Philosophical Works of the Late James Frederick Ferrier/Institutes of Metaphysic (1875)/Section 2/Proposition 4

by James Frederick Ferrier

PROPOSITION IV.

IGNORANCE OF OBJECTS PER SE.

We cannot be ignorant of any kind of objects without a subject: in other words, there can be no ignorance of objects per se, or out of relation to a mind.

DEMONSTRATION.

We can be ignorant only of what can possibly be known (Prop. III Agnoiology). But objects without a subject cannot possibly be known (Props. I. and II. Epistemology.) Therefore we cannot be ignorant of objects without a subject; and thus there can be no ignorance of objects per se.

OBSERVATIONS AND EXPLANATIONS.

The truths now pour down fast.1. The truths of the agnoiology now come down in a torrent. The epistemology has unlocked all the sluices. The opening propositions of the agnoiology have cleared away all obstructions which might remain; and we have now little more to do than to look on while the waters take their own unimpeded course. The counter-propositions will be rapidly swept away before the irresistible flood.

Fourth counter-proposition—is swept away.2. Fourth Counter-proposition.—"We can be ignorant of objects without a subject; in other words, we can be, and we are, ignorant of objects per se, or out of relation to a mind." This counter-proposition goes down in an instant. There can be no ignorance, in any quarter, of an object without a subject or mind, simply because there can be no knowledge in any quarter, of an object without a subject or mind.