All the Works of Epictetus, Which Are Now Extant/Book 3/Chapter 1
THE
DISCOURSES
OF
EPICTETUS.
BOOK III.
CHAPTER I.
Of Finery in Dress.
§. 1.
Certain young Rhetorician coming to him, with his Hair too curiously ornamented, and his Dress very fine; Tell me, says Epictetus, whether you do not think some Horses and Dogs beautiful; and so of all other Animals?
I do.
Are some Men then likewise beautiful, and others deformed?
Certainly.
Do we call each of these beautiful then in its Kind, on the same Account, or on some Account, peculiar to itself? You will judge of it, by this: since we see a Dog naturally formed for one thing, a Horse for another, and a Nightingale, for Instance, for another; in general, it will not be absurd to pronounce each of them beautiful, so far as it is in the Condition most suitable to its own Nature: but, since the Nature of each is different, I think each of them must be beautiful, in a different Way. Is it not so?
Agreed.
Then, what makes a Dog beautiful, makes a Horse deformed; and what makes a horse beautiful, a Dog deformed; if their Natures are different.
So it seems probable.
For, I suppose, what makes a good Pancratiast[1] makes no good Wrestler, and a very ridiculous Racer; and the very same Person who appears beautiful as a Pentathlete[1], would appear very deformed, in Wrestling.
Very true.
What then, makes a Man beautiful? Is it the same, in general, that makes a Dog or a Horse so?
The same.
What is it then, that makes a Dog beautiful?
That Excellency which belongs to a Dog.
What, a Horse?
The Excellency of a Horse.
What, a Man? Must it not be the Excellency belonging to a Man? If then you would appear beautiful, young Man, strive for human Excellency.
What is that?
Consider, when you praise, without partial Affection, whom you praise: Is it the Honest, or the Dishonest?
The Honest.
The Sober, or the Dissolute?
The Sober.
The Temperate, or the Intemperate?
The Temperate.
Then, if you make yourself such a Character, you know that you will make yourself beautiful: but, while you neglect these Things, though you use every Contrivance to appear beautiful, you must necessarily be deformed.
§. 2. I know not how to say any thing further to you: for if I speak what I think, you will be vexed, and perhaps go away, and return no more. And, if I do not speak, consider how I shall act: if you come to me to be improved, and I do not improve you; and you come to me as to a Philosopher, and I do not speak like a Philosopher.[2] Besides: how could it be consistent with my Duty towards yourself, to overlook, and leave you uncorrected? If hereafter you should come to have Sense, you will accuse me, with Reason: "What did Epictetus observe in me, that, when he saw me come to him, in such a shameful Condition, he overlooked it, and never said so much as a Word of it? Did he so absolutely despair of me? Was not I young? Was not I able to hear Reason? How many young Men, at that Age, are guilty of many such Errors? I am told of one Polemo, who, from a most dissolute Youth, became totally changed[3]. Suppose he did not think I should become a Polemo; he might however have set my Locks to rights: he might have stript off my Bracelets and Rings: he might have prevented my picking off the Hairs from my Person. But when he saw me dressed like awhat shall I say?he was silent." I do not say like what; when you come to your Senses, you will say it yourself, and will know what it is, and who they are who study such a Dress.
§. 3. If you should hereafter lay this to my Charge, what Excuse could I make;Ay: but if I do speak, he will not regard me. Why, did Laius regard Apollo? Did not he go and get drunk, and bid Farewel to the Oracle? What then? Did this hinder Apollo, from telling him the Truth? Now, I am uncertain, whether you will regard me, or not; but Apollo positively knew, that Laius would not regard him, and yet he spoke[4]. "And why did he speak?" You may as well ask, Why is he Apollo; why doth he deliver Oracles; why hath he placed himself in such a Post as a Prophet, and the Fountain of Truth, to whom the Inhabitants of the World should resort? Why is Know Thyself inscribed on the Front of his Temple, when no one minds it?
§. 4. Did Socrates prevail on all who came to him, to take care of themselves? Not on the thousandth Part: but however, being, as he himself declares, divinely appointed to such a Post, he never deserted it. What doth he say, even to his Judges? "If you would acquit me, on Condition, that I should no longer act as I do now, I will not accept it, nor desist: but I will accost all I meet, whether young or old, and interrogate them just in the same Manner: but particularly you, my Fellow-citizens; as you are more nearly related to me.""Are you so curious and officious, Socrates? What is it to you, how we act?What do you say? While you are of the same Community, and the same Kindred, with me, shall you be careless of yourself, and show yourself a bad Citizen to the City, a bad Kinsman to your Kindred, and a bad Neighbour to your Neighbourhood?""Why, who are you?"Here it is a great Thing to say, "I am He who ought to take care of Mankind;" for it is not every little paultry Heifer that dares resist the Lion: but if the Bull should come up, and resist him, say to him, if you think proper, Who are you? What Business is it of yours? In every Species, Man, there is some one Part which by Nature excells; in Oxen, in Dogs, in Bees, in Horses. Do not say to what excells, Who are you? If you do, it will, some-how or other, find a Voice to tell you; "I am like the purple Thread in a Garment[5]. Do not expect me to be like the rest; or find fault with my Nature, which hath distinguished me from others."
§. 5. What then, am I such a one? How should I? Indeed, are you such a one as to be able to hear the Truth? I wish you were. But however, since I am condemned to wear a grey Beard and a Cloke, and you come to me as to a Philosopher, I will not treat you cruelly, nor as if I despaired of you; but will ask youWho is it, young Man, whom you would render beautiful? Know, first, who you are; and then adorn yourself accordingly. You are a Man; that is, a mortal Animal, capable of a rational Use of the Appearances of Things. And what is this rational Use? A perfect Conformity to Nature. What have you then, particularly excellent? Is it the animal Part? No. The mortal? No. That which is capable of the[6] Use of the Appearances of Things? No. The Excellence lies in the rational Part. Adorn and beautify this; but leave your Hair to him who formed it, as he thought good. Well; what other Denominations have you? Are you a Man, or a Woman? A Man. Then adorn yourself as a Man, not a Woman. A Woman is naturally smooth and delicate; and, if hairy, is a Monster, and shown among the Monsters at Rome. It is the same in a Man, not to be hairy; and, if he is by Nature not so, he is a Monster. But, if he clips and picks off his Hairs, what shall we do with him? Where shall we show him; and how shall we advertise him? A Man to be seen, who would rather be a Woman. What a scandalous Show! Who would not wonder at such an Advertisement? I believe indeed, that these very Pickers themselves would; not apprehending, that it is the very Thing of which they are guilty.
§. 6. Of what have you to accuse your Nature, Sir? That it hath made you a Man? Why; were all to be born Women then? In that Case, what would have been the Use of your Finery? For whom would you have made yourself fine, if all were Women? But the whole Affair displeases you. Go to work upon the Whole then. Remove what is the Cause of these Hairs; and make yourself a Woman entirely, that we may be no longer deceived, nor you be half Man, half Woman? To whom would you be agreeable? To the Women? Be agreeable to them as a Man.
Ay; but they are pleased with smooth pretty Fellows.
Go hang yourself. Suppose they were pleased with Pathics, would you become one? Is this Is this your Business in Life? Were you born to please dissolute Women? Shall we make such a one as you, in the Corinthian Republic, for Instance, Governor of the City, Master of the Youth, Commander of the Army, or Director of the public Games? Will you pick your Hairs, when you are married? For whom, and for what? Will you be the Father of Children, and introduce them into the State, picked, like yourself? O what a fine Citizen, and Senator, and Orator! For Heaven's sake, Sir, ought we to pray for a Succession of young Men, disposed and bred like you!
§. 7. Now, when you have once heard this Discourse, go home, and say to yourself; It is not Epictetus who hath told me all these Things (for how should he?) but some propitious God, by him[7]; for it would never have entered the Head of Epictetus, who is not used to dispute with any one. Well, let us obey God then, that we may not incur the divine Displeasure. If a Crow had signified any thing to you, by his Croaking; it is not the Crow that signifies it, but God, by him. And, if you have any thing signified to you by the human Voice, doth he not cause the Man to tell it you; that you may know the divine Efficacy, which declares its Significations to different Persons in different Manners; and signifies the greatest and principal Things, by the noblest Messengers[8]. What else does the Poet mean, when he says,
Hermes I sent, his Purpose to restrain.
Hermes descending from Heaven, was to warn Him, and the Gods now, likewise, send a Hermes to warn You, not to invert the well-appointed Order of Things; nor be curiously trifling: but suffer a Man to be a Man; and a Woman, a Woman: a beautiful Man, to be beautiful, as a Man; a deformed Man, to be deformed, as a Man: for you do not consist of Flesh and Hair, but of the Faculty of Choice. If you take care to have this beautiful, you will be beautiful. But all this while, I dare not tell you, that you are deformed; for I fancy you would rather hear any thing than this. But consider what Socrates says to the most beautiful and blooming of all Men, Alcibiades. "Endeavour to make yourself beautiful. What doth he mean to say to him; Curl your Locks, and pick the Hairs from your Legs?" Heaven forbid! But, Ornament your Choice: Throw away your wrong Principles.
What is to be done with the poor Body then?
Leave it to Nature. Another hath taken care of such Things. Give them up to Him.
What! then, must one be a Sloven?
By no means: but be neat, conformably to your Nature. A Man should be neat, as a Man; a Woman, as a Woman; a Child, as a Child. If not, let us pick out the Mane of a Lion, that he may not be slovenly; and the Comb of a Cock; for he ought to be neat too. Yes, but let it be as a Cock; and a Lion, as a Lion; and a Hound, as a Hound.
Footnotes
[edit]- ↑ 1.0 1.1 These are the Names of Combatants in the Olympic Games. A Pancratiast was one who united the Exercises of Wrestling and Boxing. A Pentathlete, one who contended in all the Five Games of Leaping, Running, Throwing the Discus, Darting, and Wrestling. See Potter's Grecian Antiquities, Vol. I. ch. 21.
- ↑ Epictetus had been before considering the Propriety of his own Character as a Philosopher: but, according to Mr. Upton's very probable Conjecture, the Translation must be—would it not be cruel, &c.
- ↑ Polemo was a profligate young Rake of Athens, and even distinguished by the Dissoluteness of his Manners. One Day, after a riotous Entertainment, he came reeling, with a Chaplet on his Head, into the School of Xenocrates. The Audience were greatly offended at his scandalous Appearance: but the Philosopher went on, without any Emotion, in a Discourse upon Temperance and Sobriety. Polemo was so struck by his Arguments, that he soon threw away his Chaplet; and, from that Time, became a Disciple of Xenocrates; and profited so well by his Instructions, that he afterwards succeeded him in the Socratic School.
- ↑ Laius, King of Thebes, petitioned Apollo for a Son. The Oracle answered him, That, if Laius became a Father, he should perish by the Hand of his Son. The Prediction was fulfiled by Oedipus. Upton.
- ↑ See P. 8. §. 3.
- ↑ The bare Use of Objects belongs to all Animals; a rational Use of them is peculiar to Man. See Introduction, §. 7.
- ↑ For it is not ye that speak, but the Spirit of your Father which speaketh in you. Matt. x. 20.
- ↑ This Passage hath a remarkable Likeness to Heb. i. 1, 2, God, who, at sundry Times and in diverse Manners, spake in Times past unto the Fathers by the Prophets, hath, in these last Days, spoken unto us by his Son