Aircraft Accident Report, Southern Airways, Inc., DC-9, N97S, Tri-State Airport, Huntington, West Virginia, November 14, 1970/Synopsis

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Aircraft Accident Report, Southern Airways, Inc., DC-9, N97S, Tri-State Airport, Huntington, West Virginia, November 14, 1970
National Transportation Safety Board
3596916Aircraft Accident Report, Southern Airways, Inc., DC-9, N97S, Tri-State Airport, Huntington, West Virginia, November 14, 1970National Transportation Safety Board
SA-422
File No. 1-0223

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20591
AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT

Adopted: April 14, 1972



SOUTHERN AIRWAYS, INC., DC-9, N97S
TRI-STATE AIRPORT, HUNTINGTON, WEST VIRGINIA
NOVEMBER 14, 1970

SYNOPSIS

Southern Airways, Inc., DC-9, N97S, operating as charter Flight 932, crashed during a landing attempt at the Tri-State Airport, Huntington, West Virginia, at approximately 1936 e. s. t., on November 14, 1970. All 75 occupants, including 71 passengers and four crewmembers, were fatally injured. The aircraft was destroyed.

The flight, chartered to transport the Marshall University football team and boosters from Kinston, North Carolina, to Huntington, West Virginia, was attempting a nonprecision instrument landing approach to Runway 11 at the time of the accident. The crash occurred following impact with trees on a hill approximately 1 mile west of the runway threshold. The elevation of the broken trees at the initial impact site was approximately 922 feet m. s. l.

The Minimum Descent Altitude, below which descent is not authorized until the runway environment is in sight, for this instrument approach was 1,240 feet m. s. l.

The weather at the time of the accident was: 300 feet scattered, estimated 500 feet variable broke, 1,100 feet overcast, visibility five miles, light rain, fog, smoke, wind 360° at 4 knots, altimeter setting 29.67, ceiling ragged and variable 400 to 600 feet.

Probable Cause

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause of this accident was the descent below Minimum Descent Altitude during a nonprecision approach under adverse operating conditions, without visual contact with the runway environment. The Board has been unable to determine the reason for this descent, although the two most likely explanations are (a) improper use of cockpit instrumentation data, or (b) an altimetry system error.

Recommendations

The Board recommends that:

  1. All segments of the aviation industry continue to focus attention on the unique demands for crew coordination and vigilance during nonprecision approaches. Particular emphasis should be placed on the accelerated development of area navigation systems with vertical guidance capability and on heads-up display system.
  2. The Administrator evaluate the need for the installation and use of ground proximity warning devices on air carrier aircraft.
  3. The FAA continue to emphasize the importance of the provisions of Part 121. 445 in its surveillance and inspections of of flight operations of Part 121. Such emphasis is needed to assure that these operators (1) using the best means available to enable pilots to qualify under 121, 445, and (2) requiring pilots to show that they have acquired the requisite knowledge prior to completion of a flight release.