Page:CIA and Guatemala Assassination Proposals, 1952-1954 (1995).djvu/5

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attacks on the army.[1] A chart depicting the   chief’s plan for the CALLIGERIS (Castillo Armas) organization showed the “K” Group. It was distributed in various paramilitary planning packets as late as the spring of 1954.[2] In a briefing for   in June 1954,   also mentioned that sabotage teams would assassinate known Communists in their areas once the invasion operation began.[3]

Psychological Warfare

As in PBFORTUNE, an intensive psychological warfare program paralleled the planning for paramilitary action. Utilizing the anti-Communist network established by a Guatemalan dissident, the Chief of Political and Psychological Operations at LINCOLN developed a major propaganda campaign against the Arbenz government. Part of this program included the sending of new mourning cards to top Communist leaders. These cards mourned the imminent purge or execution of various Communists throughout the world and hinted of the forthcoming doom of the addressee. Death letters were also sent to top Guatemalan Communists such as   Guatemala City Station,   prepared these letters for the dissident leader. The “Nerve War Against Individuals,” as it was called, also included sending wooden coffins, hangman’s nooses, and phony bombs to selected individuals. Such slogans as “Here Lives a Spy” and “You have Only 5 Days” were painted on their houses.[4]

Wanting to go beyond mere threats, the dissident leader suggested that the “violent disposal” of one of the top Guatemalan Communists would have a positive effect on the resistance movement and undermine Communist morale. The dissident leader’s recommendations called for the formation of a covert action group to perform violent, illegal acts against the government. LINCOLN cautioned the dissident leader, however, that such techniques were designed only to destroy a person’s usefulness. By destroy “we do not mean to kill the man,” LINCOLN cabled the dissident leader. Responding to the proposal that a top Communist leader be killed,   Guatemala City told   he could not recommend assassinating any “death letter” recipients at this time because it might touch off “wholesale reprisals.” Reiterating that the plan was “to scare not kill,” he nevertheless suggested that   might wish to “study the suggestion for utility now or in the future.”[5]

While Agency paramilitary and psychological warfare planning both included suggestions which implied assassination proposals, these proposals appear never to have been implemented. The   chief had sought to use Castillo Armas’ “K” group scheme but there was no State Department or White House support. Such was also the case when the subject of assassination emerged in high-level Agency and inter-agency planning discussions.


  1. See   to Headquarters, 8 June 1954, Box 5 (S) or   to Headquarters, 8 June 1954, Box 5 (S).
  2. See to   Report #22, “Current Planning of CALLIGERIS Organization,” 12 December 1952, Box 134 (S) and “Contact Report,” 13 January 1954, (S).
  3. See Dispatch, to  , “Training,” 6 June 1954, Box 75 (Secret, PBSUCCESS, Rybat).  
  4. To LINCOLN, 26 May 1954, “Tactical Instructions (part II),” (S) and To LINCOLN, “Instructions’ Nerve War Against Individuals,” 9 June 1954, Box 50 (S).
  5. See COS Guatemala City, to Western Hemisphere Division, undated, Box 46, (C) and Guatemala City 553 to LINCOLN, 14 May 1954. See also the COS, dispatch Guatemala City to LINCOLN, 14 May 1954, Box 145 (S).  

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