omit to speak about genera and species, as to whether they subsist (in the nature of things) or in mere conceptions only; whether also if subsistent, they are bodies or incorporeal, and whether they are separate from, or in, sensibles,[1] and subsist about these,[2]** Kant. Sir W. Hamilton, Ed. Review, No. 115, and Reid's works; also Cat. 5, note. for such a treatise is most profound, and requires another more extensive investigation.[3] Nevertheless, how the ancients, and especially the Peripatetics, discussed these and the other proposed subjects, in a more logical manner, I will now endeavour to point out to you.
Chap. II.—Of the Nature of Genus and Species.[4]
1. Neither genus nor species denominated simply; the former is either a collection of manyNeither genus nor species appear to be simply denominated, for that is called genus which is a collection of certain things, subsisting in a certain respect relatively to one thing, and to each other, according to which signification the genus of the
- ↑ On the metaphysical part of this question, the opinions of philosophers are as vague as (I may add) they are unprofitable, hence the term "universals," is the best to be employed, as least liable to commit the logician to any metaphysical hypothesis; since the realist may interpret it of "substances," the nominalist of "names," the conceptualist of "notions." Cf. Occam, Log. p. 1, Albertus Magnus, Abelard. The agreement between the first and last, proves that there is no real difference between nominalism and conceptualism, since they were both. Vide also Mansel, Appendix A, where the authorities upon each side will be found quoted.
- ↑ Genus and species, in short all forms, have a triple subsistence, for they are either prior to the many, or in the many, or posterior to the many. Taylor. Philoponus, in his extracts from Ammonius, illustrates this as follows: Let a seal-ring be conceived, having the image of Achilles upon it, from which seal let there be many impressions taken in pieces of wax, afterwards let a man perceiving the pieces of wax to have all the impression of one seal, retain such impression in his mind: then the seal in the ring is said to be prior to the many; the impression in the wax to be in the many, and the image remaining in the conception of the spectator, after the many, and of posterior origin. This he applies to genus and species.
- ↑ Viz. metaphysics; it is, in fact, psychological. Cf. Leibnitz Meditat. de Cognit. Ver. opera, ed Erdmann. and Mansel's Prolegomena Logica.
- ↑ With this chapter compare ch. 5, of the Categories, and Top. i. 5 and 8, whence the discrepancies between the account of the predicables given by Arist. and this by Porphyry will appear, upon which see Mansel's comment. Log. App. A, p. 9. Cf. also Albertus Mag. de Predicab. Trac. II, cap. 1, Metap. iv. 28.
