1922 Encyclopædia Britannica/Artois, Battles in

ARTOIS, BATTLES IN (1914-7), see Plates I., II., III. and IV. (A) First Battle of Arras (Sept. 30-Oct. 8 1914).—After the stabilization of the battle-front on the Aisne and to the E. of it, about Sept. 16, both the Allied and the German Higher Commands

ARTOIS, BATTLES IN (CAMBRAI-LE CATEAU, 1914)

Plate I.

proceeded to despatch forces to their northern flanks, with the object of outflanking the hostile battle line. There thus ensued what is known as " the Race to the Sea," which ended about the middle of Oct. in the establishment of a continuous front from the Belgian coast to Switzerland. On this front, after a series of furious battles which raged until well into Nov., both sides settled down to trench warfare on the advent of winter.

The first attempt to outflank the German right N. of the Oise was entrusted to the French Second Army, under Gen. de Castelnau, which was transferred from Lorraine from Sept. 10 onwards. This army, consisting of the XIII., IV., XIV., XX., and XI. Corps, was eventually opposed by the German IX. Reserve, II., XVIII., XXI., I. Bav., II. Bav. and XIV. Reserve Corps, brought up from various parts of the line, and after heavy fighting, in which first one side and then the other held temporary and local advantages which proved impossible of exploitation, these forces were left facing each other on the general line Lassigny-Roye-Chaulnes-Albert-Hebuterne, on which they finally fortified themselves. The battle on the front of the French Second Army died down in this fashion about the middle of October. Before this date the further prosecution of the mutual attempt at envelopment by both sides had brought about an extension of the fighting to the neighbourhood of Arras and Lens.

Battle of the Tenth French Army around Arras, Sept. 20-Oct. 10.—The front of the Second Army was prolonged to the N. by the group of Territorial Divisions (the 8ist, 82nd, 84th and 88th) under Brugere, which had been ordered on Sept. 29 to push forward detachments to cover the detrainment of rein- forcements at Arras and Lens, and by the ist Cavalry Corps (Conneau) (ist, 3rd, 5th and loth Cavalry Divisions) which was holding the line of the Cojeul on the left of the territorials. On Sept. 30 Gen. de Maud'huy was given command of a "Detachment of the Second Army," consisting of the X. Corps, two divisions (the 70th and 77th) formed into a Provisional Corps under D'Urbal, and the ist Cavalry Corps; his orders were to concentrate in the region of Arras and to act against the right flank of the German corps facing the Second Army. It was believed that this flank would be found about Bapaume. Of the forces at Maud'huy's disposal the X. Corps was on this date marching from Amiens in the direction of Arras, being still some two days' march from the latter place, while the divisions of the Provisional Corps were commencing to detrain at Arras, covered by the ist Cavalry Corps in the line of the Cojeul and a mixed Territorial detachment at Douai.

The situation of the enemy on the front of the detachment, somewhat obscure on Sept. 30, became clearer on the following days. Strong hostile forces (the IV. German Corps) were reported as moving N. and halting for the night in the neighbourhood of Queant, with the evident intention of falling on the flank of the Second Army, at this time around Courcelles. The advanced guards of these columns had got into contact with the French cavalry on the line of the Sensee. Further to the N. other German troops (the I. Bavarian Reserve Corps) had driven the advanced troops of the Territorial detachment back to Douai.

Despite the fact that the battle showed as yet no signs of dying on the Second Army front, that the enemy were pressing hard against his centre, and that a shortage of munitions was beginning to make itself felt, Gen. de Castelnau adhered to his original intention of enveloping the hostile left with the detach- ment under Maud'huy on Oct. 2, and orders to this effect were sent to the latter on that evening; Maud'huy had already made his preparatory dispositions. The X. Corps was to be assembled around Ficheux, the divisions of the provisional corps N. of Neuville Vitasse and at Gavrelle, the Cavalry Corps N. of Monchy-le-Preux; all were to be in position by 6 A.M. The X. Corps and the yyth Division and the main body of the cavalry were to be ready to advance south-eastwards next morning against the flank of the enemy around Queant, while the yoth Div. at Gavrelle was in a position either to cooperate in this advance or to deal with any hostile forces advancing by Douai.

[n continuance of these instructions, the X. Corps was directed early next morning to move eastwards to Mercatel, whence it was to advance against the line Ervillers-St. Leger, and thence in the general direction of Mory, as soon as orders were received from Gen. Maud'huy.

Before, however, the X. Corps had reached its area of concentration around Mercatel the 77th Div. on its left was assailed from the E. by newly arrived German troops (.the IV. Corps), who forced it back from the Cojeul to the line Guemappe-Monchy-le-Preux, while at the same time the I. Bavarian Reserve Corps, which had entered Douai on the evening of the 1st, was pushing its advance westwards to the north of the Scarpe an advance which the 70th Div., delayed in its march from Lens, where it had detrained, to Gavrelle, was not yet available to oppose; the X. Corps was therefore ordered to change the direction of its proposed advance from S.E. to N.E., and assigned as its new line of attack the course of the Cojeul and as its objective the crest N. of Croisilles and W. of Heninel. The Corps would thus strike in flank the enemy advancing S. of the Scarpe, who by 2 P.M. had taken Monchy-le-Preux and driven back the 77th Div. to the line Neuville Vitasse-Feuchy Chapel. Meanwhile the 70th Div. on the N. bank of the Scarpe, advancing towards Gavrelle, had been held up and thrown on the defensive on the front Rouvroy-Izel-Bailleul, so that between it and the 70th Div. to the S. there existed a wide gap, which the ist Cavalry Corps was urgently ordered to fill to the best of its ability.

Owing to the change of direction which had been ordered the attack of the X. Corps was not delivered till the late afternoon, and made little headway against the IV. German Corps, so that at the end of the day a further gap in the French line was formed between the left of the X. Corps and the right of the 77th Div., which had to be filled by troops from the general reserve. Gen. de Maud'huy, despite the disappointment of the day, ordered that the X. Corps should be prepared to resume its attack next morning, the 3rd on the N. bank of the Cojeul in the direction of Monchy-le-Preux, while the remainder of the detachment was to maintain its positions of the previous day. The X. Corps, however, met with no better fortune on this day; the Germans maintained themselves in Neuville Vitasse after heavy to-and-fro fighting, and the retirement of the Territorial troops to the S., who were forced out of Courcelles by the attacks of the German Guard Corps, compelled the X. Corps to throw back its right in conformity, under severe enemy pressure, as far as the line Ficheux-Mercatel. Both the 77th and 70th Divs., however, succeeded in repelling all the violent efforts of the enemy; the gap between these two divisions in the Scarpe valley was successfully closed by Conneau's ist Cavalry Corps; and reinforcements consisting of the XXI. Corps (Maistre), detraining at Armentieres, Merville and St. Pol, and the 2nd Cavalry Corps (4th and 5th Cavalry Div.) under De Mitry, then holding the front Benifontaine-Lens, were placed at the disposal of De Maud'huy. These forces were increased by the 45th Div. detraining at Arras, which was assigned to D'Urbal's corps.

On the front of this corps fighting continued throughout the night, and the 70th Div. was forced to withdraw some three miles westwards to the line Vimy-Farbus-Bailleul, along the eastern slopes of the Vimy ridge. This retirement uncovered Lens, which fell into German hands early on the 4th. The situation of the detachment, which now found both its flanks in the air, was by no means an easy one; Maud'huy's orders for the 4th, however, were that the positions then occupied were to be held at all costs. The X. Corps was to maintain itself on the line Tilloy-Beaurains-Mercatel, with its right flank thrown back if necessary to Ficheux, and to reestablish the connexion with the left of the Second Army which had been lost owing to the retreat of the Territorials. D'Urbal's corps was to hold its ground on the front Vimy-Bailleul-Athies-Feuchy Chapel, so as to allow time for the XXI. Corps to advance by La Bassee against the flank of the I. Bavarian Reserve Corps, which was attacking N. of the Scarpe. The 1st Cavalry Corps was to

secure the left of D'Urbal around Givenchy-en-Gohelle. One brigade of the 45th Div. which had already been despatched to Arras was sent forward to reinforce the Provisional Corps, and the second was detrained at Beaumetz and passed on to Duisans in general reserve.

The German attacks continued without cessation throughout the sth.

Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria, commanding the Sixth German Army, arrived at Douai and took command of the whole battle front between the Somme and the Lys. On the French side Gen. Foch was entrusted with the coordination of the front N. of the Oise, and with the general control of the Second Army, the Territorial group, the ist and 2nd Cavalry Corps and Maud'huy's command, which now became the Tenth Army; Foch moved his headquarters to Doullens on the 5th, Maud'huy's remaining at Aubigny.

During the greater part of the day the Tenth Army suc- cessfully held its ground, but in the evening its left was forced to retire still further W. by the vigorous attacks of the I. Bavarian Reserve Corps, to the N. of which the 2nd German Cavalry Corps of von der Marwitz was now coming into action. Givenchy fell into the hands of the Bavarians, and while their right advanced beyond it to Souchez their centre assaulted and carried the Vimy ridge as far S. as Thelus; the French cavalry were driven back to Villers au Bois and Mont St. Eloi, while the 7oth Div., reinforced by all available troops of the 45th Div., again made head against the enemy on the line Carency- Neuville St. Vaast-Roclincourt-Athies. This was the situation reported to Gen. Maud'huy on the morning of the 5th; and shortly after this bad news had been received the X. Corps announced that its right had been forced back from Boisleux, where it had maintained itself throughout the previous day, to Ficheux; that hostile columns were reported moving round its flank by Blaireville; and that the stations of Beaumetz and Saulty on the Arras-Doullens railway were being bombarded.

This was about 10 A.M., and in view of the extreme gravity of the situation on both his flanks Gen. Maud'huy was already taking preparatory measures for the evacuation of Arras and for a withdrawal in the direction of St. Pol, should such become necessary as a result of further progress by the enemy, when Gen. Foch arrived at his headquarters and it was decided to make another effort to restore the position. The Germans had not pressed their advantage against the left of the army to the extent that had at first been feared; the Cavalry Corps was therefore ordered to advance against the right, which had pushed no further forward than Souchez, and disengage the left of the 77th Division. D'Urbal's corps, which was about to fall back to the line Mont St. Eloi-Etrun-Warlus (W. of Arras), was directed to maintain its ground with its right and centre and cooperate with its left in the attack by the cavalry. Meanwhile reconnaissances had revealed the fact that neither the German IV. Corps nor the Guard had yet taken advantage of the gap between the X. Corps on the right of the Tenth Army and the Territorials on the left of the Second Army; the former 'was therefore instructed to maintain its line and echelon troops in rear of its right between Ficheux and Gouy. Accordingly on the evening of the sth the X. Corps had established itself firmly on the front Beaurains-Riviere. The attacks of the Cavalry Corps and the 7oth Div., however, made no headway, and their line was established at the end of the day at the western foot of the Vimy ridge on the front E. of Mont St. Eloi-S. of Neuville St. Vaast-Ecurye-Roclincourt-St. Laurent. Further S. the line was continued by the 77th Div., which had been drawn back in conformity with the retirement of the formations on both its flanks to the second position prepared in rear, between Blangy and Tilloy.

The orders for the 76th were for a renewal of the attack on the left wing of the Tenth Army; it was to be carried out by the 43rd Div. (of the XXI. Corps) which was assembling W. of Carency, the ist and 2nd Cavalry Corps which were to advance between Souchez and Lievin, and the XXI. Corps (less the 43rd Division) which was to envelop the enemy's right advancing

by La Bassee and Lens on Vimy. Various untoward circum- stances combined to thwart the execution of this plan. The attack of the Cavalry Corps began late and with insufficient forces, could make little impression on the strong front held by the enemy between Notre Dame de Lorette and Angres, and the 43rd Div. to the S. of it was also held up, while the enveloping attack of the XXI. Corps from La Bassee failed to develop. Elsewhere on the front the German attacks were repulsed, and by the evening the army held the line Beaumetz- Arras (X. Corps), Arras-W. of Neuville St. Vaast (Provisional Corps)-Carency- Aix-Noulette (43rd Div. and Cavalry Corps)-S.E. of Grenay- Loos (XXI. Corps) with cavalry towards Pont a Vendin and Carvin. Arras was being shelled by the enemy.

According to army orders the XXI. Corps commenced its attack early on the 7th against the enemy reported to be on the line Angres-Lievin-Lens, while the cavalry and the 43rd Div. continued their endeavours to press forward towards Notre Dame de Lorette and Souchez. The Germans, however, had strengthened their positions during the night, and little progress could be made. Moreover, it had become evident that the battle h'ne must be extended yet further to the N. in order to meet a renewed German attempt to envelop the French left by the valley of the Lys. Accordingly the ist and 2nd Cavalry Corps were withdrawn from the battle-front in the late after- noon preparatory to their despatch to the N., the I3th Div., then in the vicinity of Lille, being ordered S. to take their place in the Tenth Army. On the rest of that army's front the situa- tion underwent no important change during the 7th.

From this date forward the fighting at Arras died gradually away. Renewed efforts by the XXI. Corps on the Sth and gth ended in the recovery of Notre Dame de Lorette. On Oct. 20 further fighting E. of Arras resulted in an advance by the loth Corps, and on the 22nd the 77th Div. was forced back N.E. of Arras by strong enemy forces, who were compelled next day to relinquish part of their gains.

These were but the dying flickers of the fire of battle which had long since shifted its main focus to the north.

Extension of the Battle to the Lys Valley, Oct. 3-12. While the battle of Arras was still at its crisis, the German right wing was already being extended further to the N. into Flanders. On Oct. 3 a mixed detachment of Landwehr entered Tournai; the 4th Cavalry Corps (3rd, 6th and Bavarian Cavalry Divs.) had come into line on the right of the ist Cavalry Corps, which was then engaged with the French 2nd Cavalry Corps, with its right S. of La Bassee. The right of these fresh forces advanced on Lille, from Tournai and Orchies, while its left advanced from Douai on La Bassee; by the 4th contact had been made with the French in the western outskirts of Lille.

To meet this new threat the French Higher -Command had moved up the 2nd Cavalry Corps (4th, sth and 6th Cavalry Divs.) under De Mitry to the area between Lens and Lille, and had garrisoned the latter city with the i3th Div. (of the XXI. Corps) which had detrained at Armentieres, covered by the 7th Cavalry Division. The first attacks of the German cavalry on the city were beaten off and the suburbs cleared; but, as has already been related, the i3th Div. was then called away to the S. to rejoin its corps, and left behind it only a weak detachment of six battalions and four squadrons to hold the city, and of these two further battalions were withdrawn on the 8th. Mean- while to the S. between Lens and the Bethune-La Bassee canal the XIV. German Corps had come into line, forcing back the French cavalry to the W. of the Lens-La Bassee road to the line Vermelles-Cambrin; on this line heavy and continuous fighting took place from Oct. 10 onwards, where the position gradually became stable.

Further to the N. the German cavalry continued their advance, extending their right as far as and beyond the Lys and covering the whole country from La Bassee by Lille, Tourcoing and Wervicq to Ypres. The centre and left of De Mitry's cavalry fell back before them, pivoting back on their right from Neuve Chapelle by Estaires and Merville to Hazebrouck and Cassel; this line was reached about Oct. 9. The main body of the German cavalry appeared to be assembled around Bailleul and Steenvoorde, while behind it strong forces of infantry were advancing, the XIII. Corps to the S. and the XIX. to the N. of Lille. The garrison of the city, although reinforced on the loth by a detachment, were unable to make head against these over- whelming forces, more especially as the presence of the German cavalry in all the area to the W. deprived it of all hope of succour; and after two days' bombardment Lille surrendered to the enemy with its garrison on Oct, 12.

The battle, however, was now about to enter on a new phase with the entry into action of the British army.

Operations of the British in the Lys Valley, Oct. 10-18. The transfer of the British from the Aisne to the left flank of the French army in Flanders had first been proposed by Sir John French on Sept. 29; the details were quickly arranged between him and Joffre, and the withdrawal from the line commenced on Oct. 1. The cavalry moved off first by road on the 2nd, and were followed by the infantry between the 8th and 12th. Sir John French, on his arrival at Abbeville on the 8th, had planned a general advance by the II. Corps, then detraining there, to the line Aire-Bethune, covered in front and to the left by the Cavalry Corps, and the detraining of the III. Corps to the N. at St. Omer. The IV. Corps and the 3rd Cavalry Div., under Gen. Rawlinson, which had been landed on the Belgian coast in order to assist the Belgians in the defence of Antwerp and had assisted in covering their retirement to the line of the Yser, had been holding the line of the Lys around Ghent on the 11th, and were instructed to maintain themselves between that town and Courtrai for four or five days, if possible; it was intended to bring the rest of the army up on the right of the IV. Corps, so as to hold the Lys line from Ghent southwards. Rawlinson was authorized, however, in case he was attacked by strong hostile forces, to fall back in the direction of St. Omer, and as a matter of fact the retreat of the Belgians to the N. of him eventually necessitated his retirement by way of Thielt and Thourout to Roulers, where the IV. Corps arrived on Oct. 12, unmolested by the enemy.

On the 10th French visited Foch, and a plan for a combined Allied offensive for the 13th, to reach the line of the Lys from Lille-Courtrai, was then drawn up. The British were to advance with their right N. of Lille, to force the river Lys at Courtrai and join up with Rawlinson's IV. Corps below that town. The Belgians were also to cooperate in the north. In accordance with this plan, the British cavalry pushing forward on the nth came into contact with the German IV. Cavalry Corps, operating before the right wing of the VI. Army, in the neighbourhood of Nieppe forest, and forced them back towards the Lys; the II. British Corps reached the line of the Aire-Bethune canal. By the I4th the cavalry had cleared the country to the E. as far as the Wytschaete-Messines ridge and pushed patrols forward to the crossings of the Lys; but the II. Corps, wheeling up its left in the direction of Merville, became heavily engaged with German infantry (the XIII. and XIX. Corps of the VI. Army), which prevented their making much headway. The III. British Corps, having completed its movement to Hazebrouck by the 13th, began its advance eastwards, to bring it level with the left of the II. Corps. This objective, however, was not attained without serious and sustained fighting; the Germans (XIX. Corps and IV. Cavalry Corps) stubbornly defended Bailleul, Meteren, Neuve Eglise, Sailly and Nieppe one after the other; by the i6th, however, the British were in possession of all these places. The II. Corps also had worked their way forward by dint of determined efforts to the line Aubers- Givenchy, and came into touch with the XXI. Corps on the left of the French X. Army, on the Bethune-La Bassee canal.

While the II. Corps, despite determined and unceasing attacks, found further progress impossible beyond the line Givenchy-Festubert-N. of Aubers, which it reached on Oct. 18, the III. Corps entered Bois Grenier and Armentieres, and was able to establish itself on a line E. of these places, while the Cavalry Corps, guarding their left, continued the line along the Lys to Menin. By the morrow the assembly of the British army in the

N. was completed by the arrival of the I. Corps at Poperinghe, St. Omer and Cassel. The battle of the Lys now became merged in the greater battle of Ypres, in which the whole British force was engaged from Oct. 20 to Nov. 20, and the description of the fighting between these dates on the front of the British II. and III. Corps will be found under that head. It may be said, how- ever, that neither the British nor the Germans, despite their utmost efforts, succeeded in bringing about any material change in the situation on the front between the Bethune-La Bassee canal about Givenchy and the Lys to the N. of Armentieres.

(B) French Offensives in Artois, 1915.—During the month of Oct. 1914 the western front had stabilized across Picardy and Artois, from the Oise to the neighbourhood of La Bassee. The line had not been chosen at the will of either party, but marked the points which each side had reached and held during the confused and rapid series of actions known as the " Race to the Sea." While there was still open country to the north it had been worth no one's while to attempt to dislodge an enemy present in any force. And when the sea had been reached and the German attacks upon the Yser repulsed, neither side retained the energy to advance. Both, therefore, had time to elaborate their defences in comparative peace, and thereby the sinuous and haphazard line already established became permanent.

About Arras the line bulged eastward, leaving Beaurains German but making St. Laurent-Blangy, Roclincourt, and Ecurie French. To the north was a westward bulge which gave the Germans Neuville-St. Vaast and La Targette, Carency and Ablain, Angres, Lievin, and La Fosse Calonne. North of Fosse Calonne the line ran straighter to the west of Loos, Hulluch, Haisnes, and La Bassee.

Artois is a chalk country. The surface soil is clay, with patches of sand unsuitable for cultivation and therefore wooded. The principal natural feature of the region is a long isolated ridge running from N.W. to S.E., which overlooks all the countryside. This ridge culminates at the chapel of Notre Dame de Lorette. East of the chapel there is a gap marked by the village of Souchez. East of Souchez again, the ridge continues as Vimy ridge and gradually dies away south of Vimy village.

The sector was of first-rate importance both for economic and for strategic reasons. North of the ridge ran the principal French and Belgian coal seam the axis of which in Artois is roughly the line Bethune-Lens. Although the public mind was naturally slow to grasp the fact, nevertheless as soon as it became clear that trench warfare would result in the postpone- ment of a decision, first-class economic objectives, such as the coal-mines, began to increase in general military value and continued to do so until the decisive campaign of 1918.

Strategically, the German lines in Artois covered the Lille-Douai-Cambrai railway, their main transversal line behind all this part of their front. Should this line be cut, were it even brought under effective artillery fire, their railway traffic would be compelled to use the inferior line Lille-Orchies-Somain-Cambrai.

Although the final elaboration of trench warfare was a matter of years, its general characteristics, especially the strain and hardship of remaining immobile and in close contact with the enemy, appeared at once. The possibility of manoeuvre disappeared and war became an affair of ever-increasing masses of material. In Artois, the importance of the sector and the nature of the soil made the fighting fierce and continuous and the hardships peculiarly bitter. The clay soil churned into a soft and sticky mud into which men sank deeply and sometimes even were lost. Everywhere the ground was humid; the Lorette ridge itself was honeycombed with springs so that trenches dug even on its summit were difficult to keep clear of water. Weapons often became unserviceable, and the men themselves looked like walking lumps of mud. Nevertheless, the fighting was not only savage but continuous. A major operation was merely a crescendo in a never-ending series of furious lesser combats, all centring about the commanding Lorette-Vimy ridges.

Throughout the first three years of trench fighting on the western front, in most of the minor operations, and in every major operation except Verdun, the Allies attacked. Save in that one case, the Germans held to their decision to stand upon the strategic defensive in France and Belgium, from Nov. 1914 to March 1918. In order to attempt a decision, it was, therefore, necessary to attack their entrenchments. The strength of the defensive in trench warfare, and the corresponding difficulty of the attack, were realized only with time.

Originally, the entire Lorette ridge was occupied by the Germans during the race to the sea ; the French swept them off in a brilliant little attack. Then the Germans moved in again and took the chapel and all the eastern end of the ridge nearly to the wood of Buvigny, not by assault but because the place had been left entirely unguarded during the night of Oct. 7-8 in the course of a relief of the French troops in the sector an incident altogether typical of the race to the sea. As regular trench warfare began, the Germans had the best of the artillery fighting. Their guns were both heavier and more numerous, and their fire control better suited to the new and unexpected sort of fight- ing. Their batteries were emplaced near Lievin . and Angres, behind Vimy ridge, and behind the butte of Monchy-le-Preux. In Nov. they began to use hand grenades, the first of the typical trench weapons to appear, or rather to reappear. The French did not begin manufacturing grenades during the following winter, and were not able to issue them to the troops until March 1915. Nevertheless, despite the German heavy artillery and grenades, the month of Nov. saw such an improve- ment in the French defensive works that casualties became fewer, although it was not yet possible to put out continuous wire.

Early in Dec. the situation changed for the better with the arrival of several units of French heavy artillery, whose fire compelled the Germans on Lorette ridge to take cover in their deep dug-outs. The French Higher Command ordered the XXI. Corps, which had held the Lorette sector since its stabilization, to attack in the hope of a break-through. The Corps commander, Gen. Maistre, was doubtful of the success of the operation proposed, judging the means insufficient and the obstacles to be encountered too strong. Nevertheless, the attack took place on Dec. 17 at 1:10 P.M. on a front of a mile and a quarter, with diversions against Auchy-les-La Bassee, and Loos, and in front of St. Laurent-Blangy. Near Lorette the artillery preparation had not been sufficient to prevent the assaulting troops coming under heavy fire, especially from machine-guns, as they left the trenches. The German wire was strong and had been very little cut. Nevertheless, they struggled on through deep mud, and succeeded in taking some trenches. For four days the operation was persisted in. The artillery support was weak, partly because of the winding, irregular front line, partly through insufficient liaison with the infantry. Against such handicaps the infantry strove bravely but in vain. At last, after murderous losses which justified only too well Gen. Maistre's forebodings, the attack was broken off.

An unbroken series of minor operations took place throughout the winter and early spring. In the afternoon of Dec. 27 ten battalions of Chasseurs Alpins, commanded by Gen. Barbot, attacked the hamlet of La Targette, after two hours of artillery preparation. " No-man's-land " was here a quarter of a mile wide, quite flat and without cover save for a single sunken road. Hence losses were heavy and onlv half a mile of first-line trenches were taken.

As the winter went on, the sticky mud became even worse, and the heavy German trench-mortar projectiles added still more to the danger and discomfort of the trenches. On March 3, at dawn, after a short but violent preparation by heavy artillery and heavy trench mortars, an entire German division made a sudden attack along the crest of the ridge, and drove the French into Buvigny wood. Two days of counter-attacks recovered most of the ground lost, and throughout March and April a series of local attacks and counter-attacks slightly improved the French position at a cost in casualties disproportionately large in comparison with the ground gained. The dead were not all Frenchmen. Already the German troops were beginning to call the ridge " Tolenhugd" the Hill of Death.

In April the first French sS-mm. trench mortars, few in number, were put in service. The French had already begun the use of hand grenades in March.

About May i the French Higher Command decided upon a general attack, and chose Artois as its sector. It was desirable that something be done on the western front in the hope of relieving the pressure upon the Russians, on whose front the great blow was about to fall. The British agreed to support the operation by a diversion in Flanders.

From the original formation of the French " Group of armies of the North," Gen. Foch had been in command. This command he still retained, and his was the decision as to the length of front to be attacked. Even at this early stage of trench warfare, he saw clearly that to estimate the possible width of an assault according to the number of infantry available was nonsense. He therefore insisted upon calculating the front to be attacked according to the available quantity of heavy artillery, insisting that a clear superiority in heavy pieces was necessary over the full width of the operation proposed. On the western front as a whole, the Germans still disposed of superior numbers in this particular arm, so that it seemed impossible to obtain a sufficient superiority of fire over a front of much more than six miles. As a result of Foch's insistence the width of the attacking front was limited accordingly. The right of the proposed assault was fixed in the neighbourhood of Roclincourt, the left on the northern slopes of Lorette ridge. At this stage of the war it was still believed that a violent effort, even on so restricted a front, stood a fair chance of breaking through the opposing trench system and restoring a war of movement.

From May 4, the German Higher Command was convinced that a considerable attack was to be expected. Nevertheless, so high ran their hopes of victory in the east that even Falken- hayn, usually so chary of reinforcements for that theatre, drew yet another division thither from France.^[1]

In Artois, the French order of battle was as follows: the left of the XVII. Corps was around Roclincourt. North of them stood the XX. Corps, its left facing La Targette and extending a little north of that village. North of the XX. came the XXXIII. Corps, commanded by Petain, the future commander-in-chief of the French armies on the western front. His extreme left faced Ablain. North again of the XXXIII. Corps, astride the Lorette ridge and on to the Arras-Bethune high road, stood the XXI. Corps which, always under Maistre, had held the sector from the beginning. The XX. and the XXXIII. Corps had three divisions each, the other corps two. All four corps formed part of the X. Army, now commanded by D'Urbal, who had relieved Maud'huy, the original army commander, in March. Foch shifted his headquarters from Cassel to Prevent on the Doullens-St. Pol road in order to follow the operation more closely. The troops were in high spirits at the prospect of quitting the foul and muddy trenches, and in the hope of fighting in the open thenceforward.

Opposite them, the German defences were formidable; indeed the painstaking German national character is well adapted to the construction of elaborate works. Each of the solidly built French villages was a complicated little citadel. North of Ecurie a huge tangle of trenches formed a strong point, known as the Labyrinth, covering more than half a square mile. A series of works, known to the French as the "Ouvrages Blancs," ran in a concave line from a hummock in front of La Targette to the western end of Carency. On the Lorette ridge itself, the ground favoured the defence. The southern slopes were precip- itous and were, moreover, cut by deep ravines which the French likened to the grooves in a melon rind. Of the five spurs between these ravines, the Germans held the easternmost three, their front line running from a point a thousand yards west of the ruins of the chapel, across the summit of the third spur, and so to the western end of Ablain a curious position which only the

great strength of the modern defensive made possible. To the

Reproduced by permission from the map of France on the scale of 1:320,000, published by the Service Géographique de l'Armée.

north the ground fell away gently in an even slope broken only by the unexpected Buval ravine. The entire German part of the ridge was covered with trenches and obstacles and swept by batteries (at ranges of two to four thousand yards) around Lievin and Angres and behind Vimy ridge.

The troops which held these defences belonged to the German VI. Army which held the front from south of Ypres to within 10 m. of Arras. It comprised 16 divs., at a combat strength of about 17,000 per division according to the reduced German divisional organization dating from the early winter of '14. This gave a little less than three men per yard of front considering the irregularities of the line. Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria commanded the army, with Maj. Gen. Krafft von Dellmensingen for chief-of-staff, and headquarters at Lille.

The attack, originally ordered for May 7, was put off to the 8th and then to the gth. Demolition fire was begun on the 7th and continued on the 8th, especially against the region of Neuville and the Labyrinth, but was hindered by the lack of all observation from the ground (no commanding points being in French hands), and by the serious imperfections of the aerial observation attempted by planes and dirigibles. The morning of the gth dawned fair, with a light mist that soon cleared away. At six o'clock an intense bombardment was opened along the whole line from Loos to Arras, with heavy, divisional, and trench artillery. On the front of the XXI. Corps the 75's held their fire until eight o'clock, then began, and continued, at the rate of four shots per piece per minute. Amid the din of the bombardment, the French observers saw the German posi- tions lost in vast clouds of smoke and dust sent up by the exploding shells. The German artillery replied energetically, searching for the French infantry assembled for the assault and occasionally hitting them with considerable effect. At 10 o'clock, precisely, the French artillery automatically increased the range and the infantry attack began.

The assaulting troops left their jumping-off trenches without signal. In a few moments it was clear that both wings were held up. The XVII. Corps could not gain a foot; the wire in front of them was still intact. The X. Corps, attempting a diversion east of Arras, uselessly lost 3,000 men in 10 minutes from machine-gun fire. North of the XVII., the right of the XX. Corps was helpless in front of the wire of the Labyrinth. The left of the XX. was doing better, the wire in front of them having been cut by the bombardment. In spite of heavy losses from German machine-guns still in position, they slowly cleared La Targette, fighting hand to hand, and by 1 1 =30 they had advanced a little over half a mile and reached the westernmost houses of Neuville. On the ridge, the XXI. Corps was advancing only very slowly, at a cost of murderous losses. Their attack was peculiarly difficult to organize for want of a single conspicuous object in their front to serve as reference point for the artillery, and upon which the infantry could align their advance. Their assaulting elements came under heavy machine-gun fire as soon as they showed themselves, so that the communication trenches were obstructed by numbers of wounded who blocked the reserves. Machine-guns firing northward from Ablain made advance impossible along the southern slope. On the plateau itself and the northern slope, swept though they were at short ranges by the German batteries around Angres and Lievin, there was a slow and painful advance of about half a mile, which took three successive lines of trenches and reached, at noon, the neighbourhood of the chapel and the land N.W. of it. Through the morning, the extreme left of Petain's Corps, the XXXIII., was fixed in front of Ablain. Other units, fighting every step of the way, were slowly working forward south of Carency.

Meanwhile, the right of the XXXIII. Corps had broken clear through the German line. Here, alone on the attacking front, the wooded hill of Berthonval had given good land observation by which to direct the bombardment. The wire had therefore been cleared and most of the machine-guns put out of action. Carrying conspicuous markers to enable the artillery to follow their march, the infantry swept forward without a check. In the intoxication of such an advance after a winter in the abominable trenches, they got out of hand and ran forward, cheering as they rushed the German elements that tried to resist them. They crossed the Bethune road, gained the crest of Vimy ridge, and looked down upon the rolling plain to the north and east, towards Lens and Douai, with no more German troops before them. Hundreds of prisoners had been taken, it was only 11:30, and they had advanced over two and a half miles.

Naturally, the German command was frightened. Partially, at least, they had been surprised, for they had assembled no reserves. Twenty miles away, in Lille, the Prince of Bavaria's staff began packing up, for if the gap could be widened the whole front would go. But naturally, the assaulting troops were completely exhausted. They had run and yelled too much and their water-bottles had been emptied too quickly. During the advance, officer casualties had been numerous. About a mile of the crest between 119 and 140 was occupied, and patrols were pushed forward to Souchez and Givenchy.

Everything now depended upon the arrival of reinforcements. With them everything might be hoped; without them it would be hard to hold the ground already gained, limited as it was by concentric machine-gun fire from Souchez, Neuville, and La Folie wood; and no reinforcements came. The advance had been faster than had been planned, and either the army staff work was slow and the necessary orders not issued in time, or else the units ordered forward failed to make good speed. Perhaps, after all, the thing was impossible. Certainly no good road ran east into the newly created salient. At all events the opportu- nity was lost.

On the German side, when the first moment of panic had passed, the reaction was rapid. Great and deserved credit was won by the staffs concerned. During the afternoon, enough battalions from the second line of the division near by were scraped together for a counter-attack (supported by artillery behind La Folie wood) which retook the crest. The French-African troops, with most of their officers gone, failed to do themselves justice. All this time Neuville and Carency were holding out, and the - XXI. Corps could not clear the Lorette plateau. Towards evening the cemetery south of Souchez had to be abandoned. Through the night, third-line battalions from the neighbouring German Army Corps began to come up. The French maintained themselves with difficulty at the Cabaret Rouge and along the road from Souchez to Neuville. The golden moment had passed.

During the next three days, the French improved their positions in vigorous local operations, taking the debris of Lorette chapel, Carency, and most of Neuville. By June i Ablain, the sugar-works west of Souchez, and the south-eastern slopes of Lorette were cleared. June saw the Labyrinth pain- fully occupied, and a narrow and difficult salient (including a bit of Vimy crest) first thrust out eastward from the Cabaret Rouge and then withdrawn. About the same time the Germans were pushed off the north-eastern slopes of Lorette their last foothold on that murderous ridge now thickly covered with the dead of both sides.

The diversions attempted meanwhile by the British had failed to affect the general situation.

Tactically, the spring offensive in the Artois had partially succeeded. Twenty-five square miles had been gained, the enemy's local resistances had been beaten down, for some hours his front had been pierced. But strategically, the operation had failed. The German front had been very slightly modified and the Russians had been helped in no way.

During the summer, the usual round of little fights went on, barren of results but endured always with the same spirit. In Aug. trench knives were issued to the French infantry for the first time.

In the autumn, another Entente offensive on the western front was decided upon. The French prepared to attack in Champagne and both French and British in Artois, the French from Neuville to north of Souchez, which large village was, by this time, laid almost level with the ground; the British from Haisnes to Loos a far more ambitious effort than previous British trench-warfare operations. The main attack, however, was that in Champagne, Artois being only the scene of a diversion on a large scale.

The troops to be put in motion were Maistre's much-enduring XXI. Corps in front of Souchez, and on their right the XXXIII. Corps, now commanded by Fayolle, in front of La Folie. The French and German Higher Commands were the same, except that Maj. Gen. v. Kuhl was now chief-of-staff at Prince Rupprecht's headquarters.

Tactically, the operation was planned differently from that of May in that the attempt was made to crush the enemy by an intense bombardment prolonged throughout several days and that, therefore, no surprise could be hoped for. Objectives were to be strictly limited.

Accordingly on Sept. 20, with improved ground and air observation, and with guns and munitions available on a larger scale than ever before, there began a bombardment of the German works and rear areas, which continued day and night for five days. On the morning of the 25th the bombardment was intensified. At the same time the Germans began their counter-preparation and succeeded in inflicting some loss on the French infantry in their jumping-off trenches. The fine weather had turned to rain.

At 25 minutes past 12 the infantry attack began. The spirit of the German infantry had been broken by the bombardment so that there was little or no resistance, what little there was being due to imperfect "mopping-up."^[2] Meanwhile, the German barrage had been laid down too late, and afterwards ignorance of the situation made their artillery afraid to fire. On the other hand, the rain and the muddy, shell-torn ground made the advance very slow. Not until 5:30 in the evening of Sept. 26 were the ruins of Souchez completely cleared and the line carried a quarter-mile to the eastward.

Meantime, unknown to the French, the German command was passing through a crisis of anxiety. Their reserves had not yet come up and the positions on Vimy ridge were almost without defenders and trains were run at short intervals on the Douai-Mericourt-Rouvray line to simulate the arrival of reinforcements. But the bad weather, the abominable terrain, and the French policy of limited objectives saved the situation for the Germans. On the 27th their reserves arrived and the situation was reestablished. The action continued, but although the 28th saw the French lines advanced to include an important redoubt in front of Givenchy, the German front was no longer in danger of being broken, and after the 28th the French broke off the battle.

Early in 1916, British troops relieved the French in the sector, which had seen the longest, and (after Verdun) the most mur- derous battle of the entire war. The French are said to have had in Artois no less than 100,000 killed. The XXI. Corps alone, by Dec. 1915, lost 80,000 dead or wounded, 18,000 of whom fell in the six weeks from May 9 to June 20.

(H. N.*)

(C) Neuve Chapelle. The objects with which Sir John French attacked the German lines in March 1915 were to obtain a more favourable position for his share in the major operations to be undertaken in conjunction with the French. The fighting of Oct. and Nov. 1914 had left the British right between the La Bassee canal and Armentieres in an indifferent position tactically. After gaining a foothold on the ridge which runs S.W. from Lille past Aubers they had been thrust off it into the more or less waterlogged low ground at its foot. To recover this ridge was essential if the German hold on the Lille-La Bassee line was to be effectively shaken and Sir John hoped, moreover, to stimulate his troops whose offensive spirit had found few outlets in the cramping conditions of trench warfare in a swamp. The point he selected for his attack was on the front held by Sir Douglas Haig's I. Army, where the Germans' capture of the village of Neuve Chapelle (Oct. 27 1914) had driven a salient into the British lines. This portion of the British front had always been particularly difficult and costly to hold and a substantial success here might not only gain a footing on the Aubers ridge but render the German positions opposite Givenchy and Festubert untenable.

The attack delivered on March 10 by the 8th Div. (IV. Corps) on the left and the Meerut Div. (Indian Corps) on the right was successful in effecting a surprise. There had been no long preliminary bombardment to give warning of the attack, for the ammunition supply only sufficed for 35 minutes' shelling, and the infantry, finding the wire well cut except at the extreme ends of the line, stormed the positions with ease. The 25th Bde. of the 8th Div. carried Neuve Chapelle village and joined hands with the Gahrwal Bde., who had overrun the ground between the village and the cross-roads S. of it known as " Port Arthur." Many prisoners were taken, and it seemed that reinforcements had only to push on to achieve a substantial advance. Unfortunately, the stubborn resistance of the Germans at the ends of the line absorbed the attention of the troops in immediate support. On the left, S. of the ruined farm known as " the Moated Grange," the 2nd Middlesex were held up by wire, which a fold of the ground had concealed from the artillery- observing officers; on the right at Port Arthur a strong point held out for several hours, and was only carried when the 2nd Seaforths of the Dehra Dun Bde. reinforced the original assailants of the Gahrwal Brigade. Similarly, it was not till well past midday, and after heavy fighting, that the 2$rd Bde., improving the lodgment made by their right battalion, the 2nd Scottish Rifles, secured their second objective, and then only by utilizing two battalions of the 24th Bde. as well as their own supports, the 2nd Devons and 2nd West Yorkshires. Meanwhile the 25th Bde. had cleared Neuve Chapelle but found their left too much exposed to allow any advance beyond the village. More important still, the orders had been explicit that the reserves were not to be put in without sanction from the Corps, and the extreme difficulty of maintaining communications with the advanced troops prevented divisional and corps headquarters from keeping in touch with the progress of the attack and delayed the advance of the reserves. Not till the afternoon was well advanced did the leading troops of the 7th Div. pass through the 8th, and though the 2ist Bde. then cleared a substantial area N. of Neuve Chapelle and made some progress down the German trenches beyond the Moated Grange, German rein- forcements both of men and guns made their presence felt, and darkness stopped the advance before the road running N.W. from the Moulin du Pietre past Mauquissart had been crossed. On the right, meanwhile, two Gurkha battalions of the Dehra Dun Bde. pushed forward into the Bois de Biez, but their position was dangerously isolated and they had to be withdrawn E. of Riviere des Layes.

The chances of substantial progress on the second day, already diminished by the arrival of strong German reinforce- ments, were further reduced by weather conditions which made aerial direction of the British artillery fire impossible. This, combined with the interruption of telephone communica- tions between the forward observing officers and their batteries, prevented the cooperation between artillery and infantry needed to reduce the numerous machine-gun posts furnished by the houses which studded the area N. of Neuve Chapelle. Groups of these, especially along the Moulin du Pietre-Mauquissart road, proved most formidable obstacles. Moreover, the Ger- mans, besides throwing in all the local reserves of their VII. Corps, together with the 6th Bavarian Res. Div. which was resting near Lille, brought up much additional artillery, so that the 7th and Lahore Divs. came under heavy fire and suffered severely in crossing ground in rear of the advanced troops, sometimes without even reaching the front line. The 7th Div. beat back counter-attacks and added considerably to the tale of prisoners, but made no real progress; the 8th could do no more, but until the right of the 8th Div. could come forward to cover it the Indian Corps could not tackle the Bois de Biez.

On the next morning (March 12) violent counter-attacks against several points made it obvious that strong German reinforcements had come up. Advancing in mass against the Bareilly Bde. along the Rue du Bois and against the rest of the Meerut Div. N. of Port Arthur, the Germans were mown down in numbers without ever reaching the British line. Opposite the Moulin du Pietre another determined attack broke through the 24th Bde., to be thrown back by a prompt counter-stroke by the ist Worcesters; and in this quarter also very heavy losses were inflicted on the Germans. Further N. again the 21st Bde. lost some advanced trenches, but successfully main- tained its main position and lent effective aid to the 2nd Scots Guards and 2nd Borderers of the 2oth Bde., who carried a strong redoubt N.E. of the Moated Grange and took 300 prisoners of the VII. Corps. But still the Moulin du Pietre-Mauquissart road barred any advance, and the machine-guns in the fortified houses held up all attempts to get forward. Thus, though the 25th Bde. repulsed several attacks they could not carry the line forward from Neuve Chapelle; the Sirhind Bde. (Lahore Div.) made a little ground and took prisoners but could not cross the Riviere des Layes; and now that all advantages of surprise had gone Sir John French saw that little was to be gained by pressing the attack. March 13 therefore saw the fighting much diminished in intensity; gains were consolidated and the troops reorganized, but the attack was suspended.

The battle of Neuve Chapelle ended therefore somewhat disappointingly. The substantial advance which had at one moment seemed within reach had not been realized: the delay in pushing the British reserves had allowed the Germans to rush to the danger spot reinforcements sufficient to bar the road to the high ground of the Aubers ridge. Thus while the tactical position round Neuve Chapelle was much improved the strategical situation was unchanged. The losses, over 4,200 in the Indian Corps, nearly double that in the IV., had been heavy, while of three minor operations undertaken as diversions those at Givenchy (I. Corps) and Wytschaete (II. Corps) failed, only the III. Corps proving successful against 1'Epinette (S.E. of Armentieres). Still, it would be wrong to class Neuve Chapelle among British defeats. The troops were undoubtedly encouraged by seeing that German positions could be stormed and the captured ground held against powerful counter-attacks. Nearly 1,700 prisoners had been taken and the German losses had exceeded the British. Rifles, artillery and machine-guns had found splendid targets, and the German battalions who had shown themselves in the open had been shot down in masses. It was felt that another attack in which the lessons of the battle could be turned to good effect might lead to far-reaching results.

(D) Aubers Ridge and Festubert.—The part assigned to the British in the Allied offensive of May 1015 gave them as their immediate objective the S.W. end of the Aubers ridge. The IV. Corps was to attack at Rougebancs, N.E. of Neuve Chapelle, using the 8th Div. in the first assault and supporting it with the 7th, while S.W. of Neuve Chapelle the Meerut Div. (Indian Corps) and the ist Div. (I. Qorps) attacked from the line of the Rue du Bois which joins the Estaires-La Bassee road at the " Port Arthur " cross-roads. It was hoped that these divisions pushing forward in an easterly direction would establish touch behind the Bois de Biez with the IV. Corps advancing southward past Aubers. But whether successful or not in their immediate tasks, the British would materially assist the Allied operations if their attack diverted German guns and men from the crucial point N. of Arras where the French were attacking.

It was with the greatest confidence that the British forces looked forward to this attack. Neuve Chapelle had whetted their hopes; it was believed that at this second attempt the lessons of Neuve Chapelle would be turned to good effect, that the causes which had robbed that attack of greater success

would be avoided, that the increased artillery and ammunition available would allow of a far more effective bombardment. Unfortunately, the delays in renewing the attack, due partly to weather conditions but even more to the insufficient ammunition supply, had given the Germans time to so strengthen their positions that only the heaviest artillery could produce any substantial effect upon them. Parapets, many feet in thickness and backed up by concrete, were proof against i8-pounders, and afforded complete protection against anything short of a direct hit to the machine-guns placed in pits sited at the ground level which swept the " no-man's-land " with a grazing fire. It was only the bitter experiences of May 9 which revealed how very formidable the German defences had become and what an increase in battering-power would be needed to reduce them.

The actual attack delivered early on May 9 met with modified success at Rougebancs, but with complete failure at Rue du Bois. Here the infantry found the enemy's trenches strongly manned; the machine-guns from their pits at the base of the parapets maintained a deadly fire; scarcely any of the assailants managed to reach the enemy's parapets, and the few who did get into the German lines were promptly overwhelmed. More- over, the German artillery at once opened a heavy counter- bombardment, and the British supports and reserves, packed into crowded communication and assembly trenches, suffered severely, while the task of evacuating wounded and reorganizing the troops for a second attempt proved extremely difficult. A second effort was, however, made by both the ist and Meerut Divs. about 7 A.M., though without success; and when in the course of the afternoon the Bareilly Bde. of the Meerut Div. and the ist Bde. of the ist Div. were put in, the same result followed. A handful of the ist Black Watch made a lodgment in the enemy's trenches, but so small a party was powerless and was speedily overwhelmed.

At Rougebancs the right brigade of the 8th Div., the 24th, failed except at one point to reach the enemy's trenches, and suffered very severe losses. On its left, however, the 2nd Rifle Bde. and ist Royal Irish Rifles of the 25th Bde. captured a considerable frontage, and lodgments were also made by the 2nd Lincolnshires and the I3th (Kensington) London Regiment. However, consolidation proved exceedingly difficult. Machine- guns on the flanks, which could not be located or silenced, prevented the advance of reinforcements; efforts to dig communi- cation trenches came under heavy shelling, and could not be completed before German counter-attacks, vigorously pressed and well supplied with bombs, drove back those assailants who had penetrated beyond the front trenches and gradually forced the survivors out of the positions they had captured. The Rifle Bde. held on longest, keeping the Germans at bay till after midnight, but before the 7th Div. could push a battalion across to relieve them a renewed counter-attack ousted them from the German trenches. The division's losses came to over 4,500, about the same as at Neuve Chapelle, but without the satisfaction of retaining any of the ground won at the first assault. The ist Div. lost nearly 4,000 men, the Indian Corps had over 2,000 casualties, and the completeness of the failure was the more felt because of the high hopes so generally enter- tained.

However, though the French attacks had also fallen short of the success anticipated, they had gained some ground and were being continued. Sir John French therefore determined to renew his efforts to assist his allies, though on a less ambitious scale. North-east of the village of Festubert the German lines running northward from Givenchy turned N.E. at a sharp angle towards the Bois de Biez, making a salient which it was proposed to attack on two sides. On the night of May 15-16, therefore, the I. and Indian Corps renewed their attempt to advance from the Rue du Bois, using the Meerut and 2nd Divs., while the 7th Div. which had been transferred from the IV. to the I. Corps, attacked eastwardly from Festubert. The attack was preceded by an intermittent bombardment extending over several days, instead of the short but intensive bombardment employed on March 10 and May 9. Over a large part of the front attacked the German wire was effectively cut, but opposite the Indian Corps the German parapets successfully defied the efforts of the British artillery and (on the left of the front attacked) the Meerut Div. and the left of the 2nd Div. failed to carry the hostile trenches. The rest of the 2nd Div. fared better; the 6th Bde. and part of the 5th stormed the front German line, and reinforced by their reserves began pushing on against the second line. At 3:15 A.M. on May 16 the 7th Div. attacked, while the Meerut Div. made a fresh attempt. Once again machine-guns sheltered behind Lille damaged parapets and shot down the Gahrwal Bde., and this failure affected the advance of the division, who had to establish a defensive flank on their left and to devote their main efforts to getting touch with the 2nd Div. whose attack had met with considerable success, especially in the centre, where the 2nd Scots Guards and 1st Royal Welsh Fusiliers had penetrated deep into the German positions. On their right also the 2nd Queen's, after a temporary check, had got well in, and while they pushed on towards La Quinque Rue a bombing attack down the German front line, S. of the point of entry, led to the clearing of 700 yd. and the capture of 200 prisoners. But casualties had been heavy, and on the left the stubborn resistance of a strong point held up the left of the 20th Bde., which exposed the flank of the most advanced parties. These, out of touch with their supports, were forced back by counter-attacks. Similarly, the progress of the 2nd Div. was retarded by the resistance of two fortified farms, Cour d'Avoue and Ferme du Bois. Until these strong points could be reduced substantial progress was impossible.

Next day (May 17) operations were continued, a special effort being made to close the gap between the 2nd and 7th Divs., after which it was hoped to push on towards Rue d'Ouvert and Chapelle St. Roch. The first of these objects was effected, after about 700 Germans in the angle between the two attacks had left their trenches, apparently intending to surrender, but had been shelled by their own guns and almost wiped out. But the Ferme du Bois held up the 2nd Div., which could only progress to some extent on its right. The 7th Div. started well and cleared the strong points which had checked the left of the 2otii Bde., but could not get much further in the direction of Cour d'Avoue, while the efforts of the 2nd Bedfords and 4th Camerons to push on against Rue d'Ouvert were not in the end successful. On May 18 the 4th (Guards) Bde. attacked Cour d'Avoue from the W., but could not carry it, and Canadian infantry, who on that day began relieving the 7th Div., did not succeed in doing more than master an orchard which had been reached (but lost again) on May 16 by some of the 7th Division. By this time the Germans had brought up considerable reinforcements and many machine-guns, and as the ammunition available was nearly exhausted all chance of substantial success seemed gone. For another week, however, severe fighting continued between La Quinque Rue and Givenchy, the brunt falling on the Canadians and on the 47th (London) Div. who were holding the Givenchy sector. These operations resulted in the capture of several hundred yards of trenches, including two formidable strong points, and the repulse of several German counter-attacks, but by May 25 Sir John French found it necessary to call a halt. It was now clear that though the great French effort further S. had won much valuable ground it had failed to break the enemy's line or to prove the decisive stroke that had been hoped for: the Allies had to resign themselves, therefore, to a suspension of active operations. Actually, it was not till the end of June that this became complete, and in the interval two minor attacks were made near Givenchy, one by the 7th and 51st (Highland Territorial) Divs., the other by the Canadians: neither, however, resulted in any appreciable gain of ground, and although on June 16 an attack by the 3rd Div., now in the V. Corps, carried some German trenches W. of the Bellewaarde ridge and improved the tactical situation in the Hooge neighbourhood, it did not lead to the recapture of Hooge and involved the assailants in heavy losses.

For three months, therefore, the position on the British front was one of almost complete stagnation. The only events of real importance were the arrival of the long-expected "New Army" divisions, the first of which, the 9th (Scottish) Div., actually began its disembarkation at Boulogne on the day of the disastrous repulse at Fromelles and Rue du Bois. By the end of July eight of these divisions were in the country, and their presence permitted the formation of a III. Army, which took over from the French a line to the N. of the Somme between Arras and Albert. During this period there was of course intermittent activity on the British front, mainly in the Ypres salient. Here at the end of July the Germans, making use for the first time against the British of their Flammenwerfer (liquid-fire projectors), attacked and captured the right trenches of the 14th (New Army) Div. just S. of Hooge. The battalion holding the trenches was overwhelmed, and a counter-attack next day was unsuccessful. Ten days later, however (Aug. 9), two brigades of the 6th Div. made a fresh attempt after careful reconnaissance and preparation. The German position was carried on a front of 1,000 yd., and heavy losses were inflicted on them; they brought up large reinforcements and strove desperately but unsuccessfully to regain the ground, but the 6th Div. held firm, retaining the trenches lost in the Flammenwerfer attack with a small spur N. of the Menin road.

It gives some indication of the difference in scale between the war of 1914-8 and the greatest of the previous campaigns of the British army that the 1,800 casualties of the 6th Div. in this quite minor action exceeded by 50% the losses of Wellington's army at Busaco.

(E) Loos. If in the Allied offensive of Sept. 1915 the British army, as in May, played only a subsidiary part, its contribution far outstripped both in men and in materials the meagre preparations of May. A four days' bombardment on a scale hitherto unprecedented preceded the attack, for which nine divisions were available as against the four of May 9, while six others contributed by undertaking diversions. The frontage attacked extended over nearly 6 m., from just S. of the mining village of Loos on the right to the La Bassee canal on the left. The line ran fairly straight from S. to N. for nearly 3 m., but then curved away in a N.W. direction towards Cuinchy, so that two of the three divisions of Sir Hubert Cough's I. Corps on the left had to attack N.E., while the right, Sir Henry Rawlinson's IV. Corps, was striking due east. Further, Cough's left division, the 2nd, was to attack on both sides of the canal, the 5th Bde. from Givenchy-les-La Bassee, the 6th and 38th Bdes. from Cuinchy. The 5th Bde.'s attack was one of the operations intended to distract the enemy and divert his reserves, but the other brigades aimed at reaching Auchy and linking up near Haisnes with the left of the main attack. A defensive flank would thus be established, under cover of which, and of a similar flank to be formed on Rawlinson's extreme right by the 47th Div., the central divisions of the I. and IV. Corps with the XI. Corps in support and the cavalry in readiness behind, would, it was hoped, break through between Haisnes and Loos, reach the Deule canal at Port a Verdin and unite E. of Lens with Gen. Foch's troops.

To improve the chances of success and introduce an element of surprise it had been decided to employ against the Germans their own device, gas. Elaborate preparations had been made for the use of this weapon, and on its expected effectiveness in surprising and demoralizing the defenders the highest hopes were based.

The operations to be undertaken as diversions were much more substantial in scale than those which had accompanied the Neuve Chapelle attack. The ipth Div. was to attack in the low ground E. of Festubert. North of Neuve Chapelle the Indian Corps, supported on the left by the 2oth Div., was to assault the German salient at Mauquissart, the legacy of the Neuve Chapelle fighting. Further N. again the 8th Div. was to attack at Bridoux, while the principal diversion was that to be undertaken against Hooge and the Bellewaarde ridge on the Ypres front by the 3rd and i4th Divisions. These attacks were more than mere raids; they all aimed at definite tactical improvements in the local situations, but their primary object was to

prevent the transfer of reserves to the main point of attack. This object they achieved, even if they nowhere resulted in permanent gains of ground, for it was only by prompt and vigor- ous use of reserves and hard fighting that the Germans recovered their initial losses at Hooge, at Bridoux and at Mauquissart where the Indian Corps made a fine fight.

In the preliminary bombardment the field guns were em- ployed to cut the wire, while the heavier guns battered the other defences. Considerable damage was inflicted both on the trenches and their garrisons, though in places deep dug-outs allowed the defenders to escape lightly. Most of the wire was effectively destroyed, but at several points folds of the ground concealed it from observation, and at two at least this had far- reaching effects, parts of the attack, which was delivered at 6:30 A.M. on Sept. 25, being held up by uncut wire. More- over, the wind proved too weak to carry the gas forward quickly, and thus made it in places worse than useless. This was nota- bly the experience of the 2nd Div. at Cuinchy, and its attack, though gallantly pressed, proved unsuccessful and costly. Better success attended the gth Div. E. of the railway to Ver- melles, though its left brigade, the 28th, found the wire practi- cally intact and was repulsed with heavy losses, a second attack by the supporting battalions faring no better. The 26th Bde. had to assault the formidable and important Hohenzollern Redoubt, which protruded in front of the slag heaps and miners' cottages at " Fosse 8," S. of Auchy. With great gallantry and at a heavy cost the Highlanders carried the Redoubt and swept on over the German main line, clearing the cottages and slag heaps behind. Some of the supports were absorbed in securing this first objective, but the remainder pushed forward and established themselves just short of Haisnes in the Pekin trench, part of the German second line. With prompt support Haisnes might have been carried, but the 2yth Bde. were much delayed by the returning wounded and German prisoners who crowded the communication trenches, and before its leading battalions could reach the front the opportunity had passed; German reserves had arrived. All the gth Div. could attempt was to maintain its gains against the counter-attacks.

Opposite the yth Div. the chief tactical feature was a group of quarries W. of Cite St. Elie. These were reached and taken by the 22nd Bde., but at a cost which left it too weak to carry its second objective, Cite St. Elie. The 2oth Bde., however, penetrated much deeper into the German position, capturing eight guns, and reaching the cross-roads between Cite St. Elie and Hulluch. But it was out of touch with the 22nd Bde. on its left, and as the division's reserves, the 2ist Bde., were partly absorbed in consolidating the quarries sufficient reinforcements were not forthcoming to carry the attack any farther. Thus despite its substantial initial success the advance of the I. Corps came to a standstill. The detachments which had established themselves in the German second line were scattered and isolated, and needed both reinforcements and artillery support. But information was scanty and slow to get back to headquarters and without accurate information artillery support was impos- sible; the immediate reserves had been used up, and as no more were forthcoming the opening could not be exploited.

On the left of the IV. Corps the ist Div. had as its objective the line from Hulluch to Bois Hugo, N.E. of Loos. Its left brigade, the ist, was most successful: it stormed the front line and pushed on to Hulluch over several lines of trenches, captur- ing three guns. But here it found itself unsupported, for the zd Bde. on its right had been stopped by uncut wire several hundreds of yards long and its repeated assaults proved equally unsuccessful and costly. The reserves of the ist Div. had, therefore, to be used against its first objective, and not till the afternoon were they able by crossing the German trenches on the flanks of the untaken portion to compel its defenders to surrender. By the time, therefore, that the 2nd Bde. finally reached its objective at Bois Hugo the delay had had serious consequences: the ist Bde. had already been forced back 500 yd. from Hulluch, and the left flank of the next division to the right, the isth, had been insecure all day.

Nevertheless, the 1 5th Div. had achieved remarkable success. Attacking with the 46th Bde. on the left and the 44th on the right, it carried the German front line, swept on over a second trench system into Loos and through it, and pushed on over " Hill 70," E. of Loos, until brought up by the defences of Cite St. Laurent, one of the suburbs of Lens, and by a railway embankment farther north. But their rapid advance had car- ried the men beyond the reach of artillery support; mixture of units had destroyed cohesion, and touch had been completely lost with the headquarter formations in rear. Moreover, though some of the 46th Bde. had reached and occupied Puits 14 bis, a mine S. of Bois Hugo, the 2nd Bde.'s failure had left the isth exposed to counter-attacks from the N., and reserves which might have secured the advanced position had to be diverted to that flank. On its other flank, however, the i5th Div. had no cause for anxiety. The 47th (London) Div. had as its task the formation of a defensive flank from the S.E. of Loos back to the British front line. This task it had accomplished to the letter, capturing three guns and several hundred prisoners, and after consolidating all its objectives it maintained them against vigor- ous counter-attacks.

About noon, then, on Sept. 25 the prospects of a break- through seemed bright. If reserves could have been promptly pushed in, the arrival of German reinforcements might have been forestalled and the advanced troops not only supported but carried farther forward. Unluckily, neither Gough nor Rawlinson had reserves available, and at noon the leading troops of the XI. Corps were still 3 m. from the original German front line and had to thread their way forward through an area congested with transports and with traffic of every description. More guns meant larger ammunition columns, while additional machine-guns meant additional limbers, and the rapid expan- sion of the British army had not only meant increased impedi- menta but had brought into staff posts many officers without staff training or experience. The congestion of the rearward areas was a serious handicap, but hardly to be wondered at.

By the time the leading units of the XI. Corps reached the front matters had already changed for the worse. At nearly every point German counter-attacks had thrust back the most advanced troops, and though the Germans had had to pay heavily for their gains the fact that their reinforcements were arriving in strength was even more serious than the loss of ground. At Hill 70 in particular there had been desperate fighting, and only with great difficulty had the isth Div. main- tained a position on its western slopes, thanks largely to the initiative of a battalion commander who, arriving there after the advance had swept on over the crest, had promptly en- trenched a position on which the remnants of the advanced troops were able to rally when the counter-attack drove them back. But now that the XI. Corps was up it was hoped to push on again next morning.

The plan for Sept. 26 was that the IV. Corps, reinforced by the 2ist and 24th Divs., should renew the attack from Loos to Hulluch. As a preliminary portions of the I5th and 2ist Divs. were to recover the crest of Hill 70. However, as their attack started the Germans began a series of heavy counter-attacks from Bois Hugo southward, and succeeded in driving out of Bois Hugo the brigade of the 2ist Div. which had just relieved the 2nd Bde. there. Profiting by this they pressed in on the left flank of the I5th Div. and gradually forced it back. Far- ther S. the efforts of the 4$th and 6znd Bdes. to carry Hill 70, were held up by wire which the Germans had rapidly put up, and by a redoubt on the crest. Moreover, when the main attack was delivered it was mainly by enfilade machine-gun fire from Bois Hugo that the 24th Div. was repulsed and driven back. All efforts of the 2ist Div. to recover Bois Hugo failed; the ist Div. could effect nothing by itself, and it was largely the pos- session of Bois Hugo and of Puits 14 bis which finally enabled the Germans to thrust the defenders of Hill 70 down the hill in upon Loos. That village, however, was secured by the arrival of the 6th Cav. Bde., and N. of Bois Hugo the Germans did not attempt to advance beyond the La Bassee road. To the I. Corps also Sept. 26 had brought disappointment. Shortly before midnight (Sept. 25-26) a German attack broke through at the junction between the 7th and 9th Divs. and penetrated into the quarries, which passed back into German hands, the left of the 7th Div. recoiling to the old German support trenches. On its right the 7th Div. maintained all but its most advanced positions, and linked up with the 1st in front of Hulluch, but two attempts to recover the quarries failed. At Fosse 8 the 73rd Bde. of the 24th Div. (which had relieved the 26th Bde.) had great difficulty in holding its ground against counter-attacks. Fosse Alley, however, the intermediate line between the front system and Haisnes, which had been evacuated when the quarries were lost, was reoccupied and held by the 27th Bde., and the Germans had to pay highly for such ground as they regained. But they had now brought up several fresh divisions, and pressed their attacks hard, especially against the inexperienced 73rd Brigade. Before midday on Sept. 27 these troops, short of ammunition, food and water, and quite unable to reply effectively to the German bombers, were driven out of their positions. A dashing advance by the remnants of the 26th Bde. prevented the loss of the Hohenzollern, which had seemed imminent, but the recapture of Fosse 8 and the dump made Fosse Alley untenable and compelled its evacuation. Against the 7th Div., however, the Germans were less successful, and Sept. 27 saw the right of the position of the I. Corps fairly satisfactorily consolidated.

While the I. Corps had been defending its gains, the IV. had been striving to make more. During the night of Sept. 26-27 the Guards Div. had relieve ' the 2ist and 24th opposite Hulluch and Bois Hugo. On the afternoon of the 27th its 2nd Bde. attacked Bois Hugo and Puits 14 bis, while its 3rd advanced through Loos against Hill 70. Both attacks were splendidly pressed and achieved valuable gains. Chalk Pit Wood was reached and secured, though Puits 14 bis could not be held against heavy counter-attacks, and a line was established just W. of the La Bassee road to link up with the ist Div. opposite Hulluch. Similarly the 3rd Guards Bde. put Loos out of danger of recapture by making good a line just below the crest of Hill 70.

By the evening of Sept. 27 all hopes of a speedy and decisive success were gone. No break-through had been achieved, and Gen. Foch's attack also had been checked. Still the vigour with which the Germans hurled counter-attack after counter-attack at the positions taken from them testified to the value they attached to them. The fighting was fiercest round the Hohenzollern Redoubt, which the 28th Div. took over from the 9th on Sept. 28 and held under considerable difficulties till Oct. 3, when a specially violent attack drove them from its ruins, though even then they retained a substantial portion of the 9th Div.'s gains of Sept. 25. On Oct. 5 the Guards relieved the 28th Div., and during the next week made several minor gains by bombing-attacks. Fighting was also heavy without producing any marked change in the tactical situation round the quarries on the frontage held in succession by the 7th, 2nd and 12th Divisions. From the Vermelles-Hulluch road to Loos the Germans were less aggressive, their only serious effort on this front being on Oct. 8, when they attacked in great force, only to be repulsed with very heavy losses especially by the 1st Div. at Chalk Pit Wood and by the French, who had taken over Loos itself on Sept. 30.

After this repulse the Germans made no more big counter- attacks. By recovering the dump and Fosse 8 they had won back observation posts which overlooked much of the salient which the battle had produced. Sir John French was naturally loth to abandon the effort to recover them, and decided to bring up the 46th (North Midland) Div. for a fresh attack on the Hohenzollern Redoubt, while simultaneously the I2th and 1st Divs. should attack the quarries and Hulluch. The attack, delivered on Oct. 13, was only partially successful, but did result after heavy fighting in. the recovery and retention of the bulk of the redoubt. The 12th Div. failed to retake the quarries, but made useful gains which improved its line. The 1st Div., however, once again found Hulluch too much for it, so that the net result of the attack did not encourage a repetition, and with this major operations in the battle area ended. The French continued attacking in Champagne for some weeks, though even there all prospect of decisive success was gone, while in Artois they had already abandoned their offensive.

When the results of the British offensive are set against the high hopes entertained before the attack it is excusable to write it down as a failure. The gain of ground was not worth the 50 to 60 thousand casualties incurred in its capture, but the German losses on the British front were almost as heavy, and the capture of over 20 guns and 3,000 prisoners was no small encouragement. It had been shown that the Germans could be driven from positions they believed impregnable. Moreover, valuable experience had been gained not only in the use of the new weapon, gas, but in staff work, in administrative arrangements and in tactics, experience to be turned to good account in 1916. At Loos an effort had been made to apply the lessons of Neuve Chapelle. It was partly because Neuve Chapelle had shown the dangers of retaining too close a hold on the immediate reserves that it had been arranged that the troops (immediate reserves included) were to press forward without limitation. Loos showed the advantages of the "limited objective" and of dealing with untaken portions of a hostile line rather by outflanking them than by renewing direct attacks; it also showed that the patterns of grenades in use in the British army were too varied and mostly unsuitable for wet weather, with other lessons major and minor. It is easy in the light of the experience gained at and after Loos to criticize the whole plan as too ambitious for the resources, human and material, at the commander-in-chief's disposal; to point out the unwisdom of employing raw troops in a great battle within a fortnight of their landing in France; to argue that, had the frontage attacked been narrower and the divisions disposed in greater depth, more immediate reserves would have been available. Still the balance remains on the side of gain. Loos inflicted heavy losses on the Germans; it was a foretaste of heavier losses in store for them. The performances of the 9th, 12th and 15th Divs. showed that the improvised " New Armies " of Britain were likely to prove a factor of decisive importance in the war.

(C. T. A.)

(F) The German Retreat to the Hindenburg Line, 1917. In order to follow intelligently the operations which took place during the early part of 1917 it is necessary to understand thoroughly the situation which had arisen and the general atmosphere which had been created as a result of the prolonged fighting on the Somme. In Dec. 1916 Gen. Nivelle was appointed to the chief command of the French forces. He declared great confidence in his ability to break through the enemy's defences by the delivery of a mighty blow specially prepared, and immediately disclosed his project to the British commander-in-chief, Sir Douglas Haig. The plan was briefly as follows: (a) to deliver the main attack by three French armies on the Aisne front one of these armies to be in reserve for purposes of exploitation; (b) to deliver a subsidiary attack by the British army on the Arras front; (c) to undertake minor actions between Reims and Arras to contain the enemy; (d) vigorous exploitation. In order to give effect to these proposals and to enable the French to undertake the major operations with large reserves, Gen. Nivelle's plan included the relief of French troops by the British as far S. as the Amiens-Roye road. The weakness of this plan, apart from the Russian revolution and release of German reserves, which could not be foreseen, lay in the imposition of the major task on the French armies, already exhausted by two years of heavy fighting and the strain of the defence of Verdun, while the British, at the height of their strength and vigour, instead of being trained and concentrated for a vigorous blow, were relegated to defensive work and the minor rôle. These operations were to take place as early as possible, and it was hoped that the respective attacks would be launched early in April. The Somme battles had evidently shaken the enemy seriously, and had caused his defensive front in the neighbourhood of the Ancre to become a pronounced and dangerous salient. Moreover, it was known that he was constructing a rearward line of defence, subsequently known as the Hindenburg Line, which would materially shorten his defensive front and thus release a number of divisions which could be moved into reserve.

Such was the position of affairs on Jan. 1 1917. The maintenance of pressure on the enemy on the Ancre-Somme battlefront was now of immediate importance. Signs were not lacking that the enemy had considerably weakened, and his position in the Ancre salient was vulnerable and dangerous. After a period of bad weather it became possible during Jan. to undertake minor and local operations, which resulted in the capture of the Beaumont Hamel spur, thus opening up a wide field of view and observation for artillery fire. No time was lost in making use of this advantage. Indeed, it was essential to engage the enemy closely, whether it was his intention to retire voluntarily to some previously prepared position, or whether his defence was involuntarily weakening. The country on both banks of the Ancre consists in pronounced undulations with spuxs running towards the stream from both north and south. Opportunity was offered for skill in the handling of comparatively small bodies of troops, in making use of the ground, and of cooperation both by movement and by fire. Making use of the tactical advantage obtained by possession of the Beaumont Hamel spur, the 6yd Div. carried out a successful operation early in Feb. which carried the British front forward on the N. bank of the river. This assisted towards the capture of a point on the S. bank, which gave observation into the upper valley of the Ancre and over the German gun positions. These hostile batteries which protected the Serre salient were forced to withdraw, thus weakening to a dangerous degree the German defences to the north. It was now possible to attack with advantage the Serre-Beauregard and Courcelette-Miraumont ridges, the possession of which, besides turning the German defences on the N. in the neighbourhood of Gommecourt and Monchy, would open up a further field of view up the valley of the Ancre, where many hostile batteries had been located. In order to gain this position an assault was delivered on the morning of Feb. 17 by the 2nd, 18th and 63rd Divs. on both banks of the stream. On the N. bank the attack was completely successful, while on the S. bank considerable resistance was encountered. Nevertheless, the whole position was occupied shortly afterwards, and small detachments and patrols working forward succeeded in occupying the enemy's defences on a wide front from opposite Guedecourt to Serre, including the villages of Warlencourt and Miraumont as well as the Beauregard spur.

It had become increasingly evident that the German defence was weakening, and their troops were being gradually withdrawn, the first indications being on a narrow front in the valley of the Ancre, but now on a more considerable scale. The prolonged period of exceptional frost following on a wet autumn had frozen the ground to a great depth. The thaw, however, began in the third week of Feb.; the roads, disintegrated by the frost, now broke up, and the area of the 1916 battlefield became a quagmire. On the other hand the conditions of the weather favoured the defenders, who fell back on to fresh unbroken ground, and the succession of misty days covered their movements.

Notwithstanding these difficulties the British and Australian troops kept up constant pressure, and by the delivery of minor attacks drove the enemy from position to position, until by the end of Feb. the whole of the Ancre valley and the higher ground to the N., including the village of Gommecourt, fell into their hands. The enemy had now evidently fallen back into a previously prepared line of defence the trench system known as the Le Transloy-Loupart line, cutting off the Ancre salient and covering the villages of Le Transloy, Grevillers, Achiet-le-Petit and Bucquoy. It was possible that he would make a stand on this defensive line. If not, undoubtedly his withdrawal would be conducted on a more comprehensive scale altogether and on a wider front.

Owing to the heavy work required to be executed in rendering the roads passable, and moving forward guns, ammunition and supplies, in addition to the necessity for gaining ground to within assaulting distance of this defensive system, a delay of a week occurred before operations of a more serious character could be undertaken. On March n and 12 the Le Transloy- Loupart line was subjected to so effective a bombardment that on the morning of the I3th the enemy abandoned this strong position. Grevillers and Loupart wood were immediately occupied, and preparations put in hand to attack the enemy's next line of defence, which covered Bapaume and Achiet-le-Grand.

For some time prior to this date indications had been ob- served of a further and wider extension of the German withdrawal. It had been ascertained that the Germans were preparing with feverish haste a new and powerful defensive system, the Hindenburg Line, which, branching off from the original defences near Arras, ran S. E. for 12 m. to Queant and thence passed W. of Cambrai in the direction of St. Quentin. The immediate object appeared to be to escape from the salient between Arras and Le Transloy, but it was also evident from the preparations the Germans were making on a grand scale, that they contemplated an eventual evacuation of the greater salient between Arras and the Aisne valley N.W. of Reims. The withdrawal to the Hindenburg defences would cause a very considerable contraction in the length of the line, with a consequent increase of the German reserves. It was evident that the Somme battles of 1916 had materially reduced his strength, and with the expected onslaughts on the western front, coupled with a Russian offensive on a grand scale, it was necessary for them to contract the front and conserve their strength.

Constant watch had accordingly been kept by the British along the whole front S. of Arras, strong patrols, kept alert and active, pushing forward here and there, with the result that St. Pierre Vast wood was occupied on March 16. Meanwhile in- formation was received which indicated the reduction of the enemy's forces S. of the Somme, and pointed to the probability that his line in that sector was being held by rear-guard detachments supported by machine-guns, whose withdrawal might be expected at any moment.

It was evident that the enemy was withdrawing according to a carefully prepared plan along the entire front of recent operations and on both banks of the river Somme. Orders were accordingly given by the British G.H.Q., in conjunction with the French, for a general advance on the morning of March 17. Except at certain localities where detachments of infantry and machine-guns had been left to cover his retreat, there was little serious resistance to the advance, and that resistance was rapidly overcome.

On March 17 Chaulnes was captured by the 6ist Div. and Bapaume by the 2nd Australian Div., while further to the right the French entered Roye. On the following and subsequent days the advance continued, and the whole intricate system of German defences in this area, consisting of many miles of powerful well-wired trenches which had been constructed with immense labour, passed into the hands of the Allies.

On March 18 the British 48th Div. gained the important tactical position of Peronne, and Mont St. Quentin which lies above it. The possession of this locality at the angle of the Somme showed clearly that the enemy would not stand on the line of the river, for it outflanked, that line to the south. The bridges over the Somme, which had been systematically destroyed, were temporarily and partially repaired with great rapidity, and the British troops, passing over, deployed into open country with patrols and cavalry thrown forward.

By this time the Allies' advance had reached a stage at which the increasing difficulty of maintaining the communications rendered it imperative to slacken the pace of the movement. Not only had the bridges over the river Somme been destroyed, and the roads rendered almost impassable both artificially and from the weather, but the wide belt of devastated ground over which the Somme battle had been fought offered immense difficulties to the passage of guns and transport. Moreover, in front lay an enemy whose armies were capable of launching a vigorous counter-offensive. Strong detachments of his infantry and cavalry occupied tactical points along the line of advance, serving to keep the enemy supplied with information and as a screen to his own movements. His guns, which had already been withdrawn to previously prepared positions, were available at any moment to cover and support a sudden counter-stroke, while the conditions of the country across which the Allies were moving made the progress of their own artillery unavoidably slow. The bulk of the enemy's forces were known to be occupying a very formidable defensive system, upon which he could fall back should his counter-stroke fail. On the other hand the Allies, as they moved forward, lft all prepared defences farther and farther behind them. In such circumstances the necessity for caution was obvious. In order to combat these dangers and difficulties, the Allies were compelled, at the various stages of the advance, to select and put into a state of defence successive lines of resistance, which the main bodies would occupy, and in which they could give battle in the event of a hostile riposte. Meanwhile advanced guards, patrols and reconnoitring detachments pushed ahead and maintained touch with the enemy, and roads, railways, bridges, telegraphs and telephones were constructed or restored with rapidity.

As the Allies approached the Hindenburg Line, the resistance of the enemy stiffened and the fighting for the various tactical localities became more severe. During the first week in April the British had almost reached the Hindenburg Line, and had gained possession of the villages of Lempire, Epehy, Metz-en-Couture, Lagnecourt, Noreuil, Croisilles, Henin-sur-Cojeul and Beurains. The enemy was now withdrawn to his great defensive line, which he had taken months to prepare, shortening his front considerably and enabling him to bring several divisions into reserve. He had in front of him a devastated zone where the mounting of an Allied attack would present extreme difficulties, thereby releasing yet other troops from the guard of the trenches to pass into reserve.

(G) Battle of Arras (April-May 1917). At the close of 1916, and before the appointment of Gen. Nivelle to the command of the French forces, a general plan had been agreed upon by all the Allies to conduct a simultaneous offensive on all fronts. The British part in this offensive was to consist of a double attack along the Scarpe and Ancre valleys, to cut off the Gommecourt salient created as a result of the Somme fighting. The V. Army was to attack along the Ancre, the III. Army was to debouch from Arras along the Scarpe, while the I. Army (Canadian Corps) was to secure the left flank of these operations by seizing the Vimy ridge. Owing to the exhaustion of the French armies the main operations were to be conducted by the British, who would not press the attack unduly in the direction of Cambrai, but be prepared to switch rapidly to the N. and undertake further operations of greater dimensions in Flanders.

The appointment of Gen. Nivelle in Dec. 1916 to the chief command of the French, and the acceptance of his plan of offensive, dislocated the strategical plans for the British armies at this particular juncture.

The Nivelle plan gave the French the major r&le, as indicated earlier, namely, that of delivering a 'decisive blow from the Aisne front, while the British operations in Artois were to be of a subsidiary character. It is to be noted in this connexion that the extension of the front in relief of the French caused a reduction of power to the British which materially affected their operations throughout the remainder of the year. The Nivelle plan relied on the success of the main offensive by the French, but if that failed the subsequent operations would be seriously handicapped. This was a matter of first-class importance, seeing that the French had already been overstrained while the British were reaching the height of their strength and efficiency. Apart from this, the actual tactical scheme and dispositions required little modification as a result of the acceptance of the Nivelle plan.

General Nivelle did not altogether approve of the plan of the British commander-in-chief, and urged that the attack on the Vimy heights should be abandoned and that the concentration should be effected farther S. on the Arras-Ancre front, pointing out that the inclusion of Vimy would cause too wide an exten. sion and dissipation of force. This point is of some interest as showing the difficulties which a commander has to face in the selection of his front of attack and objectives. Sir Douglas Haig had, however, given the closest attention to the various factors affecting the situation, and refused to give way. His arguments were mainly two: firstly, that the capture of the Vimy ridge was essential to secure the left of his operations, and secondly, that any attack mounted S. of Arras, and S. of the point where the Hindenburg Line hinged on the main German front, would be delivered into a pocket or would be entirely dislocated by a voluntary withdrawal of the enemy from the Gommecourt salient, whereas the German forces were bound to stand and fight for the Vimy ridge. The British commander-in-chief scented the retreat of the Germans to the Hindenburg Line and laid his plans to meet that eventuality. The result was that even after the German retreat little or no alteration was necessary. Had he, however, given way to the pressure placed upon him and mounted his attack from Arras to Gommecourt, the operation, which was required by Gen. Nivelle to draw in the hostile reserves and pave the way for the main French attack on the Aisne, could not have taken place at all. The task of the British was to attract as large forces of the enemy as possible and so reduce the opposition to the French. As soon as the German retreat developed, all those troops and heavy artillery which were not required with the V. Army in its advance from the Ancre were diverted to the III. and I. Armies in order to strengthen their attacks to the utmost.

The preparations for a great offensive, where reliance is placed on artillery to destroy the enemy's defences and reduce his fire-power to such a point as to enable a successful advance to be made, are extremely long and arduous. When transport requirements on the Arras front were first brought under consideration, the neighbourhood was served by two single lines of railway leading to Arras, the combined capacity of which was less than half the requirements. Considerable constructional work, therefore, both of standard- and narrow-gauge railway, had to be undertaken to meet the programme. Roads had to be improved and adapted; new roads had to be constructed, and material massed forward for construction across the enemy's defences as soon as the troops advanced. For this latter purpose use was made both in this and in later offensives of plank roads. These were built chiefly of heavy beech slabs laid side by side, and were found to be of great utility, being capable of rapid construction over almost any nature of ground. By these means the accumulation of the vast stocks of munitions and stores of all kinds required for the offensive, and their distribution to the troops, were made possible. Hutting and other accommodation for the troops concentrated in the area had to be provided in great quantity; an adequate water-supply had to be guaranteed. Very extensive mining and tunnelling operations were also carried out. In particular, advantage was taken of the existence of a large system of underground quarries and cellars in Arras and its suburbs to provide safe quarters for a great number of troops. Electric light was installed in these caves and cellars, which were linked together by tunnels, and the whole connected by long subways with the trench systems E. of the town.

A problem peculiar to the launching of a great offensive from a town arose from the difficulty of ensuring the punctual debouching of troops and the avoidance of confusion and congestion in the streets both before the assault and during the progress of the battle. This problem was met by the most careful and complete organization of routes.

Practically the labour of the whole of the troops was required to carry through all this work, and while this immense task was proceeding, the British IV. and V. Armies were vigorously pursuing the enemy to the Hindenburg Line, and the French front was in process of being relieved as far S. as the Amiens-Roye road. All this placed a heavy strain on the British troops. Meanwhile, during the first three months of 1917, negotiations of fundamental importance were proceeding between the high commands and the Governments of France and Great Britain, touching on the principle of unity of command. General Nivelle desired to secure the command of all the forces involved, both British and French. Certain differences of opinion early declared themselves between the British and French com- manders-in-chief. These were chiefly in the first instance in connexion with the date of attack, and the extent to which the French troops in front line should be relieved. The transporta- tion service and the Nord railway were not equal to the work of operations on so great a scale at so early a date as that proposed by Nivelle; and in view of the fact that the British commander- in-chief desired to give his troops some rest and training and was somewhat sceptical as to the degree of success which would be attained by the French, was desirous of limiting the extension of his front to the Amiens- Villers Bretonneux road. A temporary agreement on Jan. i that the attack should take place as early as possible, and that the French should be relieved as far as the above road by the end of Jan., did not satisfy Gen. Nivelle; the latter referred the whole question to his Government and, indirectly, to the British War Cabinet, with the result that a Cabinet meeting was held in London on Jan. 15 at which both Sir D. Haig and Gen. Nivelle were present. The conclusions arrived at were as follows: (a) the British to relieve the French forces as far S. as the Amiens-Roye road, relief to be completed by March i; (b) the offensive to commence on April i at latest; (c) vigorous exploitation to be undertaken by all the forces both French and British, if necessary. The French troops in front line were accordingly relieved to the Amiens-Roye road, and preparations pushed forward to deliver the attack at the earliest possible date. But the transport difficulties had become so acute that, notwithstanding the fact that every available British soldier was utilized for railway construction and other work, a serious breakdown in the Nord railway system appeared to be inevitable, and the matter had to be referred to the French Government with a view to obtaining greater facilities. Further negotiations in regard to the problem of command took place secretly between the British and French Governments, and materialized in the Calais conference on Feb. 26 and 27 1917. This conference had originally been summoned to discuss the question of transportation. There were present: M. Briand (premier), Gen. Lyautey (Minister of War), Gen. Nivelle (French C.-in-C.), Mr. Lloyd George (British Prime Minister), Gen. Robertson (Cl.G.S.), Sir D. Haig (British C.-in-C.), Gen. Kiggell (C.G.S.). A scheme was set before the conference by the French Government for the establishment of an Allied G.H.Q. and the appointment of a French generalissimo, and the breaking up of the British divisions to form an "amalgam" with the French troops. General Robertson and Sir D. Haig were in complete ignorance of this proposal until the cut-and- dried scheme was produced; the British Prime Minister, however, while opposing the French proposal to break up the British army and form an " amalgam " with French brigades, directed these two officers to draw up a scheme of command, by which the control of operations in the coming battle would be solely in Gen. Nivelle's hands, and the British army under his orders. This was the decision of the War Cabinet. The scheme was accordingly drawn up in the course of the morning of Tuesday Feb. 27, so that when the conference met at 11:30 A.M. on that day, discussion was limited to questions of detail. Finally the French War Committee and British War Cabinet agreed to the following arrangements:

(1) The British War Cabinet recognizes that the general direction of the campaign should be in the hands of the French commander- in-chief.

(2) The British commander-in-chief to conform his plans to those of the French during the preparation and progress of the projected campaign.

(3) Within the limits of (2) the British commander-in-chief will be permitted to utilize his own resources and forces in the manner which he considers most desirable.

(4) In regard to (2) an exception will be made in a case where he considers that such action would endanger the safety of the army

or prejudice its success; in that case a report shall be made, together with the reasons, for the information of the War Cabinet.

(5) The respective Governments will decide the date at which the operations referred to in (i) and (2) shall be deemed to be at an end.

As all students of war agree, within the army of a combatant nation, unity of control is essential to secure the most effective execution of military operations. In theory, it is equally desirable in all circumstances. There is, however, a difficulty inherent in applying the principle of unity of control to Allied nations. This difficulty lies in the incidence of responsibility. For example, if the British armies are placed under the command of a French general, the British commander cannot be held responsible to the nation. The responsibility for the British armies cannot devolve on the French commander, and must therefore de- volve on the British Government. At the Calais conference, however, an effort was made by the British War Cabinet to make the field-marshal commanding the British forces retain responsibility by instructing him to conform his preparations to the views of the French commander, except in so far as he considered that this would endanger the safety of the army or prejudice the success of its operations.

The battle of Arras was the first occasion on which the experiment was tried of securing a form of unity of command, and after the conference of Calais the British forces to be engaged in the battle were placed, within the limitations noted above, under the general control of Nivelle. Certain differences of opinion, however, still existed, and the whole question was again referred to the Governments, with the result that the two commanders-in-chief and two Cabinets met in London on March 13 in order to define the position more clearly.

During the month of March, as previously narrated, the Germans continued to withdraw to the already prepared Hindenburg Line, followed up and pressed by British troops, until early in April they were established in positions covering that line. On the British side, the extensive preparations necessary were pushed ahead as quickly as possible and so far as the available transport facilities permitted. The general plan agreed upon was that the British attack should be launched as early as possible in April and that the French main attack on the Aisne should follow two or three days later. This was to permit and induce the German reserves to be drawn into the British battle and towards the British front, and thus enable the main attack by the French to be delivered with greater prospects of success and exploitation. The British actually launched their assault on April 9, but for reasons of unfavourable weather the French postponed their attack until April 16. Prior to the offensive the new German lines of defence on the British front ran in a general north-westerly direction from St. Quentin to the village of Tilloy-les-Mofflaines just S.E. of Arras. Thence the German original trench systems continued northwards across the valley of the Scarpe to the Vimy ridge which, rising to a height of 475 ft., dominates the country eastwards. The front attacked by the III. and I. Armies on the morning of April 9 extended from just N. of the village of Croisilles, S.E. of Arras, to just S. of Givenchy-en-Gohelle at the ncrthern foot of the Vimy ridge, a front of nearly 15 miles. The enemy's defences comprised the normal powerful defensive front consisting of three separate and heavily wired trench systems, and in addition, from 3 to 5 m. further E. a new defensive system, known as the Drocourt-Queant line, which in fact was a northward extension of the Hindenburg Line, branching from that line at Queant.

The great strength of these defences demanded very thorough artillery preparation, and this in turn could only be carried out effectively with the aid of the air service. A greater mass of artillery, both guns and howitzers, was used for preparation in proportion to the front engaged than had yet been available in any previous British attack. Three weeks prior to the attack the systematic cutting of the enemy's wire was commenced, while the heavy artillery searched the enemy's back areas and communications. Night firing, wire cutting and bombardment of hostile trenches, strong points and billets continued steadily and with increasing intensity on the whole battle-front till a few days before the assault when the general bombardment was opened. During this latter period extensive gas discharges were carried out and frequent raids undertaken by day and night along the whole front of attack.

Aircraft were incessantly at work during the whole of this time not only in air fighting and directing the artillery fire, but also in photographing the enemy's defences so as to ascertain the extent of damage effected and the best means of approach for the infantry. Much intelligence and information was gleaned from these photographs as to the progress of the preparation, and from the raids as to the condition of the enemy, and any modifications in regard to his method of holding his defences.

The general object of the attack was to engage and absorb the maximum number of hostile troops; the general plan was to secure the high ground at Monchy-le-Preux and the Vimy ridge and to bring the V. Army into effective operation on the southern flank of the battle; the general method of attack was a succession of comparatively short and deliberate advances, the separate stages of which were arranged to correspond approximately with the enemy's successive trench systems. As each stage was reached a short pause was to take place according to a prepared time-table to enable the troops detailed for the attack on the next objective to form up for the assault.

Tanks were allotted to each corps for specific tasks, such as the capture of the powerful redoubts of Telegraph Hill and the Harp (just S. of Tilloy-les-Mofflaines) and Railway Triangle, a stronghold formed by the junction of the Lens and Douai railway lines E. of Arras. The whole scheme of attack along the entire 15-mile front was carefully coordinated. A special feature in the operation was the debouching of the troops to the assault directly from the town of Arras, the subterranean passages and caves of which had been prepared so as to harbour the reserve troops and enable them to pass protected to the trench systems, and so to the assault.

The troops engaged in the attack were as follows (from S. to N.): III. Army (Gen. Sir E. H. H. Allenby), VII. Corps (aist, 3oth, 56th, and i4th Divs.), VI. Corps (3rd, I2th, 15th, and 37th Divs.), XVII. Corps (gth, 4th, 34th, and sist Divs.), I. Army (Gen. .Sir H. S. Home), Canadian Corps, ist, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Canadian Divs., and i3th Bde. (sth British Division). In all there were 17 divisions, with 989 heavy guns and 1,890 field pieces. In addition the Cavalry Corps was brought forward behind the III. Army, in case the development of the battle should give rise to an opportunity for the employment of mounted troops.

The general attack on April 9 was launched at 5:30 A.M. under cover of a heavy and effective artillery barrage; the infantry advanced everywhere, and within 40 minutes the whole of the German first line system had been stormed and captured, except at the northern extremity of the Vimy ridge. At 7:30 A.M. the advance was resumed according to programme; more severe fighting took place in view of the greater opposition encountered. Several strong points and localities were stubbornly held by the enemy, but by 12 noon the whole of these and all the second objectives with the exception of the railway triangle had fallen, from Neuville Vitasse as far N. as La Folie farm. As always happens in such a battle, the enemy's troops managed to retain certain tactical localities. Meanwhile the artillery was brought forward to support the attack on the third objectives. Owing to the long range the wire in front of the enemy's third trench system had not been effectively cut in many places; nevertheless good progress was made, and many batteries were captured.

The battle now inevitably became more ragged, owing to the increasing opposition and to the local modification of plans necessitated by the unexpected occurrences inseparable from the battlefield. South of the Scarpe, St. Martin and Feuchy Chapel on the Arras-Cambrai road were captured. In the Scarpe valley the i$th Scottish Div. after a long struggle stormed the railway triangle, and moving rapidly forward captured the village of Feuchy. The 37th Div., hitherto in reserve, whose r61e it was to pass through the first-line troops to the assault of the high ground and village of Monchy-le-Preux, endeavoured to widen the breach made in the enemy's third line of defence in order to carry out its task, but was held up by the wire. South of the Scarpe, the enemy's third line had been captured in places, but he still retained possession of the greater portion of it, together with the high ground of Orange Hill and Monchy-le-Preux. North of the Scarpe practically the whole of the day's programme was carried through. On the right the 4th Div. in reserve passed through the troops in front line, and according to plan captured the village of Fampoux, thus making a great breach in the enemy's third system of defence. In the centre the Canadian Corps stormed the Vimy heights, entrenched itself on the eastern slopes, and sent patrols out along the front. On the left the 4th Canadian Div., en- countering violent opposition at Hill 145 on the northern ex- tremity of the ridge, was compelled to postpone the attack till the following day.

The operations of April 9 had been eminently successful, in spite of heavy squalls of snow and rain; and large numbers of the enemy's troops and guns had been captured.

During the night of the gth to loth the 37th Div. made progress through the break in the German third line S. of the Scarpe, advancing to the northern slopes of Orange Hill; and on the morning of the loth about noon the advance became general, the whole of the enemy's third line S. of the Scarpe being reduced, and the 37th Div. reached the north-western edge of Monchy-le-Preux. A great struggle then centred round this village, and all efforts of the infantry to seize it directly, and of the cavalry to pass around either flank of it, failed, chiefly owing to the lack of effective artillery support due to the long range and the rapidity of the advance. On the morning of the 11th, however, assisted by tanks, the fight was resumed, and by 9 A.M. the village was captured, and subsequently many counter-attacks repulsed.

Meanwhile the Germans had been stubbornly defending the Cojeul valley and the Hindenburg defences at their junction with the old third line, a vital part of the front, where the open forward slopes, swept from end to end by the enemy's machine-guns, rendered any advance extremely difficult. In this area an operation of a bold and hazardous character was undertaken on the morning of the nth, which was nearly successful. At 4:30 A.M., in conjunction with an attack by the right of the III. Army on Hemnil and Wancourt, the V. Army (4th Australian and 62nd Div.), assisted by tanks, made a gallant effort to breach the Hindenburg Line in the neighbourhood of Bullecourt. The execution of the attack, being over a wide extent of open country, was exceedingly difficult; Australian troops, however, penetrated as far as Riencourt-lez-Cagnicourt and the 62nd Div. reached Bullecourt, but owing to determined opposition and the failure of the attacks by the right of the III. Army these positions could not be maintained. Had both attacks been successful and the two armies joined hands forward, a very wide breach in the enemy's defences in an important area of the battlefield would have been effected with far-reaching results. It was not till the morning of April 12 that the 2ist and 56th Divs. succeeded in capturing Hemnil and Wancourt.

North of the Scarpe much fighting of an indeterminate nature took place at Roeux and the neighbourhood on this day, but at the extreme northern extremity of the battlefield the 4th Canadian Div. and 24th Div. secured the whole of the important positions on the flank of the Vimy ridge and astride the Souchez river at the ""Pimple " and " Bois en hache." The Germans now began to withdraw from the eastern slopes of the Vimy ridge, and British and Canadian patrols moved forward until by the evening of April 14 a line had been reached N. of the river Scarpe from Roeux to E. of Bailleul-Hirondelle Wood and Lievin to the old front line at the Double Crassier.

On the right by the evening of the I4th the attacking troops had fought their way forward with great difficulty along the Hindenburg Line as far as Fontaine-les-Croisilles and Wancourt Tower, while farther N. many counter-attacks on Monchy-le-Preux were repulsed. The main offensive by the III. and V. Armies terminated on the i4th; the artillery support was becoming inadequate, and the troops in front line required relief. A remarkable success had been gained; the British front line had been moved forward some 4m., and some 13,000 prisoners and 200 guns had been captured. It was not possible, however, to break off the battle, seeing that the French offensive was on the point of being launched, and it was important that the full pressure of the British operations should be maintained in order to assist jt. Much had already been accomplished; the enemy had been compelled to pour men and guns into the breach, and a large hostile concentration in the battlefield was in process of being effected.

The only offensive action taken by the Germans during this period in this area occurred on April 15, when they attacked the British position from Hermies to Noreuil with 16 battalions. An initial success, in which some of the British battery positions were overrun, was at once neutralized by a counterstroke which restored the line.

On April 16 the French launched their main offensive on the Aisne. The decisive results which had been looked for were not achieved; there was no rapid break through or exploitation by a reserve army of manoeuvre. On the contrary, ragged fighting took place which continued until May 5, and the French armies, worn out by more than two years of heavy fighting, were in no condition to sustain an exhausting offensive. The unified command was in the hands of a French general who had planned and conducted operations which proved to be unsuccessful. From April 15 to May 5 the British continued their operations on the Arras- Vimy front at the request of the French and in order to carry out the r&le of absorbing the enemy's reserves. During this period attacks were executed by the British on April 23 and 28 and on May 3 and 5, with the result that the line was pushed forward to include Qucmappe-Gavrelle and Arleux, and some 6,000 additional prisoners and 50 guns were taken. On May 5 the great offensive operations on the Aisne and Scarpe were brought to a close, and on May 15 Gen. Nivelle was relieved of his command. This brought to naught the effort to obtain unity of command, and the operations provided a warning as to the dangers involved where armies of different nationalities are concerned.

Such was the story of a great and successful British effort under conditions of abnormal difficulty. The Russian Revolution had declared itself, the French armies had broken down, the enemy was recovering his reserve power, and the period of the year was getting late for the transference of operations elsewhere. The British field-marshal commander-in-chief then decided immediately that it was necessary to continue on the offensive and to transfer the theatre of operations to the north.

(H) The Relief Offensive in Front of Lens.—The great British offensive in Flanders was launched on July 31 1917 and continued to be pressed throughout the autumn. Towards the middle of Aug. a slight improvement took place in the weather, and advantage was taken of this to deliver the second attack E. of Ypres. As it was desirable to prevent the enemy from weakening the remainder of the front so as to effect a greater concentration in Flanders, it was desirable and even necessary to threaten and undertake operations of a minor character at various points to pin the enemy's reserves. A highly successful operation was carried out in the neighbourhood of Lens, and the threat to this town undoubtedly had the effect of preventing the enemy from concentrating the whole of his attention and resources on the main battle-front.

At 4:25 A.M. on Aug. 15 the ist and 2nd Canadian Divs. attacked on a front of 4,000 yd. S.E. and E. of Loos. The objectives consisted of the strongly fortified Hill 70, which had been reached, but not held, in the battle of Loos in Sept. 1915, and the mining suburbs of Cite Ste. Elisabeth, Cite St. Emile, and Cite St. Laurent together with Bois Rase and half Bois Hugo. The observation from Hill 70 had been very useful to the enemy, and in the possession of the British, would materially increase their command over the defences of Lens. Practically the whole of these objectives were gained rapidly at light cost, and in exact accordance with plan. Only at the farthest limit of the advance a short length of German trench W. of Cite St. Auguste resisted the first assault. This position was again attacked on the afternoon of the following day and captured after a fierce struggle lasting far into the night. A number of local counter-attacks on the morning of Aug. 15 were repulsed, and in the evening a powerful attack delivered across the open by a German reserve division was broken up with heavy loss. In addition to the enemy's other casualties, 1,120 from three German divisions were captured by the British. Thus not only was the British position improved but three German divisions, which might have been used in roulement on the Flanders front, were severely handled, and the enemy received a lesson which would prevent him from unduly weakening the defensive fronts.

(I) The Battle of Cambrai (Nov.-Dec., 1917).—The repeated attacks delivered by the British in Flanders over a period of more than three months had brought about a large concentration of the enemy's forces in that area, with a con- sequent reduction of his strength and garrisons in other sectors of his front. The British object in the operations at Cambrai, which took place on Nov. 20 1917, was to gain a local success by a surprise attack at a point where the enemy did not expect it, and on a front which had already been weakened, and thus disarrange the enemy's plans of withdrawing troops from France to operate in Italy. The sector opposite Cambrai had been carefully selected as the most suitable. The ground there was, on the whole, favourable for the employment of tanks which were to play an important part in the enterprise. If, after breaking through the German defence systems on this front, the high ground at Bourlon could be secured and a defensive flank established facing E., and opportunity should be created of exploiting the situation towards the N.W., the capture of Cambrai itself was subsidiary.

As a result of the pressure in Flanders and the Russian Revolution, large German forces had already been brought from the Russian front, partly in exchange for exhausted divisions and partly as additional reinforcements. Moreover, it was certain that heavy German reinforcements would continue to be railed to the western front during the winter. These troops would be largely utilized to strengthen the weakened sector, and if the opportunity, which existed, to deliver a surprise attack at an early date under favourable conditions were not taken advantage of, it would certainly lapse. Against this argument in favour of immediate action must be weighed the fact that the conditions of the Flanders struggle had severely taxed the strength of the British forces, and that the losses, which had not yet been made good, had been heavy.

On the other hand the resources required for the operation were not great, seeing that the force to be employed must be small, for, owing to the requirements of surprise and secrecy, any considerable concentration of troops would be impossible to maintain. The success of the enemy's operations in Italy, too, added force to the arguments in favour of undertaking the operation; although the means available had been reduced by the despatch of troops to the Italian front, the situation on that front was critical, the Italians having been driven back between Oct. 24 and Nov. 10 from the Isonzo to the Piave.

After consideration of these factors, it was decided, by the British command, to undertake the operation, and the execution was entrusted to the III. Army. The general plan of attack was to dispense with previous artillery preparation, and to depend on tanks, of which there would be nearly 500 available, to break down the enemy's wire and cover the infantry advance. No previous abnormal artillery fire was to take place and no registration of guns or any action which might indicate to the enemy that an attack was impending. The infantry was specially trained to work in combination with tanks, and the whole operation depended for success on secrecy and on bold, determined and rapid action.

The German defences on the selected front between Vendhuille on the Scheldt canal and the river Sensée comprised the three

systems constituting the Hindenburg Line (greatly improved during the course of the year) with fortified posts in advance, such for example as La Vacquerie and the north-eastern corner of Havrincourt Wood. Behind this again were two other de- fensive lines known as the Hindenburg Reserve Line and the Beaurevoir-Masnieres Line. That portion of this front which lies between the Scheldt canal and the Canal du Nord offered an opportunity for a tank drive to the N. which would include the capture of the important position about Bourlon. The full force of tanks together with five divisions (i2th, 2oth, 6th, sist, 62nd) and a portion of another (36th) were allotted to this front extending from Gonnelieu on the right to Havrincourt Wood on the left. Two divisions were, moreover, to be held in reserve behind this front ready to move forward, and the cavalry was to be at hand ready to exploit a success towards the N. and turn the enemy's defences from the rear. In order to make the front of attack more imposing, to deceive and hold the enemy, gas and smoke attacks, dummy attacks with dummy tanks, artillery fire, raids and subsidiary attacks were to be carried out on an extensive scale both on southern and northern flanks.

All preparations were carried out with the greatest secrecy, and during the evening prior to the battle troops and tanks were moved forward into positions of assembly, great care being taken to muffle the noise to the utmost. This was rendered particularly difficult owing to the hard and frosty weather. Each tank was provided with a compressed brushwood fascine some 8 ft. in depth, for the purpose of assisting it in crossing the main Hindenburg trench, which was of abnormal dimensions.

At 6:20 A.M. on the morning of Nov. 20 1917 the tanks and troops moved forward to the attack on a front of about 6 m. from E. of Gonnelieu to the Canal du Nord opposite Hermies. At the same hour the subsidiary and feint attacks took place. On the principal front of attack the tanks rolled on, protected by a smoke barrage from the enemy's artillery. The Hindenburg Line was rapidly overrun. The izth Div. after severe fighting at Lateau Wood captured the Bonavis spur. The 2oth Div. captured La Vacquerie and stormed Welsh ridge, while the 6th Div. entered Ribecourt. The surprise was complete, and the enemy surrendered in considerable numbers. The 2pth Div. which had been in reserve moved forward and, passing through the 6th and 2oth Divs., entered Masnieres and captured Marcoing and Neuf Wood, securing the passages of the canal at both villages and the bridge intact at the latter. In this neighbourhood it was not possible to enlarge the footing gained on the E. bank of the canal, owing to the arrival of hostile reinforcements in the neighbourhood of Rumilly where severe fighting took place.

Meanwhile the 62nd and sist Divs. attacked the Flesquiercs ridge, the latter being stubbornly opposed and seriously delayed by the defence of that place. The 62nd Div. however pressed forward and captured Graincourt, its advanced troops entering Anneux. Flesquieres continued to hold out throughout the day against the 5ist Div., but troops of the 6th Div. entered Noyelles before nightfall. But for the delay at Flesquieres and the destruction of the bridge at Masnieres the operations would have been completely successful, and would have opened up a great field for exploitation on the following day.

On the morning of the 2ist the attack was resumed. But little progress was made on the Masnieres-Rumilly front. Farther W. the village of Flesquieres, turned from the N., fell at 8 A.M., and the sist and 62nd Divs. with tanks and cavalry moving rapidly forward captured Cantaing and Fontaine- Notre-Dame, and reached the southern edge of Bourlon Wood. Throughout the day infantry and cavalry were heavily engaged at Noyelles. On the extreme left the 36th Div. cleared the Hindenburg Line as far N. as Moeuvres.

By the evening of the 2ist the British had gained possession of the Bonavis spur, a bridgehead E. of the Canal de 1'Escaut including Masnieres and Noyelles, the whole of the Flesquieres ridge and the ground to the N. as far as the southern edge of Bourlon Wood including Cantaing and P'ontaine-Notre-Dame.

It was now nearly 48 hours after the commencement of the attack, and hostile reinforcements might be expected; at the same time it was necessary from the lie of the ground to decide whether to go on and attack the heights of Bourlon or to with- draw to the Flesquieres ridge. Owing to the importance of the possession of the Bourlon heights and the visible signs of with- drawal of the enemy, having regard also to the situation in Italy, it was decided to proceed with the attack.

On the 22nd, while the British were carrying out reliefs with a view to the prosecution of the attack, the enemy recaptured Fontaine. On the 23rd the 4oth Div. with tanks attacked and captured the whole of Bourlon Wood, but the attempts to. secure Bourlon and Fontaine, after a severe struggle, failed.

The struggle for Bourlon resulted in several days of fierce fighting. On the morning of the 24th the Germans counter- attacked and were repulsed; in the afternoon the British attacked, captured the village and beat off a counter-attack, but the resistance on the Fontaine-Bourlon-Moeuvres front was very considerable. On the 2 5th and 26th the enemy again counter- attacked in force and succeeded in recapturing Bourlon and the wooded spur between that place and Fontaine. The situation in the wood was now somewhat difficult; on the 27th an organized British attack succeeded in improving the position in the wood, but the troops which at one time had entered Bourlon and Fontaine were obliged to fall back again.

During the 28th and 2gth no attacks took place, the troops, which had been heavily engaged were relieved, and on the whole front efforts were made to strengthen the position gained. During the ten days' fighting 10,500 prisoners and 142 guns were taken, but the main objective, the Bourlon locality, which would turn the whole of the enemy's positions S. of the Sensee canal and river Scarpe, had not been secured. This was primarily due to the initial failure at Flesquieres village.

In the last days of Nov. signs were not lacking on the whole of the front between Vendhuille and Bourlon that the Germans intended to regain the positions which they had lost. On the whole of this front they had carried out artillery registration, but the importance of Bourlon to them and the massing of their troops indicated that their main attack would be delivered on the Bourlon front.

Measures were taken accordingly by the British command;, this front was strengthened, while five divisions were disposed on the right flank from Cantaing to the Bauteux ravine. Farther S. the original front was held as before, the frontage being wide for the number of troops available. The Guards were in reserve, about Villers Guislan, the 62nd Div. on the Bapaume-Cambrai road and the 6ist Div. assembling in rear, while four cavalry divisions were available in the neighbourhood. Practically all these troops had already been heavily engaged. All troops were warned to expect an attack.

On Nov. 30 the Germans attacked about 8 A.M., delivering their main assault, as anticipated, on the Bourlon front, and a subsidiary attack on the Cantaing- Vendhuille front. The former was successfully repulsed after the most severe fighting, but on the Bonavis spur and in the direction of Villers Guislan the- Germans made rapid progress. On this latter front their attack was in the nature of a surprise assault, without any previous bombardment, but accompanied by a hail of gas and smoke shells and bombs. Villers Guislan, Bonavis, Gonnelieu and Gouzeaucourt rapidly fell into their hands, but their advance was stayed by the resolute action of the Guards, assisted by tanks, which resulted in the recapture of Gouzeaucourt and part of the ridge between that place and Gonnelieu, while the troops holding La Vacquerie succeeded in keeping their opponents at bay. Meanwhile on the N., from Fontaine to Moeuvres,. the enemy's main assault, delivered between 9 and 10 A.M.,. and preceded by a heavy bombardment, was repulsed with heavy losses and at close quarters. This assault was repeated during the morning and afternoon, but all attempts of the Germans to gain any important success either on this front or about Masnieres failed completely. On the following days, Dec. i, 2 and 3, there was severe fighting in the open in the Gonnelieu neighbourhood, with the result that the Germans progressed in the direction of Villers Plouich, capturing the hamlet of La Vacquerie and thus rendering the position of the British troops defending Masnieres and Marcoing extremely precarious. Further fighting continued during the next few days, but the Germans' strength was exhausted and their losses had been severe.

It now became necessary for the British command to decide whether to embark on another offensive battle on a large scale, or to withdraw to a more compact line on the Flesquieres ridge. Although this decision involved giving up important positions won with great gallantry, withdrawal was undoubtedly the correct course under the conditions. Accordingly on the night of Dec. 4-5 the evacuation of the positions N. of the Flesquieres ridge was commenced, and on the morning of the 7th the with- drawal was completed successfully without interference from the enemy. Captured guns and material which could not be removed were destroyed.

The new line taken up corresponded roughly with the old Hindenburg Line from N.E. of La Vacquerie, N. of Ribecourt and Flesquieres to the Canal du Nord i m. N. of Havrincourt, i.e. about 2 to 2½ m. in front of the line held on Nov. 20 at the commencement of the operations.

These operations undoubtedly had a direct influence on the Italian campaign, by diverting reinforcements and suspending operations at a critical moment when the Allies were making their first stand on the line of the river Piave.

In the offensive it had been hoped by a powerful tank attack and surprise to break and turn the enemy's defences where he was least prepared, and thus created a favourable tactical situation which would place him at a great disadvantage. The failure to secure immediately the Bourlon locality was responsible for the inability to create such a situation, and this was due to the accident at Flesquieres, where one German officer handling a field gun put a number of the attacking tanks out of action by direct hits. Success had been very nearly complete.

During the whole of these operations the French were prepared to cooperate with a special force which had been brought forward in readiness, should an opportunity have occurred for exploitation. These troops, with the exception of a few guns which were utilized for defensive purposes subsequent to the German counter-offensive, were not brought into action and were eventually withdrawn.

These operations in the neighbourhood of Cambrai should be regarded as an incident in the great four and a half years' battle a surprise stroke followed by a rapid counterstroke in which although the British did not achieve their tactical object, the balance of advantage remained to a large extent in their hands. The Germans, though successful in their counter- offensive, were apparently not so successful as they had hoped to be.

The main objects of the attack had been attained. The initiative was retained and the enemy's plans deranged. German reinforcements were prevented from being despatched to the Italian front. The enemy had also been prevented from deliver- ing an attack on the French front, which would undoubtedly have produced disastrous results.

(J. H. D.)

1. Falkenhayn, Die Oberste Heeresleitung, p. 74. At this period, Falkenhayn says, the total German combatant strength in the western theatre was 1,900,000 against an Allied total of 2,450,000.
2. This process, called by the French " nettoyage " and by the British " mopping-up," was the clearance, by troops specially detailed for the purpose, of the enemy trenches that had been reached and passed by the leading troops of the attack but might and in practice usually did contain scattered but intact and dangerous groups of the enemy.