This page needs to be proofread.
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECRET - Sensitive
| Page | ||
| 21. | The Department of Defense accepts the French proposal to send a U. S. military mission to Indochina. State 5655 to Paris, 18 May 1953 | 40 |
| 22. | The U. S. is prepared to support a French request to NATO to permit diversion of French Air Force manpower to Indochina in view of the fact that "the near collapse of the maintenance and pilot capabilities of the French Air Force in Indochina is close at hand." State 5693 to Paris, 21 May 1953 | 42 |
| 23. | The U. S. backs down on its intent to have Thailand submit the "Laos invasion" case to the Security Council. "French attitude regarding Thai appeal has been emphatic almost to the point of hysteria." Dulles 2297 to Bangkok, 1 June 1953 | 44 |
| 24. | The Intelligence Advisory Committee concludes that Communist China will not invade Indochina even though hostilities conclude in Korea. The French situation, however, is expected to continue to deteriorate while the Viet Minh prestige increases. National Intelligence Estimate, NIE-91, 4 June 1953 | 45 |
| 25. | The Joint Chiefs of Staff propose "Terms of Reference" for the O'Daniel Military Mission to Indochina. JCS Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 10 June 1953 | 59 |
| 26. | The O'Daniel mission arrives in Saigon to pursue discussions with General Henri Navarre on the manner in which U. S. aid may best contribute to the French war effort. State Press Release 329, 20 June 1953 | 68 |
| 27. | General O'Daniel recommends to the JCS that a capability for small Industry in Indochina be established, that an increase in artillery units be approved for Indochina, and that the U. S. "think in terms of the 'Navarre Concept' in association with the war in Indochina," O'Daniel Report to JCS, 14 July 1953 | 69 |
| 28. | The U. S. expresses gratification at announced French political plans and indicates that the Navarre Plan "had impressed as favorably." Stress is placed on having other alternatives available if negotiations were to start, e.g., the Navarre Plan. Assurance is given the French that Communist China will not intervene in Indochina. US-France Bilateral Talks, 15 July 1953 | 97 |
iv
TOP SECRET - Sensitive
