essay, I have been unable to accept his final conclusion or inference of fact in that case.
I am perfectly conscious that much in opinions of the very highest authority contradicts what I am about to say. I nevertheless and notwithstanding consider the law to be as I am striving to explain it.
Just as it is believed that "tendency" is the paramount consideration in cases of restraint, and is limited and defined by the doctrine of "indirectness," so I believe that the basis of our civilization, law, and religion is "coöperation." Though constituting the greatest source of human power for either good or evil, coöperation in turn is limited and defined by the doctrine of competition, that it may accomplish legitimate purposes only.
As to religion, I take it no one will question what I say. It would be an anomaly if a nation's law and religion were diametrically and irreconcilably in conflict on such a subject. As to our civilization, to deny this position would be equivalent to the assertion that civilization is not civilization, for civilization is coöperation among men!
And, so, to the law.
I think it is on this subject, as on the others of which I have treated, largely controlled by purpose, intent, tendency. Where men coöperate for good they are most effectively engaged in furthering the public welfare; and it is no less true that where they coöperate for evil, they in like measure intensify the evils aimed at. That I understand to be the whole doctrine of criminal conspiracy.
So, while I feel that in the Securities case the test of the stifling of all motives for competition was absolutely correct and properly applied, and while I
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