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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
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| 7. | Dulles outlines U.S. policy on Indochina to Bidault. The U.S.: (1) is fully aware of the importance of the French struggle; (2) sees the situation with "real sense of urgency"; (3) shares concern regarding "adequacy of the financial contribution" by Indochinese and French residents there; (4) desires agreement that Viet Minh defeat would deter CHICOM intervention; and (5) appreciates French views on participation by Associated States in discussing policy and receiving U.S. military and economic aid. Dulles 4907 to Paris, 19 March 1953 | 15 |
| 8. | President Eisenhower stresses the importance of EDC as a means for European viability to Mayer and LeTourneau. The "President declared that EDC is so important in American eyes that the American people would not support aid to France if they were given the impression that France is resorting to dilatory tactics in order to postpone ratification.…" Dulles 4992 to Paris, 26 March 1953 | 17 |
| 9. | Secretary Dulles reassures the French that a "Chinese Communist attack is unlikely" in Indochina and that any Korean armistice would have "automatically failed [its] purpose." Dulles 5001 to Paris, 27 March 1953 | 19 |
| 10. | The French plan to create, "strong free states, in Indochina" is to be studied even though Eisenhower feels that the timetable is too slow. The U. S. is intent on doing nothing to increase France's difficulties. Dulles 5040 to Paris, 30 March 1953 | 21 |
| 11. | Cost deficits of the French "strategic concept" are $231 million and $299.3 million for CY 1954 and 1955. No formal request for the U.S. to assume the deficits is made but "French intent is clear that is their plan." Dulles 1967 to Saigon, 7 April 1953 | 22 |
| 12. | President Eisenhower indicates publicly that an armistice in Korea should mean "an end to the direct and indirect attacks upon the security of Indochina and Malaya." The warning is clear to Red China that armies released by the armistice to attack elsewhere would make the armistice "a fraud." White House Press Release, 16 April 1953 | 23 |
| 13. | The JCS summarize the weaknesses of the French Plan presented by LeTourneau and Allard. Briefly, the plan is not aggressive, insufficient consideration is given to cutting the enemy supply lines, insufficient emphasis is given to placing responsibility on the Vietnamese, and the plan relies extensively on small unit operations. See also documents numbered 35, 36 and 37, below. JCS memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 21 April 1953 | 24 |
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