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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECRET - Sensitive
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| 14. | The U. S. urges the French to come forward with a program which can sensibly be sold to Congress as holding promise of a satisfactory outcome, "perhaps in a couple of years." Dulles indicates that the President would favor as much as $525 million and possibly more this year if Congress could be told "this program has enough chance of success.…[that] it will largely clear up the situation." Bi-Partite US-French Conversations, 22 April 1953 | 27 |
| 15. | The JCS at a meeting with State informally indicates reservations on the feasibility of the French plan. The JCS feel that the French must appoint an "aggressive French military leader" to Indochina, revise the strategy toward more offensive action, and use Vietnamese forces in large rather than small units -- otherwise "U.S. aid would be wasted" in Indochina, State TOSEC 9 to Paris, 14 April 1953 | 31 |
| 16. | The U. S. position is clearly that "armies released in Korea" will not strike elsewhere. Since the Indochina war does not have the "status of an international war," the U. S. suggests that perhaps the French should bring the current Laos problem before the Security Council. Extract of Tripartite US-UK-French Meeting, 25 April 1953 | 32 |
| 17. | France is told that the U. S. proposes to recommend an FY 1954 Mutual Security Program (MSP) for France of $100 million for equipment of French units in SACEUR, $460 million in funds as 40% of Indochina war expenditure rate, and an additional unspecified amount involving trained Associated States forces. Memorandum on Aid, Paris 5673 to Secretary of State, 26 April 1953 | 34 |
| 18. | The French are reluctant to bring the Laos aggression before the Security Council because it "might precipitate a colonial debate." Dulles Memorandum of Conversation, 17 April 1953 | 37 |
| 19. | The French request for C-119 aircraft reaches Eisenhower and raises the question of sending U. S. personnel on combat missions in Indochina, Such a decision is seen as having "repercussions" and raising many problems. Douglas MacArthur, II, memorandum, 27 April 1953 | 38 |
| 20. | The JCS approves the loan of six C-119 aircraft to the French for use in Indochina provided they are flown by civilian pilots. The CIA is to complete the transactions. State Far East Memorandum to Dulles, 28 April 1953 | 39 |
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