rising the jurisdiction of the separate courts. This must have proved a bad economy, for such an arrangement holds no longer. The governor was to appoint in each county not fewer than three, nor more tnan four judges. The State was to be divided into circuits of not more than six, nor fewer than three counties. A President Judge was to be appointed for each circuit, who acted also as President Judge of each court in his district. The President and Judges were necessary for holding Common Pleas, Oyer and Ter miner, and general jail delivery. Any two of the judges of the Court of Common Pleas — not necessarily including the President Judge — might hold a court of Quarter Ses sions, Orphans' Court, or Registers' Court. Existing commissions were to remain in force until the expiration of the terms. After that the judges were to be appointed for good behavior. When the utter dislocation of all things at that time is remembered, Lord Mansfield's finding that Chief-Justice McKean's decis ions showed " liberality . . . strong reason . . . and legal learning" becomes a very high commendation. These cases are of some historic interest. Respublica v. Abraham Carlisle, I Dallas, 39. Indictment for treason. The defendant took a commission, under the King of Great Britain, to watch and guard the gates of the city of Philadelphia. This and the following belong to the year 1778. Respublica v. John Roberts, 1 Dallas, 42. Indictment for high treason. By the Court : " There is proof of an overt act, that the prisoner did enlist, and evidence is now offered to shew that he also endeavored to persuade others to enlist, in the armies of the enemy. But we are of opinion that the word persuading, used by the legislature, means to succeed, and that there must be an actual enlistment of the person persuaded, in order to bring the de fendant within the intention of the clause. 2 Lord Ray. 889. "The evidence offered, however, is proper
to shew quoanimo the prisoner himself joined the British forces." The execution of both these men called forth, among many others, the above quoted comments of Major Andre. The case of Wharton et al. v. Morris et al. 1 Dallas, 1 33, 1785, is interesting for many reasons. It brings up equitable jurisdiction; involves among the parties and their counsel the wellknown names already mentioned, and also those of Willing, Wilcocks, Sergeant, Lewis, Gouverneur Morris, and Ingersoll; and raises the question of what is " current money." Other cases of a technical interest should be briefly referred to. The Chief-Justice's language is given in each. " I recollect one case in the books upon this point; and that is that an acknowledgment of a debt after suit takes it out of the Statute of Limita tions." " It is the opinion of the court . . . that the common law of England has always been in force in Pennsylvania; that all stat utes made in Great Britain before the settle ment of Pennsylvania have no force here unless they are convenient and adapted to the circumstances of the country." What would he have said about Quia Emptores? "An alien enemy has no right of action whatever during the war; but by the law of nations, confirmed by universal usage, at the end of the war all the rights and credits, which the subjects of either power had against the other, are revived; for during the war they are not extinguished, but merely suspended. If, also, a conquered country is ceded, the old possessors are entitled to their estates; and when any country is conquered, the possessors are not deprived of their es tates, but only change their masters. This is clearly the case between two independent powers, but how will the case be between this country and Great Britain at the close of the war? Why, had we been conquered, our lives and all our property would have been the forfeit; but even as the business now stands (1782), the subjects of Great Britain may, perhaps, claim a revival of the debts due to them from the citizens of Amer
