Page:North Dakota Reports (vol. 1).pdf/158

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134
NORTH DAKOTA REPORTS.

the only prior lien was both paid and satisfied. Whether Barnes took subject to the prior equity in favor of the plaintiff we do not decide, for, assuming that he did, the plaintiff has by his own solemn act estopped himself from insisting on the priority of lien. Simpson v. Del Hoyo, 94 N. Y. 189, and cases cited; McNeil v. Bank, 46 N. Y. 325. Certainly the plaintiff is in no better position than he would have been had he personally stated to Barnes that his (plaintiff's) mortgage had been paid and satisfied, and Barnes, relying on that statement, and of course inferring from it that the mortgage he was about to purchase had become a first lien, had bought the mortgage for value and in good faith. ‘Equity will listen to no plea against the words of a suitor, misleading another to his detriment, if the admission could be retracted. It is under the Beecher & Dean mortgage that defendant Elizabeth McKnight claims title.

It was urged that the fact that there appeared to have been recorded, about the same time this satisfaction was recorded, another mortgage to the same mortgagee as in the lost mortgage, and for about the same amount, was sufficient to put Barnes on inquiry as to whether the new mortgage and satisfaction together did not, in reality, constitute mere record evidence of a lost security, which it was never intended to cancel or release. In the first place, the mortgage is for several hundred dollars more than the lost mortgage, which is in no manner referred to therein, es would naturally have been done if it had been the design of the parties merely to create an evidence of a lost security. The mortgagor is not the same person in the two mortgages; and, although the new mortgage recites that the property is free from incumbrances, yet this cannot be held to be sufficient to make it the duty of Barnes or his attorney to inquire whether it was not intended as a mere evidence of the lost mortgage, because the mortgagee in the new mortgage had precluded all necessity for inquiring by executing with his own hand, and placing upon the public record, a statement that the lost mortgage had not only been satisfied, but also paid. He was guilty of gross negligence in making and recording such a statement without examining the record, to ascertain whether there was not an intervening incumbrance, which an innocent