SOCIOLOGY. 309 SOCIOLOGY. conduct the whole nervous organization is mold- ed accordingly. Mental and practical resem- blances are created. The stimuli presented by external nature create types of emotion and of intellect. The stimuli of economic opportunity, leading to activities of utilization, create types of disposition. The stimuli which impel men to adapt themselves to their environment, when they have failed to adapt the environment to themselves, create types of character. Types of emotion, intellect, disposition, and character in their various combinations make up the vari- ous types of mind. The important types of intellect are ( 1 ) those in which judgment is determined subjectively, by instinct, habit, and auto-suggestion; (2) those in which it is objectively determined, by e.- ternal suggestion; (3) those in which it is subjectively determined, by emotion, mood, and temperament ; and ( 4 ) those in which it is ob- jectively determined, by evidence. The types of disposition are ( 1 ) the aggressive ; ( 2 ) the in- stigative (which, instead of directly attacking, commanding, or inventing, tries to achieve the purposes of life by working through other men by suggestion, temptation, or persuasion) ; (.3) the domineering (the disposition of those who have the power to impress others, and who love to assert authority) ; and (4) the creative, the disposition of those who assume responsibility and convert ideas into realities. The types of character are (1) the forceful, directly created by the struggle for existence which eliminates weaklings: (2) the convivial, which emerges when the struggle for existence has been so far successful that men may relax their efforts and devote themselves to pleasure ; ( 3 ) the austere, which is produced by reaction against the ex- cesses of the convivial; and (4) the rationally conscientious, which is produced by reaction against the excesses of the austere. The t^'pes of mind are ( 1 ) the ideo-motor. the activities of which are for the most part instinctive; (2) the ideo-emotional. which is emotional (rather than physically active), imaginative, suggestible, instigative. and convivial; (3) the dogmatic- emotional, marked by an extreme development of preferential attention, devotion to a dominant idea or belief, intolerance, domineering disposi- tion, and austere character; (4) the critical- intellectual, in which the ideo-motor. ideo-emo- tional, and dogmatic emotional activities, always present in combination, are habitually kept under the control of a critical and vigilant in- tellect, and in which di^^position is creative and character rationally conscientious. These various mental and moral types found in any large population of civilized men have been produced by varying degrees of responsive- ness to differing stimuli, and in their turn they determine the degree to which the whole popula- tion, or large sections of it, can share a com- mon impulse. The more highly differentiated a population is into intellectual and character types the fewer are the stimuli which can move all to common purpose and action. Each type affords the basis for a conscious- ness of kind, especially if the type is correlated with a tie of kinship, as nationality, or ethnic or color race, or a tie of local or class interest. The consciousness of kind is a complex state of mind, including sympathy, perceptions of re- semblance, affection, and the desire for recog- nition. The consciousness of kind is almost as inlluential as the resources of the environment in determining the ethnic composition of a population. Thus, for example, the overwhelm- ing preponderance of Teutonic elements in the foreign-born population of the North Central States of the United States is largely to be accounted for by the selective attraction of kin- ship. Little if any less important th.an the perfect consciousness of kind is that consciousness of potential resemblance, of mental approach, which is the subjective side of assimilation. In a mixed population the different ethnic elements are continually undergoing changes which tend to break down their differences, and to establish community of feelings and ideas. In like man- ner, differentiated types of mind and character when brought into close association tend to be- come alike, just as when under unlike influences they tend to become differentiated. The causes of assimilation are conflict, toler- ation, and imitation. Gabriel Tarde, as we have seen, has undertaken to derive the entire social pi'ocess from imitation. He recognizes in society, and in the universe at large, conflicts of action, as well as repetitions or similarities, and in his important work, La logique sociale, he develops the social aspect of a process of adaptation. whereby conflicts of action and repetitions of action are reconciled. This is to identify all similarities or repetitions of action with imita- tion. It would seem 'to be more accurate to recognize both original (or simultaneous) simi- larities, and repetitious (or sequent) similari- ties, and to identify imitation with the latter only. Moreover, inasmuch as it is through the establishment of sequences of similarity that adaptation or adjustment is brought about, imi- tation must necessarily be identified with adapta- tion. All of these processes are seen in perfec- tion in a society of mixed elements. Conflicts sometimes result in the subjection of the weaker, sometimes in an equilibrium of strength, which is the basis of toleration, and sometimes in good feeling and imitation. So far. then, from being an original social process (which simultaneous like response to stimulus is), imitation is prac- tically the auxiliary process of assimilation, whereby conflicts are softened and unlike ele- ments are made alike. Given, now, similarities of mind and char- acter in a population, and a consciousness of kind, conditions are present for the formation of agreeing purposes, a concert of wills, and co- operation. Together these processes may be called concerted volition. The degree of resem- blance, the consciousness of kind, the character of the stimuli, determine the extent of concerted action. This may be a temporary concerted vo- lition, such as is seen in festivals, crusades, strikes, panics, insurrections, and political cam- paigns, or it may be a relatively enduring co- operation. Cooperation grows bv indistinguish- able gradations out of momentary like responses which may begin accidentally, as. for example, when bystanders run simultaneously to a person hurt or in trouble. The consciousness of kind is necessary to supplement such beginnings by making it evident to each of the participating individuals that they are working toward the same end. and that they are sufficiently alike to work together successfullv. There must, how-
