On the 13th day of November, 1887, Judge Horton re-married. His second wife was Mrs. Mary A. Prescott, the widow of Mr. A. Prescott, in his lifetime a very successful banker of Topeka, Kansas. On account of his official duties in the Supreme Court of the State, Judge Horton has taken up his official residence at Topeka, the capital, and resides in a handsome home facing Capitol Square. Chief-Justice Horton is now in the prime of manhood; enjoys excellent health, and has before him, in the ordinary course of affairs, many years of activity and usefulness. In personal appearance he possesses in an eminent degree, without any overstrain ing, but naturally, the manner and bearing of the court; dignified as becomes his ex alted position, popular, and accredited with many warm friends. He is a model judge, conferring honor upon the great State which has honored him with the most eminent place in her gift. Notwithstanding the almost insuperable demands of the court, over which he pre sides with, such impartiality, constancy, and unsullied reputation, the Chief-Justice finds some leisure to indulge in reading, of which he is very fond, in the range of his tastes comprising the best literary efforts of the day, and the old authors. As an example of the style of the judicial writings of Chief-Justice Horton, we make the following extracts from opinions handed down by him. In 1874 the Legislature of the State of Kansas enacted a statute making railroad companies liable for all damages to any of their employes in consequence of the negli gence of a co-employe. One of the principal railroad companies attempted to evade this statute by compelling its employes to waive and release in writing all liabilities imposed by the statute. Chief-Justice Horton held, in The Kansas Pacific Railway Company v. Peavey, 29 Kas. 169, that this could not be done, and that such contracts were invalid. He said :
"Whether this legislation be wise or not, it is not within our province to determine. We must assume that the legislature had satisfactory reasons for changing the rule of the common law, and having adopted the statute, as we may assume, for wise and beneficial purposes, we do not think a railroad company can contract in advance for the release of the statute liability. It is a familiar principle of law that a contract made in violation of the statute is void, and also that agreements contrary to the policy of statutes are equally void. There are exceptions : thus, it is no part of the policy of the law to encourage frauds, by releasing the fraudulent party from the obligation of his contract, and so a party shall not set up his own illegality or wrong to the prejudice of an innocent person. (Bemis v. Becker, 1 Kas. 226.) Again, he who prevents a thing being done shall not re cover damages resulting from the non-performance he has occasioned. The plaintiff below is not within these or other exceptions, and therefore the ruling of the District Court upon the demurrer must be sustained. While the reasons for the rule of the common law, that the master ought not to be responsible for injuries inflicted upon one ser vant by the negligence of another servant in the same common employment, seem plausible and correct theoretically, yet we may assume that the legislature did not find the practical operations of the rule affording sufficient security to persons engaged in the hazardous business of operating railroads; that for the protection of the lives and limbs of the employes of such companies, the legislature deemed it necessary to enact the statute. If the statute was enacted for the better protection of the lives and limbs of railroad employes, it would be against public policy for the courts to sanction contracts made in advance for the release of this liability, especially when we consider the unequal situation of the laborer and his employer. Take this illustration : In some States, and in our own, the owners of coal-mines, which are worked by means of shafts, are required to make and con struct escapement shafts in each mine, for distinct means of ingress and egress for all persons em ployed or permitted to work therein. Such a statute is for the benefit of employes engaged in working in coal-mines; but the owner of such a mine would not be permitted to contract in ad vance with his employes in contravention of the provisions of the statute. The State has such an
