An old darkey was under indictment for some trivial offence, and was without counsel. The judge appointed a young lawyer to defend him, who had never tried a case in court. As he walked forward to consult with his client, the prisoner turned to the judge and said, — "Yo' Honah, am dis de lawyer what am depointed to offend me?" "Yes." "Well," continued the old darkey, "take hit away, Jedge; I pleads guilty."
The defence of insanity had been strongly and persistently urged in the case of a prisoner on trial for horse-stealing; and as the prosecuting attorney made no attempt to reply to or contro vert the argument, all appeared to be going on swimmingly until it came to the judge's charge. Addressing the jury, the court said : " The plea of insanity has been set up, and I charge you, gentlemen of the jury, that it should receive your very grave and serious deliberation; but I must be allowed to say, gentlemen, that for my self, on a review of the whole case, I can discover no evidence of insanity on the part of the prisoner, except, perhaps, in the selection of his counsel.
Judge. It would be more respectful to this court, sir, if you would keep your hands out of your pockets. Why do you do so, sir? Defendant. Just for the novelty of the thing, your Honor. Judge. Novelty! What d' ye mean? Defendant. Fact is, your Honor, my attorney has had his hands in there so long, I 'm tickled to death to get a chance at them myself.
At the trial of a case, a juryman being absent from his seat, all the others being occupied, a dog, looking for his master, quietly took possession of the vacant chair. "You see, Mr. ," said the judge, turning to one of the counsel, " that the jurymen's seats are all occupied. Are you ready to proceed?" The attorney addressed raised his glasses to his eyes, and after a brief survey of the jury-box replied, — "Your Honor, that fellow might do for a judge, but I should hate to trust him for a juryman."
NOTES. In one of the law courts of Helsingborg, Swe den, a queer case of hypnotism has puzzled the judges. A young medical student brought suit against a practising physician in the town for hav ing hypnotized him several times against his will, with the result that his nervous system was injured and his mind somewhat enfeebled. Several wit nesses appeared for the plaintiff; and to the aston ishment of the court, they all appeared to be crazy, and gave the most contradictory and astounding testimony. Hereupon a medical gentleman came upon the stand and further astonished the court with the announcement that his confrere, the de fendant, had hypnotized the witnesses and made them say just whatever he liked. Finally the court adjourned the case, and appointed a commission to see if the entire crowd were not crazy. A curious question of criminal law has arisen in Virginia. Mrs. Virginia Taylor was indicted and tried for the murder of her husband by poison, and was convicted of murder in the second degree. The court set aside the verdict as contrary to law, as the statute makes murder by poisoning murder in the first degree. Afterward, on the application of the prisoner, she was discharged without any further trial or proceeding, the court basing its action in discharging her upon the statute which provides that " if the verdict be set aside and a new trial granted the accused, he shall not be tried for any higher offence than that of which he was convicted on the last [first] trial." (Code, Sec. 4,040.) The court, in discharging the accused under the circumstances, by implication, if not expressly, held that a conviction of murder in the second degree was unwarranted by the law; and as the statute quoted prohibited a conviction of mur der in the first degree, and as the facts would not warrant a conviction of a lesser offence, the pris oner had to be discharged. From an address delivered by the Hon. Samuel F. Miller, the senior Associate Justice of the Su preme Court of the United States before the LawDepartment of the University of Pennsylvania, the following extract is taken : — "It is of very little use to the court that counsel should refer to a case in a general way, unless it is one of those remarkable cases the principle of which
