Arnold v. United States/Opinion of the Court

by Joseph Story

Indeed, this qualification relative to the opportunity and consequent presumption of knowledge, is so essential that the statement might otherwise be questioned as deficient in accuracy. For the maxim, in terms as stated by Blackstone, is not found in the text of the Pandests indicated by his note of reference, (4 Blackstone Com. page 27,) nor does that text warrant the position stated by Blackstone as a maxim, unless it be considered as applicable to the case of a law, which might be known by every one, and which, therefore, every one is holden to know, and this may be deemed the fair import of the Latin terms, in which the position is stated. If so considered, and not otherwise, it agrees with the general doctrine of the Roman law, and is a principle of universal jurisprudence.

In relation to positive law, that principle implies the necessity of its being made known, before it can impose any obligation. Positive law is a manifestation of the legislative will; and although there may be a legislative will, it does not become a law, where it is not manifested.

There was no argument on the part of the United States.

STORY, J. delivered the opinion of the Court as follows:

The United States brought an action of debt against the Defendants on a bond given for the payment of duties on goods imported in the brig Dover into the port of Providence.

Upon the pleadings in the Court below, judgment was given in favor of the United States, and the Defendants have brought the present writ of error to reverse that judgment.

The material facts are, that the brig arrived within the limits of the United States on the 30th day of June, 1812; and within the collection district of Providence, on the first day of July, 1812. On the second day of July, an entry was duly made at the custom house and the present bond was then executed.

The principal question which has been argued is, whether on these facts the goods are liable to the payment of the double duties imposed by the act of the first day of July, 1812, ch. 112. That act provides 'that an additional duty of 100 per cent. upon the permanentduties now imposed by law, &c. shall belevied and collected upon all goods, wares and merchandizes which shall, from and after the passing of this act, be imported into the United States from any foreign port or place.' It is contended that this statute did not take effect until the second day of July; nor indeed until it was formally promulgated and published. We cannot yield assent to this construction. The statute was to take effect from its passage; and it is a general rule that where the computation is to be made from an act done, the day on which the act is done is to be included.

It is further contended that the importation was complete by the arrival of the vessel within the jurisdictional limits of the United States, on the thirtieth day of June. We have no difficulty in overruling this argument. To constitute an importation so as to attach the right to duties, it is necessary not only that there should be an arrival within the limits of the United States, and of a collection district but also within the limits of some port of entry. This was expressly decided in the case of the United States v. Vowell, 5 Cranch, 368.

Without therefore adverting to the consideration of the regularity or sufficiency of the pleadings we are all of opinion that on the merits the judgment must be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed with six per cent. damages and costs.

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