tation was sent to the rebels ; the deputation returned several hours later, convinoed of the futility of the negotiations. On September 1st General Zankievitch sent an ultimatum to the rebels demanding that they lay down
their arms, and menacing in case of refusal to open fire with artillery
if the order was not obeyed by September 3d at 10 o'clock.
"The order not being executed, a light fire of artillery was opened on the place at tlie hour agreed upon. Eighteen shells were fired, and the rebels were warned that the bombardment would become more intense. In the night of September 3d 160 men surrendered. September 4th the artillery bombardment recommenced, and at 11 o'clock, after 36 shells had been fired, the rebels raised two white flags and began to leave the camp without arms. By evening 8^00 men had surrendered. 150 soldiers who remained in the camp opened fire with machine-guns that night. The 5th of September, to make an end of the affair, a heavy barrage was laid on the camp, and our soldiers occupied it little by little. The rebels kept up a heavy fire with their machine-guns. September 6th, at 9 o'clock, the camp was entirely occupied. . . . After the disarmament of the rebels, 81 arrests were made. ..."
Thus the report. From secret documents discovered in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, however, we know that the account is not strictly accurate. The first trouble arose when the soldiers tried to form Committees, as their comrades in Russia were doing. They demanded to be sent back to Russia, which was refused; and then, being considered a dangerous influence in France, they were ordered to Salonika. They refused to go, and the battle followed. ... It was discovered that they had been left in camp without officers for about two months, and badly treated, before they became rebel- lious. All attempts to find out the name of the "Russian artillery brigade" which had fired on them were futile; the telegrams discovered in the Minis- try left it to be inferred that French artillery was used. . . ,
After their surrender, more than two hundred of the mutineers were shot in cold blood.
8.
TERESTCHEKKO'S SPEECH {Be8Um4)
"... The questions of foreign policy are closely related to those of national defence. . . . And so, if in questions of national defence you think it is necessary to hold session in secret, also in our foreign policy we are sometimes forced to observe the same secrecy. . . .
"German diplomacy attempts to influence public opinion. , . . There- fore the declarations of directors of great democratic organisations who talk loudly of a revolutionary Congress, and the impossibility of another winter campaign, are dangerous. . . . All these declarations cost human lives. . . .
"1 wish to speak merely of governmental logic, without touching the questions of the honour and dignity of the State. From the point of view of logic, the foreign policy of Russia ought to be based on a real compre- hension of the mterests of Russia. . . . These interests mean that it is impossible that our country remain alone, and that the present alignment of forces with us, (the Allies), is satisfactory. ... All humanity longs for peace, but in Russia no one will permit a humiliating peace which would violate the State interests of our fatherland!"
The orator pointed out that such a peace would for long years, if not for centuries, retard the triumph of democratic principles in the world, and would inevitably cause new wars.
"All remember the days of May, when the fraternisation on our Front threatened to end the war by a simple cessation of military operations, and lead the coimtry to a shameful separate peace . . . wd "snVvbX. ^^^V«» '^ was necessaiy to use to make the soldier masses a. VJ&a ttocX. understand
