Again, (it is reprehended,) if from what is stated, the definition of the contrary is not evident, since they who well define, signify also the contraries besides: or if it is not of itself evident of what the definition is spoken; but such cases, like ancient pictures, cannot be known, what each is, without a superscription.
Chapter 3
If then definition be obscure, we must examine from such places as these, but if it has been stated excessively, we must first see whether any thing is employed which is present with all things, or simply with beings or with those which are under the same genus with the thing defined; since it must inevitably happen that this will be asserted in excess. For it is requisite to separate genus from other things, but difference from something of those in the same genus, wherefore what is present with all things is simply separated from nothing, but what is present with all under the same genus is not separated from those in the same genus, so that an addition of this kind is vain.
Or (we must observe), whether what is added be proper, but this being taken away the rcmaining definition is proper, and demonstrates substance, e. g. in the definition of man, receptive of science is superfluously added, since this being taken away, the remaining definition is appropriate, and manifests the substance. In a word, every thing is superfluous, which when taken away the remainder causes the thing defined to be manifest, such indeed is the definition of the soul, if it be number moving itself, for that which itself moves itself is soul, as Plato has defined it. Or is what has been mentioned property indeed, yet does not manifest essence when number is taken
