The Sophistical Elenchi
Concerning sophistical elenchi, and such as appear, indeed, elenchi, yet are paralogisms but not elenchi, let us treat, commencing in natural order, from the first.
That some, then, are syllogisms, but that others which are not, appear (syllogisms), is clear, for as this happens in other things through a certain similarity, so also does it occur in arguments. For some have a good habit, others appear (to have it), being inflated on account of their family, and decorating themselves; some, again, are beautiful on account of beauty, but others appear so from ornament. Likewise, in the case of things inanimate, for of these, some are really silver, and others gold, but others again, though they are not, appear so to sense; for instance, substances like litharge and tin (seem) silvery, others dyed with gall (appear) golden. In the same manner also, syllogism and elenchus, one indeed is (in reality), but the other is not, yet seems so from inexperience, for the inexperienced make their observations as it were, withdrawing to a distance; for syllogism is from certain things so laid down, as that we collect something of necessity, different from the things laid down, through the posita; but an elenchus is a syllogism with contradiction of the conclusion. Some, indeed, do not do this, but appear to do it from many causes, of which this is one place most natural and most popular, viz. through names, for since we cannot discourse by adducing the things themselves, but use names as symbols instead of things, we think that what happens in names, also happens in things, as with those who calculate, but there is no resemblance. For names and the number of sentences are finite, but things are infinite in number, wherefore it is necessary that the same sentence and one name should signify many things. As therefore there, those who are not clever in calculation are deceived by the skilful, in the same manner also, with regard to arguments, those who are unskilled in the power of names are deceived by paralogisms, both when they dispute themselves, and when they hear others, for which reason also, and others which will be assigned, there may be a syllogism and elenchus in appearance, but not in reality. Since, however, to some men it is more the endeavour to seem, than to be, wise, and not to seem, (for the sophistical is apparent but not real wisdom, and a sophist is a trader from apparent and not real wisdom,) it is clearly necessary to these, that they should rather seem to perform the office of a wise man, than to perform it and not to seem to do so. On the other hand, it is the business of him who is skilful in any thing, (that I may compare one thing with one,) not to deceive about what he knows, and to be able to expose another who does deceive; and these consist, the one, in being able to give a reason, and the other in receiving one. Therefore it is necessary, that those who desire to argue sophistically, should investigate the genus of the before-named arguments, since it is to the purpose; for a power of this kind, will cause a man to appear wise, which these happen to prefer.
That there is then, a certain such genus of arguments as this, and that they, whom we call sophists, desire such a power, is evident; but how many species of sophistical arguments there are, and from what number this power consists; also, how many parts there are of this treatise; and concerning the other points, which contribute to this art, let us now speak.
In disputation, there are four genera of arguments, the didactic, the dialectic, the peirastic (or tentative), and the contentious. The didactic, indeed, are those which syllogize from the proper principles of each discipline, and not from the opinions of him who answers, (for it is necessary that he who learns, should believe:) the dialectic are such as collect contradiction from probabilities: the peirastic are those which are (conclusive) from things appearing to the respondent, and which are necessary for him to know, who pretends to possess science, (in what manner, indeed, has been defined elsewhere:) the contentious are those which infer, or seem to infer, from the apparently, but not really, probable. Now concerning the demonstrative, we have spoken in the Analytics, but concerning the dialectic and peirastic in other treatises; let us now, therefore, speak about those which are contentious, and litigious.
We must, in the first place, assume how many are the objects which they aim at, who contend, and strive, in disputations, and these are five in number: an elenchus, the false, the paradox, the solecism, and the fifth, to make their opponent in disputation trifle, (this is to compel him frequently to say the same thing,) or what is not, but seems to be, each of these. They specially indeed, prefer, to appear to confute by an elenchus, next to point out some false assertion, thirdly, to lead to a paradox, and fourthly, to make (their adversary) commit a solecism, (and this is, to make the respondent, from the argument, speak barbarously), in the last place, to make (a person) frequently say the same thing.
The modes of employing elenchus are two, for there are some conversant with diction, but others without diction, those which cause appearance (of elenchus) according to diction, are six in number, which are equivocation, ambiguity, composition, division, accent, and figure of speech. The credibility of this, however, is from induction and syllogism, both whether some other (mode) be assumed, and because we may signify what is not the same in so many ways by the same names and sentences. Such arguments as these are from equivocation, as that those scientifically cognizant, learn, for grammarians learn those things which they recite from memory; for to learn, is equivocal, (signifying) both to understand, by using science, and also to acquire science. Again, also, that things evil, are good, for that things necessary are good, but that things evil are necessary; for necessary is twofold, viz. that which is indispensable, which frequently happens also in evils, for (some evil is indispensable), and again, we say that good things are necessary, (that is, expedient). Moreover, that the same person sits, and stands, and is ill, and well, for he who rose, stands, and he who became well, is well; but he who was sitting, rose, and he who was ill, became well, for that he who is ill, does, or suffers any thing, does not signify one thing, but sometimes signifies him who is now ill, or sitting, sometimes him who was ill before, except that both he who was ill, and being ill, became well, but he is well, not being ill, and he who was ill, not (who is) now, but (who was) before. Such arguments as these however, are from ambiguity:
- τὸ βούλεσθαι λαβεῖν με τοὺς πολεμίους,
- ἆρ’ ὄ τις γινώσκει τοῦτο γινώσκει;
for both he who knows, and what is known, may signify in this sentence, the same thing as knowing; also
- ἆρ’ ὄ ὁρᾷ τις, τοῦτο ὁρᾷ—but he sees a pillar, so that the pillar sees: and,
- ἆρα ὁ σὺ φῂς εἶναι, τοῦτο σὺ φῂς εἶναι; φῂς δὲ λίθον εἶναι, σὺ ἀρα φῂς λίθος εἶναι
- ἆρ’ ἔστι σιγῶντα λέγειν; for σιγῶντα λέγειν is two-fold, signifying both that he who speaks, is silent, and those things which are spoken. There are, however, three modes of the equivocal and ambiguous, one when the sentence or word properly signifies many things, as an eagle and a dog; another when we are accustomed thus to speak; and a third, when the conjoined signifies many things, but separated (is taken) simply, as ἐπίσταται γράμματα, for each ἐπίσταται, and γράμματα, signifies if it should so happen, one thing, but both (conjointly) many things, either that letters themselves have science, or that some one else knows letters.
Ambiguity therefore, and equivocation, are in these modes, but the following belong to composition; as that he who sits, can walk, and that he who does not write, may write. For it does not signify the same if a person speaks separately and conjointly, that it is possible that a person sitting, may walk, and that one not writing, may write, and this in a similar manner, if some one should connect (the words), that he who does not write, writes; since it signifies that he has a power by not writing, of writing. If however he does not join (the words, it signifies), that he has a power, when he does not write, of writing; also he now learns letters, since he learned what he knows; moreover, that he who is able to carry one thing only, is able to carry many.
Concerning division, (the arguments) are such as these, that five is two and three, and odd and even, and that the greater is equal, for it is so much, and something more; for the same sentence divided, and conjoined, does not always appear to signify the same thing; as
- "Ἐγὼ σ’ ἔθηκα δοῦλον ὄντ’ ἐλεύθερον,"
- "πεντηκοντ’ ἀνδρῶν ἑκατὸν λίπε διõς Ἀχιλλεύς."
But from accent, in discussions which are not committed to writing, it is not easy to frame an argument, but rather in writings and poems, as, for instance, some defend Homer against those who accuse him as having spoken absurdly,
- τὸ μὲν οὖ καταπύθεται ὄμβρῷ,
for they solve this by accent, saying that οὔ is to be marked with an acute accent. Also about the dream of Agamemnon, because Jupiter himself does not say,
- δίδομεν δέ οἱ εὖχος ἀρέσθαι,
but commanded the dream διδόναι; such things therefore are assumed from accent.
Those (arguments) occur from figure of speech, when what is not the same, is interpreted after the same manner, as when the masculine is interpreted feminine, or the feminine as masculine, or the neuter as either of these, or again, quantity as quality, or quality as quantity, or the agent as the patient, or the disposed as the agent, and other things as they were divided before. For what is not (in the category) of action, it is possible to signify in the diction, as if it were in it, (action); thus, to be well is asserted in a similar form of speech, as to cut or to build, though that signifies a certain quality, and being disposed in a certain way, but this to do something, and in the same manner also with regard to other things.
The elenchi, then, which belong to diction, are from these places, but the species of paralogism without diction are seven; one from accident; the second on account of what is asserted simply, or not simply, but in a certain respect, or some where, or at some time, or with a certain relation; the third from ignorance of the elenchus; the fourth from the consequent; the fifth from petitio principii; the sixth from placing non-causa pro causâ; the seventh from making many interrogations, one.
Paralogisms, then, which arise from accident, are when it is required to be granted, that any thing is similarly present with a subject and accident, for since there are many accidents to the same thing, it is not necessary that all these should be present with all the predicates, and the subject of which they are predicated. Thus, if Coriscus is different from man, he is different from himself, for he is a man; or if he is different from Socrates, but Socrates is a man, they say that it is granted, that he is different from man, because it happens that that from which he is said to be different is a man.
Other (paralogisms arise) from some particular thing being said to be simply this, or in a certain respect, and not properly, when what is predicated in part, is assumed as spoken simply; e.g. if (some one should infer that if) what is not, is the obiect of opinion, what is not, is, for it is not the same thing to be a certain thing, and to be, simply. Or, again, that being is not being, if some one of the number of beings is not, for instance if man is not, for it is not the same for a certain thing not to be, and not to be simply, but there seems from the affinity of diction, to be but a small difference between a certain thing existing and existence, and a certain thing not existing and non-existence. Likewise, also, (paralogisms arise) from (predication) in a certain respect, and simply, thus, if an Indian, being wholly black, has white teeth, he is white and not white, or if both are present in a certain respect, that contraries are present at the same time. Such a case, however, (of paralogism) it is easy for every body to perceive in certain (sentences), for instance, if assuming the Ethiopian to be black, he should ask whether he is white as to his teeth, if then in this respect he is white, it may be thought syllogistically proved, when he has perfected the interrogation, that (the man) is black and not black. In some (sentences), indeed, (the paralogism) is frequently latent, viz. in those, where when an assertion is made in a certain respect, the simply (being asserted) also seems to follow, and in those wherein it is not easy to perceive, whether the attribution is appropriate. Now such a thing occurs, wherein opposites are similarly inherent, for it seems that either both, or neither, must be granted as simply predicated; e.g. if one half (of a thing) is white, but the other black, whether is it, (the thing itself,) white or black?
Others (arise) from its not being defined what a syllogism is, or what an elenchus, but the definition is omitted, for an elenchus is a contradiction of one and the same, not of a name but of a thing, and of a name not synonymous, but the same (collected) necessarily from the things granted, the original (question) not being co-enumerated according to the same, with reference to the same in a similar manner, and in the same time. In the same way also, falsify about any thing (occurs); some, however, omitting some one of these, appear to employ an elenchus, as that the double and the non-double are the same, for two are the double of one, but not the double of three; or if the same thing is the double and not the double of the same, yet not according to the same, for according to length it is double, but according to breadth it is not double: or if it is (the double) of the same thing, and according to the same, and in a similar manner, yet not at the same time, wherefore there is an apparent elenchus. A person, however, might refer this, too, to those which belong to diction.
Those which are from petitio principii, arise thus, and in as many ways as it is possible to beg the original question; they seem, however, to confute from inability to perceive what is the same, and what is different.
The elenchus on account of the consequent, is from fancying that the consequence reciprocates. For when from the existence of that thing, this necessarily is, they fancy that if this is, the other necessarily is, whence also deceptions from sense about opinion occur. For often men take gall for honey, because a yellow colour is consequent to honey, and since it happens, that the earth when it has rained becomes moist, if it be moist, we think that it has rained, yet this is not necessary. In rhetorical (arguments), the demonstrations which are derived from a sign are from consequent, for when persons desire to show that a man is an adulterer, they assume a consequent, that he is fond of adorning his person, or that he is seen wandering by night, these things, however, are present with many men, but the thing predicated is not present. Likewise, also, in syllogistic (arguments), for instance, the argument of Melissus, that the universe is infinite, assuming the universe to be unbegotten, (for nothing can be generated from what is not,) but what is generated is generated from a beginning; if, therefore, the universe was not generated, it had not a beginning, so that it is infinite. Nevertheless, this does not necessarily happen, for it does not follow, that if whatever is generated has a beginning, whatever has a beginning is also generated, as neither is it necessary, if a man in a fever is hot, that whoever is hot should have a fever.
That which is from what is not a cause, being assumed as a cause, is when what is causeless is taken, as if the elenchus were produced on account of it. Now such a thing happens in syllogisms leading to the impossible, since in these it is necessary to subvert some one of the posita; if then it be reckoned in necessary interrogations, for the impossible to result, the elenchus will often appear to arise on account of this, as that soul and life are not the same, for if generation be contrary to destruction, a certain generation will be to a certain destruction, but death is a certain destruction, and is contrary to life, so that life is generation, and to live is to be generated, but this is impossible, wherefore soul and life are not the same. It is not, however, syllogistically concluded, for the impossible happens even if some one should not say that life is the same as soul, but only that life is contrary to death, which is corruption, and generation to corruption. Such arguments, then, are not simply unsyllogistic, but unsyllogistic as to the thing proposed, and a matter of this kind frequently escapes, no less the observation of the interrogators themselves.
Such, then, are the arguments which result from what is consequent, and from what is not a cause, but others from making two interrogations one, when it escapes notice that there are many, and one answer is given as if there were one (interrogation). In some cases, therefore, it is easy to perceive that there are many (interrogations), and that one answer must not be given, as, whether is the earth sea, or the heaven? in others it is less (easy), and as if there were one interrogation, men either assent, because they do not answer what is asked, or seem to be confuted, as, whether is this person, and this, a man? so that if some one should beat this, and that person, he will beat a man, and not men. Or again, in those things of which some are good, but others not good, are all good or not good? for whatever a man replies, it is possible to appear either to assert an elenchus or what is apparently false; for to say that some one of the things not good is good, or that some one of the things good is not good, is a falsehood. Still, sometimes, there may be a true elenchus from certain assumptions, for instance, if a man should grant that things white, naked, and blind, are similarly called one and many, for if that is blind which has not sight, but is adapted to have it by nature, those also will be blind which have not sight, but are naturally adapted to have it; when therefore, one thing has it, but another has not, both will see or will be blind, which is impossible.
We must either, therefore, thus divide apparent syllogisms and elehchi, or refer them all to ignorance of the elenchus, assuming this as a principle, for it is possible to resolve all the modes mentioned into the definition of the elenchus. In the first place, if they are unsyllogistic, for the conclusion must result from the posita, so that we may say it is of necessity, and not that it appears to be. Next, as to the parts of definition, for of those (paralogisms) which are in diction, some are from two-fold signification, for instance, equivocation, and a sentence (ambiguous) and a similar figure (of speech), (for it is usual with all these to signify this particular thing,) but composition, and division, and accent, (produce false reasoning,) from the sentence not being the same, or the name being different. But it is necessary that this should be the same as the thing is so, if there is to be an elenchus or syllogism; thus, if a garment (is to be concluded), a garment, and not a vestment, ought to be syllogistically concluded: for that is true, indeed, but is not syllogistically inferred, as there is still need of interrogation, that it signifies the same thing by him who investigates the why.
Paralogisms from accident, become evident when the syllogism is defined, for it is necessary that there be the same definition of the elenchus, except that contradiction is added, for the elenchus is a syllogism of contradiction. If then there is not a syllogism of accident, there is not an elenchus, for neither if when these things exist it is necessary that this should be, (but this is white,) is it necessary to be white on account of the syllogism, nor if a triangle has angles equal to two right, but it happens to it to be a figure, either first or the principle, (does it follow) that figure, or principle, or first, is this thing. For the demonstration is not so far as it is figure, nor so far as it is first, but so far as it is triangle, and similarly in other cases. Wherefore, if an elenchus is a certain syllogism, that which is from accident will not be an elenchus, but by this, artists, and the scientific generally, are confuted by the unscientific, for they form syllogisms from accident, against scientific men, but they, not being able to distinguish, either grant when questioned, or not granting, fancy that they have granted.
Those which belong to "in a certain respect," and "simply," (arise) because the affirmation and negation are not of the same thing, for of what is in a certain respect, white, the negation is, that which in a certain respect, is not white, but of what is simply, white, that which is simply, not white. If then, when it is granted that a thing is in a certain respect white, a person assumes it as if said, simply white, he does not produce an elenchus, but he seems to do so, from ignorance of what an elenchus is.
The most evident of all, are those which were before mentioned, from the definition of an elenchus, wherefore they are thus also denominated; as an appearance (of elenchus) is produced from the ellipse of definition, and by those who thus divide, the defect of definition must be laid down, as common to all these.
Those also which are from petitio principii, and from admitting "non-causa," "pro causâ" become manifest by definition, for it is necessary that the conclusion should happen in consequence of these things existing; which is not amongst "non-causes;" and again, the original question not being enumerated, which those paralogisms have not, which subsist from petitio principii.
Those which belong to the consequent, are a part of accident, since what is consequent, happens; still it differs from accident in that it is only possible to assume accident in one thing, as that yellow and honey are the same, also whiteness and a swan, but what follows is always in many things, for those which are the same with one and the same thing, we consider the same with each other, wherefore there is an elenchus from the consequent. Still this is not altogether true, as if it should be from accident, for snow, and swan, are the same, so far as each is white. Or again, as in the argument of Melissus, a person assumes that to have been generated, and to have a beginning, are the same; or that to become equals, is identical with to receive the same magnitude; for because what was generated has a beginning, they require it to be granted, that what had a beginning, was generated, as if both these were the same from having a beginning, viz. that which was generated, and what was finite. Likewise, also in things made equal, if those which receive one, and the same magnitude, become equal, those also which become equal, receive one magnitude, so that the consequent is assumed. Since then, an elenchus which is from accident, subsists in the ignorance of the elenchus, it is clear that this also is the case, with that which is from the consequent, and this is also to be considered in another way.
Notwithstanding, those paralogisms which are from making many interrogations, one, consist in our not distinctly unfolding the definition, of the proposition. For the proposition is one thing of one, since there is the same definition of a thing, one only and simply, as of man, and of one man only, and similarly in other cases. If then, one proposition be that which requires one thing of one, an interrogation of this kind will be simply a proposition, but since a syllogism is from propositions, and the elenchus is a syllogism, an elenchus also will consist of propositions, wherefore if a proposition be one thing of one, it is evident that he (who errs) in the definition of syllogism, is in ignorance of an elenchus, as that seems a proposition, which is not one. If then he gives an answer, as if to one interrogation, it will be an elenchus, but if he does not, yet seems to do so, it will be an apparent elenchus, so that all the places fall into ignorance of the elenchus, those from diction, because there is apparent contradiction, which was the characteristic of an elenchus, but the rest from the definition of syllogism.
Deception of these (paralogisms) from equivocation and (ambiguous) sentence, arises from our not being able to distinguish that which is multifariously predicated, (since it is not easy to divide some things, for instance, the one, being, and the same;) but of those from composition and division, in consequence of fancying there is no difference between a conjoined, and a divided sentence, as is the case in most things. Similarly also with regard to those from accent, for either in nothing, or not in many things, a sentence with intention, and a sentence with remission, appear to signify the same thing. But of those from figure of speech, it is on account of the similarity of diction, for it is difficult to distinguish what things are predicated after the same, and what in a different manner, (since he who is able to do this, almost approaches the perception of truth, and especially knows how to assent,) because we suppose that every thing predicated of a certain thing, is this definite thing, and we admit it as one; for this particular definite thing, and being, seem especially to be consequent to the one, and to essence. Wherefore this mode is to be placed amongst those (fallacies) which belong to diction; first, because deception rather arises to those who consider with others, than by themselves, (for consideration with others, is through discourse, but that by oneself, is no less through the thing itself;) next, it happens that one is deceived by oneself, when one makes the consideration by words; moreover, deception is from resemblance, but resemblance from diction. Of the paralogisms from accident, (there is deception) from our inability to distinguish the same, and different, and one, and many, and to what attributes, and thing, all these are accidental. Likewise also, as to those from what is consequent, for the consequent is a certain part of accident; besides also, in many instances it appears, and is required to be granted thus, that if this thing is not separated from that, neither will that, be separated from this. Nevertheless, of those which are from the defect of definition, and of those from a certain respect, and simply, there is deception from the difference being small, for we concede universally, as if a certain thing, or in a certain respect, or in what manner, or now, signified nothing in addition. Likewise also, in the case of those which assume the original question, and which are not causes, and such as make many interrogations as if they were one, since in all these, the deception arises from smallness, as we do not accurately distinguish either the definition of the proposition, or of the syllogism, on account of the before-named cause.
Since we have assigned the causes from which apparent syllogisms arise, we also have those from which sophistical syllogisms and elenchi may be produced. Now I call a sophistical elenchus and syllogism, not only the syllogism and elenchus which are apparent but not real, but also the real, but which appear (falsely) appropriate to a thing. Such are they which do not confute according to a thing, and expose the ignorant, which was the province of the peirastic art, but the peirastie is a part of the dialectic, which is able syllogistically to conclude the false through the ignorance of him who admits the argument. Sophistical elenchi, on the other hand, though they syllogistically infer contradiction, do not render it evident whether he, (the opponent) is ignorant, for by these arguments, persons impede the man of science.
Now that we obtain these by the same method is evident, for from those things, through which it appears to the hearers, that the subjects of investigation are syllogistically concluded, from these they may appear also to the respondent, so that there will be false syllogisms through either all or some of these, for what a person, not interrogated, thinks he has granted, he will also admit when interrogated, except that in some cases it happens at the same time that what is deficient is questioned, and what is false is detected, as in the paralogisms from diction and solecism. If then, paralogisms of contradiction arise from apparent elenchus, it is clear that false syllogisms will be derived from as many (places) as apparent elenchus. But the apparent is from parts of the true; for when each fails, there may appear an elenchus, as that which is from the conclusion not happening in consequence of the reasoning; that which leads to the impossible; also, that which makes two interrogations, one, from the proposition; and that which assumes what is from accident, instead of what is per se, and a part of this, which is (derived) from what is consequent; besides not to happen in the thing, but in the discussion; then, instead of (assuming) contradiction universally, according to the same, and with reference to the same, and after the same manner, (to assume it) in a certain thing, or according to each of these; further from the original (question), not being reckoned, to assume the original question. Hence, we shall be in possession of those things from which paralogisms occur, since they cannot arise from more, but they will all be from the (places) specified.
A sophistical elenchus, is yet not simply an elenchus, but against some person, and a syllogism likewise, for except it be assumed that what is from the equivocal signifies one thing, and what is from a similar figure of speech, (signifies) this thing only, and the rest in like manner, there will neither be elenchi nor syllogisms, whether simply, or against him who is interrogated, but if this is assumed, there will be, indeed, against him who is interrogated, but simply there will not be, since they do not assume that which signifies one thing, but what appears (to do so) and from this person.
Nevertheless, we should not endeavour to assume from how many places they are confuted, who are confuted by elenchi, without the science of all things, which, however, belongs to no one art, since there are perhaps infinite sciences, so that evidently there are also infinite demonstrations. Still there are also true elenchi, for in whatever it is possible to demonstrate, we may also therein confute him who lays down a contradiction of the truth, as if he asserted the diameter of a square to be commensurate with its side, a person might confute him by showing it incommensurate. Wherefore, it will be necessary to be scientifically cognizant of all, for some (elenchi) will be from geometrical principles, and their conclusions; others from medical principles; others from those of other sciences; moreover, false elenchi are similarly amongst infinites, since according to each art there is a false syllogism, as the geometrical in geometry, and the medical, (false syllogism) in medicine. Now I mean by according to art, that which is according to the principles of that art, therefore it is evident that places are not to be assumed of all elenchi, but of those which belong to dialectic, since these are common to every art and faculty. It is also, indeed, the province of the man of science to investigate the elenchus which is in each science, whether it is only apparent, not real, and if it is, why it is; but that (elenchus) which is from things common, and does not fall under any art, belongs to dialectics. For if we have those particulars from which probable syllogisms about any thing arise, we have those also from which (probable) elenchi are formed, since the elenchus is a syllogism of contradiction, so that an elenchus is either one or two syllogisms of contradiction, therefore we have the number of places from which all such originate, and if we have this, we also possess their solutions, for objections of these are solutions. We have, however, the places from which apparent elenchi arise, not apparent to every one, but to certain persons, for the places are infinite, if any one considers from what they appear to the multitude casually. Hence it appears, that it is the province of the dialectician, to be able to assume from what number of particulars, through common (propositions), either a real, or an apparent elenchus, whether dialectic, or apparently dialectic, or peirastic, is produced.
That however is not a difference of arguments which some state, viz. that some arguments belong to the name, but others to the reason, since it is absurd to suppose that some arguments belong to a name, but others, and not the same, pertain to the reason. For what else is it, not to pertain to the reason, than for the arguer not to employ the name, in (the sense in) which, he who is interrogated, would admit it, fancying that the question was (in that sense) made? still this very thing belongs also to name; but to the reason, when it is understood in the sense, in which it was admitted. If indeed any one, when a name signifies many things, fancies that it signifies one thing, both the questionist and the person questioned, (as perhaps being, or one, signifies many things, but the respondent and the questionist (Zeno), thinking it to be one, interrogate, and the argument is that all things are one,) this discussion will belong to the name, or to the reason of the person interrogated. If however a person thinks that it signifies many things, it evidently does not pertain to the reason; for in the first place, what belongs to name and reason, is conversant with such arguments as signify many things; next it is (adapted) to any one, for to pertain to reason does not consist in argument, but in the respondent being disposed in a certain manner to the things granted. Further, all these arguments may possibly pertain to name, for to belong to name is here not to pertain to reason, for unless all these arguments (may be referred hither), there will be certain others pertaining neither to name nor to reason; but they say that all (belong to one of these), and distinguish all to be either belonging to name or to reason, and that there are no others. Still, whatever syllogisms belong to multifarious signification, some of these belong to name, for it is absurdly said, that all which are from diction are from name; nevertheless, there are certain paralogisms which are not produced, from the respondent being disposed in a certain manner towards these, but because the very argument itself contains such an interrogation as signifies many things.
In short, it is absurd to discuss an elenchus, and not prior to it a syllogism, for an elenchus is a syllogism; so that we must discuss a syllogism prior to a false elenchus, for such an elenchus is an apparent syllogism of contradiction. Wherefore, the cause (of deception) will either be in the syllogism, or in the contradiction, (for it is necessary that the contradiction be added,) sometimes indeed in both, if the elenchus be apparent. But it is in the contradiction and not in the syllogism, when a person asserts that he who is silent speaks; but this is in both, viz. that some one may give what he has not got; but that the poetry of Homer is a figure from being a circle, is in syllogism, and that (which errs) in neither, is a true syllogism.
But (to return), whence the discussion digressed, do mathematical arguments pertain to the reason or not? and if a triangle seems to some one to signify many things, and he grants (not so far as it is figure, of which this is concluded) that it has angles equal to two right, does this discussion belong to the reasoning faculty of his mind or not?
Again, if a name signifies many things, but he does not understand, nor fancy (that it does), how does this disputation not pertain to the reason? or how must we interrogate, unless by granting a distinction, whether any one may inquire if it is possible for him who is silent to speak or not, or whether it partly is not, and partly is, possible? If then, some one should grant that it is by no means possible, but another should contend that it is, will not the disputation be against the reasoning faculty? though the dispute seems to belong to those which are from name; there is not then a certain genus of arguments, which belong to the reason. Nevertheless, some pertain to name, yet not all are such, not (I say) those which are elenchi, but not the apparent elenchi, for there are apparent elenchi, which are not from diction, for instance, those which are from accident, and others.
Notwithstanding, if some one thinks fit to claim a division, I mean that the silent speaks, partly in this and partly in that manner; yet to demand this, is, in the first place, absurd, (for sometimes what is interrogated does not seem to subsist multifariously, and it is impossible to divide that which a man does not conceive). Next, what else will to teach be? for it will render the manner in which a thing subsists evident to him who neither considered, nor knew, nor supposed that it is predicated in another way. Since what prevents this also being done in things which are not double? are then unities equal to duals in four? but the duals are inherent, some in this, but others in that way. Is there also one science of contraries or not? but some contraries are known, others unknown: so that he appears to be ignorant, who requires this, viz. that to teach is different from to discuss, and that it is necessary that the teacher should not interrogate, but himself declare, but that the other should interrogate.
Moreover, to postulate affirmation or denial is not the province of one who demonstrates, but of him who makes a trial, for the peirastic art is a certain dialectic, and considers not the scientific, but him who is ignorant, and who pretends. Whoever therefore considers things which are common really, is a dialectician, but he who does this apparently, is a sophist; the contentious and sophistical syllogism also are, one indeed, apparently syllogistic about things with which the peirastic dialectic is conversant, although the conclusion be true, for it deceives in assigning the why, and (in the other kind are those paralogisms), which not being according to the method of each thing, seem to be according to art. For false descriptions are not contentious, (since paralogisms are according to those things which are subject to art,) neither even if there is a certain false description about the true (conclusion), as that of Hippocrates, viz. the quadrature of the circle through lunulæ, but as Bryso squared the circle, though the circle should be squared, yet, because it is not according to the thing, it is on this account sophistical. Wherefore both the apparent syllogism about these things, is a contentious argument, and the syllogism which seems to be according to the thing, even if it be a syllogism, is a contentious argument, for it appears to be according to the thing, wherefore it is deceptive and unjust. For as injustice, in contest, has a certain form (of justice), and is a certain unjust combat, so in contradiction the contentious is an unjust combat, for both there, those who make conquest entirely the object of their preference, try all things, and here, the contentious do. Those therefore who are such, for the sake of victory itself, seem to be contentious men and lovers of strife; but those who are so for the sake of the glory which tends to gain, are sophists, for the sophistical art, as we said, is a certain art of making money from apparent wisdom, wherefore they desire an apparent demonstration. Those who love strife also, and sophists, employ the same arguments, yet not for the sake of the same things, and the same argument will be both sophistical and contentious, yet not according to the same, but so far as it is for the sake of apparent victory, it is contentious, and so far as it is for (apparent) wisdom, it is sophistical, for the sophistical art is a certain apparent, but not real wisdom. The contentious man however is in a certain respect disposed with reference to the dialectician, as the false describer is to the geometrician, for (the one) paralogizes from the same things with dialectic, and the false describer (subsists in the same way with regard to) the geometrician. Still he is not contentious, because he describes falsely from principles and conclusions which are subject to art, but it will be evident that he who is subject to dialectic, is about other things contentious, as the quadrature of the circle through lunulæ is not contentious, but (the quadrature) of Bryso is contentious, and it is impossible to refer the one except to geometry alone from its being from the proper principles, but (we may refer) the other to many who do not know what is possible and impossible in each thing, for it will accord. Or as Antipho squared the circle, or if a man should not grant it is better to walk after supper on account of the argument of Zeno, it is not medical, for it is common. If then, the contentious person subsists altogether with reference to the dialectician, as he who makes a false description does to the geometrician, there would not be a contentions syllogism about those; now however the dialectician is not in any definite genus, nor does he demonstrate any thing, nor is he such as the universal (philosopher). For neither are all things in one certain genus, nor if they were, is it possible that beings should be under the same principles, so that none of those arts which demonstrate a certain nature is interrogative, for it is not possible to grant each of the parts, for a syllogism does not arise from both. Dialectic however is interrogative, but if it should demonstrate, though not all things, yet it would not interrogate primary things and proper principles; for there being no concession, he would no longer have arguments from which he could discourse against the objection. It is also peirastic, for neither is the peirastic art such as geometry, but even an unscientific man may possess it, since it is possible that he who is ignorant of a thing may make trial of one who is ignorant, if he concedes not from what he knows, nor from properties, but from consequents, which are such as there is nothing to prevent him who knows them, not knowing the art, but it is necessary that he who does not know them, must be ignorant (of the art). Wherefore, it is evident that the peirastic art is the science of nothing definite; hence also, it is conversant with all things, since all arts use certain common things, on which account all men, even idiots, use after a certain manner, the dialectic and peirastic, for all up to a certain point endeavour to form a judgment of such as announce any thing. These however are common, for they know these no less, though they appear to speak very foreign from the purpose. All men therefore confute, for without art they partake of this with which dialectic is artistically conversant, and he is a dialectician who is peirastic in the syllogistic art. Nevertheless, since these are many, and are about all things, yet are not of such a kind as to be in a certain nature and genus, but as negations, other things again are not such, but are properties, it is possible from these to make a trial about all, and that there should be a certain art, and that it should not be such as those are which demonstrate. Wherefore, the contentious person is not one who in all respects thus subsists, as the maker of a false description, for the contentious person will not be paralogistic from a certain definite genus of principles, but will be about every genus.
Such then are the modes of sophistical elenchi, but it is not difficult to perceive that it is the province of the dialectician to investigate these, and to be able to effect them, for the method about propositions comprehends the whole of this theory.
We have treated of the apparent elenchi, but with regard to showing that something is falsely serted, and bringing an argument to something contrary to opinion, (for this was the second object of sophistical preference,) in the first place, this generally happens from a certain manner of inquiry, and through interrogation. For to make an interrogation to nothing definitely laid down, is adapted to the investigation of these things; since those who speak casually commit a greater fault, and they speak casually who have nothing proposed. Both to ask many questions, even if that should be defined against which a discussion is made, and to require a person to assert what appears, produces a certain abundance of argument, so as to lead to what is contrary to opinion, or false; and whether being questioned, he asserts or denies some one of these things, to lead him to those particulars against which an abundance of argument is supplied. They are able however, to injure by these means, less now, than formerly, for they ask what this has to do with the original proposition; still the element of obtaining something false or contrary to opinion, is to question no thesis immediately, but to assert that the question is made from the desire of learning; for this consideration makes a place for argument.
In order to show a false assertion, a proper sophistical place is to bring (the opponent) to those things against which there is an abundance of arguments; but we may do this both well and badly, as was observed before.
Again, to state paradoxes, observe from what genus the disputant is, then ask what that is which such men assert to be contrary to the common opinion, for to each (sect) there is something of this kind. The element however of these is to assume the thesis of the several (sects) in the propositions, but an appropriate solution of these, is adduced to show that what is contrary to opinion does not happen through the argument, and this is always the wish of him who contends.
Moreover, from volitions and apparent nions, since they do not desire and say the same thing, but employ the most seemly words, and desire things which appear profitable; for instance, they say, it is necessary to die well, rather than to live pleasantly, and to he justly poor, than to be basely rich; but they desire the contrary. He therefore who speaks according to volitions, must be brought to apparent opinions, but he who speaks according to these, must be brought to concealed (volitions), for it is necessary in both ways to speak paradoxes, since either they assert what is contrary to apparent or to unapparent opinions.
The place indeed of causing the assertion of paradoxes is very extensive, as Callicles in the Gorgias is introduced, saying, (which also all the ancients consider to happen,) from what was according to nature, and according to law; for they say nature, and law, are contraries, and that justice according to law, is excellent, but according to nature, it is not excellent. Wherefore we must oppose him according to law who speaks according to nature, but lead him to nature who speaks according to law, for to say that it exists in either of these two ways, is paradoxical. But according to them, that which is after nature is true, but what is according to law is that which appears to the multitude; wherefore it is evident that they, as the disputants, now endeavoured either to confute the respondent, or to make him assert paradoxes.
Some questions, indeed, have on both sides an answer contrary to opinion, as whether is it right to obey the wise or a father, and ought we to do things advantageous or just, and is to be injured more eligible than to injure? We ought, however, to lead to conclusions which are opposed to the multitude and the wise, if, indeed, some one speaks as those who are conversant with disputations, we ought to bring him to conclusions contrary to the multitude; but if he speaks as the multitude, (to conclusions contrary) to those who are conversant with disputations. For the one, indeed, say that the happy man is necessarily just, but it seems contrary to the opinion of the many, that a king should not be happy; thus to collect things contrary to opinion, is the same with leading to what is contrary to nature and law, for law is the opinion of the many, but the wise speak after nature and after truth.
Paradoxes, indeed, we must investigate from these places, but with regard to making a man trifle, what we mean by trifling we have already declared, but all such arguments will produce this, if it is of no consequence whether a name or a sentence is stated, but the double and the double and the half are the same, if then, the double is the double of the half, it will be the double of the half of the half. Again, also, if instead of double, we lay down the double of the half, it will be thrice said, the double of the half of the half of the half. And is desire then the desire of the pleasant? but this is the appetite of the pleasant, wherefore desire is the appetite of the pleasant of the pleasant.
All such arguments, then, are among the ber of relatives, where not only their genera, but also the things themselves are predicated with reference to something, and are referred to one and the same thing; thus appetite is the appetite of something, and desire the desire of something, the double also is the double of something, and the double of the half. Those also whose essence is not really amongst relatives, but in short, of which there are habits or passions, or some such thing manifested in their definition which are predicated of these. Thus, the odd is a number having a middle, but there is an odd number, wherefore there is a number number having a middle, and if τὸ σιμον is a concavity of nose, but there is a concave nose, there is then nose nose concave.
They seem to produce (trifling) sometimes which really do not produce it, because the inquiry is not added, whether the double enunciated by itself signifies something or nothing, and if it signifies any thing whether it signifies the same, or something else, but the conclusion is immediately adduced; yet from the name being the same, there seems to be the same thing and the same signification.
Solecism is what we have declared before; sometimes, however, it is possible to produce this, and not producing to seem to do so, and producing it, not to appear to, as Protagoras said, if μὴνις and πήληξ, are of the masculine gender: for he who says οὐλόμενην, commits a solecism according to him, but to others does not seem to, but he who says ὀυλόμενον, seems to solecize but does not. Hence it is clear that a certain art can produce this; wherefore many arguments which do not infer a solecism, seem to infer it as in the elenchi.
Almost all apparent solecisms, indeed, are from hoc, and when the case signifies neither male nor female, but what is between, for hic signifies the masculine, hæc the feminine, and hoc, indeed, ought to signify what is between, but frequently signifies either of these, as, for instance; "What is this?" "Calliope," "wood," "Coriscus." All the cases then of the masculine and feminine differ, but of what is between, some do, and others do not; frequently, therefore, when "hoc" is given, they syllogize as if "hunc" were said, and in like manner take one case for another. Now a paralogism is produced, because "hoc" is common to many cases, for "hoc" at one time signifies "hic," and at another time "hunc;" it is requisite, however, that it should signify alternately with the verb "est," "hic," but with "esse," "hunc," for instance, "est Coriscus," "esse Coriscum." Also in like manner with feminine nouns, and with those which are called σκεύη, (furniture,) but which have a feminine or masculine inflection, for whatever end in ο and ν, have alone the inflection of σκεύη as ξύλον, wood, σχοινίον, a rope, but those which are not thus, (have the inflexion) of the masculine or feminine, some of which we refer to σκεύη, as ἀσκὸς, a bladder, is a masculine noun, but κλίνη, a bed, is feminine; wherefore, likewise, in such things also, "est" and "esse" will produce a difference. In a certain respect too, a solecism is similar to those so called elenchi, from things not similar being similarly assumed, for as in them in things, so in these a solecism is committed in words, for "man" and "white" are both things and words.
It is evident, then, that we must endeavour to infer a solecism from the cases enumerated.
Such, then, are the species of contentious arguments, and the parts of the species and the modes which have been stated; still it makes no slight difference to concealment, if things which belong to interrogation, are arranged in a certain manner, as in the case of dialectics, hence, after the above-mentioned particulars, these must be first discussed.
One thing which contributes to confutation by an elenchus is prolixity, for it is difficult to consider many things at once, and for prolixity we must employ the above-named elements. Another thing is rapidity, for those who are slow, perceive less; anger also, and contention, for all men who are disturbed, have less power of observation. The elements, however, of anger, are for a man to render himself obviously willing to commit injustice, and to conduct himself with thorough impudence. Moreover to arrange the questions alternately, whether a man has many arguments for the same thing, or (to show) that they subsist in one way, and not in another, for at the same time it happens that (the opponent) will guard against many things or such as are contrary. In short, all the things enumerated before as contributing to concealment, are useful also for contentious arguments; for concealment is for the sake of escaping notice, and escaping notice for the sake of deception.
Against those indeed who deny whatever they think contributes to the argument, an interrogation must be made from negation, as if he (the querist) wished the contrary, or by making the interrogation equally; for it not being evident what (the interrogator) wishes to assume, (the respondents) are less indignant. When, too, any one admits the several particulars partially, by making an induction of the universal, frequently an interrogation must not be made, but we must use it as granted, for sometimes they (the respondents) think they have admitted, and appear to the auditors from making mention of induction, as if the particulars had not been questioned in vain; and in those wherein the universal is not signified by name, we must yet use similitude, as may be expedient, for similitude frequently escapes notice. In order also to assume a proposition, we ought to make the inquiry by a comparison of the contrary; as if it should be necessary to assume, that it is right in all things to obey a father, (we must ask) whether it is necessary to obey parents in all things, or to disobey them in all? and, (if it is answered that we ought) frequently (to obey them, we must ask) whether many things are to be conceded to them, or a few? for if it is necessary (to obey them), many things will seem to be conceded, for when contraries are placed by each other, they appear to men to be greater, and great, and worse, and better.
The sophistical false accusation indeed of those who question, when not syllogistically concluding any thing, they do not question the extreme, but conclusively say, as if a syllogism had been made, "it is not so and so;" this very much and frequently causes a person to appear confuted by an elenchus.
It is also sophistical, when a paradox is laid down, to demand that what is apparent should be answered, that being proposed which seemed true from the beginning, and to question things thus, "Whether does it seem so to you?" for it is necessary if the question be of those things from which a syllogism is formed, that there should be either an elenchus or a paradox; if he grants, an elenchus, but if he neither concedes nor says that it seems to him to be true, something contrary to opinion, and if he does not concede, but acknowledges it seems true to him, a form of elenchus.
Moreover, as in rhetorical, so also in elenchtic disputation, we must investigate contrarieties in a similar manner, either (such as are contrary) to what is said by him, or to what he acknowledges well said or done, or to those that seem to be such, or to similars, or to most, or to all. And as also respondents frequently, when they are confuted, assert that what they seem to be confuted in has a two-fold meaning; so questionists must use this mode against objectors, so that if it happens in one way, but not in another, (they say) they admit it only thus, as Cleophon does in his Mandrobulus. It is also necessary, by withdrawing from the argument, to cut off the remaining parts of the attacks, and for the respondent, if he foresees, to anticipate in objection and speaking. Sometimes also, we must attack something different to the assertion, assuming that, if a person has it not in his power to attack the position; which Lycophron did, when the thing proposed was an encomium on the lyre. Against those indeed who require arguments to be advanced against a certain thing, (since it seems necessary to assign a cause, but certain things being mentioned, more caution can be used,) it must be said that it universally happens in elenchi, that we assert contradiction, because we deny what the arguer asserted, but what he denied we assert; but (we must not say that we begin to prove one part of the contradiction); for instance, that there is the same science of contraries, or that there is not the same. But it is not proper to question the conclusion after the manner of a proposition, since some things are not to be questioned, but to be employed as if acknowledged.
From what places then questions are, and how we must make them in contentious exercises, has been shown; but concerning reply, and how it is proper to solve, and what, and for what use such arguments are profitable, must be stated in the next place.
They are useful then to philosophy for two causes; first, indeed, as being for the most part from diction, they enable us to know in a better manner, in how many ways each thing is predicated, and what kind happen similarly, and what differently, both in things and in names. Secondly, (they contribute) to inquiries by oneself, for he who is easily deceived by a paralogism by another, and does not perceive this, may also himself frequently experience the same thing from himself. Thirdly, in the remaining place, (they tend) still more to fame from appearing to be exercised about all things, and not to be unskilful in any thing; for that he who engages in disputation should blame the arguments (of another), without being able to distinguish any thing about their badness, produces a suspicion of apparent indignation, not on account of the truth, but on account of unskilfulness.
How therefore respondents should oppose such arguments is evident, since we have before rightly shown from what, paralogisms arise, and have sufficiently exposed impostures in interrogation. It is not the same thing however assuming an argument to see and to solve its futility, and to be able quickly to oppose an interrogator, for what we know we are often ignorant of, when it is transposed. Moreover, as in other things, the quicker and the slower increase by exercise, so is it also with arguments; hence, if a thing is evident to us, but we have not meditated upon it, we are frequently deficient in it on certain occasions. Sometimes indeed it happens as in diagrams, for having analyzed them, we sometimes are unable to reconstruct them; thus also in elenchi, knowing the cause of the connexion of the argument, we are unable to dissolve the argument.
First then, as we say, we ought sometimes to prefer to syllogize probably, rather than truly, thus also we must solve sometimes rather probably than according to truth, for in short, we must contend with contentious men, not as if they were confuting, but as appearing to do so, since we do not say that they conclude syllogistically, so that we must direct ourselves to their not appearing. For if an elenchus is a contradiction not equivocal, from certain (assumptions), there will be no necessity of distinguishing against things ambiguous and equivocation, for he does not make a syllogism. Still we must make a division, for no other reason than because the conclusion appears to have the form of elenchus. Wherefore we must be cautious not of being confuted, but of seeming to be so, since ambiguous interrogations and those which are from equivocation, and other such deceptions, both obscure the true elenchus, and render it dubious whether a person is confuted by an elenchus or not. For since it is possible at the end, when a conclusion is made (for the respondent) to say that that he has denied, (viz. the interrogator) not what the respondent affirmed, but equivocally, even if he happens especially to tend to the same point, it is doubtful whether he is confuted by an elenchus, for it is dubious whether he now asserts the truth. If on the otber hand, dividing, he questions the equivocal or the ambiguous, the elenchus will not be obscure, and what the contentious less require now than formerly, viz. that the person questioned should answer yes or no, should occur. Nevertheless, now because querists do not question well, it is necessary that the person questioned should add something to his answer, correcting the faultiness of the proposition, since if he, the querist, disanguishes sufficiently, the respondent must necessarily say yes or no.
If, indeed, any one should suppose that to be an elenchus, which is according to equivocation, it will be impossible for the respondent in any way to avoid confutation by an elenchus, for in visible things it is necessary to deny the name which he affirms, and to affirm what he denied. For as some correct there is no benefit, for they say that Coriscus is not musical and unmusical, but that this Coriscus is musical, and that unmusical, since that Coriscus is, will be the same sentence with that this Coriscus is unmusical or musical, which he at one and the same time affirms and denies. Yet perhaps they do not signify the same thing, for neither does the name there, so that there is some difference, if, however, he assigns to the one to mean simply Coriscus, but adds to the other a certain one or this one, it is absurd, for it will not be more in one than in the other, as it is of no consequence to which it is attributed.
Nevertheless, since it is dubious whether he who does not distinguish the ambiguity, is confuted by an elenchus or not, but is allowed in disputations to make a distinction, it is evident that he who does not distinguish, but simply grants the interrogation, errs, wherefore, if not the man himself, yet his argument, resembles a confuted elenchus. It frequently happens, however, that they who see the ambiguity, are unwilling to distinguish from the frequency of those who propose things of this kind, that they may not seem to be morose in every thing, and next, not thinking that the argument depends on this, a person frequently meets with a paradox, wherefore since distinction is allowable, it must not be delayed as we said before.
Unless, indeed, a person makes two interrogations be one, there will not be a paralogism from equivocation and ambiguity, but either an elenchus or not. For what difference is there in asking whether Callias and Themistocles are musicians, or whether to both, being different men, there is one common name? for if that signify more than one, he (who uses it) will ask many things. If, then, it is not right to require that we assume simply, one answer to two questions, it is evidently not becoming to answer simply, any thing equivocal, not even if, as some require, it be true in all; for this is just the same as if it were asked, whether Coriscus and Callias are at home or not? whether both are present or not present? since in both ways the propositions are many. For it does not follow if the assertion is true, that there is on this account our question, since there may be ten thousand different questions asked, to all of which it may be true to answer yes or no, yet nevertheless, one answer must not be given, for disputation would be subverted, and this is the same as if the same name, should be assigned to different things. If, then, it is not right to give one answer to two questions, it is evident that we must not answer yes or no in things equivocal, since neither does he who says this, answer, but speak, (merely,) and this is claimed in a certain respect amongst those who dispute, because the result is concealed.
As, therefore, we said since neither are certain things, elenchi really, which seem to be so, in the same manner also, certain will seem to be solutions which are not, but which we say that sometimes it is necessary to adduce rather than the true, in contentious arguments and in opposition to (a paralogism from) duplicity. Likewise, we must answer things which seem to be (true) by saying, "be it so," for thus, least of all, would there be a parexelenchus, but if a person should be compelled to assert some paradox, there "to seem," must especially be added, for thus, there will appear to be neither an elenchus nor a paradox. Since, however, it is clear how the original proposition is made a postulate, and men think altogether (that it is made so), if it be near (the question) we must subvert and not grant certain things, as if the interrogator made a petitio principii, and when any one requires such a thing to be granted which necessarily, indeed, results from the thesis, but is false or contrary to opinion, it must be said to be the same (as the question), for things consequent from necessity appear to be parts of the thesis itself. Moreover, when universal is assumed not in name but by comparison, it must be said that he (the opponent) assumes it, not as it was given, nor as he proposed it, for from this an elenchus frequently arises.
He however who is excluded from these, must have recourse to (asserting) that the thing is not well demonstrated, objecting according to the definition stated.
In names then, which are properly so called, it is necessary to answer either simply or by distinction. As to, however, those things which we admit, secretly perceiving them, for instance, whatever are not clearly interrogated, but with diminution, from this an elenchus happens, as, for instance, "Is what belongs to the Athenians, the possession of the Athenians?" "Yes." In like manner, as to other things, "Does not man also belong to animals?" "Yes." Man therefore is the possession of animals. For we say that man is of animals, because he is an animal, and Lysander is of the Lacedæmonians, because he is a Lacedaeæmonian; wherefore it is clear that where the proposition is obscure, we must not make a simple concession.
But when of two existents, the one existing, the other also appears of necessity to exist, but this existing, that does not from necessity; he who is asked which of the two (he thinks exists) ought to give that which is less (widely extended), for it is harder to syllogize from many things. Yet if some one should argue that there is something contrary to the one, but not to the other, even if the assertion be true, we must say that the contrary (of the other, is), but that the name of the other, is not laid down.
Nevertheless, since some of the things which the multitude assert, are such that he who does not admit them, they would say, answered falsely, but others are not such; as those of which there are contrary opinions, (for whether the soul of animals, is corruptible or incorruptible, is not determined by the multitude,) in which then it is doubtful how it is usual to enunciate what is proposed, (so that it may be asked) whether (it appears to the respondent) as sentences, for they call both true opinions and universal enunciations sentences, as that the diameter of a square is incommensurate with its side. Besides, of which there is a two-fold opinion as to truth, in these, by transferring the names, a person would especially escape detection, for from its being doubtful in what way the truth subsists, he will not appear sophistically to cavil, and from there, being opinions on both sides, he will not seem to answer falsely, for the transition will render his answer incapable of confutation by an elenchus.
Further, those interrogations which a person foresees, must be previously objected to and declared, for thus especially he will impede the inquirer.
Since however a right solution is the detection of a false syllogism, (showing) by what interrogation the falsity occurs; but a syllogism is called false in two ways, (either if it is falsely concluded, or if not being a syllogism, it seems to be one,) what is now said to be a solution will be a correction of an apparent syllogism, (showing) from what interrogation it is apparent. Hence, it happens that those arguments which conclude by syllogism, are solved by negation, but apparent ones by distinction. Again, since some of the arguments syllogistically concluded are true, but others have a false conclusion; those which are false, according to the conclusion, we may solve in two ways, by taking away some one of the interrogations, and by showing that the conclusion does not thus subsist; but those (which are false), according to the propositions, by taking away some (interrogation) only, for the conclusion is true. So that they who desire to solve an argument, should first consider if it is conclusive or inconclusive; next, whether the conclusion is true or false, that we may solve it either by division or subversion, and subverting it either in this or that way, as was observed before. Still, it makes a great difference whether a person, being interrogated or not, solves the argument, since to foresee is difficult, but to consider at leisure is easy.
Of elenchi which are from equivocation and ambiguity, some have an interrogation signifying many things, but others a conclusion multifariously stated; for instance in the case, that he who is silent speaks, the conclusion is two-fold, but in this, that he who knows, at the same time does not know, one interrogation is ambiguous, and what is two-fold is at one time (true), and at another not, for the two-fold signifies that which is, and that which is not.
In those assertions, therefore, in the conclusion of which there is the multifarious, except (the opponent) assumes contradiction, there is not an elenchus, as in this, that the blind man sees, for without contradiction there was not an elenchus; but in those in the interrogations, of which (there is the multifarious), it is not necessary previously to deny what is two-fold, for the argument does not subsist with reference to this, but on account of this. In the beginning, then, since both the name and the sentence are two-fold, we must answer thus, that it partly is, and partly is not, as that the silent speaks is partly true, and partly not. And that τὰ δέοντα should be done, is true of some things, but not of others, for τὰ δέοντα are predicated multifariously. Still if it be latent, at the end we must correct the interrogation by an addition; "Is it then true, σιγῶντα λέγειν?" "No, but τόνδε σιγῶντα." In those, also, which have the multifarious in the propositions, (we must act) in like manner; "Do they not at the same time then, know what they know?" Yes, but not those who thus know, for it is not the same thing that (those who know), at one and the same time know, and that those who thus know, cannot (at one and the same time know). In short, (the respondent) must contend even if the adversary simply concludes, and (he must assert) that he denied not the thing affirmed by him, but the name, so that it is not an elenchus.
It is evident how these arguments which are from division and composition must be solved, for if a divided and a composite sentence have a different signification, that must be stated which is contrary to the conclusion. Now all such arguments are from composition or division. "Did he strike him with that, with which you saw him striking?" and "with what he struck, with that, did you see him striking?" have something of ambiguous interrogations, but nevertheless it is from composition. For what is assumed from division is not two-fold, because there does not arise the same sentence when divided, unless also ὄροσ, and ὄροσ pronounced with the accent, signify a different thing; but in writings the name is the same, since it is written from the same elements, and after the same manner, and there indeed the marks are the same, but the things pronounced are different. Hence what is assumed from division is not two-fold, and it is likewise clear that not all elenchi are from the two-fold, as some say.
The respondent therefore must make a distinction, for it is not the same thing for a man to say, that he saw some one striking with his eyes, and that with his eyes he saw some one striking, and the argument of Euthydemus (belongs to this). "Have you now, being in Sicily, seen the triremes which are in the Piraeus?" and again, "Can a man being good, be a bad shoemaker?" but some one being a good shoemaker, may be bad, so that there will be a bad shoemaker. (Again,) "Are those exercises worthy, of which the sciences are worthy?" but the exercise of a bad man is worthy; wherefore, what is bad, is a worthy exercise, but what is bad is both an exercise and that which is bad, so that what is bad, is a bad exercise. "Is it true to say now that you are born? you are therefore born now." Or does this (sentence) signify another thing when divided, for it is now true to say that you are born, but not that you are now born. As to the manner in which you are able, and the things which you are able to do, will you do these things, and in this manner? but when not playing on the harp, you have the power of playing, wherefore, you would play when not playing; or may we not say that he has the power of playing on the harp, when he does not play, but when he does not do it, of doing it?
Some indeed solve this (sophism) in another way, for if (the respondent) grants that be is able to do so, they say it does not happen that he who does not play plays, for he does not grant that he does it in whatever way it is possible, nor is it the same thing to say as it is possible, and in whatever way it is possible to do it. Still, it is evident that they do not solve it well, for of arguments from the same (place) there is the same solution, but this will not suit all, nor questions in every way, but is (adapted) to the interrogator, not to the argument.
Arguments indeed are not derived from accent, neither in writings nor sentences pronounced, unless there may be a few, such as this argument, "Is τὸ οὗ καταλύεις a house?" yes! "Is not τὸ οὑ καταλύεις the negation τοῦ καταλύεις? yes! "But you said that τὸ οὗ καταλύεις was a house, therefore a house is a negation." How therefore the solution must be made, is clear, for "ου" does not signify the same thing, when pronounced more acutely, and when more gravely.
Moreover, it is evident how we must oppose arguments derived from things asserted after the same manner, which are not the same, since we have the genera of the categories; for the one indeed grants when interrogated, that it is not any of those things which signify essence, but the other shows that it is one of the number of relatives or quantities, and seems to signify essence on account of the diction, for instance, in this argument. Is it possible to do, and to have done, the same thing at the same time? No. But it is possible to see, and at the same time to have seen, the same thing, and according to the same. Is it possible for any thing which suffers, to act? No. But "it is cut," "it is burned," "it is perceived," are enunciated similarly, and all signify to suffer something; again, "to speak," "to run," "to see" are enunciated similarly with each other, but "to see" is to perceive something, so that it is to suifer, and to act something, at one and the same time. Still, if any one having there granted that it is impossible to do and to have done the same thing at the same time, should say that it is possible to see and to have seen, he is not yet confuted, if he should not say that "to see" is to do something, but to suffer, for there is no need of this interrogation, but he is supposed by the hearer to have granted this, when he granted that "to cut" is to do, and "to cut" is to have done something, and whatever other things are similarly asserted. For the auditor himself supplies the rest as asserted in a similar manner, but this is not similarly asserted, but seems to be so from the diction. The same thing indeed happens, as in equivocations, for in them, he who is ignorant of words, thinks that (the opponent) denies the thing which (the respondent affirms), and not the name (only), though there is still need of an interrogation, whether regarding one thing he asserts the equivocal, for this being granted there will be an elenchus.
The following arguments also are like these: Whether has some one lost that, which once having, he afterwards has not? for he who has lost one die will not have ten dice, or may we not say that he has lost what he has not (now), but which he had before; but that it is not necessary that he who had not so much, or so many things, should have lost so many. Asking then, what he has, in the conclusion he introduces so many, for ten things are so many; if then, it had been asked at first, has he who has not so many things as he formerly had, lost so many, no one would admit it, but either that he had lost so many, or some one of these. Also (the deception is similar), that some one may give what he has not, for he has not one die only, or does he not give that which he has not, but as to the manner in which he had it not, viz. one, for the word "only," does not signify this particular thing, nor such a quality, nor quantity, but how it subsists with relation to something, (i. e.) that it is not with another. It is therefore as if some one asked, can any one give what he has not, and if a person denied it, should ask whether any one can give rapidly, when he does not possess rapidly, and this being agreed to, should conclude that a man may give what he has not. It is also manifest that it is not syllogistically considered, (for to give) rapidly is not to give this thing, but in this way, and a person may give in a manner different from that in which he possesses, for possessing it gladly, he may give it painfully.
Similar also are all the following: Can any one strike with that hand which he has not? or see with the eye which he has not, for he has not one alone. Some indeed solve this by saying, that he has one alone, whether it be an eye or any thing else, who has more than one, but others that he has received what he has, for he gave one die alone, and this man has, they say, one die alone from this man. Others, again, immediately subverting the question, (say) that it is possible to have what he has not received, as if having received sweet wine, when it is corrupted in the receiving of it, a man should have sour wine; still, as we have observed before, all these solve, not with reference to the argument, but to the man. For if this were the solution, he who gave the opposite would not be able to solve it, as in other cases; thus, if the solution is, that it partly is, but partly is not, if it be simply granted, there is a conclusion, but if there is not a conclusion, there cannot be a solution; but in the before-named, all things being granted, we do not admit that there is a syllogism.
Further, of such arguments are the following: Has some one written what is written? But it is written that you now sit, which is a false statement, yet it was true when it was written, wherefore at one and the same time, there was written a false and a true assertion. To declare, however, an assertion or opinion false or true, signifies, not this particular thing, but this quality, for the reasoning also is the same in opinion. Again, as to what a learner learns, is it that which he learns? but some one learns quickly what is slow, therefore he does not say what some one learns, but how he learns. Again, what a person walks through does he tread on? But he walks through the whole day, it is not said that which he walks upon, but when he walks; nor when (we say) he drinks a cup (do we show) what, but from what, he drinks. Also with regard to what a person knows, does he know it by learning or discovery? but of those, one of which he discovers and the other he learns, (with these,) when both are (assumed), neither (accords): or is it that here "every thing" is assumed, but there not "every." Also, (we may add the deception,) that there is a certain third man besides man himself, and individuals, for man and every common thing, is not this particular thing, but signifies a certain "quale" or relative, or in some way, or something of this kind. Likewise, also, in the question, whether Coriscus and Coriscus the musician, are the same or different question, for the former signifies this particular thing, but the other a thing of a certain quality, so that we cannot set out this; nor does the exposition make a third man, but the concession, (that what is common) is that very thing which is this particular thing, for (thus) to be this particular thing, is not that which Callias is, and which man is. Neither will it signify, if some one should say that what is set out, is not what this particular thing is, but what is a thing of a certain quality, for besides the many, there will be one certain thing, for instance man. We must evidently therefore, not grant that what is predicated in common of many, is this particular thing, but that it signifies either quality, or relation, or quantity, or something of the kind.
In short, of disputations from diction, the solution will always be according to the opposite of that from which the argument is derived, thus if the argument is from composition, the solution will be through division, but if from division, it will be through composition. Again, if (the argument) is from acute accent, the grave accent will be the solution, but if from the grave, an acute (will be). If, however, from equivocation, it is possible to solve by adducing the opposite name, thus if it happens that we can say a thing is animated, by denying that it is not animated, we can show that it is animated, but if (the respondent) says it is inanimate, but (the arguer) concludes it is animated, we must say that it is inanimate. In the same way with ambiguity, but if (the argument is derived) from similitude of diction, the opposite will be the solution, as, "Can any one give what he has not?" or not what he has not, but in the way in which he has not; for instance, one die alone. What any one knows, does he know by learning or discovery, and yet not the things which he knows, and does he tread on what he walks through, but not when, and so of the other (deceptions).
With respect to those which are from accident, there is one and the same solution for all of them, for since it is uncertain when an assertion can be made of a thing present from accident, and in some things this appears and is conceded, but in others, men deny that it is necessary, it must be said as being similarly adapted to all, that (the conclusion) is not necessary. Nevertheless, it is necessary to produce something similar. All such arguments however as these are from accident. Do you know what I am about to ask you? Do you know him who approaches, or him who is covered? Is this statue your work; or is the dog your father? Are not a few things, assumed a few times, few? For it is evident in all these, that it is not necessary that what is verified of accident, should also be verified of the thing, for in things alone which according to essence are without difference and one, all things appear to be inherent as the same, since to what is good, it is not the same thing to be good, and to be that which is intended to be asked, neither to him who approaches or who is covered, is it the same thing to be one approaching, and (to be) Coriscus, so that it does not follow, if I know Coriscus, but do not know the person approaching, that I know, and am ignorant of, the same person, neither if this is a work and is mine, is it my work, but either (my) possession, or thing, or something else; the other deceptions also (we must solve) after the same manner.
Some however solve them by distinguishing the question, for they say that it is possible to know, and not to know the same thing, yet not according to the same; therefore not knowing him who approaches, but knowing Coriscus, they say they know indeed, and are ignorant of the same thing, but not according to the same. But in the first place, as we have already said, it is necessary that there should be the same correction of arguments (derived) from the same (place), but this will not be (the solution) if some one does not assume the same axiom from "to know," but from "to be," or "to subsist after a certain manner;" as if this (dog) is a father, and is yours, (therefore it is your father,) for though this is true in certain instances, and it is possible to know, and to be ignorant of, the same thing, yet here what is said, is by no means appropriate. Still there is nothing to prevent the same argument having many faults, yet not the exposition of every fault is a solution, for it is possible that some one may show that to be false, which is syllogistically concluded, but may not show whence it is false; as that argument of Zeno, that nothing can be moved. Wherefore, if some (respondent) should endeavour to lead to the impossible, he errs, though it should be concluded ten thousand times, since this is not a solution, for the solution was the display of a false syllogism, (showing) whence it is false, if then (the opponent) concludes nothing, whether he endeavours to collect the true or the false, the manifestation of that thing is a solution. Perhaps indeed, nothing prevents this occurring in certain cases, except that in these, this cannot appear, for he knows that Coriscus is Coriscus, and that he who approaches is he who approaches. It seems indeed to be possible to know, and not to know the same thing, for instance, to know that a thing is white, but not to know that it is musical, for thus a man knows and does not know the same thing, yet not according to the same, but here he knows what approaches, and Coriscus, and Coriscus (to be) that which approaches, and (to be) Coriscus.
Likewise, also they err, who solve (by stating) that every number is few, as those whom we mentioned, for if nothing being concluded, leaving out this, they say that they have concluded the true, for that every number is both much and few, they err.
Some also solve these syllogisms by duplicity, as that it is your father, or son, or servant; yet it is evident that if the elenchus appears to be assumed from the multifarious, it is necessary that the name or the sentence should properly be of many, but that this person is the son of this man, no one asserts properly, if he is the master of a son, but the composition is from accident. Is this yours? yes! but this is a son, therefore this is your son, because it happens to be both yours and a son, yet not your son.
Also (the solution of the deception by which it is concluded), that something amongst evils is good, since prudence is the science of things evil, for to be of the number of these, (they say) is not predicated multifariously, but (as) possession, or if it should be multifariously, (for we say that man is of the number of animals, yet not their possession, and if any thing is referred to evils, as to be said to be of a certain thing, is it on this account of evils, yet this is not to be of the number of evils;) it seems then (to be assumed) from, "in a certain respect" and "simply." Perhaps, however, it is possible that something good may be of evils in a two-fold respect, yet not in this argument, but rather (in that), "Can there be a good servant of a bad (master)?" But perhaps neither thus, for it does not follow if he is good and pertains to this man, that he is the good of this man at the same time, nor when we say that man is of animals, is this predicated multifariously, since neither when we signify any thing, by removal, is this predicated multifariously, for when we say the half of a verse, we signify, Give me the Iliad, as, for instance, (Give me,) "Sing, Goddess, the anger."
Those which are from this particular thing, being predicated properly, or in a certain respect, or some where, or after a manner, or with a relation to something, and not simply, we must solve by considering the conclusion with reference to contradiction, whether it is possible for any thing of this sort to occur in them. For contraries, and opposites, and affirmation, and negation, simply indeed, cannot possibly be inherent in the same thing, though nothing prevents each of these being inherent in a certain respect, or with relation to something, or after a manner, or one being inherent in a certain respect, but another simply. Wherefore, if one is (predicated) simply, but another in a certain respect, there is not yet an elenchus; but this we must investigate in the conclusion, in reference to contradiction.
Nevertheless, all such arguments are as follow: is it possible, for what is not, to be? But what is not, is something. In like manner being, will not be, for it will not be any one of beings. Is it, then, possible that the same person can at one and the same time take an oath properly, and commit a perjury? Is it possible that the same man, at one and the same time, can believe and not believe, the same person? Or are to be a certain thing, and to be (simply) not the same? But non-being, if it is a certain thing is not simply; neither if a person swears properly this, or in a certain respect, is it necessary that he swears properly; for swearing that he shall be perjured when he swears, he swears this alone in a proper manner, but he does not swear (simply) in a proper manner, nor does he believe who disbelieves, but he believes a certain thing. Similar is the argument about the same person speaking falsely and truly at the same time, but from its not being easy to perceive, whether a person assigns the word simply to the speaking truly or falsely, it (the solution) seems difficult. Still there is nothing to prevent it being false, indeed, simply, but in a certain respect, or of a certain thing, true, also certain things being true and yet not true (simply). Similarly also, in regard to the terms, "with reference to something," and "where" and "when," for all such arguments result from this. Is health or wealth a good thing? but to the foolish and to one who does not use it properly, it is not good, wherefore it is good and not good. Is to be well or to be powerful in a city a good thing? Sometimes this is not better, therefore the same thing is good or not good to the same. Or does nothing prevent what is simply good, not being good to a certain person, or good to this man, but not now, or not good here. Is that which a prudent man would not desire, an evil? But he does not desire to lose good, wherefore good is evil, for it is not the same thing, to say that good is evil, and to lose good. Likewise, also, the argument about the thief, since it does not follow if a thief is a bad thing, that to take him is also bad, therefore he (who wishes to take him) does not desire a bad, but a good thing, for to take a thief is a good thing, and disease is bad, but not to lose disease. Is the just preferable to the unjust, and the justly to the unjustly, yet to die unjustly is preferable. Is it just for every man to have his own property, yet those which some one according to his own opinion adjudges, though it be false, are the property (of that person) by law, therefore the same thing is just and unjust. Also, whether is it necessary to condemn him who speaks justly, or him who speaks unjustly? Yet it is just that the injured should state sufficiently what he has suffered, but these would be unjust things, since it does not follow if to suffer any thing unjustly is eligible, the unjustly is more eligible than the justly, but simply indeed the justly, yet nothing hinders this particular thing, though unjustly (done, being more eligible) than what is justly (done). Also, for every one to have his own is just, but to have another person's, is not just, yet nothing hinders this judgment from being just, e. g. if it be according to the opinion of the judge, since it does not follow if this thing is just or in this way, that it is simply just. Likewise, also, those which are unjust, nothing prevents its being just to relate them, since it does not follow, if it is just to relate them, necessarily that the things are just, as neither if it is beneficial to speak of them, (does it follow) they are beneficial; and the like of just things. Wherefore if things asserted are unjust, it does not follow that he who speaks unjust things prevails, for he says those things which are just to say, but simply, and unjust to bear.
To those which arise from the definition of elenchus, as was before described, we must make a reply by considering the conclusion with reference to contradiction, how it will be the same thing, and according to the same, and with reference to the same, after the same manner, and in the same time. If then, an interrogation be made in the beginning, we must not acknowledge as if it were impossible for the same thing to be double and not double, but we must state that it is not possible so as that an elenchus be acknowledged to be made. All these arguments however are from such a place as this: Does he who knows each particular that it is each particular, know the thing? and the ignorant person in like manner? But some one knowing Coriscus that he is Coriscus, may be ignorant that he is a musician, so that he knows and is ignorant of the same thing. Also, is the size of four cubits greater than that of three cubits? But a size of four cubits in length may be made out of three cubits, and the greater is greater than the less, wherefore the same thing is greater and less than itself.
Those from begging the (original question) and assuming it if it is manifest, must not be granted to the inquirer, not even if it be probable that he speaks the truth; but if it be latent, ignorance, from the fault of such arguments as these, must be retorted on the questionist, as not disputing (well), for an elenchus is without that (which was interrogated) from the beginning. Next, that he granted not that he (the opponent) should use it, but as being about syllogistically to prove the contrary, as in parexelenchi.
Those also which prove from the consequent we must show from the argument itself. Now there is a two-fold consequence of consequents, for it is either as universal to particular, as animal to man, for it is taken for granted, if this is (joined) with that, that also is with this; or according to oppositions, for if this follows that, the opposite also follows the opposite. Hence also the argument of Melissus, for if what was begotten had a beginning, he requires it to be granted that the unbegotten had not (a beginning), wherefore, if the heaven is unbegotten, it is also infinite. Yet this is not so, for the consequence is vice versâ.
In whatever syllogistically conclude from something being added, we must observe whether it being taken away, the impossible, nevertheless, results. Next, we must make this clear, and we must say that it was granted, not as seeming (true), but as adapted to the argument, but he, the arguer, uses what is nothing to the purpose.
Against those which make many interrogations one, we must employ definition immediately in the beginning, for the interrogation is one to which there is one answer, so that neither many things must be affirmed or denied of one thing, nor one of many, but one of one. As indeed in the case of things equivocal, at one time (the attribute) is in both, but at another in neither, so that the interrogation not being simple, it happens that those who answer simply, suffer nothing; in like manner also, in these cases. When then many are present with one, or one with many, nothing repugnant happens to him who simply concedes, and who errs according to this error; but when it is in one, but not in the other, or many are predicated of many, and both are partly present with both, and partly not, this, again, is to be avoided. For instance, in these arguments: If one thing is good, but another evil, it is true to say that these are good and evil, and again, that they are neither good nor evil, since each is not each, wherefore the same thing is good and evil, and is neither good nor evil. Also, Is every thing the same with itself, and different from something else? but since these are not the same with others, but with themselves, and are different from themselves, the same things are different from, and the same with, themselves. Besides, if what is good becomes evil, and what is evil good, there will be two things, and of two, being unequal, each itself will be equal to itself, so that the same things will be equal and unequal to themselves.
Such arguments, then, fall into other solutions, for "both" also, and "all" signify many things, wherefore, except the name, it does not happen that the same thing is affirmed and denied, but this was not an elenchus. Still, it is clear that unless many interrogations are assumed for one, but one thing be affirmed or denied of one, there will not be an impossibility.
With regard to those which lead to frequently saying the same thing, we must evidently not grant that the categories of relatives, separated by themselves, signify any thing; as the double without the double of the half, because it is manifest; for ten is (understood) in (the expression) ten minus one, and "to make" in the (expression) "not to make," in short, affirmation in negation, yet still it does not follow, if a man says that this is not white, that he should say it is white. Perhaps indeed, the double signifies nothing (alone), as neither what is in the half, or if indeed it does signify any thing, yet not the same as when conjoined. Nor does science in species (as if it is medical science) signify what is common, but that was the science of the object of science. Indeed, in those attributes through which (the subjects) are declared, we must say this, that what is signified separately, and what in a sentence are not the same. For the hollow in common, signifies the same thing in a flat nose and a crooked leg, but when added, nothing prevents (its signifying a different thing), but the one signifies (what happens) to the nose, and the other to the leg, for there it signifies a flat nose, but here a crooked leg, and it makes no difference to say a flat nose or a hollow nose. Moreover, we must not grant diction in a direct (case), for it is false, since τὸ σιμὸν is not a hollow nose, but this is an affection, as it were, of the nose, so that there is no absurdity, if a flat nose be a nose having a hollowness of nose.
Concerning solecisms, indeed, whence they appear to happen we have shown before, but how we must solve them will be evident in the arguments themselves. For all these aim at constructing hoc; Is what you say truly this thing truly, but you say that something is a stone, something then is a stone. Or is to say a stone, not to say "quod" but "quem," not "hoc" but "hunc," if then some one should ask; Num quem vere dicis est hunc? he would not seem to speak conformably to the Latin language, as neither if he should say; Num quam dicis esse, est hic? but when he says wood, or whatever signifies neither the feminine nor the masculine, it makes no difference. Wherefore, a solecism does not arise, if what you say is, be "hoc," but you say that wood is, this therefore is wood: a "stone," however, and "hic," have the appellation of the masculine. If, indeed, some one should inquire is he, she? and again, what? (quid)? Is not he Coriscus? and then should say, he therefore is she, he does not syllogistically collect a solecism, not even if Coriscus signify, what she signifies; but the respondent does not grant it, and it is necessary that this should be questioned, besides. If, however, it neither is nor is granted, it is not syllogistically collected, neither in reality nor against him who is questioned, hence in like manner there also, it is necessary that a stone should signify hic, but if this neither is (assumed) nor granted, we must not admit the conclusion, nevertheless it seems to be from the dissimilar case of the noun appearing similar. Is it true to say that hæc is that which you say hanc is? but you say it is a shield, hæc then is a shield. Or is it not necessary if hæc does not signify parmam, but parma, but parmam is hanc. Neither if what you say is hunc be hic, but you say it is Cleon, therefore hic is Cleon, hic is not Cleon, for it was said, quem aio hunc esse, est hic, non hunc; for when the question is thus made it is not according to the rules of grammar. Do you know hoc? but this is a stone, you know then a stone, or does it not signify the same thing in the expression, do you know hoc? and in hoc autem est lapis? but this is a stone? but that in the former it signifies hunc and in the latter hic. Num cujus scientiam habes hoc, scis? Habes autem scientiam lapidis: scis igitur lapidis; is it not that when you say hujus, you say lapidis, but when you say hoc, lapidem? but it is granted cujus scientiam habes, te scire, non hujus, sed hoc; and therefore non lapidis, sed lapidem.
From what is stated then, it is manifest that such arguments as these do not syllogistically collect a solecism, but seem (only) to do so, also why they thus seem, and in what manner they are to be opposed.
Of all arguments we must know that in some it is more easy, and in others more difficult, to perceive from what cause, and in what, they deceive the hearer, since often the one are the same with the other, for we ought to call that the same argument which is derived from the same place, and the same argument may appear to some to be derived from the diction, to others from accident, to others from another (place), because each when it is transferred is not equally evident. As then in (deceptions) from equivocation, which mode of paralogism seems to be the most usual, some are manifest to every one, (for almost all absurd sentences are from diction, for instance, Vir ferebat per scalas δίφρον; a man put δίφρος through a ladder: and ὅπου στέλλεσθε? To the sail-yard: and Utra boum ante pariet? Neutra; sed retro ambæ; again, Estne Boreas καθαρὸς? By no means, for it caused the death of a mendicant and a merchant. Is it Evarchus? No, but Apollonides; and almost all other deceptions in the same manner.) Some seem notwithstanding to escape the most experienced, a proof of which is, that they oftentimes contend about names, as whether the one and being are predicated in the same signification, or in a different one, of all things. For to some indeed, being and the one seem to signify the same thing, but others solve the argument of Zeno and Parmenides, from saying that one and being are predicated multifariously. Likewise, also with regard to those derived from accident and each of the other (places), some arguments will be easy to perceive, but others difficult, and it is not alike easy in all, to perceive in what genus they are contained, and whether it is, or is not an elenchus.
Yet the argument is acute, which reduces a person to the greatest doubt, since this is especially pungent. Now doubt is two-fold, one in arguments concluding syllogistically, with regard to which interrogation is to be subverted, but the other in contentious arguments, as to how some one should speak of the thing proposed, wherefore in the syllogistic, the shrewder arguments cause greater investigation, but a syllogistic argument is most acute, if from things which appear especially probable, a person subverts what is especially probable. For the argument being one, when the contradiction is transposed, will have all the syllogisms alike, for a person will always, from probable assertions, subvert or confirm what is similarly probable, wherefore it will be necessary to doubt. An argument then of this kind is especially acute, which makes a conclusion equal to the questions, but that next, which is from all similar (assumptions), for this in like manner will produce doubt, as to which of the interrogatories is to be subverted; nevertheless, this is difficult, since a subversion is to be made, but what is to be subverted is uncertain. Of contentious arguments, the most acute is that in which at first it is forthwith uncertain whether it is syllogistically concluded or not, and whether the solution is from the false or from division, but the second of the rest is that which evidently must be (solved) through division or removal, but in which it is not clear through the removal or division of what interrogation it must be solved, indeed whether this removal or division is from the conclusion, or from one of the interrogatories.
Sometimes therefore, the argument which is not conclusive is silly, e. g. if the assumptions be very incredible or false, but sometimes it is not to be despised. For when one of such interrogations is deficient, the syllogism about which, and through which, the argument (is employed), and which neither assumes this, nor concludes, is silly, but when (the interrogation is deficient,) which may be externally (assumed), the argument is by no means to be despised, but (here) the argument indeed is good, but the querist has not interrogated well.
Since the solution at one time belongs to the argument, at another to the questionist, and the question, and sometimes to neither of these, in like manner also, it is possible both to question and conclude against the thesis, and against the respondent, and against the time, when the solution requires more time than the present opportunity (allows) to argue against it.
From how many, and what kind of particulars then, paralogisms are produced by disputants, also how we shall both prove the false and compel (the opponent) to argue paradoxically; further, from what things a syllogism results, and how we must interrogate, moreover, what is the order of interrogations, for what, too, all such arguments are useful, and concerning both every answer simply, and how arguments and syllogisms must be solved, concerning all these let what we have said suffice. It now remains that recalling our original proposition, we should say something briefly concerning it, and add an end to what has been enunciated.
We designed then to discover a certain syllogistic faculty, about a problem proposed from things in the highest degree probable, for this is the office of the dialectic per se, and also of the peirastic art. Since, however, there is added to this, on account of the affinity of the sophistical art, that a person may not only make trial dialectically, but even as one endowed with knowledge; on this account we not only supposed what was said to be the object of this treatise, viz. to be able to assume an argument, but also that sustaining the argument, we may defend the thesis in a similar manner, through the greatest probabilities. We have besides, assigned the cause of this; since, for this reason also, Socrates questioned, but did not answer, for he confessed that he knew nothing. Moreover, it has been shown in the preceding treatise, with reference to how many, and from what number this will be, and whence we shall be well supplied with these; further, how interrogations must be made, and how every one must be arranged, and likewise, concerning the answers and solutions of things appertaining to syllogisms. Such other particulars besides, have been developed as belong to the same method of arguments, and in addition to these, we have discussed paralogisms, as we stated before, wherefore, it is evident that what we proposed has sufficiently obtained its end. Still we ought not to be ignorant of that which occurs in this treatise; for of all discoveries, some being received formerly from others, elaborated partially afterwards, have been increased by those who received them; but others being discovered from the beginning, are wont to receive, at first, but small increase, becoming much more useful by the increase which they receive from others afterwards. For the beginning of every thing is perhaps, as it is said, the greatest thing, and on this account the most difficult; for that is the hardest to be perceived, which, as it is the most powerful in faculty, is by so much the smallest in size; yet when this is discovered, it is more easy to add and co-increase what mains, which also occurs in rhetorical arguments, and in almost all the other arts. For they who discovered principles, altogether made but little progress; but men who are now celebrated, receiving, as it were, by succession from many who promoted (art) by parts, have thus increased it; Tisias after the tirst (authors), but Thrasymachus after Tisias, Theodorus after him, and many (others) have brought together many particulars, wherefore it is no wonder that the art has a certain multitude (of precepts). Of this subject, however, there has not been a part cultivated, and a part not before, but nothing of it has existed at all, for of those who employed themselves about contentious arguments for gain, there was a certain instruction, similar to the treatise of Gorgias. For some gave rhetorical, others interrogative discourses to learn, into which each thought their conversation with each other would most often fall. Hence the instruction indeed to their disciples was rapid, but without art, since they supposed they should instruct them by delivering not art, but the effects of art, just as if a person professing to deliver the science of keeping feet from injury, should afterwards not teach shoemaking, nor whence such things (as safe-guards for the feet) may be procured, but should exhibit many kinds of shoes of every form; for he would indeed afford assistance as to use, yet not discover the art. And indeed, about rhetoric, many old discourses are extant, but about the art of syllogism we have received nothing at all from the ancients, but we have laboured for a long time by the exercise of investigation. If then, it appear to you, when you have inspected (our writings), that this method derived from such materials as existed originally, when compared with other treatises which have been increased from tradition, has been (handled) sufficiently, it remains for you all, or for those who have heard this work, to excuse the omissions in this method, and to be very grateful for its discoveries.