fame [1]
measures with that to which it is equal. Certainly. But that which is greater or lesser than the things with which it is commensurate, will possess more measures than the lesser quantities, but fewer than the greater. Certainly. But to those to which it is incommensurable, with respect to the one part, it will consist of lesser ; and with respect to the other, of greater measures. How should it not ? Is it not, therefore, impossible that that which does not participate of same should either be of the same measures, or admit any thing in any respect the same ? It is im-
in this cafe it would not be the cause of all things. For the better opposite is not the cause of the worse, but in a certain respect communicates with it, without being properly its cause. For neither does sameness give subsistence to difference, nor permanency to motion ; but comprehension and union pervade from the better to the worse.possible.
- ↑ It is by no means wonderful that the demonstrations of the equal and the unequal, which are here assumed as symbols of mundane deity, should be adapted to physical and mathematical equals, to the equals in the reasons of foul, and to those in intellectual forms. For it is necessary that demonstrations in all these negations should begin supernally, and should extend through all secondary natures, that they may show that the one of the Gods is exempt from intellectual, psychical, mathematical, and physical forms. concerning things equal and unequal, All such axioms, therefore, as are now assumed must be adapted to this order of Gods. Hence, says Proclus, as it contains many powers, some of which are coordinate with each other, and extend themselves to the self-perfect and the good, but others differ according to transcendency and subject in—the former must be said to be characterised by equality, but the latter by inequality. For the good is the measure of every thing: and hence such things as are united by the same good are measured by the fame measure, and are equal to each other. But things which are uncoordinated with each other make their progression according to the unequal. Since, however, of things unequal, some are commensurate and others incommensurate, it is evident that these also must be adapted to divine natures. Hence commensuration must be referred to those Gods, through whom secondary natures are mingled with those prior to them, and participate of the whole of more excellent beings : for thus, in things commensurate, the lesser is willing to have a common measure with the greater,, the same thing measuring the whole of each. But incommensuration must be ascribed to those divinities from whom things subordinate, through the exempt transcendency of more excellent natures, participate of them in a certain respect, but are incapable through their subjection of being conjoined with the whole of them. For the communion from first to partial and multifarious natures is incommensurate to the latter. If, indeed, the equal and the unequal are symbols of the mundane Gods, the commensurate and the incommensurate are here very properly introduced. For in things incorporeal and immaterial this opposition has no place, all things being there effable ; but where there is a material subject, and a mixture of form and something formless, there an opposition of commensuration very properly subsists. Hence, as the mundane Gods are proximately connective of fouls and bodies, form and matter, a division appears in them, according to the equal and the unequal.
