All the Works of Epictetus, Which Are Now Extant/Book 2/Chapter 23

by Epictetus

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CHAPTER XXIII.

Of the Faculty of Speaking.

§. 1.A book will always be read with the greater Pleasure, and Ease too, if it be written in a fair Character: therefore every one will the more easily attend to Discourses likewise, ornamented with proper and beautiful Expressions. It^[1] ought not then to be said, that there is no such Thing as the Faculty of Elocution: for this would be at once the Part of an impious and fearful Person^[2]. Impious; because he dishonours the Gifts of God; just as if he should deny any Use in the Faculty of Sight, Hearing, and Speech itself. Hath God then given you Eyes in vain? Is it in vain, that he hath infused into them, such a strong and active Spirit, as to be able to represent the Forms of distant Objects^[3]? What Messenger is so quick and diligent? Is it in vain, that he hath made the intermediate Air, so yielding, and elastic, that the Sight penetrates through it? And is it in vain, that he hath made the Light; without which all the rest would be useless? Man, be not ingrateful; nor, on the other hand, unmindful of your superior Advantages^[4]: but for Sight, and Hearing, and indeed for Life itself and the Supports of it, as Fruits, and Wine, and Oil, be thankful to God: but remember, that he hath given you another Thing, superior to them all; which makes use of them, proves them, estimates the Value of each^[5]. For what is it that pronounces upon the Value of each of these Faculties? Is it the Faculty itself? Did you ever perceive the Faculty of Sight or Hearing, to say any thing concerning itself? Or Wheat, or Barley, or Horses, or Dogs? No. These Things are appointed as Instruments and Servants, to obey that which is capable of using the Appearances of Things. If you inquire the Value of any thing; of what do you inquire? What is it that answers you^[6]? How then can any Faculty be superior to this; which both uses all the rest as Instruments, and tries and pronounces concerning each of them? For which of them knows, what itself is; and what is its own Value? Which of them knows, when it is to be used, and when not? Which is it, that opens and shuts the Eyes, and turns them away from improper Objects? Is it the Faculty of Sight? No: but that of Choice. Which is it, that opens and shuts the Ears? What is it, by which they are made curious and inquisitive; or, on the contrary, deaf, and unaffected by what is said? Is it the Faculty of Hearing? No: but that of Choice. Will this then, perceiving itself to exist in [Man amidst] the other Faculties, [which are] all blind and deaf, and unable to discern any thing, but those Offices, in which they are appointed to minister, and be subservient to it; and that itself alone sees clearly, and distinguishes the Value of each of the rest; will this, I say, inform us, that any thing is supreme, but itself? What doth the Eye, when it is opened, do more, than see? But whether we ought to look upon the Wife of any one, and in what manner, what is it that tells us? The Faculty of Choice. Whether we ought to believe, or to disbelieve what is said; or whether, if we do believe, we ought to be moved by it, or not; what is it that tells us? Is it not the Faculty of Choice? Again: the very Faculty of Elocution, and that which ornaments Discourse, if there be any such peculiar Faculty, what doth it more, than merely ornament and arrange Expressions, as Curlers do the Hair? But whether it be better to speak, or to be silent; or better to speak in this, or in that Manner; whether this be decent, or indecent; and the Season and Use of each; what is it that tells us, but the Faculty of Choice? What then, would you have it appear, and bear Testimony against itself? What means this? If the Case be thus, that which serves, may be superior to that to which it is subservient; the Horse to the Rider; the Dog, to the Hunter; the Instrument, to the Musician; or Servants to the King. What is it that makes use of all the rest? Choice. What takes care of all? Choice. What destroys the whole Man, at one time, by Hunger; at another, by a Rope, or a Precipice? Choice. Hath Man, then, any thing stronger than this? And how is it possible, that what is liable to Restraint should be stronger, than what is not? What hath a natural Power of hindering the Faculty of Sight? Both Choice, and what depends on Choice. And it is the same of the Faculties of Hearing and Speech. And what hath a natural Power of hindering Choice? Nothing independent on itself, only its own Perversion. Therefore Choice alone is Vice: Choice alone is Virtue.

§. 2. Since, then, Choice is such a Faculty, and placed in Authority over all the rest, let it come forth and say to us, that the Body is, of all Things, the most excellent. If even the Body itself pronounced itself to be the most excellent, it could not be borne. But now, what is it, Epicurus, that pronounces all this? What was it, that composed Volumes, concerning^[7] the End of [Being], the^[7] Nature of Things, the^[7] Rule [of Reasoning]; that assumed a philosophic Beard; that, as it was dying, wrote, that it was then spending its last and happiest Day^[8]? Was this, Body, or was it the Faculty of Choice? And can you then, without Madness, confess any thing superior to this? Are you in reality so deaf and blind? What then, doth any one, dishonour the other Faculties? Heaven forbid! Doth any one deny, that the Faculty of Sight^[9] is useful, and preferable [to the Want of it]? Heaven forbid! It would be stupid, impious, and ungrateful to God. But we render to each its Due. There is some Use of an Ass, tho' not so much as of an Ox; and of a Dog, though not so much as of a Servant; and of a Servant, though not so much as of the Citizens; and of the Citizens, though not so much as of the Magistrates. And, though some are more excellent than others, those Uses, which the last afford, are not to be despised. The Faculty of Elocution hath its Value, though not equal to that of Choice. When therefore I talk thus, let not any one suppose, that I would have you neglect Elocution, any more than your Eyes, or Ears, or Hands, or Feet, or Clothes, or Shoes. But if you ask me, what is the most excellent of Things, what shall I say? I cannot say, Elocution, but a right Choice: for it is that which makes use of this, and all the other Faculties, whether great or small. If this be set right, a bad Man becomes good; if it be wrong, a good Man becomes wicked. By this we are unfortunate, fortunate; we disapprove, or approve each other. In a word, it is this, which, neglected, forms Unhappiness; and, well cultivated, Happiness.

§. 3. But to take away the Faculty of Elocution; and to say, that it is in reality nothing, is not only ingrateful to those who gave it, but cowardly too. For such a Person seems to me to be afraid, that, if there be any such Faculty, we may not, on occasion, be able to treat it with Contempt. Such are they too, who deny any Difference between Beauty, and Deformity. Was it possible then, to be affected in the same Manner by seeing Thersites, as Achilles; or Helen, as any^[10] other Woman? These also are the foolish and clownish Notions of those, who are ignorant of the Nature of Things; and afraid, that, whoever perceives a Difference, must prefently be carried away, and overcome. But the great Point is to leave to each Thing its own proper Faculty; and then to see what the Value of that Faculty is, and to learn what is the principal Thing, and, upon every Occasion, to follow that, and to make it the chief Object of our Attention: to consider other Things as trifling in Comparison of this; and yet, as far as we are able, not to neglect even these. We ought, for Instance, to take care of our Eyes; but not as of the principal Thing, but only on account of the Principal: because that will no otherwise preserve its own Nature, than by making a due Estimation of the rest, and preferring some to others. What is the usual Practice then? That of a Traveller, who returning into his own Country, and meeting on the Road with a good Inn, being pleased with the Inn, should remain at the Inn. Have you forgot your Intention, Man? You were not travelling to this Place, but only through it. "But this is a fine Place." And how many other fine Inns are there, and how many pleasant Fields? But only to be past through in your Way. The Business is, to return to your Country; to relieve the Anxieties of your Family; to perform the Duties of a Citizen; to marry; have Children; and go through the public Offices. For you did not set out, to chuse the finest Places; but to return, to live in that where you were born, and of which you are appointed a Citizen.

§. 4. Such is the present Case. Because by Speech, and verbal Precepts, we are to arrive at Perfection; and purify our own Choice; and rectify that Faculty, of which the Office is, the Use of the Appearances of Things: and, because, for the Delivery of Theorems, a certain Manner of Expression, and some Variety and Subtilty of Discourse, becomes necessary; many, captivated by these very Things, one, by Expression, another, by Syllogisms, a third, by convertible Propositions, just as our Traveller was by the good Inn, go no further: but sit down and waste their Lives shamefully there, as if amongst the Sirens. Your Business, Man, was to prepare yourself for such an Use of the Appearances of Things, as Nature demands: Not to be frustrated of your Desires, or incur your Aversions: never to be disappointed, or unfortunate: but free, unrestrained, uncompelled; conformed to the Administration of Jupiter; obedient to that; finding fault with nothing but able to say, from your whole Soul, the Verses which begin,

Conduct me, Jove; and thou, O Destiny.

While you have such a Business before you, will you be so pleased with a pretty Form of Expression, or a few Theorems, as to chuse to stay and live with them, forgetful of your Home; and say, "They are fine Things!" Why, who says they are not fine Things; But only as a Passage; as an Inn. For, could you speak like Demosthenes, what hinders, but that you might be a disappointed Wretch? Could you resolve Syllogisms like Chrisippus, what hinders, but that you might be miserable, sorrowful, envious, in short, disturbed, unhappy? Nothing You see then, that these are mere Inns, of small Value; and that your Point in View, is quite another Thing. When I talk thus to some, they suppose, that I am overthrowing all Care about Speaking, and about Theorems: but I do not overthrow that; only the resting in these Things without End, and placing our Hopes there. If any one, by maintaining this, hurts an Audience, place me amongst those hurtful People: for I cannot, when I see one Thing to be the principal and most excellent, call another so, to gain your Favour.

Footnotes

1. These are the Words of Epictetus; to which there are others equivalent afterwards. His Meaning, probably, is, that the Value and Usefulness of the Faculty of Elocution ought not to be denied: in Opposition to the Doctrine of Epicurus, who declared all the liberal Arts and Sciences to be useless and mischievous. See Diog. Laert. L. X. §. 6. and Menage's Notes there.
2. He proves the Timidity at the Beginning of §. 3.
3. It was an old Notion, that Vision was performed by the Emission of Rays from the Eye to the Object, not the Admission of Rays from the Object into the Eye; and to this Epictetus here refers.
4. Mr. Upton gives a different Sense to κρεισσονων; but I think, that both παλιν, and what afterwards follows, justifies the English Translation.
5. See B. I. c. 1.
6. The Hearer is understood in this Place to say, The Faculty of Choice. It is not improbable, however, that the Greek Word προαιρετικη, may have been omitted in transcribing.
7. Celebrated Treatises on these Subjects, composed by Epicurus.
8. These Words are Part of a Letter written by Epicurus, when he was dying, to one of his Friends. See Diog. Laert. L. X. §. 22.
9. Probably for προαιρετικη: should be read ορατικης; which Word is used by Epictetus, but a little more than a Page before.
10. Mr. Upton's Reading ἡν ετυχε.