that it was not by this method that the Russian State must end the war and guarantee its interest ..."
He spoke of the miraculous effect of the July offensive, what strength it gave to the words of Russian ambassadors abroad, and the despair in Germany caused by the Russian victories. And also, the disillusionment in Allied countries which followed the Russian defeat. . . .
"As to the Russian Government, it adhered strictly to the formula of May, 'No annexations and no punitive indemnities.' We consider it essential not only to proclaim the self-determination of peoples, but also to renounce imperialist aims. ..."
Germany is continually trying to make peace. The only talk in Germany is of peace; she knows she cannot win.
"I reject the reproaches aimed at the Government which allege that Russian foreign policy does not speak clearly enough about the alms of the war. . . .
"If the question arises as to what ends the Allies are pursuing, it is indispensable first to demand what aims the Central Powers have agreed upon. ...
"The desire is often heard that we publish the details of the treaties which bind the Allies; but people forget that, up to now, we do not know the treaties which bind the Central Powers. ..."
Germany, he said, evidently wants to separate Russia from the West by a series of weak buffer-states.
"This tendency to strike at the vital interests of Russia must be checked. . . .
"And will the Russian democracy, which has inscribed on its banner the rights of nations to dispose of themselves, allow calmly the continua- tion of oppression upon the most civilised peoples (in Austria-Hungary)?
"Those who fear that the Allies will try to profit by our difficult situation, to make us support more than our share of the burden of war, and to solve the questions of peace at our expense, are entirely mistaken. . . . Our enemy looks upon Russia as a market for its products. The end of the war will leave us in a feeble condition, and with our frontier open the flood of German products can easily hold back for years our industrial development. Measures must be taken to guard against this. . . .
"I say openly and frankly: the combination of forces which unites us to the Allies is favourable to the interests of Russia, ... It is therefore important that our views on the questions of war and peace shall be in accord with the views of the Allies as clearly and precisely as possible. . . .
To avoid ail misunderstanding, I must say frankly that Russia must present at the Paris Conference one point of view . . .'"
He did not want to comment on the nakaz to Skobeliev, but he referred to the Manifesto of the Dutch-Scandinavian Committee, just published in Stockholm. This Manifesto declared for the autonomy of Lithuania and Livonia; "but that is clearly impossible," said Terestchenko, "for Russia must have free ports on the Baltic all the year round. . . .
"In this question the problems of foreign policy are also closely related to interior politics, for if there existed a strong sentiment of unity of all great Russia, one would not witness the repeated manifestations, every- where, of a desire of peoples to separate from the Central Government. . . .
Such separations are contrary to the interests of Russia, and the Russian delegates cannot raise the issue. . . "
9.
THE BRITISH FLEET {etc)
At the time of the naval battle of the Gulf of Riga, not only the Bolsheviki, but also the Ministers of the Provsional Government, con-
