part, vide Cat. ch. 5, noteboth a whole and a part; part indeed of something else, but a whole not of another, but in other things, for the whole is in its parts.[1] Concerning genus then, and species, we have shown what is the most generic, and the most specific, also what the same things are genera and species, what also are individuals, and in how many ways genus and species are taken.
Chap. III.—Of Difference.[2]
1. Difference predicated commonly, properly, and most properly. Cf. Whately, Mansel, and Wallis.Difference may be predicated commonly, properly, and most properly: for one thing is said to differ from another in common from its differing in some respect in diversity of nature, either from itself, or from something else; for Socrates differs from Plato in diversity of nature, and himself from himself when a boy, and when become a man, also when he does any thing, or ceases to do it, and it is always perceived in the different ways in which a thing is somehow effected. Again, one thing is said to differ properly from another, when one differs from another by an inseparable accident; but an inseparable accident is such as blueness, or crookedness, or a scar become scirrhous from a wound. Moreover, one is most properly said to differ from another, when it varies by specific difference, as man differs from horse by specific difference, i. e. by the quality of rational. 2. Every difference is effective of diversity—the common and proper render a thing (
Greek characters) (alienum), the mostUniversally then every difference acceding to a thing renders it different, but differences common and proper render it different in quality, and the most proper render it another thing. Hence, those which render it another thing are called specific, but those,
- ↑ Genus is a whole in predication, containing under it various subjective species; species is a whole in definition, containing genus and differentia, as parts of the essence; the former may be called "Totum Universale," the latter "Totum Essentiale," (cf. Crakanthorpe, Logica, lib. ii. ch. 5): sometimes the distinction is expressed by the terms, "whole of extension," and "whole of comprehension." Port Royal Log., part i. ch. 6. Species contain genus by implication, genus contains species by comprehension, so also in this latter sense, does species contain "individuals," yet it is a less full and complete term than that of "individual." Vide Whately, Log. ii. ch. 5, sec. 3; Wallis, lib. i. 4; Abelard de Gen. et Spec.; Hill's Log. vol. i.
- ↑ Vide notes to ch. 5, Categories, and chapters 7, 12, 13, 14, Isag.
