Commissioner Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Jean

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Commissioner Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Jean by John Paul Stevens
Court Documents

United States Supreme Court

496 U.S. 154

Commissioner Immigration and Naturalization Service  v.  Jean

No. 89-601  Argued: April 23, 1990. --- Decided: June 4, 1990


The Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) directs a court to award fees and other expenses to private parties who prevail in litigation against the United States if, inter alia, the Government's position was not "substantially justified." 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). The District Court found that respondents were prevailing parties within the meaning of the EAJA, petitioners' position was not substantially justified, and there were no other special circumstances that would make a fee award unjust. The Court of Appeals upheld these findings, but remanded for recalculation of fees. Although petitioners concede that fees for time and expenses incurred in applying for fees are appropriate, they contend that respondents are ineligible for fees for services rendered during the substantial litigation over the fees unless the Court finds that petitioners' position in the fee litigation itself was not substantially justified.

Held: A second "substantial justification" finding is not required before EAJA fees are awarded for fee litigation itself. Pp. 158-166.

(a) The EAJA's "substantial justification" requirement is a single finding that operates as a clear threshold for determining a prevailing party's fee eligibility. Once a litigant has met all of the eligibility conditions for fees, the district court has the discretion to adjust the amount of fees for various portions of the litigation, guided by reason and the statutory criteria. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40. There is no textual support for the position that the Government may assert a "substantial justification" defense at multiple stages of an action, since the EAJA refers only to a single "position," §§ 2412(d)(1)(A) and (d)(2)(D), that the Government has taken in the past, § 2412(d)(1)(B), in "any civil action," § 2412(d)(1)(A). Pp. 158-162.

(b) Petitioners' argument that automatic awards of "fees for fees" will encourage exorbitant fee requests, generate needless litigation, and unreasonably burden the federal fisc is rejected. First, no fee award is automatic, since a district court always has discretion to fix the amount of the award once eligibility is established. In contrast, requiring courts to make a separate "substantial justification" finding regarding the Government's opposition to fee requests would multiply litigation. Second, the EAJA's purpose to eliminate the average person's financial disincentive to challenge unreasonable governmental actions would be defeated if the Government could impose on prevailing parties the costs of litigating fee requests, costs that may exceed those incurred in litigating the claim's merits. Pp. 162-166.

863 F.2d 759 (CA 11 1988), affirmed.

STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Washington, D.C., for petitioners.

Ira J. Kurzban, Miami, Fla., for respondents.

Justice STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.


This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).