Philosophical Works of the Late James Frederick Ferrier/Institutes of Metaphysic (1875)/Letter to Mr De Quincy
PAPERS SUPPLEMENTARY
TO THE
'INSTITUTES OF METAPHYSIC'
LETTER TO MR DE QUINCEY.
My dear Sir,—Mr Blackwood has just favoured me with a proof of your testimonial. It goes so far beyond what I am entitled to on account of my actual performances, and at the same time touches with such nice discrimination on the points in which I have endeavoured to excel, that I scarcely know whether I ought to despair of ever justifying such glowing commendations, and of approximating so high a standard, or whether I ought to accept them as a cheering stimulus to further exertions, and as an augury of metaphysical victories which I may perhaps yet live to achieve. Let me take the more hopeful view; and as some very small return for the great kindness and honour you have done me, let me lay before you a slight chart of the speculative latitudes which I have reached, and which I expect to navigate without being wrecked. "The Theory of Knowing and Being" (and all metaphysic centres in these two words), which I hope to publish soon, is a system which, like a telescope, shuts up as short, and pulls out as long, as one pleases. We shall now shut it up very short, yet even in that state we may perhaps get a glimpse of the heavens through it.
The speculation is threefold. First, the theory of Knowing (epistemology); secondly, the theory of Ignorance (agnoiology); thirdly, the theory of Being (ontology). The theory of ignorance is that which merits most attention, if not on its own account, at any rate on account of its consequences. It seems to me to be an entire novelty in philosophy. Here, so far as I can learn, I have absolutely no precursor. Many a time and oft have philosophers inquired into the nature of Knowledge, but who has investigated the nature of Ignorance?
Let us begin with the second part of the system. There are two kinds of ignorance; but only one of these is ignorance properly so called. There is, first, an ignorance which is incident to some minds as compared with others, but not necessarily incident to all minds. Such ignorance is a defect, an imperfection. A Hottentot is ignorant of geometry; a Frenchman knows it. This kind of ignorance is ignorance. But, secondly, there is an ignorance or nescience which is of necessity incident to all intelligence by its very nature, and which is no defect, or imperfection, or limitation, but rather a perfection. For example, it is impossible for any mind to know that two straight lines enclose a space, or to know the opposite of any of the mathematical axioms; shall we say then that we are ignorant of these? That would be absurd. No man can be ignorant that two and two make five; for this is a thing not to be known on any terms, or by any mind. This fixes the law of ignorance, which is, that "we can be ignorant only of what can (possibly) be known," or, in barbarous locution, "the Knowable alone is the ignorable."
What, then, is the knowable alone, the only possibly knowable? Because if we can fix this we shall also fix the only ignorable, or that alone which we can be ignorant of. The Epistemology answers this question, and fixes thing-mecum, object plus subject, matter plus mind, as the only knowable. Along with whatever I apprehend (infinitely diversified though the things may be), I must apprehend me. And every intelligence must do the same: it must always apprehend itself along with the thing, whatever the thing may be. What I apprehend is never "things" but always "me-apprehending-things." (An objection must here be obviated: How do we come to overlook ourselves so completely as we usually do when apprehending things? Answer, The law of familiarity fully accounts for this.) Thing or things-plus-me is thus fixed as the only knowable, the only possibly knowable, and the knowable alone having been fixed as that which we can be ignorant of, it follows that thing-or-things-plus-(another)-me is what alone we can be ignorant of. (The nature of the synthesis indicated by the plus cannot here be touched upon.)
But what becomes of "thing minus me," "object by itself," "matter per se;" Kant's "Ding an sich"? "It is," says Kant, "that of which we are ignorant." Nay, that is precisely the point where he and all other philosophers have gone astray, have stumbled and broken their noses. It is not that which we are ignorant of, because it is not that which can possibly be known by any intelligence on any terms. To know thing per se or sine me, is as impossible and contradictory as it is to know two straight lines enclosing a space : because mind by its very law and nature must know the thing cum alio, i. e., along with itself knowing it. Therefore it is just as impossible for us to be ignorant of matter per se, thing minus me, Ding an sich, as it is impossible for us to know this.
The difference, you perceive, between this and every other system is, that while every other system refers our nescience of matter per se to a defect or limitation in our cognitive faculties, and thus represents us as ignorant of matter per se in the proper sense of the word ignorant, this system refers our nescience of matter per se to the very nature of constitution of all reason, refers it to a necessary law which is the very perfection and essence of all intelligence, supernal, terrestrial, and infernal, and thus represents us as not ignorant of matter per se, in any proper and intelligible sense of the word ignorant.
Now for a glimpse of the ontology. No ontology was possible so long as our ignorance of matter per se was admitted. Because in answer to the question, What is real and absolute Being? one man might say, It is that which we know; it is object-plus-subject; it is the universe-mecum. But another man might answer, It is that which we are ignorant of. In which case it would be quite possible for real and absolute Being to be matter per se, this being what, in our present supposition, we are ignorant of; in short, no conclusion but an uncertain or alternative conclusion could be reached, and there is no science in an alternative conclusion. But once exclude matter per se from the pale both of our knowledge and of our ignorance, and an ontology becomes, for the first time, possible. Because in answer to the question, What is real and absolute Being? we must either reply, It is that which we know, in which case it will be object plus subject, because this is the only Knowable; or we must reply, It is that which we are ignorant of, in which case, also, it will be object plus subject; because, it having been proved that we can be ignorant only of the Knowable, and it having also been proved that the only knowable is object plus subject, it follows that the only ignorable (the only thing we can be ignorant of) is Object plus subject. This, then, is the ὄντως ὄν, the unit or minimum, out of ourselves, of our completed ignorance (as it is, in ourselves, of our completed knowledge), a (to us) unknown subject, or intelligence, or ego in a (to us) unknown synthesis with (to us) unknown things. But you must not judge of the system from these abrupt and ineffectual jottings. It will not shut up so short as I anticipated.—Very truly yours,
Thomas de Quincey, Esq.