Philosophical Works of the Late James Frederick Ferrier/Institutes of Metaphysic (1875)/Section 3/Proposition 10
PROPOSITION X.
WHAT ABSOLUTE EXISTENCE IS.
DEMONSTRATION.
Absolute Existence is either that which we know or that which we are ignorant of, (Prop. V., Ontology). If Absolute Existence is that which we know, it must be the synthesis of subject and object—the union of the universal and the particular, the concretion of the ego and the non-ego, because this, and this alone, is knowable (Props. I. II. VI. IX., Epistemology). This synthesis alone is the conceivable (Prop. XIII., Epistemology). This, and this alone, is the substantial and absolute in cognition (Props. XVII. XXI., Epistemology). Again, if Absolute Existence is that which we are ignorant of, it must equally be the synthesis of subject and object, the union of the universal and the particular, the concretion of the ego and the non-ego, because this, and this alone, is what we can be ignorant of (Prop. VIII., Agnoiology). Therefore, whichever alternative be adopted, the result is the same. Whether we claim a knowledge, or profess an ignorance, of the Absolutely Existent, the conclusion is inevitably forced upon us that the Absolutely Existent is the synthesis of the subject and object—the union of the universal and the particular—the concretion of the ego and non-ego; in other words, that the only existences to which true, and real, and independent Being can be ascribed are minds-together-with-that-which-they-apprehend.
OBSERVATIONS AND EXPLANATIONS.
This proposition solves the problem of ontology.1. This proposition solves the problem of ontology. It demonstrates what is—what alone absolutely exists: and thus the end or aim which it was the business and duty of this section of the science to accomplish, has been overtaken.—(See Introduction, § 54.) A predicate declaratory of its character has been affixed to Absolute Existence, and this predicate applies to it equally whether we are cognisant of it, or are ignorant of it. If we are cognisant of Absolute Existence, it must be object plus subject, because this, and this alone, is what any intelligence can know. If we are ignorant of Absolute Existence, it must be still object plus subject, because we can be ignorant only of what can be known—and object plus subject is what alone can be known. Thus the concluding truth of the ontology is demonstratively established, and comes out all the same whether we claim a knowledge, or avow an ignorance, of that which truly exists. Thus the ultimate end of the system is compassed,—compassed by legitimate means,—and its crowning pledge triumphantly redeemed.—(See Introduction, § 60.)
It answers the question: What is truth?2. The solution of the ontological problem affords, moreover, an answer to the ultimate question of philosophy—What is truth?—(See Introduction, § 60.) Whatever absolutely is, is true. The question, therefore, is—But what absolutely is? And the answer, as now declared, is, that object plus subject is what absolutely is—that this, and this alone, truly and really exists. This synthesis, accordingly, is the truth: the Ground—below which there is neither anything nor nothing.
3. The reader who has followed the system up to All Existence is the synthesis of the universal and the particular.this point, should now be at no loss to understand how the synthesis of the particular and the universal is alone entitled to the name of "the Existent." This doctrine, or at least an approximation to it, was the burthen of the philosophy of antiquity—the truth mainly insisted on by the early Greek speculators. But the doctrine at that time, and as they expounded it, was of necessity unintelligible. None of them knew, or at any rate none of them said, what the universal was which entered into the synthesis of Existence. None of them named it. Hence their statement made no impression on the popular mind, and it has remained an enigma to all succeeding generations. No one could understand why the particular (that is, material things by themselves) was denied to be truly existent. But these Institutes have now distinctly shown what this universal is, and the darkness is dissipated—the ancient doctrine becomes luminous. The Institutes have shown that this universal is oneself: oneself, first, inasmuch as this element must form a part of everything which any intelligence can know, (Props. I. II., Epistemology); oneself, secondly, inasmuch as this element must form a part of everything which any intelligence can conceive, (Props. XII. XIII., Epistemology); oneself, thirdly, inasmuch as this element must form a part of everything which any intelligence can be ignorant of, (Prop. VIII., Agnoiology). These points having been demonstratively established, it is conceived that people should have now no difficulty in understanding how oneself or the ego must also form a part of everything which really and truly exists, and consequently how the Absolutely Existent should in all cases be the union of the universal and the particular; and further, how Absolute Existence cannot be accorded to the particular—that is, to mere material things—inasmuch as these, by themselves, are the contradictory to all knowledge, and likewise the contradictory to all ignorance; and, therefore, cannot have true Being ascribed to them, unless we are prepared to maintain that the nonsensical, or that which is neither nothing nor anything, is the truly and absolutely existent.
Thus the equation of the Known and the Existent has been proved.4. It was formerly remarked (Epistemology, Prop. VI., Obs. 10), that the equation or coincidence of the known and the existent is the ultimate conclusion which philosophy has to demonstrate. This demonstration has been supplied, and the conclusion has been reasoned out from the bottom. The universal and the particular (ego and non-ego) in cognition are also in all essential respects the universal and the particular in existence; or, expressed more popularly, the conclusion is that every true and absolute existence is a consciousness-together-with-its-contents, whatever these contents may be. Thus Knowing and Being are shown to be built up out of the same elements; and thus the laws of cognition are demonstrated to be in harmony with the laws of existence; and thus psychology, the whole spirit of whose teaching is to inculcate the frightful doctrine that there is no parallelism between them, is overthrown.—(Epistemology, Prop. VII., Obs. 13.)
The coincidence of the Absolute in Existence with the Absolute in Cognition has also been proved.5. It has now, moreover, been shown, by means of strict demonstration, that the substantial and absolute in existence equates, in essentialibus, with the substantial and absolute in cognition. The substantial and absolute in cognition was found to be the synthesis of the ego and non-ego—of the subject and object—of the universal and the particular. This same synthesis was found to be the substantial and absolute in ignorance, and hence it follows that this same synthesis is the substantial and Absolute in Existence; because the substantial and absolute in existence must be either that which we know or that which we are ignorant of. And thus we obtain further proof and corroboration of the coincidence of the Known and the Existent. The ego is the summum genus of existence, no less than of cognition.—(Epistemology, Prop. VII., Obs. 9 and 13.)
6. To remove any ground of misapprehension, it is necessary, at this place, to direct attention to the words "in essentialibus" in the preceding paragraph. Attention called to restriction in foregoing paragraph.The Absolute, as known by us, has been proved to be identical with the existing Absolute, not in all respects accidental as well as essential, but only in all essential respects: in other words, the Absolute in existence cannot be declared to coincide exactly with the Absolute in our cognition, but only with the absolute in all cognition: or to express the restriction differently—The ontology gives out as the existing Absolute the result which is obtained from the study of the necessary laws of knowledge only, and not the result which is obtained from the study of both the necessary and the contingent laws of knowledge, (see Epistemology, Prop. XXII., Obs. 8). An illustration, or concrete example, will enable the reader to understand clearly this somewhat abstract statement.
Illustration of restriction—What the ontology gives out as alone Absolute Existence.7. The absolutely Existent which each of us is individually cognisant of, is—himself-apprehending-things-by-the-senses. A man cannot be cognisant of himself merely, or of things merely, or of senses merely. He, therefore, cannot be cognisant of these three as existences, but only as factors or elements of existence; and the only true and absolute existence which he can know is, as has been said, their synthesis—to wit, himself-apprehending-things-by-the-senses. Now the circumstance to be particularly attended to is, that the part of the synthesis here printed in italics is contingent in its character. Our five senses are the accidental part of the absolute in our cognition: they are not a necessary part of the Absolute in all cognition, and therefore they are not a necessary part of every absolute existence. Other intelligences may be cognisant of themselves-apprehending-things-in-other-ways-than-we-do. In which case their Absolute, both in cognition and existence, would be different from ours, in its accidentals, but not in its essentials. So that all that the ontology professes to have proved in regard to absolute existence is, that every Absolute Existence must consist of the two terms—ego and non-ego—subject and object—universal and particular; in other words, of a self, and something or other (be it what it may) in union with a self.
This paragraph qualifies a previous assertion.8. It was formerly remarked (Epistemology, Prop. X., Obs. 21), that it would be necessary in the ontology to qualify the assertion that "Plato's intelligible world was our sensible world." The foregoing observations may enable the reader to understand to what extent that assertion has to be qualified. Plato's intelligible world is our sensible world, in so far as all the essential elements both of cognition and of existence are concerned; but not in so far as the contingent elements, either of cognition or of existence, are concerned: in other words, Plato's intelligible world is our sensible world to this extent, that it is that which must embrace a subjective and an objective factor—an ego and a non-ego—but not to this extent that it is that into whose constitution (whether considered as known or as existent) such senses as ours must of necessity enter. Hence what we term the sensible world is the only intelligible or truly existing world in so far as it consists of ourselves and things, but it is not the only intelligible and truly existing world in so far as the senses are embraced in this synthesis, for these are the contingent and (possibly) variable conditions of the known; and are consequently the contingent and (possibly) variable conditions of the existent. The other terms (ego and non-ego) must co-exist wherever there is either knowledge or existence. Hence it may be truly said that every existence is a co-existence; and that to attempt as all psychology does, to cut down this co-existent into two separate existences (mind and its objects), is to aim at the establishment of contradiction in the place of knowledge, and of nonsense in the place of existence.
In what sense we know, and in what sense we are ignorant of, Absolute Existence.9. A word must here be added to explain in what sense, and to what extent, we are cognisant of absolute existence, and in what sense, and to what extent, we are ignorant of the same. Every man is cognisant of absolute existence when he knows—himself and the objects by which he is surrounded, or the thoughts or feelings by which he is visited; every man is ignorant (in the strict sense of having no experience) of all absolute existence except this—his own individual case. But a man is not ignorant of all absolute existences except himself and his own presentations, in the sense of having no conception of them. He can conceive them as conceivable, that is to say, as non-contradictory. He has given to him, in his own case, the type or pattern by means of which he can conceive other cases of absolute existence. Hence he can affirm, with the fullest assurance, that he is surrounded by Absolute Existences constituted like himself, although it is impossible that he can ever know them as they know themselves, or as he knows himself. He will find, however, that every attempt to construe to his mind an absolute and real existence which is not a synthesis of subject and object, resolves itself into a contradiction, and precipitates him into the utterly inconceivable. But although absolute existences are innumerable—although every example of objects plus a subject is a case of Absolute Existence—there is, nevertheless, only one Absolute Existence which is strictly necessary, as the next and concluding proposition of the ontology will show.
10. Tenth Counter-proposition.—"Absolute Existence is not the synthesis of the subject and Tenth counter-proposition. object, &c.,—in other words, minds-together-with-that-which-they-apprehend are not the only true and absolute existences—but that which the mind apprehends may exist absolutely, and out of all relation to a mind; while the mind may exist absolutely, and out of all relation to any thing (or thought) apprehended." This counter-proposition, which attributes absolute existence to the contradictory, has been already sufficiently controverted.