either in politics or literature. He was a lawyer, pure and simple, and among lawyers his fame " must live or bear no life." He is said to have possessed no eloquence as an advocate, but to have made his way at the bar by learning and diligence.. An anecdote often told of him may be pardoned here. At church on one occasion with the Chief-Justice, when the collection plate was approaching, he could find nothing but a five-dollar gold piece in his pocket. "Ruffin," said he, "lend me a quarter." The Chief-Justice did not have it. " Lend me a half or a dollar." A shake of the head was the reply. He slammed the gold piece in the plate, saying in desperation " D—n you, go!" Judge Daniel's opinions will be found in twenty-one volumes of the Reports, to wit, 14 and 15 N. C, 17 to 30 N. C. inclusive, and 36 to 40 N. C. inclusive, embracing the Law and Equity reports for sixteen years, beginning December Term, 1832. His opin ions are of Spartan brevity, usually half a page or less, and very rarely indeed exceed ing one page. The following may be turned to as fair specimens of his style of thought and expression : State v. Stalcup, 23 N. C. 30 and State v. Wilson, lb. 32, as to the requisite averments and proof in indictments for riot, and Hardin v. Borders, as to the same in actions for malicious prosecution. In Mitchell v. Mitchell, lb. 257, he construes a will in a fourth of a page; and in Gaither v. Teague, 26 N. C. 65. he decides a question as to the admissibility of evidence in less than five lines. Fleming v. Straley, 23 N. C. 305, discusses evidence on a question of domicile. State v. Fore, lb. 378, holds that as to indictments, if the sense be clear and the charge sufficiently explicit, nice objec tions should be disregarded. Ballew v. Clark, 24 N. C. 23, is a ruling that a party signing an instrument can plead that he was insane when he - did it, and that the old doctrine that a man cannot stultify himself had long been exploded. Rowland v. Row land, lb. 61, decides that in a civil action
against several who have a joint interest, the declaration of one as to a fact within his own knowledge is evidence against all the other defendants also. Copeland v. Copeland, 25 N. C. 513, is a decision in half a page that an overseer from whom a slave is retreating had no right to shoot at him to stop him, and that the owner of a slave which is unjustifiably injured while hired out, can recover damages for the injury. Locke v. Gibbs, 26 N. C. 42, is a ruling that one may recover damages for a malicious prosecution of his slave. Smith v. Low, 27 N. C. 197, holds that the return of a ministerial officer of his acts out of court, unlike the records of the court, is only prima facie correct, and not conclusive. Needham v. Branson, lb. 426, decides that where a conveyance of land is made to husband and wife, they do not take as joint tenants or as tenants in common, but by entireties, and on the death of one the entire estate devolves upon the other. Wright v. Mooney, 28 N. C. 22, holds that a judgment in one court is a set off in an action in assumpsit in another court. State v. Gherkin, 29 N. C. 206, rules that falsely putting a witness's name to a bond which does not require a sub scribing witness does not vitiate the bond, and is not forgery. Coon v. Rice, lb. 217, construes a case coming under the rule in Shelley's Case. State v. Thomas, lb. 381, holds it to be error in the judge to tell the jury that they must find for one of the par ties unless they believe his witness had committed perjury. Judge Daniel's will is in eight lines. In it "he disposed of a large estate, gave his blessing to his children and his soul to his God." He was ten years at the bar, and thirty-two years consecutively a judge, — sixteen years on the Superior Court and sixteen in the Supreme Court. For eleven years (1833-1844) Ruffin, Daniel, and Gaston sat together on the Supreme Court bench of North Carolina. No State has surpassed that bench in ability and learning. To our own judicial annals that time is what —
