Advanced Australia/Chapter 9
Chapter IX
THE NEW COMMONWEALTH
THE question of most interest to the English visitor to Australia at present is that of the proposed federation of the colonies. Founded at different times and under different circumstances, the colonies have no political bond of union other than the common one which binds them to the Motherland. When I was passing through the colonies there seemed to be every probability that the great work of bringing them together in a federal union was nearing completion. An inquiry into the origin of the movement; the difficulties that have beset and delayed it; and the means by which those difficulties have so far been overcome, and the hopes of the promoters of the movement raised, is one that I, who take an interest, like the rest of us, in political topics and in the development of the great British Empire, most naturally made. An epitome of the result of my inquiries will, I hope, prove of interest.
There are so many things which favour a federation of the Australian colonies that one wonders it was not accomplished long ago. The difficulties which have encumbered similar movements in other parts of the world are many of them quite absent from the Australian problem. The people to be united are of the same race and tongue. They are sprung from the same source, and enjoy the same free institutions. Geographically, they are all united, and the political lines which divide them are still merely abstractions set out on a map. They are all, with the exception of Tasmania and New Zealand, on the one continent; and they possess (more by good luck than good management) the whole of that continent, and are, therefore, not troubled by the presence of any foreign element.
The inducements to federation, again, are of course very great One of the primary advantages to be derived is a common system of defence. At present each colony has its separate forces, and no force may act outside its own dominions; so that the troops could not be massed at any one point of danger under a single commander. Then there is the important consideration that an Australian Commonwealth will speak to the world with far greater weight than the whole of the colonies acting separately. It is also strongly felt by the colonists that the merely political divisions which exist might tend to grow more marked as time goes on; and that disputes between states of the same race are, like disputes in families, often embittered by the actual nearness of the parties to each other. There are some questions, such as the control of the few important rivers of Australia, which might in time lead to bloodshed, failing any other method of settlement. If one colony, for instance, absorbed so much of the waters of the rivers which flow through it as to interfere with the navigability of the lower portions, it might inflict great loss on its neighbours; a thing to which they could scarcely be expected tamely to submit. Then, again, there is a strong desire on the part of many to do away with the inter-colonial Customs duties, by which the products of one colony are heavily taxed on entering another.
For all these and other reasons Australian federation has been a matter of discussion in the colonies for many years past. It must be credited to Lord Grey that he had the foresight in 1850 to endeavour to pass an Australian Constitution Act through the British Parliament, empowering a voluntary union of any two or more colonies in a General Assembly, which should have power to legislate upon certain specified subjects, notably Customs taxation. But his proposal received so little support that it was withdrawn. Various steps were taken by the colonies themselves to draw closer together and pave the way for federation. One of the most practical of these was the holding of occasional conferences between leading members of the various Governments in order to discuss matters of common interest, and arrive at some uniform proposals to be submitted to the different Legislatures. Five or six such conferences were held; but, though the object was good, and they were carried out in perfect good faith, they accomplished little. It was found that very few of the arrangements ever got the force of law. Changes of Government were so frequent that there could be no continuous policy upon any subject; as the incoming Government was generally averse to the proposals of its predecessors. It was felt that something more was needed: and in 1883, spurred on by the claims of the French in the New Hebrides, which were then attracting a great deal of attention, a scheme for the creation of a Federal Council for Australasia was adopted at a conference in which all the colonies were represented; and the Imperial Parliament passed a measure permitting the formation of the Council.
The prime mover in this scheme was Mr James Service, the Premier of Victoria, a man of broad and statesmanlike views; to whose efforts it is mainly due that the New Hebrides are not now a French possession. Mr Service strenuously advocated the formation of the Federal Council, on the ground that it would lead the way to the establishment of a closer union, as its powers could be added to from time to time as the necessity arose. Mr Service is still living in Melbourne, but he has reached a very advanced age, and is in feeble health. During my stay in Victoria he resigned his position as a member of the Legislative Council, the only political office which he still held. Whatever ground there might have been for his hope that the Federal Council would grow into federation, it never had a chance of fulfilment; for the Premier of New South Wales, Sir Henry Parkes, after actually proposing the resolutions upon which the Council was founded, came to the conclusion that the body proposed to be created was too weak to be of any practical value, and he did not submit the Bill to his Parliament. With New South Wales standing out, any scheme for federating the Australian Colonies would be a failure. That Colony never was represented on the Federal Council, and, though the Council is in existence to-day, and has held eight sessions (in 1886, '88, '89, '91, '93, '95, '97, and '99) successively, at which matters of intercolonial import have been discussed, it certainly has held out no promise of supplying the place of a more complete federation. New South Wales, New Zealand, and South Australia at first declined to join. The last-named colony sent delegates to the session of '89. But the Federal Council is, and would in any case have remained, a purely deliberative body, without any funds at its disposal, or any power to put its resolutions into force. It can only recommend certain proposals for the adoption of the various Parliaments. At times, however, its united representations to the Home Government have had great weight, and have effected good in matters of Australasian interest.
Sir Henry Parkes, one of the most prominent and picturesque figures in Australian history, was the promoter of the next important movement towards federation. It was chiefly due to him that a National Australasian Convention, to which delegates were appointed by the Parliaments of each of the colonies, including New Zealand, met at Sydney in 1891. Sir Henry Parkes was appointed president, and on his motion resolutions were adopted affirming the following principles:—
"The powers and rights of existing colonies to remain intact, except as regards such powers as it might be necessary to hand over to the Federal Government."
"No alteration to be made in State boundaries without the consent of the Legislature of such State, as well as the Federal Parliament."
"Trade between the federated Colonies to be absolutely free."
"Power to impose Customs and Excise duties to rest with the Federal Government and Parliament."
"Military and naval forces to be under one command."
"The Federal Constitution to make provision to enable each State to make amendments in its Constitution, if necessary, for the purpose of federation."
"The Federal Parliament to consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, the latter to possess the sole power of originating money Bills."
"A Federal Court of Appeal to be established; and an Executive, to consist of a Governor-General and such persons as might be appointed his advisers."
A draft Constitution Bill embodying these and other principles was adopted by the Convention. It was hoped by many that federation would almost immediately result. New Zealand, which is separated by four or five days' sail from Sydney, sent three delegates to the Convention, in place of the seven allotted to each Colony, and intimated that its immediate adhesion to any scheme of federation need not be expected, on account of its being cut off by such a waste of ocean from the other Colonies. But, apart from this, it was believed that federation of all the other colonies was now in sight. These hopes were doomed to disappointment. The Bill drafted with such formality was virtually still-born. By several of the Parliaments it was never considered at all. In Victoria it was passed, with considerable modifications, but met with much hostility.
The drawback to all the movements for federation up to this point was that they had no force of public opinion behind them, and they awakened no enthusiasm in the mass of the people. It was, in effect, necessary to wait for a few years, till the native-born Australians had, in two senses, attained their majority. During the 'eighties, this element of the population first perceptibly began to assert itself. The emigrants from the old country, the colonists, began to be outnumbered by their own progeny, the true colonials. And as these latter came to feel their strength (which they soon began to show, if only by an express preference for native-born politicians), the earlier provincial bitternesses, the result, in reality, of the rivalry amongst the pioneers of the infant settlements, seemed to them strangely unbusinesslike and out-of-date. The apathy of the public had been due to the natural inability of the Englishman or Scotsman who had settled in Melbourne or Adelaide (for example), to feel or think as an Australian. And it is largely due to the efforts of the Australian Natives' Association of Victoria that this apathy has, to some extent at least, been overcome. The Association, formed originally for mutual benefit purposes, and admitting Australian natives only to membership, was for some years looked at rather askance by the grey-beards. But it succeeded by sheer pertinacity, and by the force of the rising tide. It took up the cause of federation warmly, and advocated it with constancy and determination. It sent delegates to the other colonies, established branches, and worked up in the minds of the youth a desire that their native land should rise to the dignity of a nation. In its early years the association was viewed, as I have said, with some suspicion, on account of its supposed leanings towards a policy of separation from the motherland. It has now, however, removed all taint of such a suspicion from itself; for it is ultra-loyal, and has always laid it down that federation must be accomplished under the Crown. It was at a conference convened by the Australian Natives' Association, held at Corowa, a small town on the Murray, that the principle was first advocated on which the more recent effort for federation has been conducted. This was that the people must be directly interested in the movement, by themselves electing delegates to a convention, apart from the Parliaments.
It is at this point that Mr G. H. Reid, the then Premier of New South Wales, becomes a prominent figure in the federation movement: which, indeed, it will easily be seen, has throughout (until the uprising of the national sentiment to which I referred) been a favourite means of self-advertisement, or play-ground for the personal ambitions, of one politician after another. Mr Reid is the most astute of them all; and is, indeed, the one man with whom the Home Government will have to reckon in case of trouble over the proposed abolition of the appeal to the Privy Council. He was not a member of the Convention of 1891, and posed as a strong opponent of the measure drafted by that Convention. But it is a curious feature of Australian politics that everyone is in favour of federation—even its most determined opponents. It is always only to the particular form, time, or conditions of federation that ostensible objection is taken, Mr Reid's position, then, was simply that the movement was premature. He thought there was no occasion to hasten towards federation, and he thought also, at the moment, maybe, that New South Wales had more to lose than to gain by it. He is an ardent free-trader, as free-traders go in Australia; and he saw that a federation accomplished between six or seven colonies, only one of which had adopted a free-trade policy, must almost inevitably be based on protectionist lines, so far at least as the outside world is concerned. However, he overcame his objections in this respect; and in 1895, on his suggestion, a conference of Premiers was held at Hobart, Tasmania. At this conference all the Australian colonies, with New Zealand as well as Tasmania, were represented. An enabling Bill was drafted for submission to the Parliaments, permitting the election (by the electors of each colony) of ten persons to a Convention to draw up a scheme of federation. This Bill was passed in all the colonies named except New Zealand and Queensland. It was not expected that New Zealand would come in; but the defection of Queensland was a severe blow to the movement. The Parliament of that colony failed, after several attempts, to agree as to the basis of the representation of the colony.
Mr Reid made a special journey to Queensland to try to induce the colony to join, for New South Wales expected the support of its northern neighbour on some of the crucial matters to be decided by the Convention. There was a fear that Victoria might obtain the support of the Southern and Western colonies in a combination against New South Wales, and the mother-colony was reluctant to enter into a Convention without Queensland. As a matter of fact, it may be said that such fears were groundless. The delegates to the Convention found a natural cleavage according to their political convictions, but there was no attempt to combine colony against colony, or one group of colonies against another.
The delegates were elected by each colony, voting as one constituency. This plan enabled the predominant party in each colony to secure the whole of the representation, if the election were conducted upon party lines. Victoria was the only colony where this occurred, and all her delegates were elected by the Radical party. The relative strength of that party, as opposed to the Constitutional or Conservative party, was as six to four; but the minority got no representation at all. Such acknowledged political leaders as Sir Frederick Sargood, Sir Henry Wrixon, Mr Gillies, and Mr Murray Smith, were excluded in favour of much inferior men of the other political colour, and this weakened the Victorian delegation as compared with the other colonies. In the other colonies a fair representation of all parties was secured; Western Australia, however, as usual, taking her own line, and sending delegates appointed, not by the people, but by Sir John Forrest. In New South Wales strong feeling was roused against the candidature of Cardinal Moran, the Roman Catholic Primate of Australia. This incautious, though (to those best acquainted with Australia) highly significant step provoked a counter-combination, amongst the Protestants, which included the leading men of both political parties: and His Eminency was defeated.
The Convention met at Adelaide in March 1897, and Mr C. C. Kingston, the Premier of that colony, was elected president. An initial mistake was made in administering a snub to Mr Reid, and appointing Mr Edmund Barton, a delegate from the same colony, as leader of the Convention, to act as a Premier does in arranging and submitting business. Such an appointment was necessary, for there must be some recognised leader if confusion and endless debates upon points of procedure are to be avoided, but it would have been much more tactful to appoint Mr Reid. There was, on the part of a number of the delegates, a certain jealousy of him. He is a masterful man, and they feared that he might assert himself too prominently. Moreover, Mr Barton is a Protectionist, and this had some weight in an assembly largely Protectionist. The arrangement was privately come to before the Convention met, the ostensible reason being that Mr Barton was elected head of the poll in New South Wales, and that therefore a compliment was paid to the mother colony in selecting him. Mr Reid showed no resentment, but seconded, in graceful terms, the proposal that Mr Barton should be the leader. In other respects the appointment was an excellent one, for Mr Barton is a man of great ability and tact, and he led the Convention in a masterly manner. Still this matter, small as it may seem, is of importance to anyone who wishes to get a grasp of the federal movement. It was undoubtedly a slight to Mr Reid, the originator of the Convention, to pass him by and select a delegate from the colony he represented—and a man not at that time connected with politics—in his place. Such petty intercolonial and personal jealousies have had marked effect on the movement at various stages. The effect of this action was, as many think, to transform Mr Reid, the most powerful man in the most important colony of the group, from an ardent leader to a watchful critic. He took a leading part in the Convention, it is true; but the subsequent failure or, rather, delay of the movement may have had a direct relation to this primary mistake. In a word, Australia has paid for an affront to Mr Reid by waiting another year or so for the Commonwealth.
I have mentioned the inducements to federation and the facilities for its accomplishment, and I must now set out a few of the most important difficulties to be overcome, and show how they were met. The first of these is the question of State rights. The colonies differ widely in population, from New South Wales with her 1,346,240 inhabitants, and Victoria with 1,175,490, to Tasmania with 177,341, and Western Australia with 168,129. Yet Tasmania is as much a political entity as New South Wales, and had no intention of entering into a federation unless its position as a State was strictly conserved. Otherwise it would simply be absorbed, and become a province, and a minor province, of the larger States. On the other hand, how were the two large colonies. New South Wales and Victoria, to be convinced that Tasmania should have equal power in the federation as a State with either of them? Again, it was conceded on all hands that responsible government, the form of government to which British people are accustomed, must be continued. This means that the executive must be responsible to one House alone, and that House must hold the power of the purse. How this can be accomplished and yet the States House—the Senate—can remain a strong institution, capable of conserving the rights of the several communities as States;—this was the really great difficulty in the way of the Convention. There were some who boldly asserted that responsible government was quite inconsistent with federation; that federation would kill responsible government, or responsible government would kill federation. On this question the Convention almost came to a deadlock. The representatives of the smaller States contended that if the Senate was to be a real protector of State rights it must have the power of amending as well as rejecting money Bills; and that its functions were entirely different from those of an ordinary Upper Chamber, which is merely a House of review, the representative of stability and deliberation, whose opposition is always to be set aside when the will of the people, clearly and unmistakably ascertained, is against it. What guarantee of the maintenance of State rights could there be if the Senate was thus to be always set aside, simply because a majority of the people of the Federation desired it? Ultimately a compromise was arrived at; several of the representatives of the smaller States giving way, against their own judgments—as they said—merely to save federation. The arrangement is that each colony shall be equally represented in the Senate; and that each House shall have equal power of originating Bills, with the exception of Bills appropriating revenue or imposing taxation, the right of originating which is reserved to the House of Representatives, the popular Chamber. The Senate will not have the power of amending these appropriation or taxation Bills, but it may return them to the House of Representatives, with a message suggesting the omission or amendment of any of their provisions; and the House of Representatives may deal as it pleases with such suggestions. This is the practice which obtains between the South Australian Houses, and it has been found to work well. There was bitter opposition to its adoption in the Commonwealth's Senate, on the part of both the smaller and larger States; so that it is probably the best practice possible. Some representatives of the latter contended that the power of suggestion is virtually the power of amendment. Some representatives of the smaller States maintained, on the contrary, that it gives away everything, for the House of Representatives may toss the suggestions aside and act as it pleases. However, as I have said, it was adopted as a compromise.
Allied to this difficulty was that of securing finality in regard to any legislation on which the two Houses may be opposed. It was contended by some delegates that under the Commonwealth Bill a permanent disagreement could not occur. The provisions of the suffrage were such that the people could not disagree permanently with themselves; for it had previously been provided that both Houses are to be elected on the suffrage that prevails in each colony for the election of the representatives of the popular Chamber—that is, practically on the basis of manhood suffrage, (or universal suffrage in the colonies which have adopted it) with no property qualification for either electors or representatives; every State to have six representatives in the Senate or States House, and to be represented according to population in the House of Representatives. How then, it was asked, could the people of the Federation, voting as States for the Senate, disagree with the people of the Federation voting as different constituencies for the election of their representatives in the Lower House? However this might be, it was determined to insert some provisions for the prevention of what are known as "deadlocks" between the two Houses. Here again there was great difficulty, and danger of final disagreement. It was proposed that the question in dispute should be decided by the electors at a referendum. But this was strenuously opposed by the representatives of the smaller States, as tending simply to swamp them by force of numbers, and give all power to the two large States. This, it was said, was not federation, but amalgamation and absorption. Finally, the following elaborate provision was arrived at. In the case of Bills, other than appropriation or taxation Bills, which have been twice passed by the House of Representatives, and twice rejected or shelved by the Senate, the two Houses are to be simultaneously dissolved; and if, after the election, they should still disagree, the members of the two Houses will meet at a joint sitting, and the Bill will become law if three-fifths of the members present, and voting at the joint sitting, vote for it. If less than that proportion vote for it, it will be rejected. In accordance with this arrangement, it is provided that the number of senators shall always be as nearly as possible half the number of representatives.
It had often been proclaimed by the political wiseacres that the protective system was the lion in the path of federation, for that no colony would consent to give up the Customs duties levied upon the goods of other colonies. There appeared, however, before the Convention met, a universal consensus of opinion amongst the people, guided still by the Australian Natives, that a federation must provide for the inter-colonial free-trade. And this point was conceded without dispute; the only question raised being as to how the colonies were to be compensated in their revenues for the loss of duties thus abolished. It was provided that within two years of the establishment of the Commonwealth a uniform Customs and Excise tariff shall be enacted; and that then trade between the colonies shall be absolutely free.
There was considerable difficulty over the question of the control of the rivers; for on this matter New South Wales, Victoria, and South Australia stood in a position of antagonism. The principal river system of Australia has its rise in New South Wales; and the Murrumbidgee joins the Murray, which is the northern boundary of Victoria, and which flows, in the latter part of its course, through South Australia. The last-named colony wished to provide that the navigability of the rivers should be the first consideration in the federation, fearing that New South Wales might in the future adopt some extensive system of irrigation, which would deprive the rivers of a considerable portion of their waters, and interfere with the navigation of the Murray. After a long discussion it was decided that the right to a "reasonable" use of the waters of a river for the purpose of irrigation or conservation shall be preserved to the people of the colony through which it flows. The interpretation of the word "reasonable" is left to the High Court of the Commonwealth, in case of dispute.
Another question, the importance attached to which people in England will find, at first, some difficulty in understanding, was the site of the federal capital. I have before alluded to the rivalries and jealousies existing between different colonies. Nowhere has this rivalry been so manifest as between Sydney and Melbourne. So strong is it, even now, on the part of Sydney residents more especially, that if the Convention had decided that the federal capital was to be fixed in Melbourne, New South Wales would not have consented to enter into the federation. On the other hand, Melbourne residents would be very reluctant to see Sydney chosen, as it is considered that great importance would be given to the rival city if the residence of the Governor-General was fixed in that capital, and the Houses of Parliament held their sitting there.
It was resolved to leave this matter to the Federal .Parliament to settle; but a proviso was added, on the motion of Sir George Turner, the Premier of Victoria, that the site of the federal city must be federal territory. This was designed to prevent either Melbourne or Sydney becoming the capital, for neither place, of course, could afford to excise a large proportion of valuable city property from its possessions, and hand it over to the Commonwealth.
The taking over of the public debts and the railways was strongly advocated by some, but there were so many difficulties in the way that it was felt that federation would be unduly postponed if it was not accomplished till these matters could be adjusted. Power was, however, given to the Federation to take these over, with the consent of the States.
The financial problems involved in federation proved to be most intricate, and no satisfactory solution was arrived at. It was provided that, immediately on the establishment of the Commonwealth, the Federal Government shall assume the administration of the departments of Customs and Excise; and at subsequent dates to be arranged it shall take over from the States posts and telegraphs, naval and military defence, lighthouses, lightships, beacons, buoys, and quarantine. Other matters of government may be given over, but only on federal legislation. The transfer of these services would leave the States with a large deficiency in their revenues, and it was therefore provided that for the first five years all the surplus raised by the Commonwealth, after paying for federal services, shall be returned to the States in the proportion contributed by them. In the meantime accounts are to be kept, with the help of which the Federal Parliament may arrive at an equitable method of distribution at the end of that term. Special concessions were made to Western Australia, which derives nearly all its revenue from Custom duties, most of which are levied on goods coming from the other colonies. If these duties were to be abolished without any compensatory arrangement. Western Australian finances would be hopelessly disarranged. It will be allowed, therefore, gradually to diminish its Customs tariff during a period of five years. Just at the close of the Convention, a provision was added, on the motion of Sir Edward Braddon, the Premier of Tasmania, that three-fourths of the revenue derived by the Commonwealth from Customs duties must be returned to the States. This clause, which, it will be perceived, might make it necessary, in order to secure enough revenue for Federal purposes, to impose a crushing weight of taxation on the States, was quickly assailed by the Bulletin as the "Braddon blot."
These were the most important points of difficulty, and the arrangements arrived at in respect to them. But it is necessary to mention one or two other matters in order that a clear understanding of the present position may be gained. The judicial power of the Commonwealth is to be vested in a High Court of Australia, which is to hear appeals from the Supreme Courts of the States, and from the inter-States Commission. This interference with the common-law right of all British subjects to appeal to the Privy Council, i.e. to their Sovereign, would be by way of depriving the Australian of his citizenship in the Empire. It was bitterly opposed by a large section of the community, especially amongst those lawyers whose opinion should carry most weight; a petition against it was presented to the Convention by the Australian National League; and it will probably be disallowed by the Imperial Parliament. It is a pity that a source of possible friction was not avoided by a hint, which might easily have been given by the Colonial Office, to Mr Reid and the other Premiers. But I have dealt more fully with this matter in a subsequent chapter.
The inter-States Commission is a body to be appointed for the proper administration of the federal laws relating to trade and commerce between the States of the Commonwealth. It will have jurisdiction, for instance, over the question of railway rates. There has been great rivalry on the borders between the different way systems, specially low rates being charged to attract trade from one colony to another. This has proved to be a most difficult matter to settle. I need only mention further that the Commonwealth has no powers except those specially delegated to it, all other matters resting in the control of the States; that the name "Commonwealth" was chosen, after much discussion, as being preferable to "Federation"; and that the members of each House are to be paid £400 a year each for their services.
The Federal Constitution can only be amended by an absolute majority of the members of each House of the Federal Parliament. The amendment is then to be submitted to the people by means of the referendum, and has to be accepted by a majority of the people of the Commonwealth, as well as by a majority of the States, before it becomes law. These precautions are held to be necessary, in the interests of the smaller States more especially. For if the Constitution were subject to any ready method of amendment, any provisions they might make at the outset for their preservation as States might be swept away by subsequent legislation.
The results that I have summarised were arrived at after three meetings of the Convention. Between the first and the second meeting the draft Bill was submitted to the various Parliaments, and many amendments were made. These were taken into consideration at a meeting in Sydney, which adjourned to Melbourne before it could finish its sittings. I have given the final results, attained after the Convention, all adjournments included, had sat for about a year, from March 1897 to March 17, 1898.
The next step was the submission of the Constitution Bill to the people, as provided in the Enabling Acts. Popular interest in the subject was kept alive by the press (which is a potent factor in political matters in Australia), and by public discussion. The advocate of the Bill worked hard, but there was in each colony a strong party of opposition. A tax of 30s. per head is levied on all cattle coming into the colony of Victoria, and it was gravely contended, on behalf of the grazing interest, that the abolition of this stock tax would reduce the value of land in Victoria by no less than £37,500,000. In New South Wales Mr Barton and a large party made splendid efforts to induce the people to accept the Bill, but Mr Reid's attitude was peculiar. For a long time he refrained from expressing his opinion. Then he made a speech in the Sydney Town Hall, so carefully balanced in praise and blame, that till the last sentence no one knew what course he proposed to recommend. He finally said that though he would vote for the Bill himself, he could not recommend others to do so, but would leave them to the exercise of their own judgment. He had, however, previously declared that if the Bill was accepted as it stood, he thought the federal capital would be certainly fixed in Melbourne, and had raised other strong objections.
The draft of the Enabling Bill, agreed to by the Premiers at Hobart, provided that in New South Wales the Commonwealth Bill should not pass unless 60,000 electors voted for it, in Victoria 50,000, and in the other Colonies in proportion. The Bill was at first passed in that shape in New South Wales, but subsequently, with the consent of Mr Reid, the minimum for New South Wales was raised to 80,000.
On June 3, 1898, a vote was taken in Victoria, New South Wales, South Australia, and Tasmania, on the Draft Commonwealth Bill, as passed by the Federal Convention in March, 1898. The voting was as follows:
| Victoria | 96,600 | for Federation | 21,200 | against it. |
| New South Wales | 71,472 | „ | 65,954 | „ |
| South Australia | 35,317 | „ | 17,173 | „ |
| Tasmania | 10,709 | „ | 2,532 | „ |
| Total | 214,038 | „ | 106,859 | „ |
Majority for the Bill 107,179. The Bill was carried in Victoria, South Australia, and Tasmania; but was lost in New South Wales, as the statutory number in favour (80,000) was not reached.
The Bill was not submitted to the people in Western Australia, as the Enabling Act of that Colony provided that Western Australia should only join a federation of which New South Wales formed a part. The three other Colonies, which had affirmed the Bill, might have proceeded to form a federation; but this was never even proposed, so general was the conviction that the Commonwealth was inevitable, and that, weary as everyone was by this time of the prolonged discussion, the matter must now be seen through once and for all.
The constituencies of New South Wales now became the battle-ground of federation, for a general election took place not long after the federal poll was taken. Mr Barton entered the lists in favour of the Bill, and opposed the Premier in his own constituency. No candidate declared against federation itself, but only against the particular form proposed. Mr Reid proposed in vague terms certain amendments, and invited the Premiers of the other Colonies to meet him to consider them. Sir George Turner replied by asking what amendments were proposed; but the Premiers of South Australia and Tasmania declined to go behind the vote of the people, and discuss amendments in a Bill which they had sanctioned by large majorities. Mr Barton was defeated, after a close contest, by the Premier, but the result of the elections as a whole was that Mr Reid's majority was reduced from one of over twenty members to four only. A considerable majority of the electors voted for those candidates who supported the Bill. Mr Barton was subsequently elected for another constituency.
After the election, Mr Reid submitted and passed through the Assembly of New South Wales the following amendments to the Bill:—
1. "That if equal representation of the Colonies in the Senate be insisted on, the provision for a three-fifths majority at the joint sitting of both Houses be removed, and a simple majority decide, or that the provision for a joint sitting be replaced by a provision for a national referendum." Mr Reid contended before the electors that the three-fifths majority provision would enable a minority to defy the majority.
2. "That what is known as the Braddon clause (three-quarters of the revenue from Customs to be given back to the States) be removed.
3. "That provision be made in the Bill for the establishment of the federal capital in such place within the boundaries of New South Wales as the Federal Parliament may determine.
4. "That better provision should be made against the alteration of the boundaries of a State without its own consent.
5. "That the use of inland rivers for the purpose of water conservation and irrigation should be more clearly safeguarded.
6. "That there should be a uniform practice in respect to money Bills, and that all money Bills should be treated as Taxation Bills.
7. "That the mode of appeal from the Supreme Courts of the State should be made uniform, namely, that the appeal should be either to the Privy Council or to the High Court, but not indiscriminately to either." And, lastly, a demand was made for a more thorough consideration of the financial clauses; the evil to be avoided, if possible, being "excessive burdens of taxation, a prolonged system of book-keeping, uncertainty as to the amount of the surplus to be divided, and uncertainty as to the method of distributing it among the States."
The other Premiers, after some difficulty, were induced to meet Mr Reid, and to take his proposals into consideration. And a final compromise was arrived at, the chief points in which were that deadlocks should be dealt with by a simple majority of both Houses at a joint sitting; that the operation of the Braddon clause should be limited to ten years; that the appeal to the Privy Council should be disallowed, in all matters affecting Federal or State rights, and, in private matters, should be restricted, if necessary, by Federal Legislation; and that the Federal Capital should be in New South Wales, at some point not less than 100 miles distant from Sydney. The Governor-General and the Parliament of the Commonwealth will use Melbourne as the temporary capital pending the selection (and construction) of the place of their banishment. And it is generally hoped in Australia that the land-values of this antipodean Washington (the name of which, by the way, remains to be invented) will go a long way towards lightening the burthen of taxation.
The amended Bill was again submitted to the popular vote in June and July of this year (1899), with the result that Victoria, South Australia, and Tasmania have reaffirmed, with additional emphasis, their former decision. New South Wales this time accepted it with a sufficient majority: thus leaving only two colonies (for New Zealand is definitely outside the Commonwealth) to be consulted. Queensland came in early in September, after a lively campaign, which was carried on throughout the colony: in which the anti-Federalists of Sydney and the whole of Australia showed themselves anxious to spare neither pains nor money over their last stand. Every use was made of the Queensland Separation movement, which had smouldered, with a gradually increasing intensity, for the last thirty years, or, indeed, since the foundation of the colony in 1859, The Separatists desired the sub-division of Queensland into three autonomous States; believing that their vast stretch of coast cannot be administered fairly from Brisbane, which is in the extreme south-east corner of the colony. Now, clause 123 of the Commonwealth Bill forbids the Federal Parliament to sub-divide a State without the consent of the State's Parliament; and moreover, Federation would abolish the right of appeal in such matters (expressly reserved, as it happens, in the existing constitutions of both Queensland and Western Australia) to the Imperial Government. Again, the Southern Colonies would in any case have objected to Queensland being represented in the Federal Senate as three States, with eighteen Senators instead of six. While, therefore, many of the farmers and manufacturers of the south were opposed to federation because it involves inter-colonial free-trade; and the planters were of course against it by reason of their fear of the Australian working-man and his inevitable Asiatic Exclusion Bill; the Northern and Central voters objected to it because it would make their dream of separation for ever impossible; and, finally, the whole South, as such, professed itself resolute to resist any attempt to meddle with Clause 123. The Asiatic question was, and is, particularly serious. Some form of coloured labour is probably essential to the prosperity of the far North. Yet the Australian democracy, and more especially the native-born Australians, who are, as has been seen, the very soul of the federal movement, are resolute not to allow any part of Australia to be over-run, as it easily might be, by swarms of such Chinese, Japanese, Cingalese, Javanese, Malays, and Kanakas, as have already secured a foot-hold in Queensland. The danger is far from being imaginary. Japanese women fill the brothels of the colony; Japanese men employ white labour in the pearl fisheries and on sugar plantations; white unfortunates are used as prostitutes by the Kanakas; Thursday Island is Asiatic; and the existence of a "secret protocol" between the Brisbane Government and that of the Mikado is apparently not denied. There were, it must be confessed, all the materials for a very pretty quarrel over these matters, taken as a whole. And yet, as seems to have been all along the expectation of those who know Australia most intimately, the one dominant desire for union carried the day, though, it is true, by a very bare majority; and even these final and most serious obstacles were somehow adjusted.
The case of Western Australia has been left to the last, because her case is singular. She is, in the first place, not essential, at all events at present, to the formation of the Commonwealth; and, in the second place, after having obviously waited to see if the recusancy of Queensland, or some other accident, might not give her a much desired excuse for not entering the Union, she is now showing her heartfelt reluctance (or rather that of her governing class) to pass under the central control. The history of this colony, as we have seen, has been entirely separate from that of the rest of Australia. Her population—the older section of it—has lived apart; and she is in a different stage of political and economic development Her agriculturalists are anxious to keep their home market, which the producers of the rest of the continent are equally anxious to exploit; and her statesmen wish her to have time peaceably to assimilate her new-comers, and (probably) to attempt new loans. She fears neglect and mismanagement; though no mismanagement of the gold-fields, it is true, could be worse than that which has allowed the whole of the dividend-paying mines to drift into European ownership, while the wage-earning population are left mostly without homes, and must remit half their incomes to their families on "the other side." Finally, under the Commonwealth, South Australia could refuse to permit a trans-continental railway, which it has now become Western Australia's chief ambition to construct. British Columbia, under similar circumstances, made the Canadian Pacific Railway the price of her adhesion to the Dominion. The Government, and the party of the old settlers, with the exception of their leader. Sir John Forrest, who is bound by his pledges to the Convention, are undisguisedly hostile to federation, and here is a rough statement of its "advantages" by a Radical and Outlander member of the Legislative Assembly;—
"The advantages of Federation:—New South Wales gets the federal capital, the biggest political power, the control of all the inland navigation of Australia, and the abolition of all border duties for her sheep and cattle. Victoria gets the temporary capital, the second political pull, and a free market for all her over-glutted manufactures. South Australia gets the sole right of building a trans-continental railway, or of refusing the same right to any other State. Queensland keeps her black labour, and has a huge protected market for her sugar, bananas, coffee, and other tropical produce. Tasmania gets the free run of Australasia for her fruits and jams. Western Australia gets the right to extra-tax herself for five years, and to lose £330,000 a year. No wonder George Reid reckons it a good bargain!" (Cf. Appendix C.)
The odds seem, on the face of it, to be against federation in Western Australia. Yet here, again, after all, opposition may melt away. The Premier is not in a hurry to go to the referendum. Mr Reid, shortly before his fall, thought it worth while to send him a rather blustering telegram, reminding him of his pledges, and threatening him and his with every penalty which can be visited on the backslider. (Somehow telegrams do not make altogether for diplomacy.) But the Bill, which has suffered drastic amendment from the Select Committee of the two Houses in Perth, must be submitted, in the end, to the people. And then, it is to be remembered that, whatever may be the course taken by the older population, the majority of the adult males of the colony are new-comers from "the other side "; who care little for the agriculture of their latest home, but a great deal for a cheap breakfast-table; who owe it to the management of Perth that they have mostly, till this referendum, been without a vote, and are likely to use their new power against their late masters; finally, who will refuse to be influenced by fiscal considerations, because the Australian working-man, in the plenitude of his power, as we have seen, always refuses to tax himself.
The obstacles to a perfectly complete federation of Australia are thus worst, perhaps, in the final lap. But in Western Australia, as was the case in Queensland, the conflict of local animosities and interests is so confused that men are as likely as not at any moment to turn, in sheer weariness and bewilderment, to the simple panacea of the Commonwealth. For Australia as a whole, federation, in the end, is now not only inevitable, but desirable, as the only hope of permanent security against the foreigner, and the very beginning of a national life. And the Empire has nothing to lose, but everything to gain by it. No cut-and-dried scheme of Imperial Federation will be brought forward by the discreet statesman who remembers how near we seemed to it in the years before the revolt of our American colonies, and how perilous a matter, among Anglo-Saxons, is taxation without representation. But Australia is our depot and main strength on that side of the world, whither the battle of world-interests is now shifting. Too much stress must not be laid by the enthusiast on the offers, which are for the moment fashionable, of colonial contingents for our ever-recurring wars. They are sometimes merely symptoms of a desire to combine a sort of authorised filibustering with the benefits of a camp of instruction; the outcome as well of the natural desire of officers and men for adventure and experience, as of a willingness of the colonial authorities to wash the spears of the young men of their embryonic armies at the expense, in the main, of the British tax-payer. Australia cannot afford to go seriously to war until she is obliged; though it is far from impossible that the stress of war, when it does come, may be productive of good, in the shape of renewed moral earnestness and the heightening of the national ideals. Yet in the meanwhile, on the other hand, it would be base, as well as unwise, to under-estimate the friendliness, the confidence, the racial loyalty, of which such spontaneous offers must necessarily be the outcome. And it is as well to remember that, even as things are, the forces locally raised by our colonial possessions generally almost equal our own Militia, which may yet again some day become our more specially British Army, when, if ever, the Imperial Army, as such, is re-organised to serve the requirements of an organised Empire: while, to look only to the immediate future, the Australian Commonwealth, in particular, which will take over the fortifications of Thursday Island and King George's Sound, must fortify also Hobart and Port Darwin; will organise its forces to protect its provincial capitals from the raids, with which they have repeatedly been threatened, of marauding European powers; and will probably maintain a field army capable of dealing with an invasion, for instance, of Mongolian sepoys. [See Appendix A.] The existing Federal Squadron, of five third class cruisers and two gunboats, will probably be increased; the formation of a Federal Naval Reserve is being considered; in a word, the newest nation in the Greater English Commonwealth is not to be, even at the outset, without its complement of national armed strength: which is always so much the better for us. The whole process is one of inevitable, because organic, growth: the formation of true political organisms. The Canadian Dominion and the Australian Commonwealth will be followed, as Lord Grey hoped to have seen, by a South African Union, and after that—But that is as far, perhaps, as we shall look (if we are wise) for the present. In the meantime, the Commonwealth Bill will be submitted to the British Parliament before long, and it will be for us to see that our colonial fellow-subjects are not legislated out of their Imperial citizenship. The constitutional link between the nation and the colonies is through the person of the Queen in Council. The Privy Council, which administered our first plantations, and which, so recently as Earl Grey's time, was held to be the proper authority to settle the then proposed constitutions of Australia and the Cape, is, for many reasons, more likely than Parliament itself to become the centre round which the ultimate organisation of the Imperial Commonwealth may crystallise. The judicial prerogative of Her Majesty is, as Mills puts it (apart from our control over the foreign relations of the colonies), the one yet unquestioned element of our Imperial power. And it is, for that matter, in a very experimental democracy, a great safeguard and convenience, as the Legislative Council of New South Wales and others have discovered, to the propertied Australian. But this is a matter which demands separate treatment.