Texas Pacific Railway Company v. Humble

by Melvin Fuller

United States Supreme Court

181 U.S. 57

Texas Pacific Railway Company  v.  Humble

 Argued: March 7, 8, 1901. --- Decided: April 8, 1901

This was an action brought by Emma Humble against the Texas & Pacific Railway Company in the circuit court of Miller county, Arkansas, to recover compensation for personal injuries sustained by her in the defendant's station at Texarkana, Arkansas, on April 9, 1898, by reason of defendant's negligence, and removed on defendant's petition to the United States circuit court for the western district of Arkansas. Plaintiff obtained judgment, which was affirmed by the circuit court of appeals for the eighth circuit, 38 C. C. A. 502, 97 Fed. Rep. 837, and thereupon this writ of error was sued out.

The evidence, in addition to establishing the circumstances of the infliction of the injury, tended to show that Mrs. Humble had been a resident of Arkansas for nearly ten years; that she had kept a boarding house and a hotel at Pine Bluff, in said state, for some years, conducted by her as her sole and separate business and in her name, until she left Pine, Bluff for Texarkana, in October, 1897, where she remained until April 9, 1898, and during this time began to run a hotel, but became temporarily ill, and gave it up. Her husband had taken up his residence in Louisiana at the time of the injury, and she had then started to go to him.

Prior to the trial the railway company moved the court to compel Mrs. Humble to make her husband a party plaintiff, but the court overruled the motion, and defendant excepted. Defendant objected to all evidence tending to show that plaintiff's capacity to labor was diminished by the injury, and saved an exception to its admission.

At the close of the evidence defendant requested the court to give the jury certain instructions, of which the third, fourth, sixth, and seventh are as follows:

3. 'The plaintiff cannot recover any damages on account of her injury diminishing her capacity to labor and earn money, because there is no evidence showing any capacity to labor or earn money at and just before she was injured.'

4. 'In this case the plaintiff being a married woman and her husband not joining in the suit, she cannot recover any damages on account of her diminished capacity to labor and earn money.'

6. 'The plaintiff being a married woman, and her husband not having joined her in this suit, and she and her husband having her present and prospective home in the state of Louisiana, then the law of Louisiana would apply as to the right to recover damages by reason of the fact that plaintiff's capacity to labor in future has been lessened by the injury, and by the law of that state she cannot recover such damages.

'You will therefore allow nothing as damages for any diminished capacity to labor and earn money.'

7. 'Plaintiff cannot recover anything on account of her diminished capacity to labor.

'Because there is neither pleading nor evidence showing that plaintiff was engaged in any business, profession, or occupation.

'And her lessened capacity to perform household duties cannot be the basis of plaintiff's recovery.'

The court declined to give these instructions, and each of them, and the defendant excepted to the refusal of each.

The court instructed the jury as follows: 'If you should find for the plaintiff, in assessing her damages you will take into consideration her age and earning capacity before and after the injury was received, as shown by the proofs, her physical condition before the injury, and her physical condition after the injury, and the nature and character of the injury she received, whether it be permanent or temporary in its nature, and find for her such sum as will fairly and reasonably compensate her therefor, including therein fair and reasonable compensation for any physical and personal pain and suffering she may have undergone as the result thereof.'

Defendant excepted to so much of this portion of the charge as allowed the jury to 'take into consideration her age and earning capacity before and after the injury was received as shown by the proofs.'

Messrs. John F. Dillon, Winslow S. Pierce, and David D. Duncan for plaintiff in error.

Mr. Oscar D. Scott for defendant in error.

Mr. Chief Justice Fuller delivered the opinion of the court:

Notes