All the Works of Epictetus, Which Are Now Extant/Book 1/Chapter 29

by Epictetus

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CHAPTER XXIX.

Of Intrepidity.

§. 1.The Essence of Good and Evil, is a certain Disposition of the Choice.

What are Externals, then?

Materials to the Faculty of Choice: in the Management of which, it will attain its own Good or Evil.

How, then, will it attain Good?

If it doth not admire the Materials themselves: for right Principles, concerning these Materials, constitute a good Choice: but perverse and distorted Principles, a bad one. This Law hath God ordained, who says; "If you wish for Good, receive it from yourself." You say, No: but from another.——"Nay; but from yourself." In consequence of this, when a Tyrant threatens, and sends for me; I say, Against what is your Threatning pointed? If he says, "I will chain you;" I answer, It is my Hands and Feet that you threaten. If he says, "I will cut off your Head;" I answer, It is my Head that you threaten. If he says, "I will throw you into Prison;" I answer, It is the Whole of this paultry Body that you threaten: and, if he threatens Banishment, just the same.

Doth not he threaten you, then?

If I am persuaded, that these Things are nothing to me, he doth not: but, if I fear any of them, it is me that he threatens. Whom, after all, is it that I fear? The Master of what? Of Things in my own Power? Of these no one is the Master. Of Things not in my Power? And what are these to me?

§. 2. What, then! do you Philosophers teach us a Contempt of Kings?

By no means. Who of us teaches any one to contend with them, about Things of which they have the Command? Take my Body; take my Possessions; take my Reputation; take those who are about me. If I persuade any one to contend for these Things, as his own, accuse me, with Justice.——"Ay: but I would command your Principles too."——And who hath given you that Power? How can you conquer the Principle of another?——By applying Terror, I will conquer it.——Do not you see, that^[1] what conquers itself, is not conquered by another? And nothing but itself can conquer the Choice. Hence, too, the most excellent and equitable Law of God; that the Better should always prove superior to the Worse. Ten are better than One.

To what Purpose?

For chaining, killing, dragging where they please. for taking away an Estate, Thus Ten conquer One, in the Instance wherein they are better.

In what, then, are they worse?

When the one hath right Principles, and the others have not. For can they conquer in this Point? How should they? If we were weighed in a Scale, must not the Heavier outweigh?

§. 3. That ever Socrates should suffer such Things from the Athenians!

Wretch what do you mean by^[2] Socrates? Express the Fact as it is. That ever the poor paultry Body of Socrates should be carried away, and dragged to Prison, by such as were stronger [than itself]: that ever any one should give Hemlock to the Body of Socrates; and that it should expire! Do these Things appear wonderful to you? These Things unjust? Is it for such Things as these that you accuse God? Had Socrates, then, no Equivalent for them? In what, then, to him, did the Essence of Good consist? Whom shall we mind; you, or him? And what doth he say? "Anytus and Melitus^[3] may indeed kill; but hurt me they cannot." And again: "If it so pleases God, so let it be."

§. 4. But shew me, that he who hath the worse Principles, gets the Advantage over him, who hath the better. You never will shew it, nor any thing like it for the Law of Nature and of God, is this; Let the Better be always superior to the Worse.

In what?

In that, wherein it is better. One Body is stronger than another: Many than One; and a Thief, than one who is not a Thief. Thus I, too, lost my Lamp; because the Thief was better at keeping awake, than I. But he bought a Lamp, at the Price of being a Thief, a Rogue, and a wild Beast. This seemed to him a good Bargain: and much Good may it do him!

§. 5. Well: but one takes me by the Coat, and draws me to the Forum; and then all the rest bawl out——"Philosopher, what Good do your Principles do you? See, you are dragging to Prison: see, you are going to lose your Head!"——And, pray what Rule of Philosophy could I contrive, that, when a stronger than myself lays hold on my Coat, I should not be dragged? Or that, when ten Men pull me at once, and throw me into Prison, I should not be thrown there? But have I learnt nothing, then? I have learnt to know, whatever happens, that, if it is not a Matter of Choice, it is nothing to me. Have my Principles, then, done me no Good^[4]? What, then! do I seek for any thing else to do me Good, but what I have learnt? Afterwards, as I sit in Prison, I say: He, who makes this Outcry, neither hears what Signal is given, nor understands what is said; nor is it any Concern to him, to know what Philosophers say, or do. Let him alone.——[Well: but I am bid] to come out of Prison again.——If you have no further Need for me, in Prison, I will come out: if you want me again, I will return.——"For how long [will you go on thus?]"——Just as long as^[5] Reason requires I should continue in this paultry Body: when that is over, take it, and fare ye well. Only let not this be done inconsiderately; nor from Cowadice; nor upon every slight Pretence: for that, again, would be contrary to the Will of God: for he hath Need of such a World, and such [Creatures] to live on Earth. But, if he sounds a Retreat, as he did to Socrates, we are to obey him, when he sounds it, as our General.

§. 6. Well: but are these Things to be said to the World?

For what Purpose? Is it not sufficient to be convinced one's self? When Children come to us, clapping their Hands, and saying; "To-morrow is the good Feast of Saturn:" do we tell them, that Good doth not consist in such Things? By no means: but we clap our Hands along with them. Thus, when you are unable to convince any one, consider him as a Child, and clap your Hands with him: or, if you will not do that, at least hold your Tongue. These Things we ought to remember; and, when we are called to any Difficulty, know, that an Opportunity is come, of shewing whewhether we have been well taught. For he who goes from a philosophical Lecture to a difficult Point of Practice, is like a young Man who has been studying to solve Syllogisms. If you propose an easy one, he says; Give me rather a fine intricate one, that I may try my Strength. Even athletic Champions are displeased with a slight Antagonist. He cannot lift me, says one. This is a Youth of Spirit. No: but, I warrant you, when the Occasion calls upon him, he must fall a crying, and say: "I wanted to learn a little longer first."——Learn what? If you did not learn these Things to shew them in Practice, why did you learn them at all? I am persuaded there must be some one among you who sit here, that feels secret Pangs of Impatience, and says; "When will such a Difficulty come to my Share, as hath now fallen to his? Must I sit wasting my Life in a Corner, when I might be crowned at Olympia? When will any one bring the News of such a Combat, for me?" Such should be the Disposition of you all. Even among the Gladiators of Cæsar, there are some who bear it very ill, that they are not brought upon the Stage, and match'd; and who offer Vows to God, and address the Officers, begging to fight. And will none among you, appear such? I would willingly take a Voyage, on purpose to see how a Champion of mine acts; how he treats his Subject.——"I do not chuse such a Subject," say you.——Is it in your Power, then, to take what Subject you chuse? Such a Body is given you; such Parents, such Brothers, such a Country, and such a Rank in it; and, then, you come to me, and say, "Change my Subject." Besides, have not you Abilities to manage that which is given you? It is your Business, [we should say] to propose; mine, to treat the Subject well.——"No. But do not propose such an Argument to me; but such a one: do not offer such an Objection to me; but such a one."——There will be a Time, I suppose, when Tragedians will fancy themselves to be mere Masks, and Buskins, and long Train. These Things are your Materials, Man, and your Subject. Speak something; that we may know, whether you are a Tragedian, or a Buffoon: for both have all the rest, in common. If any one, therefore, should take away his Buskins, and his Mask, and bring him upon the Stage, in his^[6] common Dress, is the Tragedian lost, or doth he remain? If he hath a voice, he remains. "Here, this Instant, take upon you the Command." I take it; and, taking it, I shew how a Person, who hath been properly instructed, behaves.——"Lay aside your Robe; put on Rags, and come upon the Stage in that Character."——What then? Is it not in my Power to bring a good Voice [and Manner] along with me?——"In what Character do you now appear?" As a^[7] Witness cited by God.——"Come you, then, and bear witness for me; for you are a Witness worthy of being produced by me. Is any thing, external to the Choice, either Good or Evil? Do I hurt any one? Have I placed the Good of each individual in any one, but in himself? What Evidence do you give for God?"——I am in a miserable Condition, O Lord^[8]; I am undone: no Mortal cares for me: no Mortal gives me any thing: all blame me; all speak ill of me.——Is this the Evidence you are to give? And will you bring Disgrace upon his Citation, who hath conferred such an Honour upon you, and thought you worthy of being produced as a Witness in such a Cause?

§. 7. But he who hath the Power, hath given Sentence. "I judge you to be impious and profane."——What hath befallen you?——I have been judged to be impious and profane——Any thing else?——Nothing——Suppose he had pass'd his Judgment upon an hypothetical Proposition, and pronounced it to be a false Conclusion, that, if it be Day, it is light; what would have befallen the Proposition? In this Case, who is judged; who condemned; the Proposition, or he who is deceived, concerning it? Doth he, who hath the Power of pronouncing any thing, concerning you, know, what Pious, or Impious, mean? Hath he made it his Study, or learned it? Where? From whom? A Musician would not regard him, if he pronounced Bass to be Treble: nor a Mathematician, if he pass'd Sentence, that Lines drawn from the Center to the Circle, are not equal. And shall He, who is truly learned, regard an unlearned Man, when he pronounces upon Pious and Impious, Just and Unjust?

§. 8. "Oh the Injuries to which the Learned are exposed!" Is it here that you have learn'd this? Why do not you leave such pitiful Reasonings to idle pitiful Fellows^[9]; and let them sit in a Corner, and receive some little sorry Pay; or grumble, that nobody gives them any thing? But do you appear, and make use of what you have learn'd. It is not Reasonings that are wanted now. On the contrary, Books are stuffed full of Stoical Reasonings.

What is wanted, then?

One to apply them; whose Actions may bear Testimony to his Doctrines. Assume me this Charracter, that we may no longer make use of the Examples of the Ancients, in the Schools; but may have some Example of our own.

§. 9. To whom, then, doth the Contemplation of these [speculative Reasonings] belong?

To him, that hath Leisure. For Man is an Animal fond of Contemplation. But it is shameful to take a View of these Things, as run-away Slaves do of a Play. We are to sit quietly, and listen, sometimes to the Actor, and sometimes to the Musician: and not do like those, who come in and praise the Actor, and at the same time look round them every Way: then, if any one happens to name their Master, are frighted out of their Wits, and run off. It is shameful for a Philosopher, thus to contemplate the Works of Nature. Now, what, in this Case, is the Master? Man is not the Master of Man; but Death, and Life, and Pleasure, and Pain: for without these, bring Cæsar to me, and you will see how intrepid I shall be. But, if he comes thundering and lightening with these, and these are the Objects of my Terror; what do I else, but, like the run-away Slave, acknowledge my Master? While I have any Respite from these, as the Fugitive comes into the Theatre, so I bathe, drink, sing; but all, with Terror and Anxiety. But, if I free myself from my Masters, that is, from such Things as render a Master terrible, what Trouble, what Master have I remaining?

§. 10. What, then, are we to publish these Things to all Men?

No. But humour the Vulgar, and say; This poor Man advises me to what he thinks good for himself. I excuse him for Socrates, too, excused the Jailer, who wept when he was to drink the Poison: and said, "How heartily he sheds Tears for us." Was it to him that Socrates said, "For this Reason we sent the Women out of the Way?" No: but to his Friends; to such, as were capable of hearing it; while he humoured the other, as a Child.

Footnotes

1. The Sense of this Passage seems to require that the first αυτο should be read ὁ.
2. Socrates, being asked by Crito, in what manner he would be buried? answered, As you please; if you can lay hold on me, and I do not escape from you. Then, smiling, and turning to his Friends, I cannot, says he, persuade Crito, that I, who am now disputing, and ranging the Parts of my Discourse, am Socrates: but he thinks the Corpse, which he will soon behold, to be me; and, therefore, asks how he must bury me. Plato, in Phæd. §. 64. Forster's Edition.
3. The two principal Accusers of Socrates.
4. This is evidently a Continuation of the Philosopher's Answer to those who reproached him, that his Principles had done him no Good; and, therefore, is translated in the first Person, though it is ωφελησαι and ζητεις in the Greek. This sudden Change of the Person, is very frequent in Epictetus; but would often disturb the Sense, if it was preserved in a Translation. Perhaps ωφελησαι is a Mistake, for ωφελημαι; as Μ, Σ are the same Letters differently turned.
5. The Meaning of Epictetus in this Passage is not clear. If he is speaking of a voluntary Death, which some of his Expressions plainly imply, the Instance of Socrates seems improperly chosen: for he did not kill himself; but was sentenced by the Laws of his Country: to which, indeed, he paid so great a Reverence, as to refuse all the Assistance which was offered by his Friends, in order to his Escape.
6. Φαινολη. Lord Shaftesbury.
7. This imaginary Witness, first extolled, then failing in his Testimony, brings to one's Mind with unspeakable Advantage, that true and faithful Witness, who hath so fully attested the far more important Doctrines of Pardon, Grace, and everlasting Life: and taught Men, on this Foundation, not to be afraid of them that kill the Body; and, after that, have no more that they can do.
8. It hath been observed, that this manner of Expression is not to be met with in the Heathen Authors before Christianity: and, therefore, it is one Instance of Scripture Language coming early into common Use.
9. The mercenary Profesors of Philosophy, at that time.