Page:The Green Bag (1889–1914), Volume 04.pdf/623

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The Green Bag.


586

Judge Dillard is very much loved. A large fine-looking man, with a large brain and kindly heart, lie looks more like a bishop than a layman. He is unostentatious,

"And as the greatest only are, In his simplicity sublime."

He is the only lawyer in North Carolina who does not appreciate how great a lawyer Judge Dillard is. For many years he and Judge Dick (of the United States District Court, and formerly of the North Carolina Supreme Court ) have maintained an excel lent law school at Greensboro. He was suc ceeded by Thomas Ruffin. Thomas Ruffin, the fourth son of ChiefJustice Thomas Ruffin, was born Sept. 21, 1824, at Hillsboro. He was prepared for college by Samuel Smith, and one of his schoolmates was Judge Jno. H. Dillard, his lifelong friend. He graduated at the Uni versity of North Carolina, in 1844, with hon ors. Among his classmates were L. C. Edwards and Walter L. Steele, and among his college mates Gen. Rufus Barringer, Judges R. P. Dick, and Samuel J. Person. He read law under his father, and began practice at Yanceyville in 1846. In 1848 he removed to Wentworth, and formed a law partnership with Judge John H. Dillard. In 1850 he represented Rockingham County in the House of Commons. In 1856 he was elected Solicitor, and served till his resignation in March, 1860. He was an unusually strong prosecuting officer. He entered the army in 1861 as a captain in the Thirteenth North Carolina Regiment. In October, 1861, he was appointed by Governor Clark a Judge of the Superior Court, to fill the vacancy caused by the death of Judge John M. Dick. He rode the fall circuit. He then resigned, and re turning to the army was, in March, 1862, pro moted to be Lieutenant-Colonel of his regi ment. He was wounded at the desperate battle of South Mountain, Md., Sept. 14, 1862, and resigned March 13, 1863. He displayed great courage, coolness, and capacity on the battle-field. In the latter part of the war he

served as member of an Army Court in the Western Army. After the war he resumed practice at Graham, but in 1868 removed to Greensboro, and formed a law partnership with Judge Dillard and Jno. A. Gilmer, who after wards became a Superior Court Judge. In December 1870, his health becoming serious ly impaired, he abandoned the practice, and removed to Hillsboro, where he ever after re sided. For a while he was an insurance agent. His health being somewhat restored in 1875, he returned to the bar and formed a partner ship with John W.Graham. Upon the resigna tion of Judge Dillard, Feb. 11, 1881, he was appointed by Governor Jarvis to succeed him upon the Supreme Court. In 1882 he was nominated by the Democratic party to the same post, and elected. The labor of the court was too heavy for three judges, and, like Judge Dillard, he soon found that he could not remain on the bench and live. He resigned, Sept. 23, 1883, after a service of two years and a half, and resumed the prac tice of law with Hon. John W. Graham at Hillsboro. His opinions will be found in five volumes, 84 N. C. to 89 N. C. inclusive. They are a lasting monument to his industry and ability. Attention may well be called to the following: Muse v. Muse, 84 N. C. 35, which holds that a husband in a divorce suit may be ordered to pay alimony out of the pro ceeds of his labor when he owns no property. Wilson v. Seagle, lb. 110, discusses the duty of an appellant in perfecting his appeal. Wal lace v. Trustees, lb. 164, hold that the cor porate powers of a municipal corporation may be revoked, leaving the creditors to seek relief by an appeal to the legislature. Murrill v. Murrill, lb. 182, is one of many decisions hold ing that a new action will not lie when the same end can be attained by a motion in the original cause. Long v. McLean, 88 N. C. 3, decides that the constitutional provision abol ishing imprisonment for debt has no appli cation to actions in tort. Bevers v . Park, lb. 456, holds that the heir may plead the statute of limitation to a debt of his ancestor in a proceeding by the administrator to sell