All the Works of Epictetus, Which Are Now Extant/Book 2/Chapter 17

by Epictetus

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CHAPTER XVII.

How to adopt Pre-conceptions to particular Cases.

§. 1.What is the first Business of one who studies Philosophy?^[1] To part with Self-Conceit. For it is impossible for any one to begin to learn what he hath a Conceit that he already knows. We all go to the Philosophers, talking at all Adventures upon negative and positive Duties; Good and Evil; Fair and Base. We praise, censure, accuse; we judge and dispute about fair and base Enterprises. And for what do we go to the Philosophers? To learn what we suppose ourselves not to know. And what is this? Theorems. We are desirous to hear what the Philosophers say, for its Elegance and Acuteness; and some with a View only to Gain. Now it is ridiculous to suppose, that a Person will learn any thing, but what he desires to learn; or make an Improvement, in what he doth not learn. But most are deceived, in the same Manner as Theopompus, the Orator, when he blames Plato, for defining every thing. "For, what, says he, did none of us, before you, use the Words Good and Just: or did we utter them as empty Sounds, without understanding what each of them meant?" Why, who tells you, Theopompus, that we had not natural Ideas and Preconceptions of each of these? But it is not possible, to adapt Pre-conceptions to their correspondent Subjects, without having minutely distinguished them, and examined what is the proper Subject to each. You may make the same Objection to the Physicians. For who of us did not use the Words, Wholesome and Unwholesome, before Hippocrates was born: or did we utter them as empty Sounds? For we have some Pre-conception of Wholesome too; but we cannot adapt it. Hence, one says, Let the Patient abstain from Meat; another, Give it him: one says, Let him be bled; another, Cup him. And what is the Reason, but not being able to adapt the Pre-conception of Wholesome, to particular Cases? Thus, too in Life: who of us doth not talk of Good and Evil; Advantageous and Disadvantageous: for who of us hath not a Pre-conception of each of these? But is it then a distinct and perfect one? Show me this.

How shall I show it?

§. 2. Adapt it properly to particular Subjects. Plato, to go no farther, puts Definitions under the Pre-conception of Useful; but you, under that of Useless. Can both of you be right? How is it possible? Again: doth not one Man adapt the Preconception of Good, to Riches? Another, not to Riches, but to Pleasure, or Health? Upon the whole, if none of us, who use Words, either utter them without Meaning, or need to take any manner of Care in distinguishing our Pre-conceptions, why do we differ? Why do we wrangle? Why do we censure each other? But what Occasion have I to mention this mutual Contradiction? If you yourself adapt your Pre-conceptions properly, how comes it to pass, that you do not prosper? Why do you meet with any Hindrance? Let us for the present omit the second Topic, concerning the Pursuits, and the Duties relative to them: Let us omit the Third too, concerning Assent. I make you a Present of all these. Let us insist only on the First^[2]; which affords almost a sensible Proof, that you do not adapt your Pre-conceptions right. You desire what is possible in itself, and possible for you. Why then are you hindered? Why are not you in a prosperous Way? You do not decline what is necessary. Why then do you incur any thing [which is your Aversion?] Why are you unfortunate? When you desire any thing, why doth it not happen? When you do not desire it, why doth it happen? For this is the greatest Demonstration of ill Success and Misery. I desire something; and it doth not happen: and what is more wretched than I? From an Impatience of this, Medea came to murder her own Children: an Action of a noble Spirit in this View; for she had a proper Impression of what it was to be disappointed of one's Desire. "Thus I shall punish him, who hath injured and dishonoured me: and what is so wicked a Wretch good for? But how is this to be effected? I will murder the Children: but that will be punishing myself. And what do I care?" This is the Error of a Soul indued with great Powers. For she knew not where the Completion of our Desires is to be found: that it is not to be had from without; nor by altering the Appointment of Things. Do not desire the Man for your Husband, and nothing which you do desire will fail to happen. Do not desire to keep him to yourself. Do not desire to stay at Corinth; and, in a Word, have no Will, but the Will of God; and who shall restrain you; who shall compel you, any more than Jupiter? When you have such a Guide, and conform your Will and Inclinations to his, what need you fear being disappointed? Yield up your Desire and Aversion [as Slaves] to Riches, or Poverty; the one will be disappointed, the other incurred. Yield them up to Health, Power, Honours, your Country, Friends, Children, in short, to any thing independent on Choice, you will be unfortunate. But yield them up to Jupiter, and the other Gods. Give yourself up to these: let these govern: let both be ranged on the same Side with these; and how can you be any longer unprosperous? But if, poor Wretch, you envy, and pity, and are jealous, and tremble, and never cease, a single Day, from complaining of yourself, and the Gods, why do you boast of your Education? What Education, Man? That you have learned convertible Syllogisms? Why do not you, if possible, unlearn all these, and begin again; convinced, that hitherto, you have not even touched upon the Point? And, for the future, beginning from this Foundation, proceed, in Order, to the Superstructure; that nothing may happen which you do not wish, and that every thing may happen which you do. Give me but one young Man, who brings this Intention with him to the School; who is a Champion for this Point; and says, "I yield up all the rest: it suffices me, if once I become able to pass my Life, free from Hindrance and Grief: to stretch out my Neck to all Events, as free; and to look up to Heaven, as the Friend of God, fearing nothing that can happen." Let any one of you show himself of such a Disposition, that I may say, "Come into the Place, young Man, that is of right your own; for you are destined to be an Ornament to Philosophy. Yours are these Possessions; yours these Books; yours these Discourses." Then, when he hath master'd, and got the better of this first Class, let him come to me again, and say; "I desire indeed to be free from Passion, and Perturbation; but I desire too, as a pious, a philosophic, and a carefully attentive Man, to know, what is my Duty to God, to my Parents, to my Relations, to my Country, and to Strangers." "Come into the second Class too; for this likewise is yours." "But I have now sufficiently studied the second Class too; and I would willingly be secure, and^[3] unshaken by Error and Delusion, not only awake, but even when asleep; when warmed with Wine; when diseased with the Spleen." "You are a God, Man: your Intentions are great."

§. 3. "No. But I, for my part, desire to understand what Chrysippus says, in his logical Treatise of the^[4] Pseudomenos."——Go hang yourself, pitiful Wretch, with such an Intention as this. What Good will it do you? You will read the Whole lamenting all the while; and say to others, trembling, "Do as I do."——"Shall I read to you, my Friend, and you to me?——You write^[5] surprisingly, Sir; and you very finely imitate the Stile of Plato; and you, of Xenophon; and you, of Antisthenes." And thus, having relating your Dreams to each other, you return again to the same State. Your Desires and Aversions, your Pursuits, your Intentions, your Resolutions, your Wishes and Endeavours, are just what they were. You do not so much as seek for one to advise you; but are offended when you hear such Things as these; and cry, "An ill-natured old Fellow! He never wept over me, when I was setting out, nor said; To what a Danger are you going to be exposed! If you come off safe, Child, I will illuminate my House." "This would have been the Part of a good-natured Man." Truly, it will be a mighty Happiness, if you do come off safe: it will be worth while to make an Illumination. For you^[6] ought to be immortal, and exempt from Sickness, to be sure.

§. 4. Throwing away then, I say, this Self-conceit, by which we fancy, we have gained some Knowledge of what is useful, we should come to philosophic Reasoning, as we do to Mathematics and Music: otherwise we shall be far from making any Improvement, even if we have read over all the Collections and Compositions, not only of Chrysippus, but of Antipater and Archedemus too.

Footnotes

1. See B. II. c. 11. §. 1.
2. i. e. The Topic of the Desires and Aversions.
3. There are several Readings and Conjectures. I have followed Wolfius; who reads, for ασιτως, ασειστος; as agreeing best with the Sense.
4. The Pseudomenos was a famous Problem among the Stoics; and it is this. When a Person says, I lie; doth he lie, or doth he not? If he lies, he speaks Truth: if he speaks Truth, he lies. The Philosophers composed many Books on this Difficulty. Chrysippus wrote six. Philetas wasted himself to Death in studying to answer it. Menage on Diog. Laert. L. II. §. 108. Brucker Hist. Crit. Philos. vol. i. p. 613, 614.
5. This is spoken by Epictetus, in the Person of one of his Scholars; to ridicule their complimenting each other on their Writings, while they neglected the more important Concern of moral Improvements.
6. Σε δει should be σε εδει.