115 Fed. Cas. page 31] (Case No. 8,136) LAWEENCE ployed Richard H. Dana, Jr., one of the re- spondents, to edit the proposed edition, and to prepare the notes as aforesaid; and the complainant further showed that the re- spondents, without his consent, had caused the proposed edition to be printed, published, and publicly sold. Reference was also made to certain alleged pretences set up by the respondents; and the complainant prayed for an account and for an injunction, and that the respondents might be decreed to surrender and deliver up all copies of the book on hand, and to make and deliver to the complainant a good and sufficient deed of the copyrights of 1853 and 18G3 in accord- ance with his equitable title. J. J. Storrow. (Mr, Storrow stated very fully the relations between the complainant and Mr. Wheaton and his family from 1822 to the time of filing the bill, and the rela- tions of some of the respondents with each other and the complainant, reading from the correspondence printed in the record.) The negotiations with Mr. Brockhaiis were begun in 1860; his first definite proposition was not made until he had seen the ad- vance sheets of the second edition in 1863. These negotiations were all by correspond- ■ence, which was communicated to the Wheatons and to Mr. Little, and is now be- fore the court, together with the correspond- ence between the parties on the subject. It is true, and was known to the Wheatons at the time, that Brockhaiis was induced to make the offer in order to obtain from Mr. Liittle and the Wheatons the exclusive right to print in French, on the continent, Mr. Lawrence's annotations, with emendations to be made by that gentleman. Thereupon, after a negotiation with Professor Parsons, of the Dane Law School, who represented the Wheatons, the agreement stated in the bill was made, Mr, Lawrence gave the re- quired promise to Mr. Brockhaiis, and the Vheatons thereupon received the money. This contract was negotiated and drawn by skilful counsel, representing the Wheatons; it secured for them 6,000 francs due to Mr. Lawrence's labors; it imposed on hira a se- rious burden of work and expense; it at most on, .,' gave him the formal title to that ■which they confess fairly belonged to him; up to the time of this suit they have always •declared it to be entirely satisfactory: to avoid it on the ground of fraud, the respond- ■ents must show clearly that the complainant misrepresented to Mr. Parsons, or designed- ly concealed from him some fact or some means of knowledge, and that this misrep- resentation or concealment was the induce- ment which in fact led the Wheatons to xaake the agreement. 1 Story, Bq. Jur, § 200 €t seq.; Attwood v. Small, 6 Clark & F. 447; Park v. Johnson, 4 Allen, 266; Jennings v. Broughton, 5 De Gex, :m. & G. 130; Veazie V. Williams [Case No. 16,907]; Campbell v. Fleming, 1 Adol. & E. 40. The correspond- ence clearly disproves all this. From the time the Vheatons received the 6,000 francs, Mr. Lawrence, in the view of a court of equi- ty, was the absolute owner of the notes. Fletcher v. Morey [Case No. 4,864]; Parker V. Muggridge [Id. 10,743]; Clarke v. South- wick Lid. 2,863]; Collyer v. Fallon, Turn. & R. 469; Rerick v. Kern, 14 Serg. & R, 271; Sirams v. Marryat, 7 Eng. Law & Eq. 337. The correspondence shows that the parties understood that the memorandum had this effect and they cannot take advantage of their refusal to execute the further assur- ance which the memorandum called for. Browne, Frauds, §§ 4 44 — 14 6. Similar agree- ments have been held sufficient in copyright cases to sustain a bill and an injunction for piracy both as against a party to the con- tract and as against publishers claiming under such party, though without actual notice. Curt. Copyr. 315; Mawman v. Tegg, 2 liuss. 385; Sweet v. Shaw, 3 Jur. 217; Col- bum V. Duncombe, 9 Sim. 155; Sweet v. Ca- ter, 5 Jur. 68, 11 Sim. 572; Longman v. Ox- berry (1820), cited in Gods. Pat. 314. The evidence, and particularly the correspond- ence of the parties, shows that this mem- orandum contained the whole and true agree- ment of the parties, clearly and explicitly stated. The next defence is that after the com- plainant had (as they alleged) practised a fraud to obtain the control of his own prop- erty, he voluntarily gave it back again. Rights conferred or secured, or obligations imposed by an executed agx-eement, where the consideration has passed by full per- formance on one side and enjoyment on the other, cannot be returned or ti-ansferred back by an agreement not under seal with- out a new and valuable consideration. 1 Smith, Lead. Cas. 595, note to Cumber v. Wane; Wildes v. Fessenden, 4 Mete. [Mass.] 12, and cases cited; Smith v. Bartholomew, 1 Mete. [Mass.] 277; Edwards v. Chapman,
Mees. & W. 231. Even in eases where
there has not been a completed performance there must be proof of an intention to abandon and a deliberate act sufficient to carry out that intention. McCormick v. Seymour [Case No. 8,726]; Flagg v. Mann Lid. 4,847]; Kendall v. Winsor, 21 How. [62 U. S.j 331; Shaw v. Cooper, 7 Pet [32 U. S.] 320; Mowry v. Sheldon, 2 R. I. 378; Brewer v. Boston & W. R. R., 5 Mete. [Mass.] 483; Rich v. Atwater, 16 Conn. 416, and cas- es cited. When the act is without any- thing which the law deems a consideration, it may be revoked. Pierrepont v. Barnard,
Seld. [6 N. Y.] 289; Mumford v. Whitney,
15 Wend. 387; Holmes v. Fisher, 13 N. H. 12; Brewer v. Boston & W. R, R., 5 Mete. [Mass.] 478; McKay v. Holland, 4 Mete. [Mass.] 73; 2 Smith, Lead. Cas. 753, 767. The correspondence relied on as constituting the alleged waiver does not contain language which can fairly bear the construction con- tended for. If it even left the complainant's
