was owned and operated by the Federal Government. The airport was first managed by the Civil Aeronautics Agency, a division of the Commerce Department. 54 Stat. 688. In 1959, control of National shifted to the newly-created Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), an agency that, since 1967, has been a part of the Department of Transportation. See 72 Stat. 731; 80 Stat. 932, 938.

A few years after National opened, the Truman Administration proposed that a federal corporation be formed to operate the airport. See Congressional Research Service, Federal Ownership of National and Dulles Airports: Background, Pro-Con Analysis, and Outlook 4 (1985) (CRS Report), reprinted in Hearings before the Subcommittee on Governmental Efficiency and the District of Columbia of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 404 (1985). The proposal was endorsed by the Hoover Commission in 1949 but never adopted by Congress. Instead, when Congress authorized construction of a second major airport to serve the Washington area, it again provided for federal ownership and operation. 64 Stat. 770. Dulles International Airport (Dulles) was opened in 1962 under the direct control of the FAA. See CRS Report 1-2.

National and Dulles are the only two major commercial airports owned by the Federal Government. A third airport, Baltimore Washington International (BWI), which is owned by the State of Maryland, also serves the Washington metropolitan area. Like Dulles, it is larger than National and located in a rural area many miles from the Capitol. Because of its location, National is by far the busiest and most profitable of the three. ^[2] Although proposals for the joint operating control of all three airports have been considered, the plan that gave rise to this litigation involves only National and Dulles, both of which are located in Virginia. Maryland's interest in the overall problem explains its representation on the Board of Directors of MWAA. See 49 U.S.C.App. § 2456(e)(3)(C).

Throughout its history, National has been the subject of controversy. Its location at the center of the Metropolitan area is a great convenience for air travelers, but flight paths over densely populated areas have generated concern among local residents about safety, noise, and pollution. Those living closest to the airport have provided the strongest support for proposals to close National or to transfer some of its operations to Dulles. See CRS Report 3.

Despite the FAA's history of profitable operation of National and excellent management of both airports, the Secretary of Transportation concluded that necessary capital improvements could not be financed for either National or Dulles unless control of the airports was transferred to a regional authority with power to raise money by selling tax-exempt bonds. ^[3] In 1984, she therefore appointed an advisory commission to develop a plan for the creation of such a regional authority. Id., at 6.

The Commission recommended that the proposed authority be created by a congressionally approved compact between Virginia and the District, and that its Board of Directors be composed of 11 members serving staggered 6-year terms, with five members to be appointed by the Governor of Virginia, three by the Mayor of the District, two by the Governor of Maryland, and one by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate. See App. 17. Emphasizing the importance of a "non-political, independent authority," the Commission recommended that members of the board "should not hold elective or appointive political office." Ibid. To allay concerns that local interests would not be adequately represented, the Commission recommended a requirement that all board members except the Presidential appointee reside in the Washington metropolitan area. Ibid.

In 1985, Virginia and the District both passed legislation authorizing the establishment of the recommended regional authority. See 1985 Va.Acts, ch. 598; 1985 D.C.Law 6-67. A bill embodying the advisory commission's recommendations passed the Senate. See 132 Cong.Rec. 7263-7281 (1986). In the House of Representatives, however, the legislation encountered strong opposition from Members who expressed concern that the surrender of federal control of the airports might result in the transfer of a significant amount of traffic from National to Dulles. See Hearings on H.R. 2337, H.R. 5040, and S. 1017 before the Subcommittee on Aviation of the House Committee on Public Works & Transportation, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 1-3, 22 (1986).

Substitute bills were therefore drafted to provide for the establishment of a review board with veto power over major actions of MWAA's Board of Directors. Under two of the proposals, the board of review would clearly have acted as an agent of the Congress. After Congress received an opinion from the Department of Justice that a veto of MWAA action by such a board of review "would plainly be legislative action that must conform to the requirements of Article 1, § 7 of the Constitution," ^[4] the Senate adopted a version of the review board that required Members of Congress to serve in their individual capacities as representatives of users of the airports. See 132 Cong.Rec. 28372-28375, 28504, 28521-28525 (1986). The provision was further amended in the House, id., at 32127-32144, and the Senate concurred, id., at 32483. Ultimately, § 2456(f) of the Transfer Act as enacted defined the composition and powers of the Board of Review in much greater detail than the Board of Directors. Compare 49 U.S.C.App. § 2456(f) with § 2456(e).

Subparagraph (1) of § 2456(f) specifies that the Board of Review "shall consist" of nine Members of the Congress, eight of whom serve on committees with jurisdiction over transportation issues and none of whom may be a Member from Maryland, Virginia, or the District of Columbia. ^[5] Subparagraph 4(B) details the actions that must be submitted to the Board of Review for approval, which include adoption of a budget, authorization of bonds, promulgation of regulations, endorsement of a master plan, and appointment of the chief executive officer of the Authority. ^[6] Subparagraph 4(D) explains that disapproval by the Board will prevent submitted actions from taking effect. ^[7] Other significant provisions of the Act include paragraph 5, which authorizes the Board of Review to require Authority directors to consider any action relating to the airports; ^[8] subsection (g), which requires that any action changing the hours of operation at either National or Dulles be taken by regulation and therefore be subject to veto by the Board of Review; ^[9] and subsection (h), which contains a provision disabling MWAA's Board of Directors from performing any action subject to the veto power if a court should hold that the Board of Review provisions of the Act are invalid. ^[10]

On March 2, 1987, the Secretary of Transportation and the MWAA entered into a long-term lease complying with all of the conditions specified in the then recently enacted Transfer Act. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 163a-187a. The lease provided for a 50-year term and annual rental payments of three million dollars "in 1987 dollars." Id., at 170a, 178a. After the lease was executed, MWAA's Board of Directors adopted bylaws providing for the Board of Review, id., at 151a-154a, and Virginia and the District of Columbia amended their legislation to give MWAA power to establish the Board of Review, 1987 Va.Acts, ch. 665; 1987 D.C.Law 7-18. On September 2, 1987, the directors appointed the nine members of the Board of Review from lists that had been submitted by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate. App. 57-58.

On March 16, 1988, MWAA's Board of Directors adopted a master plan providing for the construction of a new terminal at National with gates capable of handling larger aircraft, an additional taxiway turnoff to reduce aircraft time on the runway and thereby improve airport capacity, a new dual-level roadway system, and new parking facilities. Id., at 70-71, 89-91. On April 13, the Board of Review met and voted not to disapprove the master plan. Id., at 73-78.

In November 1988, Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., and two individuals who reside under flight paths of aircraft departing from and arriving at National (collectively CAAN) brought this action. CAAN sought a declaration that the Board of Review's power to veto actions of MWAA's Board of Directors is unconstitutional and an injunction against any action by the Board of Review as well as any action by the Board of Directors that is subject to Board of Review approval. Id., at 10. The complaint alleged that most of the members of CAAN live under flight paths to and from National and that CAAN's primary purpose is to develop and implement a transportation policy for the Washington area that would include balanced service among its three major airports, thus reducing the operations at National and alleviating noise, safety, and air pollution problems associated with such operations. Id., at 4. The complaint named MWAA and its Board of Review as defendants. Id., at 5.

The District Court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. 718 F.Supp. 974 (DC 1989). As a preliminary matter, however, the court held that plaintiffs had standing to maintain the action for two reasons: ^[11] first, because the master plan will facilitate increased activity at National that is harmful to plaintiffs, and second, because the composition of the Board of Review diminishes the influence of CAAN on airport user issues since local congressmen and senators are ineligible for service on the Board. Id., at 980-982. On the merits, the District Court concluded that there was no violation of the doctrine of separation of powers because the members of the Board of Review acted in their individual capacities as representatives of airport users, and therefore the Board was not an agent of Congress. Id., at 985. Moreover, the Board's powers were derived from the legislation enacted by Virginia and the District, as implemented by MWAA's bylaws, rather than from the Transfer Act. Id., at 986. "In short, because Congress exercises no federal power under the Act, it cannot overstep its constitutionally-designated bounds." Ibid.

A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed. 286 U.S.App.D.C. 334, 917 F.2d 48 (1990). The court agreed that plaintiffs had standing because they had alleged a distinct and palpable injury that was "fairly traceable" to the implementation of the master plan and a favorable ruling would prevent MWAA from implementing that plan. Id., at 339, 917 F.2d, at 53. On the merits, the majority concluded that it was "wholly unrealistic to view the Board of Review as solely a creature of state law immune to separation-of-powers scrutiny" because it was federal law that had required the establishment of the Board and defined its powers. Id., at 340, 917 F.2d, at 54. It held that the Board was "in essence a congressional agent" with disapproval powers over key operational decisions that were "quintessentially executive," id., at 343, 917 F.2d, at 57, and therefore violated the separation of powers, ibid. The dissenting judge, emphasizing the importance of construing federal statutes to avoid constitutional questions when fairly possible, concluded that the Board of Review should not be characterized as a federal entity but that, even if it were so characterized, its members could, consistent with the Constitution, serve in their individual capacities even though they were Members of Congress. Id., at 345-347, 917 F.2d, at 59-61.

Because of the importance of the constitutional question, we granted MWAA's petition for certiorari. 498 U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 750, 112 L.Ed.2d 770 (1991). Although the United States intervened in the Court of Appeals to support the constitutionality of the Transfer Act, see 28 U.S.C. § 2403(a), the United States did not join in MWAA's petition for certiorari. As a respondent in this Court pursuant to this Court's Rule 12.4, the United States has again taken the position that the Transfer Act is constitutional. ^[12]

Petitioners (MWAA and the Board of Review) renew the challenge to respondents' standing that was rejected by the District Court and the Court of Appeals. To establish standing, respondents "must allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief." Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 3324, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984). Petitioners argue that respondents' asserted injuries are caused by factors independent of the Board of Review's veto power and that the injuries will not be cured by invalidation of the Board of Review. We believe that petitioners are mistaken.

Respondents alleged that the master plan allows increased air traffic at National and a consequent increase in accident risks, noise, and pollution. App. 10. "For purposes of ruling on a motion to dismiss for want of standing, both the trial and reviewing courts must accept as true all material allegations of the complaint." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2206, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975). If we accept that the master plan's provisions will result in increased noise, pollution, and danger of accidents, this "personal injury" to respondents is "fairly traceable" to the Board of Review's veto power because knowledge that the master plan was subject to the veto power undoubtedly influenced MWAA's Board of Directors when it drew up the plan. Because invalidation of the veto power will prevent the enactment of the master plan, see 49 U.S.C.App. § 2456(h), the relief respondents have requested is likely to redress their alleged injury. Moreover, the harm respondents have alleged is not confined to the consequences of a possible increase in the level of activity at National. The harm also includes the creation of an impediment to a reduction in that activity. See App. 8. The Board of Review was created by Congress as a mechanism to preserve operations at National at their present level, or at a higher level if possible. See supra, at 258. The Board of Review and the Master Plan, which even petitioners acknowledge is at a minimum "noise neutral," Brief for Petitioners 37-38, therefore injure CAAN by making it more difficult for CAAN to reduce noise and activity at National. ^[13]

Petitioners argue that this case does not raise any separation-of-powers issue because the Board of Review neither exercises federal power nor acts as an agent of Congress. Examining the origin and structure of the Board, we conclude that petitioners are incorrect.

Petitioners lay great stress on the fact that the Board of Review was established by the bylaws of MWAA, which was created by legislation enacted by the State of Virginia and the District of Columbia. Putting aside the unsettled question whether the District of Columbia acts as a State or as an agent of the Federal Government for separation-of-powers purposes, we believe the fact that the Board of Review was created by state enactments is not enough to immunize it from separation-of-powers review. Several factors combine to mandate this result.

Control over National and Dulles was originally in federal hands, and was transferred to MWAA only subject to the condition that the States create the Board of Review. Congress placed such significance on the Board that it required that the Board's invalidation prevent the Airports Authority from taking any action that would have been subject to Board oversight. See 49 U.S.C.App. § 2456(h). Moreover, the Federal Government has a strong and continuing interest in the efficient operation of the airports, which are vital to the smooth conduct of Government business, especially to the work of Congress, whose Members must maintain offices in both Washington and the districts that they represent and must shuttle back and forth according to the dictates of busy and often unpredictable schedules. This federal interest was identified in the preamble to the Transfer Act, ^[14] justified a Presidential appointee on the Board of Directors, and motivated the creation of the Board of Review, the structure and the powers of which Congress mandated in detail, see § 2456(f). Most significant, membership on the Board of Review is limited to federal officials, specifically members of congressional committees charged with authority over air transportation.

That the Members of Congress who serve on the Board nominally serve "in their individual capacities, as representatives of users" of the airports, § 2456(f)(1), does not prevent this group of officials from qualifying as a congressional agent exercising federal authority for separation-of-powers purposes. As we recently held, "separation-of-powers analysis does not turn on the labeling of an activity," Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 393, 109 S.Ct. 647, 665, 102 L.Ed.2d 714 (1989). The Transfer Act imposes no requirement that the Members of Congress who are appointed to the Board actually be users of the airports. Rather, the Act imposes the requirement that the Board members have congressional responsibilities related to the federal regulation of air transportation regulation. These facts belie the ipse dixit that the Board members will act "in their individual capacities."

Although the legislative history is not necessary to our conclusion that the Board members act in their official congressional capacities, the floor debates in the House confirm our view. See, e.g., 132 Cong.Rec. 32135 (1986) (The bill "also provides for continuing congressional review over the major decisions of the new airport authority. A Congressional Board will still have veto power over the new airport authority's: annual budget; issuance of bonds; regulations; master plan; and the naming of the Chief Executive Officer") (Rep. Lehman); id., at 32136 ("In addition, the motion provides continued congressional control over both airports. Congress would retain oversight through a Board of Review made up of nine Members of Congress. This Board would have the right to overturn major decisions of the airport authority") (Rep. Coughlin); id., at 32137 ("Under this plan, Congress retains enough control of the airports to deal with any unseen pitfalls resulting from this transfer of authority. . . . We are getting our cake and eating it too. . . . The beauty of the deal is that Congress retains its control without spending a dime") (Rep. Smith); id., at 32141 ("There is, however, a congressional board which is established by this. . . . [T]hat board has been established to make sure that the Nation's interest, the congressional interest was attended to in the consideration of how these two airports are operated") (Rep. Hoyer); id., at 32142 (The bill does "not give up congressional control and oversight-that remains in a Congressional Board of review") (Rep. Conte); id., at 32143 ("I understand that one concern of Members is that by leasing these airports to a local authority, we would be losing control over them. But, in fact, under this bill exactly the opposite is true. We will have more control than before") (Rep. Hammerschmidt).

Congress as a body also exercises substantial power over the appointment and removal of the particular Members of Congress who serve on the Board. The Transfer Act provides that the Board "shall consist" of "two members of the Public Works and Transportation Committee and two members of the Appropriations Committee of the House of Representatives from a list provided by the Speaker of the House," "two members of the Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee and two members of the Appropriations Committee of the Senate from a list provided by the President pro tempore of the Senate," and "one member chosen alternately . . . from a list provided by the Speaker of the House or the President pro tempore of the Senate, respectively." 49 U.S.C.App. § 2456(f)(1). Significantly, appointments must be made from the lists, and there is no requirement that the lists contain more recommendations than the number of Board openings. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (Sentencing Reform Act upheld in Mistretta required only that the President "conside[r]" the recommendations of the Judicial Conference); 31 U.S.C. § 703(a) (Congressional Commission only "recommend[s]" individuals for selection as Comptroller General). The list system, combined with congressional authority over committee assignments, guarantees Congress effective control over appointments. Control over committee assignments also gives Congress effective removal power over Board members because depriving a Board member of membership in the relevant committees deprives the member of authority to sit on the Board. See 49 U.S.C.App. § 2456(f)(1) (Board "shall consist" of relevant committee members). ^[15]

We thus confront an entity created at the initiative of Congress, the powers of which Congress has delineated, the purpose of which is to protect an acknowledged federal interest, and membership in which is restricted to congressional officials. Such an entity necessarily exercises sufficient federal power as an agent of Congress to mandate separation-of-powers scrutiny. Any other conclusion would permit Congress to evade the "carefully crafted" constraints of the Constitution, INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 2788, 77 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983), simply by delegating primary responsibility for execution of national policy to the States, subject to the veto power of Members of Congress acting "in their individual capacities." Cf. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 755, 106 S.Ct. 3181, 3202, 92 L.Ed.2d 583 (1986) (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment). ^[16]

Petitioners contend that the Board of Review should nevertheless be immune from scrutiny for constitutional defects because it was created in the course of Congress' exercise of its power to dispose of federal property. See U.S.C.onst., Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. ^[17] In South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 107 S.Ct. 2793, 97 L.Ed.2d 171 (1987), we held that a grant of highway funds to a State conditioned on the State's prohibition of the possession of alcoholic beverages by persons under the age of 21 was a lawful exercise of Congress' power to spend money for the general welfare. See U.S.C.onst., Art. I, § 8, cl. 1. Even assuming that "Congress might lack the power to impose a national minimum drinking age directly," we held that this indirect "encouragement to state action" was a valid use of the spending power. Id., at 212, 107 S.Ct. at 2798. We thus concluded that Congress could endeavor to accomplish the federal objective of regulating the national drinking age by the indirect use of the spending power even though that regulatory authority would otherwise be a matter within state control pursuant to the Twenty-first Amendment. ^[18]

Our holding in Dole did not involve separation-of-powers principles. It concerned only the allocation of power between the Federal Government and the States. Our reasoning that, absent coercion, a Sovereign State has both the incentive and the ability to protect its own rights and powers, and therefore may cede such rights and powers, see id., at 210-211, 107 S.Ct., at 2797-2798, is inapplicable to the issue presented by this case. Here, unlike Dole, there is no question about federal power to operate the airports. The question is whether the maintenance of federal control over the airports by means of the Board of Review, which is allegedly a federal instrumentality, is invalid, not because it invades any state power, but because Congress' continued control violates the separation-of-powers principle, the aim of which is to protect not the States but "the whole people from improvident laws." Chadha, at 951, 103 S.Ct., at 2784. Nothing in our opinion in Dole implied that a highway grant to a State could have been conditioned on the State's creating a "Highway Board of Review" composed of Members of Congress. We must therefore consider whether the powers of the Board of Review may, consistent with the separation of powers, be exercised by an agent of Congress.

Because National and Dulles are the property of the Federal Government and their operations directly affect interstate commerce, there is no doubt concerning the ultimate power of Congress to enact legislation defining the policies that govern those operations. Congress itself can formulate the details, or it can enact general standards and assign to the Executive Branch the responsibility for making necessary managerial decisions in conformance with those standards. The question presented is only whether the Legislature has followed a constitutionally acceptable procedure in delegating decision-making authority to the Board of Review.

The structure of our Government as conceived by the Framers of our Constitution disperses the federal power among the three branches-the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial-placing both substantive and procedural limitations on each. The ultimate purpose of this separation of powers is to protect the liberty and security of the governed. As former Attorney General Levi explained:

"The essence of the separation of powers concept formulated by the Founders from the political experience and philosophy of the revolutionary era is that each branch, in different ways, within the sphere of its defined powers and subject to the distinct institutional responsibilities of the others is essential to the liberty and security of the people. Each branch, in its own way, is the people's agent, its fiduciary for certain purposes.

. . . . .

"Fiduciaries do not meet their obligations by arrogating to themselves the distinct duties of their master's other agents." Levi, Some Aspects of Separation of Powers, 76 Colum.L.Rev. 385-386 (1976).

Violations of the separation-of-powers principle have been uncommon because each branch has traditionally respected the prerogatives of the other two. Nevertheless, the Court has been sensitive to its responsibility to enforce the principle when necessary.

"Time and again we have reaffirmed the importance in our constitutional scheme of the separation of governmental powers into the three coordinate branches. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S., at 725 [106 S.Ct., at 3187] (citing Humphrey's Executor, 295 U.S. [602], at 629-630 [55 S.Ct. 869, 874, 79 L.Ed. 1611 (1935) ] ). As we stated in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 [96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659] (1976), the system of separated powers and checks and balances established in the Constitution was regarded by the Framers as 'self-executing safeguard against the encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of the other.' Id., at 122 [96 S.Ct., at 684]. We have not hesitated to invalidate provisions of law which violate this principle. See id., at 123 [96 S.Ct., at 684]." Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 693, 108 S.Ct. 2597, 2620, 101 L.Ed.2d 569 (1988).

The abuses by the monarch recounted in the Declaration of Independence provide dramatic evidence of the threat to liberty posed by a too powerful executive. But, as James Madison recognized, the representatives of the majority in a democratic society, if unconstrained, may pose a similar threat:

"It will not be denied, that power is of an encroaching nature, and that it ought to be effectually restrained from passing the limits assigned to it.

. . . . .

"The founders of our republics . . . seem never for a moment to have turned their eyes from the danger to liberty from the overgrown and all-grasping prerogative of an hereditary magistrate, supported and fortified by an hereditary branch of the legislative authority. They seem never to have recollected the danger from legislative usurpations; which by assembling all power in the same hands, must lead to the same tyranny as is threatened by executive usurpations. . . . [I]t is against the enterprising ambition of this department, that the people ought to indulge all their jealousy and exhaust all their precautions.

"The legislative department derives a superiority in our governments from other circumstances. Its constitutional powers being at once more extensive and less susceptible of precise limits, it can with the greater facility, mask under complicated and indirect measures, the encroachments which it makes on the co-ordinate departments. It is not unfrequently a question of real-nicety in legislative bodies, whether the operation of a particular measure, will, or will not extend beyond the legislative sphere." The Federalist No. 48, pp. 332-334 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (J. Madison).

To forestall the danger of encroachment "beyond the legislative sphere," the Constitution imposes two basic and related constraints on the Congress. It may not "invest itself or its Members with either executive power or judicial power." J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406, 48 S.Ct. 348, 351, 72 L.Ed. 624 (1928). And, when it exercises its legislative power, it must follow the "single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures" specified in Article I. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 2784, 77 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983). ^[19]

The first constraint is illustrated by the Court's holdings in Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 48 S.Ct. 480, 72 L.Ed. 845 (1928), and Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 106 S.Ct. 3181, 92 L.Ed.2d 583 (1986). Springer involved the validity of acts of the Philippine legislature that authorized a committee of three-two legislators and one executive-to vote corporate stock owned by the Philippine Government. Because the Organic Act of the Philippine Islands incorporated the separation-of-powers principle, and because the challenged statute authorized two legislators to perform the executive function of controlling the management of the government-owned corporations, the Court held the statutes invalid. Our more recent decision in Bowsher involved a delegation of authority to the Comptroller General to revise the federal budget. After concluding that the Comptroller General was in effect an agent of Congress, the Court held that he could not exercise executive powers:

"To permit the execution of the laws to be vested in an officer answerable only to Congress would, in practical terms, reserve in Congress control over the execution of the laws. . . . The structure of the Constitution does not permit Congress to execute the laws; it follows that Congress cannot grant to an officer under its control what it does not possess." Bowsher, 478 U.S., at 726, 106 S.Ct., at 3188.

The second constraint is illustrated by our decision in Chadha. That case involved the validity of a statute that authorized either House of Congress by resolution to invalidate a decision by the Attorney General to allow a deportable alien to remain in the United States. Congress had the power to achieve that result through legislation, but the statute was nevertheless invalid because Congress cannot exercise its legislative power to enact laws without following the bicameral and presentment procedures specified in Article I. For the same reason, an attempt to characterize the budgetary action of the Comptroller General in Bowsher as legislative action would not have saved its constitutionality because Congress may not delegate the power to legislate to its own agents or to its own Members. ^[20]

Respondents rely on both of these constraints in their challenge to the Board of Review. The Court of Appeals found it unnecessary to discuss the second constraint because the court was satisfied that the power exercised by the Board of Review over "key operational decisions is quintessentially executive." 286 U.S.App.D.C., at 342, 917 F.2d, at 56. We need not agree or disagree with this characterization by the Court of Appeals to conclude that the Board of Review's power is constitutionally impermissible. If the power is executive, the Constitution does not permit an agent of Congress to exercise it. If the power is legislative, Congress must exercise it in conformity with the bicameralism and presentment requirements of Art. I, § 7. In short, when Congress "[takes] action that ha[s] the purpose and effect of altering the legal rights, duties, and relations of persons . . . outside the Legislative Branch," it must take that action by the procedures authorized in the Constitution. See Chadha, 462 U.S., at 952-955, 103 S.Ct., at 2784-2786. ^[21]

One might argue that the provision for a Board of Review is the kind of practical accommodation between the Legislature and the Executive that should be permitted in a "workable government." ^[22] Admittedly, Congress imposed its will on the regional authority created by the District of Columbia and the Commonwealth of Virginia by means that are unique and that might prove to be innocuous. However, the statutory scheme challenged today provides a blueprint for extensive expansion of the legislative power beyond its constitutionally-confined role. Given the scope of the federal power to dispense benefits to the States in a variety of forms and subject to a host of statutory conditions, Congress could, if this Board of Review were valid, use similar expedients to enable its Members or its agents to retain control, outside the ordinary legislative process, of the activities of state grant recipients charged with executing virtually every aspect of national policy. As James Madison presciently observed, the legislature "can with greater facility, mask under complicated and indirect measures, the encroachments which it makes on the co-ordinate departments." The Federalist No. 48, at 334. Heeding his warning that legislative "power is of an encroaching nature," we conclude that the Board of Review is an impermissible encroachment. ^[23]

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

It is so ordered.

Justice WHITE, with whom The Chief Justice and Justice MARSHALL join, dissenting.

Notes

1. Metropolitan Washington Airports Act of 1986, 100 Stat. 3341, 49 U.S.C.App. §§ 2451-2461 (Transfer Act).
2. "Of the three airports, National, as the Nation's 14th busiest airport (1983), handles by far the most traffic. In 1983, these airports handled passenger volumes of: National, 14.2 million; Dulles, 2.9 million; and BWI, 5.2 million. Other measures of airport activity also indicate a much greater activity level at National. On a combined basis, the [airports] earned the Federal Government a profit of $11.4 million. This profit, however, is entirely the result of activity at National, as Dulles consistently operates at a deficit. BWI, which not long ago operated at a loss, is now a consistent money maker for Maryland." CRS Report 2.
3. "There is no question that the daily management of the airports by the Metropolitan Washington Airports unit of FAA has been excellent. However, inclusion of the airports in the unified Federal budget has generally stymied most efforts to improve or expand facilities at either airport to keep pace with the growing commercial and air travel needs of the Washington area. No major capital projects have been financed at either airport from Federal appropriations since the construction of Dulles in the early 1960's. Given the continuing need to limit federal expenditures to reduce Federal deficits, it is unlikely that any significant capital improvements could be undertaken at the airports in the foreseeable future." S.Rep. No. 99-193, p. 2 (1985).
4. "Two of the suggestions made by the staff would present substantial constitutional problems. The first of these proposals would create a 'Federal Board of Directors,' consisting of three members of the House, appointed by the Speaker, three members of the Senate, appointed by the President pro tempore, and the Comptroller General. As proposed, this Federal Board would clearly be unconstitutional. In reality the Federal Board would be no more than a committee of Congress plus the Comptroller General-who is clearly a legislative officer. This committee would be authorized by the bill to veto certain types of actions otherwise within the Airports Authority's power under applicable state law. In the absence of the Federal Board, the Airports Authority could implement those decisions without further review or approval. Disapproval by the Federal Board of a particular action would thus have 'the purpose and effect of altering the legal rights, duties, and relations of persons . . . outside the Legislative Branch,' INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 952, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 2784, 77 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983), and would plainly be legislative action that must conform to the requirements of Article 1, section 7 of the Constitution: passage by both Houses and approval by the President. Id., at 954-955, 103 S.Ct., at 2785-2786. Congress cannot directly vest the Federal Board with authority to veto decisions made by the Airports Authority any more than it can authorize one House, one committee, or one officer to overturn the Attorney General's decision to allow a deportable alien to remain in the United States, to reject rules implemented by an executive agency pursuant to delegated authority, to dictate mandatory budget cuts to be made by the President, or to overturn any decision made by a state agency." App. 26-27 (footnotes omitted).
5. "The board of directors shall be subject to review of its actions and to requests, in accordance with this subsection, by a Board of Review of the Airports Authority. Such Board of Review shall be established by the board of directors and shall consist of the following, in their individual capacities, as representatives of users of the Metropolitan Washington Airports:
6. "The following are the actions referred to in subparagraph (A):
7. "An action disapproved under this paragraph shall not take effect. Unless an annual budget for a fiscal year has taken effect in accordance with this paragraph, the Airports Authority may not obligate or expend any money in such fiscal year, except for (i) debt service on previously authorized obligations, and (ii) obligations and expenditures for previously authorized capital expenditures and routine operating expenses." § 2456(f)(4)(D).
8. "The Board of Review may request the Airports Authority to consider and vote, or to report, on any matter related to the Metropolitan Washington Airports. Upon receipt of such a request the Airports Authority shall consider and vote, or report, on the matter as promptly as feasible." § 2456(f)(5).
9. "Any action of the Airports Authority changing, or having the effect of changing, the hours of operation of or the type of aircraft serving either of the Metropolitan Washington Airports may be taken only by regulation of the Airports Authority." § 2456(g).
10. "If the Board of Review established under subsection (f) of this section is unable to carry out its functions under this subchapter by reason of a judicial order, the Airports Authority shall have no authority to perform any of the actions that are required by paragraph (f)(4) of this section to be submitted to the Board of Review." § 2456(h).
11. The District Court also rejected the arguments that the case was not ripe for review and that plaintiffs had failed to exhaust administrative remedies. 718 F.Supp., at 979-980.
12. Rule 12.4 provides that "[a]ll parties to the proceeding in the court whose judgment is sought to be reviewed shall be deemed parties in this Court, unless the petitioner notifies the Clerk of this Court in writing of the petitioner's belief that one or more of the parties below has no interest in the outcome of the petition. . . . All parties other than petitioners shall be respondents. . . ." Even though the United States is technically a respondent under Rule 12.4, we shall use the term "respondents" to refer solely to plaintiffs.
13. In the lower courts, petitioners also challenged this action on ripeness grounds. Although petitioners do not press this issue on appeal, it concerns our jurisdiction under Article III, so we must consider the question on our own initiative. See Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737, 740, 96 S.Ct. 1202, 1204, 47 L.Ed.2d 435 (1976). We have no trouble concluding, however, that a challenge to the Board of Review's veto power is ripe even if the veto power has not been exercised to respondents' detriment. The threat of the veto hangs over the Board of Directors like the sword over Damocles, creating a "here-and-now subservience" to the Board of Review sufficient to raise constitutional questions. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 727, n. 5, 106 S.Ct. 3181, 3188, n. 5, 92 L.Ed.2d 583 (1986).
14. "The Congress finds that-
15. Thus, whether or not the statute gives the Airports Authority formal appointment and removal power over the Board of Review is irrelevant. Also irrelevant for separation-of-powers purposes is the likelihood that Congress will discipline Board members by depriving them of Committee membership. See Bowsher, 478 U.S., at 730, 106 S.Ct., at 3189 (rejecting relevance of likelihood that Congress would actually remove the Comptroller General). The dissenting judge on the Court of Appeals suggested that a constitutional problem could be avoided by reading the statute's requirement that Board members be members of particular congressional committees as applying only at the time of appointment. See 286 U.S.App.D.C. 334, 347, 917 F.2d 48, 61 (1990) (Mikva, J., dissenting). We do not dispute that statutes should be interpreted, if possible, to avoid constitutional difficulties. See, e.g., Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Construction Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575, 108 S.Ct. 1392, 1397, 99 L.Ed.2d 645 (1988). However, the statutory language unambiguously requires that the Board of Review "shall consist" of members of certain congressional committees. The Transfer Act cannot fairly be read to impose this requirement only at the time of appointment.
16. Petitioners and the United States both place great weight on the fact that the Framers at the Constitutional Convention expressly rejected a constitutional provision that would have prohibited an individual from holding both state and federal office. Brief for Petitioners 15; Brief for United States 21-23. The Framers apparently were concerned that such a prohibition would limit the pool of talented citizens to one level of government or the other. See 1 M. Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, pp. 20-21, 217, 386, 389, 428-429 (1911). Neither Petitioners nor the United States, however, point to any endorsement by the Framers of offices that are nominally created by the State but for which concurrent federal office is a prerequisite.
17. U.S.C.onst., Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 provides in relevant part:
18. U.S.C.onst., Amdt. 21 provides:
19. "As we emphasized in Chadha, when Congress legislates, when it makes binding policy, it must follow the procedures prescribed in Article I. Neither the unquestioned urgency of the national budget crisis nor the Comptroller General's proud record of professionalism and dedication provides a justification for allowing a congressional agent to set policy that binds the Nation. Rather than turning the task over to its agent, if the Legislative Branch decides to act with conclusive effect, it must do so through a process akin to that specified in the fallback provision-through enactment by both Houses and presentment to the President." Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 757-759, 106 S.Ct. 3181, 3204-3205, 92 L.Ed.2d 583 (1986) (STEVENS, J., concurring in the judgment).
20. "If Congress were free to delegate its policymaking authority to one of its components, or to one of its agents, it would be able to evade 'the carefully crafted restraints spelled out in the Constitution.' Id. [462 U.S.], at 959 [103 S.Ct., at 2788]." Bowsher, 478 U.S., at 755, 106 S.Ct., at 3202 (STEVENS, J., concurring in the judgment).
21. The Constitution does permit Congress or a part of Congress to take some actions with effects outside the Legislative Branch by means other than the provisions of Art. I, § 7. These include at least the power of the House alone to initiate impeachments, Art. I, § 2, cl. 5; the power of the Senate alone to try impeachments, Art. I, § 3, cl. 6; the power of the Senate alone to approve or disapprove Presidential appointments, Art. II, § 2, cl. 2; and the power of the Senate alone to ratify treaties, Art. II, § 2, cl. 2. See also Art. II, § 1, and Amdt. 12 (Congressional role in Presidential election process); Art. V (Congressional role in Amendment process). Moreover, Congress can, of course, manage its own affairs without complying with the constraints of Art. I, § 7. See Chadha, 462 U.S., at 954, n. 16, 103 S.Ct., at 2785, n. 16 (1983); Bowsher, 478 U.S., at 753-756, 106 S.Ct., at 3201-3203 (STEVENS, J., concurring).
22. "While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635, 72 S.Ct. 863, 870, 96 L.Ed. 1153 (1952) (concurring opinion).
23. Because we invalidate the Board of Review under basic separation-of-powers principles, we need not address respondents' claim that Members of Congress serve on the Board in violation of the Incompatibility and Ineligibility Clauses. See U.S.C.onst., Art. I, § 6. We also express no opinion on whether the appointment process of the Board of Review contravenes the Appointments Clause, U.S.C.onst., Art. II, § 2, cl. 2.